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■ ABSTRACT ■
This thesis examines colonial agricultural policy 
in -Tanganyika between 1920 and-1961. It describes how a 
dual system developed and the many and varied factors In 
East Africa and Europe which influenced the making of policy 
The; dual policy was re-established after'the first 
World,War to satisfy immediate needs; but it could only be 
sustained by land.laws and immigration policies which 
attracted-private .investment from overseas. ■
Before 1959? alienation of land was permitted If 
it aided the economic development of the Territory; but. it 
was also permitted if it served a social purpose - it was 
believed that ’contact* was. a practical means of modernizing 
African communities. During'the Inter-Wars period, above 
all else.it' was the German threat which influenced the 
official classes.
Aftel 194-5? emphasis, was placed on development and 
the restructuring of the political system to permit orderly 
progress toward self-government. The dual system continued 
each part of it involving policies which led to criticism ; 
and resentment of the colonial administration. Next, a 
third sector was added In the form of the public corporation 
The groundnut scheme was the fore-runner of several develop­
ments in this sector.
■ Next, the political consequences of,agricultural 
policy are examined,. Decisions affecting land usage and 
soil, conservation ensured the success of nationalism; 
conversely,\ changes in the ^ political system ensured the end
of settler influence.
In the devising of land, usage policies, there 
was ah essential continuity; if this,fact is taken into 
account, policies are more easily explained. Other 
conclusions are as f o l l o w s t h a t  support for the dual 
system, with a place for private investment in agriculture, 
has not been shown to be the cause of underdevelopment; 
that if time permitted, an efficient smallholder .farming 
system might have developed; and. finally, that the European 
settlers must at last be consigned to history.
(iii
Research Note.
Por the earlier chapters, the major source of 
information has-been the files in the Public Record Office 
and the Official Reports which dealt with settlement, rail­
way development and closer union* The papers in the Colonial 
Records Project collection, at Rhodes House, Oxford, and the 
records of the Joint East Africa Board, provided a valuable 
insight into the perceptions of administrators and settlers.
Por the post 194-5 period, there are available many 
more secondary sources which contain valuable data. The 
files in the Public Records Office were available until 194-7, 
and the Creech Jones papers, at Rhodes House, helped to 
supplement official publications. The international view 
was,, observed from a study of the three-year reports of the 
Visiting Missions of the Trusteeship Council; the metro­
politan view could be discerned from the papers of the 
Pabian Colonial Bureau, the Joint Africa Board and the 
Capricorn Africa Society. Some observations are based on 
personal experience, based on notes made at the time and 
incorporated into official safari reports. I am also 
grateful to the many former colleagues and others who 
lived in' Tanganyika who freely gave me advice and 
information.
A note on term's and abbreviations
The following terms and abbreviations appear 
in the text or chapter notes:
A.R. Annual Report submitted, by the United
kingdom, at first to the Permanent Mandates 
Commission and later to the Trusteeship Council.
C.A.S. Capricorn Africa Society.
C.O. The prefix-- for Colonial Office files in the
Public Records Office.
E.A.R.C. TheEast Africa Royal Commission 1953-1955*
J.&.A.B. Joint East Africa Board; sometimes JECAB
or JAB depending on the scope of its interests.
Legco. Tanganyika Legislative Council
P.M.C. Permanent Mandates Commission
shamba An agricultural holding - ’ ,
T.A.N.U. Tanganyika African National Union
T;L.C. Tanganyika Legislative Council (see above)
T.N.A. Tanganyika (Tanzania) National Assembly
U.T.P. United Tanganyika Party
V.M.R. Visiting Mission Report
W.B.R. World Bank Report;, the report of the Mission
to Tanganyika organized by the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
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INTRODUCTION
' Tanganyika,'the mainland part of the present
• United. Republic of Tanzania, became an independent;state 
on 9th December 1961. In many respects the country was 
.singularly ill-prepared for its new status and many people 
' were surprised at the speed with which1 the procedural tangles 
of de-colonization had been sorted out. It was the poorest 
. of the East African territories and neither- of the other two, 
according to a visiting. Royal, Commission, had done partic- 
’ ular.ly well when compared with other African countries.^
' Nationalist leaders made use of the observations of ther 
Commission.and the fact of colonial 'Status was often blamed 
for the existing technical and material deficiencies. In 
much of the recent literature on Tanzania the country has \ 
.been represented -as.. 'underdeveloped' with the implication 
that In the past the best use has never been made of man­
power,, and natural resources.
' L' The painless transition to "independence without
‘ the usual period of mass unrest, riots, and detentions which 
had come to be expected in British colonies when nationalists 
I asserted themselves was, a tribute to the political skill of 
■Dr. Julius Nyerere; nevertheless, the fact.that the. transfer 
of power was rapid made it difficult for the nationalist 
movement to retain its cohesion after its immediate aim of 
self-government had been realized. . Political development 
had begun': much later than in. Kenya or Uganda and there was 
' a real.danger that the. sudden and- successful mobilization of 
■ the peasantry in support of the national leadership,could
easily degenerate into crude racialism or parochial 
squabbling. To preserve a tenuous unity it was necessary 
to find a national aim and this soon emerged to be a crusade 
to end poverty, ignorance and disease. The national move­
ment became a ruling party, dedicated to promoting national- 
integration and economic development. The latter aim would 
be achieved, it was hoped, by following a comprehensive 
development plan and obtaining an effective mobilization of 
manpower to grow more crops .to be sold overseas. Thus, as 
in the past, exports were to provide the means for future 
development and for meeting popular expectations. It was 
not for nothing that the first Bive-Year Plan contained the 
scarcely concealed threat that if persuasion failed to
stimulate increased productivity appropriate coercive
2measures would follow.
Such determination was in sharp contrast, to the 
attitude of the preceding colonial administration which 
generally adopted a more cautious approach to the problem 
of persuading African farmers to change.their traditional 
methods of agriculture. But if colonial governments 
generally attempted to change rural practices only to the 
extent that African tribal leadership was prepared to co­
operate, there is no denying the fact that, in Tanganyika 
at any rate, it was the creation of a centralised authority, 
first German and later British, which made it possible to 
introduce important changes in agricultural practices and 
thereby bring about changes in the landscape itself. The 
generalization that agricultural development depends on the 
relationship between man, land, climate and crops needs some
qualifying; the policies of governments constitute an 
intervening variable,, . creating situations in which a change 
in long-established customs becomes possible and desirable.
When considering East Africa during the colonial 
period it is evident that it is impracticable to limit any 
evaluation of policies to an inquiry into the application 
of,, the technical means of increasing production of food and 
cash crops.- Changes in land usage, which sometimes were 
bound to lead to changes in the landscape,itself, were often 
the result of government policies only remotely related to 
agricultural.developments The growth of urban centres or 
the negotiation of commodity price agreements could, after, 
a time,-lead to substantial changes in the rural scene.
Such causation is, of course, not confined- to East Africa; 
there is the well-known example of how the landscape of 
Eastern France was changed forever by industrialization 
elsewhere.^ The relative isolation of East Africa and the 
nature of pre^colonial contacts with the outside world 
combined with the environment to mould traditional agri­
cultural practices and these constituted an equally 
important factor in influencing subsequent policies. 
Nevertheless, irrespective of whether the reasoning was 
correct or not, it was the rationale behind the agricultural 
policies of the colonial administrations,in Tanganyika 
which brought about a transformation of the countryside.
For although indigenous forms of husbandry would have 
gradually improved without the catalytic effect of an alien 
government armed with a superior technology, improvement 
would have been slower and would probably have been confined 
to the more favoured'localities. Arnold Toynbee's
proposition that the greater the challenge the greater the 
response has its limitations; where the environment is 
unusually hostile progress becomes impossible without the 
aid of resources from.outside.
An analysis of colonial policies soon becomes 
blurred with speculation and value judgments because there 
were so many factors which influenced policy decisions. In 
trying to unravel the threads it is easy to select events 
and statements which fit in with a particular theory and. 
dismiss, as irrelevant those matters which are best ignored. 
It is therefore, important to identify the factors which 
affected agricultural policy and it will be seen that they 
can be placed in two broad divisions. The first can be 
conveniently termed the political factors, such as inter­
national pressures, and events., the ethos of the colonial 
bureaucracy, the Colonial Office view and last, but by no 
means least, African reaction. The second group consists 
of those factors which involve technical problems of land 
usage and farm management and the difficulties caused by 
the environment. Whereas the influence of most of these 
factors fluctuated in an unpredictable, manner, the 
environment and the Territory’s spatial problems became 
progressively less important in determining the course of 
agricultural development as more money and expertise became 
available.
For most of the forty years under review, two 
different agricultural systems existed and developed in . 
the Territory. In the African sector, the great majority 
were engaged in subsistence farming, occupying holdings of
less’ than ten acres, and organizing cultivation on a family 
basiss; a minority,, in the more fertile areas, grew cash 
crops,in sufficient quantity to satisfy their immediate 
needs and the demands of the tax collectors. After 1945? 
a larger proportion of these . smallholders grew cash crops 
and a very small number began to'operate on a larger scale. .
The other sector consisted of farms, mostly 
between 500 and 2000 acres in size, and mostly owned or 
managed by Europeans or Asians. These farms required 
capital investment either fx^ om private sources or by means 
of loans or money raised by joint-stock- companies. To be 
able to secure the required investment, the government had 
to provide reasonable security of tenure; over the land, 
either by permitting a freehold title to exist or by 
granting a.right of occupancy. Most of the holdings in 
the,non-African sector were either plantations, concentrating 
on a single crop, or,mixed farms, or Cattle ranches. Apart 
from their managerial abilities, these farmers needed for 
success a favourable environment, stable crop prices and a 
supply of African labour. Many of the owners of the 
smaller estates were less concerned with these matters; 
their aim was to enjoy a comfortable life, in-congenial 
.surroundings rather than to maximise profits. Whatever 
their intentions, if these farmers were Northern European 
in origin they were called settlers and thus distinguished 
from other expatriates. .
But during the last decade of colonial rule,'yet. 
another sector of the agricultural, system began • to emerge. 
This consisted of ;large scale enterprises, managed;; by
public, corporations. These, growing from the ruins of the 
groundnut scheme, became progressively more important when 
political developments made further private investment in 
agriculture unacceptable.
Confidence in the laws affecting land tenure was 
won by drafting land laws based on European rather than 
African experience.., For most Africans, land was the 
property of the community and ownership could never be 
transferred by some legal device. Thus the alienation of 
land, whereby it was leased for a fixed number of years, was 
unacceptable to many Africans; it remained a potentially 
explosive issue throughout the period of British admini­
stration o It was not only irritation caused by a 
foreigner claiming ownership over tribal land; it was the 
fear that Africans might be progressively dispossessed of 
lands; they occupied in order to create new estates. Perhaps 
it is only in industrial societies that we need reminding of 
the deep-seated emotions aroused when man finds it necessary.
Z|_ . ■
to defend his property. The often repeated observation 
that ’land was the mainspring of politics in Kenya' is 
something of a commonplace; it was no less so in 
Tanganyika, nor for that matter in Fiji or Rhodesia or 
anywhere else where views on the issue can be expressed.
Lord Hailey gave clear warning of its importance when he 
wrote;
'Whatever other reasons may exist for the 
estimate made by Africans of the character 
of a government, the fact that a considerable 
area of native lands has passed permanently 
into the hands of non-natives will always 
tend t<?. colour any judgement that is formed 
of it.'^
White settlement - to use a convenient shorthand - 
and land tenure combined to provide the most difficult 
problem the colonial administration had to resolve. An 
examination of the decisions which were taken and. the 
numerous influences which were at work provide the means to 
obtain an insight into colonial administration and its 
influence over the patterns of land usage which developed. 
Whatever was decided, past experience was almost as 
important in influencing the policy-makers as their 
perception of the possibilities of the environment. The 
official mind takes kindly to precedent and on numerous 
occasions it was thought better to build on past successes 
rather than embark on doubtful experiments. This remains 
a constant theme, during, and even after, the period under 
review.
Similarly, it was possible to profit from past 
mistakes. In 1920,the incoming British officials had only 
to look across their northern frontier and observe the 
seemingly interminable confrontation between settlers and 
officials and the increasing; signs of African discontent; 
political control remained firmly in the hands of the . 
colonial administration and until the last three years of 
rule the Legislative Council exercised little influence 
over events. On the other hand, a limited amount of white 
settlement was permitted and even encouraged. Different . 
arguments in support of this policy were put forward at 
different times. However, the. economic arguments were 
more enduring and to understand the perceptions of those who 
wantbd to see more settlement, the approach must be holistic
the development of farming in one sector and the attendant 
problems often influenced the decisions taken in respect of 
the other.
But whereas the individuals and interest groups
anxious to influence decisions were all too easily
identified, it is still not an easy matter to decide where
the responsibility lay for the land* usage policies which
were adopted in the Territory. Ultimately, the Colonial
Secretary was responsible for the dependent territories in
Africa, subject only to the agreement of the Cabinet«, In
the case of Tanganyika, he was answerable to two bodies;
to the British parliament and to the Permanent Mandates
6Commission at Geneva.. The latter ceased to function in 
1939 &ud after the war similar supervisory duties were 
entrusted to the United Nations Trusteeship Council. These 
international institutions undoubtedly exerted a restraining
rj
influence but the extent of this is difficult to ascertain.' 
Within the Colonial Office, the permanent officials 
exercised considerable influence until the point in 
political development was reached when initiative was 
passing to local leaders. While Colonial Secretaries 
came and went, the officials remained, developing a Colonial 
Office 'mind1, a collective attitude to important issues. 
This rarely led to positive plans of action but it helped
o
in providing effective supervision.
In Tanganyika, sole authority was vested in the 
Governor, who was appointed by the Crown by an Order in 
Council. The Colonial Secretary could disallow legislation 
proposed by the Governor or could insist that British laws
were applied0 Nevertheless, the Governor was responsible
for the way. in which laws were implemented and on occasions
the Colonial Secretary of the day was presented with a fait
accompli which had to he accepted„ The wide discretionary
powers accorded to the Governor permitted him to make policy
rather than follow directions from London; at the same time
it was in the best interests of both of them that they should
appear to support the other.,
Within the Territory, the Governor transmitted
his directives to the various departments through the
Secretariat in bar es Salaam, a procedure which was not
modified until the decade before independence; outside the
capital, the country was divided into provinces which in
. 9turn were divided into districts* Where possible, district 
boundaries were drawn in order to,conform with tribal 
boundaries so that' the geographical responsibilities of 
each district commissioner were the same as those of the 
native authorities appointed for that, district
British policy for the Territory was based on the
intention to act in the best interests of herself and the
inhabitants of the former German colony„ During the first
twenty years, British interests were clearly associated 
with the resurgence of Germany after the debacle of 1918 
and decisions affecting white settlement were often 
influenced by perceptions of the international scene« The 
best interests of the African- inhabitants, it was believed, 
were served by the.maintenance of law and order and 
correcting abuses« In addition, it was necessary to make 
the best possible use of natural resources and to make
Africans familiar with modern economic practices insofar 
as they were willing to accept the methods prescribed to 
meet these aims. Here, too, it was believed that white 
settlement could perform a useful function.
With the ending of the second world war and the
removal of the- German threat, the strategic reasons for
retaining an African empire no longer existed. At the
same time, the changing world power structure made it
imperative to make positive plans for an eventual transfer
of authority in the dependent territories of the Empire;
this, it was argued, required economic development and the
creation of sound infrastructures. In the official view
in London, the financial backing for development on the
scale required could no longer be left to private investors;
an infection of public money and the underwriting of loans
were necessary. These were the conclusions to be drawn
from the comprehensive inquiries into conditions in the
African territories conducted by Lord Hailey after the
Depression; the changing world situation provided the spur®
The consequence was the introduction of the Colonial
Development and Welfare Act of 1940 and Hailey's subsequent
exposition of the development philosophy set the seal on the
thinking of the official classes in respect of reform in
11colonial administration. The fact that the change in
colonial priorities’took place during the Second World War 
when most of the world was undergoing a social upheaval gave 
added emphasis to the gulf in East Africa between pre-war 
and post-war situations. Henceforth the three governments 
were not only involved in spending money on development
projects on a f ar larger scale than had ever before been 
.'possible; they became progressively committed to a multi­
racial philosophy whereby it was intended that each 
community should have equal rights and opportunities.
In Tanganyika, the changes in Colonial Office 
thinking had to some degree been anticipated. In 1938, a 
Development Committee had been appointed, charged with
preparing a comprehensive plan on which future policy could
12 . be based. Eventually,, when it came to implementing some
of the proposed projects and preparing further plans it was
evident that the civil service was badly under-staffed,
partly as a. result of the War and partly because it had
been accepted.policy to keep civil service establishments 
- 1-5as small as "possible• ^ As the Groundnut Scheme clearly
showed, it was impracticable to,embark on ambitious plans
with insufficient knowledge of the problems, of tropical
agriculture. ■ ;
Although much critical comment on colonial
policies faiis to take into account the unavoidable delays
in the immediate post-war period in recruiting new staff1,
there, has also been .much speculation on whether colonial
administrations, and their successors which copied their
methods too closely, could ever be effective in a development 
- 14role. It is perhaps inevitable that the question should
be asked; since the War the metropolitan civil service has 
been repeatedly assailed for its lack of managerial expertise 
in an age of government intervention in economic affairs and 
it was therefore logical to apply the same criticism t.o the 
colonial situation where even greater initiative was called.
for. It was De Tocqueville who.observed that the French 
colonial service was a caricature of its metropolitan 
counterpart and a. similar comment applied to the British 
equivalents might not be far off the mark. In several 
studies on Africa and, Asia written after 194-5 there is a 
tendency to emphasise the distinction between hitherto 
accepted administrative practices and. 'development admin­
istration1 , the latter being what was required in newly- 
independent states. Whereas colonial administrations, it 
wa® assumed, were, only interested in maintaining law and 
order, the succeeding regimes, if they were to survive, had 
to act quickly to secure a significant rise in living 
standards. To achieve this end, they had to re-organize 
and retrain their civil services so that people and resources 
could be harnessed to the task of improving living 
conditions.. The distinction is misleading because no 
government, colonial or otherwise, could concentrate on 
performing one set of functions to the exclusion of the other. 
It is obvious that no sustained economic ..growth would ever 
be possible without a peaceful countryside and there were 
very; few colonial governments after 194-5 in Africa and Asia 
which failed to devote a proportion of their annual budgets 
to capital expenditure which could be classed as 
developmentp r :
In Tanganyika, the development era brought with 
it an important change in the relationship between the 
colonial administration and the African population. Before 
the. War, the major causes of friction between them had been 
the alienation of land and the collection of taxes. Most
Africans .welcomed or at least accepted the imposition, of ■ 
an' external- regulatoryauthority which reduced the tensions 
and uncertainties which abounded in tribal life.- Govern­
ment officials were few and far between; they were well 
known and .understood'the people, who came into contact with 
them. The post-war years.brought a substantial increase 
in the number of technical officers and, with their arrival 
and the-introduction of more positive measures, to improve 
land usage, the instances of conflict increased.a hundred­
fold. The situation was not improved by the two facts that 
the. new experts were almost without- exception aliens and 
Europeans .and that there was by now a growing awareness of 
racial animosities elsewhere, in the world. , Furthermore, 
although;new sources of capital for development became 
available,\the fact remained that Tanganyika was a poor 
country and .a higher level of recurrent revenue would be 
needed to maintain, the new services and improved infra­
structure which were planned. If private investment; in 
agriculture could be attracted, some of the returns on such 
investment would accrue to the government; thus it was' 
argued that more land had to be alienated, with a consequent 
increase In African fears about their government's intentions.
. . What,follows is an account of the changes in land
usage and farming organization.which were attempted or 
adopted during the‘period under review.and the reasons, 
political, social or economic, for the decisions which were 
.taken* There were many mistakes and disappointments; but' 
t.o= argue that development was deliberately minimal is to 
imply that therb are now no obstacles to rapid improvement.
Others claim that the direction of development was wrong 
and that the political and economic consequences of past 
policies hinders improvement today. Since the prime 
source of wealth has always been agriculture, any comment 
on such a proposition must take into account the extent, of 
the social and economic cost of the colonial policy which 
gave support to both African and non-African sectors of 
the agricultural system.
The expatriate settler farmer has all but dis­
appeared from present-day Tanzania. The arguments that, 
suggest that for a time he was an agent of modernization 
have provoked some scepticism; but as a member of a 
numerically small group, his economic contribution was 
often impressive and deserves to be placed on record. The 
political influence of the settlers, reflecting events in 
Kenya, was an important factor before 1939; it is only by 
being aware of their perceptions and attitudes that it Is 
possible to understand the logic of multi-racialism. The 
disappearance of the privately-owned estates and plantations 
marked the end of the.colonial agricultural system, with 
its two distinct and disparate sectors; whatever its 
failings it has provided the foundations on which more 
adventurous policies could be constructed, once Africans 
were masters in their own house.
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NOTES TO INTRODUCTION
L  East Africa-Royal •Commission Report_1953-55
cmd* 9475 (London 1955)9 P° 411. The Commissioners 
were impressed by the absolute and relative poverty 
of East Africa and compared the per capita net 
product of the region with other selected African 
countries* Such comparisons need to be treated 
with caution:, see D. Usher, The Price Mechanism 
and the meaning of national income statistics 0 
(Oxford 1968), where he argues that we can be 
misled fif we attribute to income statistics a 
social meaning they do not necessarily possess*’
2* Tanganyika Five Year Plan 1964-69 Vol..I (Dar 
es~Bainam ”1^477"P-19-
, 5. P. Vidal de la Blache, La Prance de l fEst,
(Paris. 1917)-
4« cf., R. Ardrey, The Territorial Imperative,
(London 1967)*
: 5» Lord Hailey, African Survey, (Oxford 1956) p* 686.
6. The P.M.Co was created under Art.22(7) of the
League, of Nations Covenant. It consisted of ten 
to eleven members, appointed by the Council, to 
act in an advisory capacity to that body.
7* Contrasting opinions have been expressed on this
i s s u e s e e  especially B.T.G-. Chidzero, Tanganyika 
and International Trusteeship., (London 1961) and 
Lord Hailey, op.oit. <> p. 301-
8. E.g., between 1925 and 1947 there were twelve 
different Secretaries of State as opposed to 
only six Under-Secretaries.
9. In 1925 the districts were grouped into eleven 
provinces. In 1932 the number was reduced to 
eight but in 1958 increased, again to nine with 
the division of Lake province.
10. Until 1951 native authorities were usually either 
individual chiefs or several chiefs acting together;, 
thereafter there began a. transition to a. council], 
system, with the councillors at first being 
nominated and', subsequently elected.
11. Address to the Royal Empire Society, printed in 
United .Empire. XXXIII (1941), p. 168.
12* Report of the Central Development Committee, 
1940 (Dar es Salaam).
13- As a result, of the observations in 1Report of
Sir Svdnev Armitage Smith on.a. financial mission 
to (Tanganyika1 cmd. CTS^Xl/ondon T932)"*
14. cf* comments on the Pakistan bureaucracy in 
A-.H. Hanson, Planning and the Politicians<> 
(London 1969), p. 199-
13. cf- G. Hunter, development Administration in
East Africa1', journal of African Administration, 
January 1967-
CHAPTER I
THE EAST AFRICA REGION
Primarily, this account of colonial agricultural 
policy is directed at achieving two objectives«, Fir^t;, it 
attempts to provide some insight into how policies 
affecting land usage were determined during the period of 
British, control and into the factors and people who 
influenced those decisions= Second, it demonstrates that 
the policies which were adopted were themselves the product 
of a previous situation and in turn exercise a significant 
influence.on the decisions which followed,. In other words, 
decisions are not always the consequence of a reasoned 
appreciation of what can be achieved in a particular 
environment; in countries where the vast majority of the 
population owe their survival to their efforts on the land, 
any decision Concerning land usage is affected by, and is 
often determined by, a variety of political and social 
factors.
Undoubtedly, there are many instances in the 
past when the actions of a government have inhibited rather 
than stimulated economic development.; in Tanganyika during 
the period examined a number of decisions probably had this 
effect, but according to the view which prevailed at the 
time they,were well justified. Conversely, the production 
of cash crops was substantially■increased by government, 
actions; this was exemplified either in the introduction 
of the conditions whereby the necessary confidence in just
treatment was established in that a fair return on
investment or effort could be expected - or in the form
of. positive encouragement, aid and advice<, Thus in an
East African context, it seems unnecessarily restrictive
to observe that the regulatory action by governments in
prescribing rules affecting land tenure has an important
1bearing on land usage* In all the three territories the
land laws, which were introduced and the customary laws which
were allowed to remain in force undoubtedly influenced
2agricultural practices; but equally important were the 
many other ways by which the respective governments sought 
to increase production* During the first few years of 
British administration in Tanganyika, the civil servants 
who took decisions and thereby established policies had 
little knowledge of agricultural possibilities and were 
prepared to adopt previous policies where they had been 
proved successful. But they also looked, and continued to . 
look, at events in Kenya and Uganda and to be influenced 
accordingly*
Thus the starting point must be to suggest some 
comparisons and to mention some of the more important of 
the geographical,' physical and social factors which deter­
mined land use in East Africa* It is evident that some of 
the environmental and social differences, although relatively 
unimportant when considered separately, sometimes combined - 
to bring about important differences in agricultural 
policies*
■The East African Region
. With the ending of the first world war, all three, 
territories were the responsibility of the Colonial Office 
and it was only to be expected,, that there, would be plenty of 
support for the proposal to bring about a closer union 
between them* A number of economic arguments were clearly 
at hand*. Contiguity made it possible to adopt common 
external tariffs; similar political systems, consisting of. 
governments controlled by civil servants from the same 
. metropolitan country and themselves for the: most part. ; 
possessing the same assumptions concerning their duties, 
made co-operation .easy in routine matters; 'a universal lack 
of.mineral resources in quantity made it imperative that 
economic development should be based on agriculture; finally 
London-based commercial interests operating throughout the-' 
region, a common currency and: a common legal system 
facilitated,the progress towards a common market-' Yet 
"another unifying/ influence, was the presence of the immigrant 
races, particularly1-the Asians, who caused a strengthening 
of the cultural, political and economic ties which developed 
after the first world war* The Africans, too, were not 
unaware of what was happening in the neighbouring territories 
as is clear from the views of their representatives on the 
question of closer union. Later, too, when members.of the 
Royal Commission of 1953 visited Uganda they were surprised 
to find that although the amount of land alienated to non- 
:. Africans was negligible, there was an underlying fear of 
further alienation, 'not unconnected with.the, history of 
Kenya’ It was the passionate hostility to, closer union '
which caused frustrating delay in setting up the inter­
territorial machinery to deal with those ecological problems 
which needed consultation, research and co-operation.
Thus during the colonial period, the region as a. 
whole presented, for Africa, a picture of comparative 
uniformity. But a closer look reveals the important 
differences in relationships between the colonial admini­
strations of the territories and the African and European 
inhabitants. These differences were caused by different 
historical, experiences during the period in which Britain 
was asserting control in each territory and also by 
different environments.
Nevertheless, in 1920 and afterwards, there was 
in the pattern of African life an essential similarity to 
be found. Few were urban dwellers; the: majority were 
either pastoralists in the drier areas or arable farmers 
in the remainder* Most of the latter group farmed on a 
subsistence basis, although already in Uganda the production 
of cotton was making.an effective contribution to the 
economy. In the absence of,the implements and the 
prophylactics which modern technology were soon to: supply, 
farming methods-, were determined by the environment. The 
arable- farmers, ■ apart, from the banana growers, practised 
shifting cultivation' and kept. some cattle when the absence 
of tsetse made this possible. The nomadic pastoralists 
preferred their way of life, maintaining that to cultivate 
land brought a loss of status; in more practical terms,, it 
was safer=to. herd cattle than to waste time growing millet 
which would either be spoilt by drought .or would be eaten
by baboonso
At this time, the European population of Kenya
easily surpassed the combined total in the other two
territories, a. pattern which continued until the end of
the colonial p e r i o d • Apart from the expatriate civil
servants the majority of Europeans resident in Kenya,
particularly before 194-5» intended to live there permanently;
in Uganda and Tanganyika, where there was a. larger proportion
of.plantations in areas with a less 'pleasant' climate, many
Europeans intended to live elsewhere after they finished
working„ This difference is reflected in the fact that in
194-8 24-D7% of the Europeans in Kenya had been born there, a
far higher proportion than that found in Uganda or
Tanganyika• Considering Kenya to be their own' country,
the settlers were more insistent on obtaining the right
to participate in public administration; to them the
expatriate civil servants who:: controlled the administration
were merely transients * ' Thus the environment affected
political attitudes; it is an important corrolary to any
inquiry which emphasises the causal relationship between
5government action and altered geographical patterns* It 
was not only the fact that the climate in the vicinity of 
the capital attracted European settlement; equally 
important was the existence of the Highlands area and the 
mobilisation of European support to ensure that its 
exclusive.occupation by them would never be ended* .
Of the other non-African communities in East 
Africa,.the 'Asians' (Indians' and Pakistanis), formed the 
largest group* The number, in Kenya always exceeded the
combined total in Uganda and Tanganyika* Comparatively
few of them were involved in farming, partly by inclination
and partly as a result of government action to limit their 
6opportunities* Asian activity was almost entirely 
restricted to commerce and, as entrepreneurs, often in the 
most remote areas, they provided one of the most pervasive 
and important means of modernization by introducing Africans 
to a cash economy*
In the development of a pattern of land usage, 
the disagreements, which sometimes amounted to open conflict, 
between these three communities and the governments of Kenya 
and Uganda played a not inconsiderable part in influencing 
the decisions taken in Tanganyika after 1920* But of 
immediate interest there was the introduction of the Kenya 
soldier settlement scheme and its unforeseen consequences•
The new settlers soon found themselves short of African 
labour and they claimed that the Kenya government had a 
duty to assist. The notorious Northey circulars followed 
and soon widespread criticism was being voiced at what was 
construed as a policy of providing compulsory labour for 
private profit. The policy was changed, but the problem 
remained and was further aggravated by other government 
decisions; the request to import labour from Asia was 
refused and, as a consequence of a financial crisis,
Africans were encouraged to stay at home and grow their own 
maize. Contradictory policies were now being implemented; 
although the encouraging of African maize production was 
intended to be a temporary measure, both the Governor and 
a visiting Mission recommended that it should be continued.
At the same time, the economic future of the colony and
the viability of the rail link was, as in the past, based
on increasing production of European-owned estates®*'7 A
shortage of labour was the consequence, for which the
government was blamed; but in spite of the extra maize
being grown at that time and although the populations were
roughly equal, in 1925 the total agricultural production by
Africans in Kenya amounted to only one-tenth of the figure
for Uganda- It was not until the adoption of the Swynnerton
Plan in the nineteen-fifties that there was any sustained
attempt to increase the. production of cash crops from the
African sector®
The basic economic problem in Uganda was the same
as in Kenya, namely to change a subsistence economy by.
introducing a money sector and' striving to make the latter
predominant- But whereas in Kenya the method adopted
required skill, enterprise and capital from abroad, in
Uganda it was the peasant farmer who was assisted, encouraged
and coerced in order to achieve the objective- When this
strategy was adopted there was no' reason to believe that in
the long term an equal effort to develop plantation
agriculture might not have been more successful- The
arguments were set out in a series' of reports prepared by
a Land Settlement Committee and the outcome was in doubt for
several years- It is evident that there;are several
explanations which can be offered to account for the
decision in 1925 to make peasant agriculture the means to
8secure economic development in Uganda- The non-African 
plantation sector was already in decline and the trend
continued® However, it was never completely extinguished, 
during the colonial period and the sugar plantations in 
particular, owned and managed by two Indian families, made 
a substantial contribution to the Protectorate's economy- 
In the African sector, it was the spectacular success of 
smallholder cotton growing which provided an effective 
answer to the argument that in East Africa, efficient arable 
farming needed the investment of capitaland .operations on a 
large scale- In spite of the inevitable opposition of the 
planters in the Protectorate, by 1920 cotton provided the 
basis of the economy; between 1920 and 1925, exports 
soared and the number of buying posts and ginneries 
multiplied- Coercion was freely practised and in Buganda, 
the land tenure system countenanced by the Protectorate 
Agreement provided the means of exercising a complementary 
sanction- Moreover, the custom of personal tribute 
aggravated the situation; 'small customary gifts «* <> •»
were magnified into substantial demands of as much as one
' » 9
bag of cotton in every three harvested- finally, to
support these pressures on the growers, an effective
marketing system operated; enterprising Asian buyers were
at hand to ensure that any cotton grown was collected and
used-
Prom the above, it is evident that the. political 
and social factors played an important part in the expansion 
of cotton growing in East Africa during the period under 
review® .They must rank equal in importance with the 
effects of the climate and the various technical problems . 
that had to be resolved- In their perception of these
factors, the officials of the respective governments took 
decisions and implemented policies which also contributed 
to different results within the region- When the growth' 
of cotton industry in Uganda is compared with the results- 
in Western Kenya, the contrast is.striking and to a great
extent government action - or inaction - must be held
• ■ 10 responsible®
In Tanganyika, these developments were studied 
with interest and it had to be decided whether to seek 
private investment in agriculture and, If so, on what terms. 
The result: was the creation of a system mid-way between the 
other territories. Unlike what had occurred there, it was 
decided that it would be wrong to give, outright support to 
one sector at the expense of the other- Although various 
political factors contributed to the adoption of this 
middle course, the geography of the region cannot be ignored, 
for'although the three respective governments in East Africa 
could decide on the extent of their support to any sector of 
the agricultural system it was the environment which deter­
mined which crops could be grown. And since each crop 
industry had to be supported by a financial and commercial 
structure tailored to its needs, there had to be a close 
relationship between what „was possible and what, was 
politically acceptable. For our purposes a systematic 
and detailed description.of the. geographical features of
the region is unnecessary since the information is available
11
elsewhere- Nevertheless, it is relevant to mention those 
physical factors which directly affected agricultural 
development at a time when there was never enough money
available to surmo.unt the difficulties-they caused-
First, there was the relative isolation of. East 
Africa from the centres of world commerce - , Although in 
pre-colonial times there had been continuous contact between 
the coastal ports and Asia, it had- done little, to stimulate 
economic development, particularly in the interior® Uganda 
was the worst affected by the. remoteness factor and it is 
significant that the sugar:Industry mentioned above owed 
its success to there being a.local market to be satisfied- 
In this case remoteness operated to. the advantage of local 
entrepreneurs® tin general, throughout East Africa long 
distances and inadequate communications discouraged and 
limited investment from private sources and for many years 
funds from public sources had to be allocated to improving 
roads and railways as a first priority- . It is necessary 
to distinguish remoteness from isolation- Long distances 
did not necessarily discourage investors provided roads- were 
open for most of the year and the, products being exported 
had a high value relative to their weight- Thus large- 
scale cultivation of tea, coffee, pyrethrum and tobacco in 
the south-west of. Tanganyika was quite feasible as soon as 
the. roads, were improved- . Qn the other hand there were many 
fertile, pockets of - land, throughout East Africa which could, 
not be reached by motor transport'and therefore remained' 
undeveloped- -
\ The effect of climate on the development of 
agriculture must also be considered- . In particular. It has. 
been the rainfall pattern which has decided the kind of 
farming activity which has been found possible in different
areas® The Royal Commission of 1953 observed that rainfall 
reliability was the basic guideline for land use; it 
decided that apart from a few notable exceptions it was 
possible to define the areas permitting arable agriculture 
as those where the reliable rainfall annual total exceeded 
thirty inches- It concluded that where the figure was under 
thirty inches or where the reliability of a thirty inch 
rainfall was poor, arable farming would be hazardous unless 
irrigation was also possible- The reliability factor is, 
of course, of immense importance since there are often 
dramatic variations in the mean annual rainfall figures.
The lower the mean annual rainfall total the more critical 
becomes this reliability factor. However, since much of 
the benefit of rain Is lost through evaporation at soil 
surface or by transpiration of plants it is useful to refer ' 
to the attempts to portray a more accurate picture of the 
rainfall factor. .What emerges is that some of the areas 
which might have been considered as having adequate rain­
fall must be relegated to the marginal category. In these 
areas termed marginal,- investment in farming requires strong 
nerves. Whereas the peasant farmer who loses his main 
crop can expect aid from more fortunate relatives or- 
ultimately from the government, the non-African farmer- 
operating on a commercial scale may well be ruined and 
forced to give up. Not only may he be faced with a wage 
bill to settle but he may also find he is unable to pay the
interest on capital borrowed and invested in his farm- 
*
Elsewhere it has been suggested that the large-scale farmer 
was able to carry on in the marginal areas because as a
European he had access, to credit facilities not available 
12to an African® It would seem that individual circum­
stances, the type of farming practised and the outlook for 
world' prices introduce too many variables to make any 
generalizations possible® All that can be said is that 
the growing of perennial crops on a large scale has been 
confined to areas where not only has the rainfall been 
adequate in quantity but also other climatic factors have 
made the area attractive- The pattern of precipitation 
is nearly as important as the quantity received. Tre­
mendous downpours can produce favourable annual statistics 
but they are less beneficial than a more prolonged rain 
falling at times to suit the crops being grown- On the 
other hand, prolonged periods of light rain are usually 
accompanied by cloudy conditions and this factor can reduce 
the yield of staples as well as of many cash crops- 
Finally, relief, altitude and soil conditions need 
consideration since they can all, on occasions, affect 
the retention of moisture in the soil- It is almost
impossible under these conditions to find existing a simple
13relationship between the crop yield and rainfall- It is
therefore, of interest to observe the effect of rainfall 
regimes on the pattern of settlement in the respective 
territories during the period of colonial rule- In 
Tanganyika and Uganda, applications for land to be- alienated 
were approved in widely scattered parts of each country and , 
the great majority of non-African settlement which followed 
was to be found in areas with better than average rainfall 
figures or where a particularly suitable rainfall pattern
could be expected- In Kenya, on the other hand, where
specific areas were set aside for European settlement, a
large proportion of such areas was considered unsuitable
14-for arable farming. Two observations are necessary- 
First, the objection to the exclusion of non-Europeans from 
the Highlands was more concerned with the government's 
acceptance of racial discrimination than with complaining 
that the best land in the Colony had been sequestrated® 
Secondly, the defining of the Highlands area to include a 
large section which was climatically marginal does not 
necessarily mean that political decisions were not influenced 
by geographical factors® It was still suitable for 
profitable ranching and for this reason was likely to 
attract European settlers® And it was stillmuch better 
than average when the climatic conditions in Kenya are 
considered as a whole® Table 1 indicates how little rain­
fall Kenya received when compared with the other two 
territories®
Apart from the rainfall factor there are other 
environmental problems which have, affected agricultural 
development® The most important of them can be summarised 
thus: lack of water supplies, poor soils, tsetse fly and
poor communications® The difficulties ■ which they caiise can 
be surmounted, to some extent., provided the money, the will 
and the necessary effort are forthcoming® Thus they were 
seen to fall into a different category to the rainfall factor 
which is difficult if,not impossible to overcome® . Never­
theless, the multiplicity of the problems and the amount of 
research and experiment required before practical solutions
could be implemented and the lack of funds for much of the 
colonial period meant that only partial success in solving 
them' was ever possible® And when at last annual revenues 
increased and more generous financial aid from external 
sources was available there was a correspondingly greater 
pressure to divert funds from dealing with these problems 
in order to improve the social services. But by the end 
of the colonial period the steady increase in the African 
populations in the more fertile areas made it increasingly 
necessary for each administration to try and make improve­
ments wherever possible® It is therefore necessary to: 
identify these problems as they affected each territory.
First, the lack of water-for domestic purposes 
and for animals reduced still further the total area of 
land which could be termed suitable for arable farming. 
Surprisingly, since it is well supplied with rivers and
lakes, Uganda was. described in 1936 as being sufficient in
15water supplies in. only one third of its area. Two
thirds of Kenya has been classified as waterless desert;
and.sixty per cent of Tanganyika is virtually waterless
and was almost uninhabited according to one report prepared
n &
in the nineteen thirties. Conversely, before the second 
World War, where water was easily available, congestion and 
the consequent deterioration of the soil soon became evident. 
The cultivation steppe, the area running south-east from 
Mwanza, provided until the nineteen-fifties a good example 
of how the availability of water for domestic purposes 
affected land usage and the settlement pattern. From a 
population map of the period it will be observed that people
were concentrated in an oblong-shaped area with a distinct
boundary between the settled and the unpopulated areas;; -
and yet, outside the oblong there is no great difference
in soils or in climate and it might- be expected that there
would be a gradual tailing-off of settlement as conditions
became less favourable„ The pattern can be explained by
the easy availability of water within the settled area
essential to people possessing primitive tools and skills,
the water being restricted to that area by a particular
geological structure* Once government intervention was
a fact, bore-holes were dug, the restrictions of the
environment overcome and the settlement pattern able to
change * At the same time an ambitious programme of dam
building was undertaken and river systems exploited
wherever possible.. Increased motor traffic sometimes
played a part in solving the water problem, particularly
where regular services could be utilised without additional 
17expenseo
Secondly, the soils fotind in East Africa are not 
(with some notable exceptions) particularly fertile. In 
much of the region are found Pre-Cambrian rock formations, 
tisually capped with lateritized soils; they are often 
lacking in humus and chemical properties and seem prone to
*1 O
leachingo Areas of high rainfall cause better plant
growth, thereby Improving the soil, but when the growth is 
cleared away for cultivation the rain has a negative effect 
since leaching becomes more marked. Thus the character­
istics of soil and rainfa3.1 have to be considered together. 
Relief introduces a further factor since the different
soil-slope relationships produce a complex, catenary 
pattern of fertile pockets of land- And throughout the 
region there are areas of high productivity set in an other­
wise unpromising . scene wherever there are alluvial deposits 
or where the soil has been enriched by a layer of volcanic 
asho'
Blit although the areas of fertile soil, are not
extensive, even on the poorer soils cultivation can be
successful providing the land is not overworked and badly 
19used* Three, practices in particular cause a loss of soil
fertility and lead to falling yields» They can be
summarised as follows: failure to prevent soil erosion,
keeping" too many goats and cattle, and allowing insufficient
resting periods in the cultivation cycle* Thus any
comparison.between the soil characteristics found in the
three territories should be made in conjunction with
observations on the soil conservation measures which are
practised® It is interesting to observe the difference
in the figures for the use of fertilisers in Kenya and
Tanganyika respectively at the end of the colonial period*
Since both countries have to import the bulk of their
fertiliser requirements, the amount used can be assessed
with some degree of accuracy* Thus for 1962 it seems
that Kenya imported five times the quantity used in 
on
Tanganyika* What makes the difference even more striking
is the fact that in Tanganyika there were more people engaged 
in agriculture and the soils in the arable areas are, if 
anything, inferior to those found in Kenya*
Next, the problem of the tsetse fly deserves
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mention* For much, of the colonial, period eradication of 
fly was more difficult than it is. today, now that long-acting. 
sprays1are available* Infestation in the past meant that, 
certain areas in each' country were virtually closed to human 
occupation®. Kenya has been the most fortunate of the 
three countries in that only about ten "per cent of the 
total land area, is affected and much of this land is 
unsuitable for arable farming* In. Uganda about 32 per cent 
is infested and in Tanganyika about: 60 per cent* Clearing
bush in order to eradicate .the fly was often expensive and
■ , ’ 21 
settlement in cleared areas had to-be carefully supervised*
It was- only by insisting that the families moving into the 
hew clearings'live close to each other that the fly could 
be prevented from returning®
■ Finally,, road and rail networks were often
inadequate until recently and this lack of a good communi­
cation system militated against economic development «> ' Cash 
crops for export could only be grown in those areas close 
to existing road and rail systems'® in such places, if 
expansion took place, congestion and soil exhaustion soon 
followed® At the same time governments were, reluctant to ; 
encourage expansion in the more isolated areas from where 
it would be impossible to evacuate produce at a reasonable 
cost* Kor was there much inclination to participate in the 
money economy in places where isolation, had delayed the 
start of any form of commercial activities * The standard 
pressures of modernization were slow to exert themselves; 
traditional values remained unquestioned and innovations 
were treated with suspicion® Where illiteracy was wide-
spread, face-to-face .contacts were very important* These 
inevitably had to be less frequent in a poor country where 
settled areas are separated from each ether by uninhabited 
bush* It was the spatial factor which delayed political 
development' in Tanganyika when compared with her northern 
neighbours® Political development is not only a growing 
awareness of an identity of interest with a larger circle * 
of acquaintances; it also stems from a growing awareness 
of one's own needs and potentialities® It was the emergence, 
of new aspirations which generated economic development and 
often provided the peasant farmer with an interest to 
experiment with cash crops® As roads improved and a system • 
of public transport was established it became easier for the 
more isolated families to travel to the market towns and 
administrative centres where they could observe the different 
needs and the changing way of life of the growing population 
of urban dwellers®
The amount of land available for agriculture 
varied between the territories and was determined to a large 
extent by the environment.(see Appendix i). In all three, 
a dual economy persisted throughout the colonial period and 
there is little doubt that the size of the subsistence sector 
was the cause as well as the consequence of the basic poverty 
of the region® Yet it is difficult to make any meaningful 
comparisons between the respective administrations in their 
attempts to promote a cash economy® There are too many 
factors involved and their signifies,nee varies between the 
territories* To name a few, there were the effects of 
climate, the amount of public and private investment, the
proportion of pastoral tribes to the total African
population,, the factor of distance, population changes,
African reaction to coercion and finally government
policies. With this catalogue of variables it is an.
oversimplification to suggest that policies found success-
22ful in one territory should have been copied in another.
Table II indicates the increase in the production of cash 
crops which occurred in the three territories; but these 
figures are the .consequence of a social cost which must be 
taken into account and cannot be quantified.
For the British administration in Tanganyika in 
1920., the aims of an agricultural policy could be easily 
recognized and quickly explained. First, it was necessary 
to prevent the recurrent famines,which brought starvation 
and misery whenever the rains failed. Second, existing 
knowledge and capacity for producing cash crops had to be 
utilised so that the budget could be balanced and prosperity 
restored.. The events and experience in the neighbouring 
territories provided guidance; .but, as will now be told, 
it was the structure developed by their predecessors which 
was to be addicted by the officials of the new administration.
TABLE' I
PERCENTAGE OF LAND AREA RECEIVING 
NOTED AMOUNTS OF ANNUAL RAINFALL 
IN FOUR YEARS: OUT OF FIVE;
Kenya Tanzania Uganda
Less .than 
20 inches 72 16 12
20-30 inches 13
Over 30 inches 13
33
31
10
78
(source: J.F. Griffiths, 'Climate',
in W.T.W. Worgan ed., East. 
Africa: its peoples and
resources (O.U.pV Nairobi 1972),
table. ii '
MAJOR'. GASH CROPS. Off ,EAST AFRICA ■(£ MILLION)
Kenya Uganda -Tanganyika
. 1928 1958 1928,. 1958 . 1928 1958
Cotton •, - 0.2 0.5 • 2.5 18.1 0.5 , 7.2
Sisal ' A - 0.5 2.5 - - 1.1 10.4
Coffee ■ 1.1 10.4 0.2 20.8, 0.7 7.4
To tal Export s 
of Agricultural. 
Produce 2.7 29.3 3.4 41.9 3.8 51.4
(source:; Tanganyika, Annual Trade Reports; 
Kenya, Statistical Abstracts; 
Annual Reports, Departments of 
Agriculture of Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanganyika.)
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CHAPTER II
THE GERMAN LEGACIi
British control over Tanganyika was based on the 
Tanganyika Order in Council, 1920, which provided that the . .
Territory was to be administered by a Governor assisted by 
an Executive Council. The British officials who were 
appointed knew little about the country and were only too 
glad to be advised by those with local knowledge. Thus- 
policies adopted in the early years were essentially of a 
makeshift nature; but' the decisions which were taken had 
far reaching consequences in that they' confirmed the pattern 
of land usage and a dual system of agriculture and- any radical 
change in policy could only be introduced with the knowledge 
that there would, be a very hostile reaction from some 
quarters. It is therefore necessary to be aware of the 
perceptions of those who were responsible for these decisions,, 
and of those too. who supported or attacked the policies which 
were adopted. But because the new administration was aware 
of the success achieved by the Germans in fostering an 
economy which was rapidly expanding until the outbreak of 
the War it is first necessary to summarise conditions in 
German East Africa in 1914; and. to describe the scene as it ' 
appeared to the new British administration.
German East Afric'a consisted of the territory 
which was to become Tanganyika, the kingdoms of Ruanda and ■ 
Urundi and the Kionga area, in the south of the colony.. . .
After the 1914-18 War the last named,was transferred to the
Portuguese and Puanda and tlrundi became mandated territories
administered by Belgium. It was. only in these two kingdoms
and the neighbouring Bukoba district-of Tanganyika.that the
Germans, gave formal permission to the tribal rulers to ■
continue to exercise any real measure of authority over their
subjects. Elsewhere, the district officer or military
administrator was the sole authority over tlie African
population although it seems he often delegated some of his
powers to, important chiefs..'1' On matters of routine
administration local chiefs who were found, efficient were
encouraged, to assist the district officer in the transmission
of information or: instructions from the government. If they
co-operated in-the collection of. hut tax they received a
percentage of the takings in addition to any tribute they
could exact from their community., But co-operation with
the district officer sometimes diminished their local
prestige. In the U.sambara area, chiefs whoitried to
enforce anti-erosion orders, or who were too energetic in
recruiting labour for the plantations, soon became unpopular.
On other occasions, particularly when their title, to a'chief-
doim was disputed, government support .arid recognition was a
valuable asset. For;their part, when they found a tribal
authority to be ineffective, the Germans made little attempt
to improve .the existing system but instead followed the
Zanzibar- practice by appointing an akida, usually an Arah
or a Swahili from the coast. German officials were: too
few for effective supervision since it was thought , to be. a
justifiable. econOm^r to employ lower-salaried local
2officials whenever possible. As late as 1914* there were
only 79 expatriate administrative officers on duty in the 
colony.
The: missionary, the. plantation manager, the 
district officer and the government school eventually 
began to bring about a. change in African attitudes and in 
some districts tribal structures were being impaired by. the 
level of recruitment for the plantations. Nevertheless, 
there was still little communication between the different 
African communities and the cohesion of the. tribal system, 
such as it was, remained. Often such systems denoted 
cultural rather than political integration although in either 
case the term 'tribe* remains the most convenient term to 
describe them. Until German control was established both 
tribal and clan structures were being progressively, weakened 
by a combination of three institutions - Islam, slavery and 
porterage. But this process was by no means universal, for 
it was mainly restricted to the communities found along the 
slave routes Or near the coast. Travel was a slow process 
and the distances between government.stations seemed 
enormous. One gains the impression of a small population 
widely distributed and - excepting in two areas - with 
abundant land for their use. It was hot surprising that; 
many Germans thought that these empty spaces would offer a 
home for a large number of German immigrants. Touring the 
country in 1914, ^on Lettow-Vorbeck describes the .scene as 
follows:
'No traveller who visits these countries (Kondos- 
Irangi and Singida) can fail to observe that in 
the fertile, elevated interior there is room for 
the settlement of hundreds of thousands of 
Europeans. Here I would like to record an
impression which I only obtained later, during 
the-war. At times we passed through fertile 
■ districts which were completely forsaken' by the 
inhabitants., but which were known not to have 
been occupied'even in the previous year. They 
had simply moved away,- had. settled somewhere else 
. in the abundantly available, empty and fertile 
country, and had there begun to cultivate fresh 
fields.'-2
But encouraging settlers was only practicable if 
a prosperous economy could be established and it was hot- at 
all; certain that this would be possible. After; the collapse 
of the Maji-Maji rebellion in 1906 there was a greater 
emphasis' on promoting the development of African agriculture. 
There were: good reasons, it was- argued, for this change of 
policy. .Firstly, there was little doubt that the govern­
ment-sponsored cotton, schemes had contributed in no small 
degree,in creating the resentment among Africans which: 
culminated in the uprising. Secondly, the settlement of 
European immigrants had not proved ah easy matter. A scheme 
to settle German peasants from Russia was a failure and the 
amount of capital needed by a would-be settler was such that
Zj.
all but the-most.adventurous were discouraged. Thirdly, 
it was observed that the opening of the Uganda railway in 
1901 had encouraged Africans near the Lake to grow more cash 
crops. Thus, it was argued, the building of a new railway 
line, at least as far as Tabora, would provide the necessary 
stimulus•to generate increased productivity from indigenous 
peasant farmers.
In 1906, a new Governor, Freiherr von Rechenberg, 
openly encouraged the development of a 'commercial1 economy, 
based on the export of cash crops grown by African small­
holders; his policy received the full support of the
5Colonial Minister, Dr. Dernburg. Inevitably, xt came in
for strong criticism from the settlers who feared that the
labour shortage would become even more acute. In order to
implement the new thinking it was first necessary t©» construct
a railway through /the middle of the country in order to make-
it possible to evacuate cash crops from the more remote areas.
pay for the construction.of the railway, loans had to be
provided by Germany and to service these loans part of the:
territorial hut tax: had to be used. The cost of building
the railway was. enormous and by 1912 over one third of the.'
local hut tax was needed to meet the interest payments.
Furthermore, a substantial proportion of the available
labour force was needed to work on the line and this
represented an opportunity cost since the plantations were
often short-handed while the line progressed westward. In
1914 it reached Lake Tanganyika at Ujiji and was at last
completed, but the War intervened before it was. possible to
6judge whether Rechenberg's optimism was justified. All the 
same, the line was there, and although it was damaged during . 
the fighting it was a valuable asset to the new admini­
stration. Moreover, it was acquired for a near-nominal sum 
and the loans raised for its construction were not.a charge 
to the mandatory power under the terms of the Peace Treaty.
The expensive railway programme, and the high cost 
of maintaining the Defence force which the Imperial govern­
ment reluctantly continued to meet, undoubtedly stimulated 
the German administration to redouble their efforts to 
develop the economy. In spite of Rechenberg's 'commercial' 
policy the number of large-scale plantations and private
farms owned by settlers increased steadily. Apart from 
agricultural enterprise the total number of German residents 
also continued to grow, though never on the scale which had 
been hoped would be possible. In the period that some three 
thousand Germans went to East Africa a million of their1 
countrymen entered the United States.
Nevertheless, the developments which took place 
provided substantial assets in addition to the railway for 
the incoming British administration. The total value of 
exports doubled, between 1908 and 1910 to reach a total of 
nearly 21. million marks; by 1912 the figure had. reached 
over 51 million marks. As had. been hoped, the rise in 
exports had been matched by a useful increase in revenue. 
Although expenditure on administration was kept low there 
was a. generous allocation of funds for improving port; 
installations and' for constructing good public buildings in 
the growing towns. Education of the African population was
not neglected and the number and. size of. the government;
7
schools was steadily increased.(
The services and the expanding economy were the 
consequence of the increasing quantity of cash crops being 
exported. The plantations of ceara rubber in the coastal 
areas had. provided a large proportion of this total until 
the market collapsed in 1912. Arabica coffee was first 
grown on Kilimanjaro in 1897 > at the. Kilema mission and 
three years later missionaries were, growing it in Mbeya 
district. A number of settlers established estates, but 
it was soon found that the., bushes only thrived in the areas 
of volcanic ash and lava soils. Coconuts and. cotton were
also grown for export although cultivation of the latter-
O
was still in the experimental stage and yields were low;
nevertheless, the number of plantations continued to increase
as communications to the interior, improved.
But the most spectacular success was the.
foundation of the sisal industry and the rapid increase in
importance of this new crop. The achievement of Dr. Hindorf
in bringing agave sisalana to East Africa and the early
9history of the industry are described elsewhere;^ for our 
purposes the significance of the development lies in the 
values of the exports - £367*961 in 1912, increasing to 
£535>579 the. following year. In 1920, in spite of shipping 
difficulties, and the uncertain future of the Territory the 
figure was higher still; thus the. industry provided a 
powerful argument for the need for plantations in the future.
In the African sector, the most important develop­
ment was the expansion of the cultivation of robusta coffee
in the Bukoba area after the government had established
10nurseries for the preparation of seedlings. Groundnuts
in the Kwanza area and cotton elsewhere in the colony
contributed, to the steadily growing output from African
cultivators. The increase, particularly during the last
three years, of German rule indicates that African production
11of cash crops was not discouraged. Thus at the end of 
the war there was an example of an economy soundly based on 
a dual system of agriculture to be.studied and - as it turned 
out - to be copied by the incoming British administration.
But progress in agricultural production was not 
accomplished without the creation of other problems.
Alienation of land to settlers was of necessity mainly
restricted to the accessible areas., and as a consequence
there occurred in some areas, a serious deterioration in
soil fertility due to a combination of overcrowding and bad
land usage. In 1913? 'bhe Agricultural Adviser to the
German government reported that soil conditions in West,
Usambara and Pare were very bad; he. observed that long
periods of fallow were needed but that this was no longer
possible owing to the increase in the native population and
12alienation of land to.German settlers. The comment
provides early evidence of the fact that as soon as shifting
cultivation was no longer possible soil deterioration soon
followed.. The. other unresolved problem concerned the
shortage of African labour which from time to time had led
to tension between the successive Governors and the settlers.
Although the Ma*ji-Magi rising had taught the' Germans the need
for caution, by 1914 it seemed unlikely that sufficient
recruits for the plantations would ever be obtained without
resort to coercion.
Another factor which represented a continuity with
pre-war .life was. the presence of the Christian missions. In
some areas the missionaries easily outnumbered all the other
Europeans, and thus provided the main point of contact; between 
13the races. Their numbers had steadily increased during
the German period and by 1913 there were some 463 mission 
stations in the colony. Between them.they claimed to be 
teaching some 100,000 pupils. Although this figure may be 
exaggerated.there is no do.ubt that the missions, together
with the government schools., had done much to provide a 
steadily increasing number of Africans with a basic education 
or training in a trade. In 1902 the government had begun 
to subsidise missions with the object of their teaching sub­
ordinate government officials. Eor their part the missions 
welcomed an arrangement which provided the way to compensate 
for the numbers of Swahili akidas and jumbes trained in the 
coastal schools. At the same time an increase in resources 
offered the means of making a greater effort to spread the 
Gospel through the ever increasing number of bush schools. 
Much of the contact with the villages was now in the hands 
of mission-trained African teachers and. catechists and. the 
make-shift village schools spread everywhere at a remarkable 
rate. The men the missions sent to the villages may have 
had little learning but they had no difficulty in attracting 
followers. The-following comment offers reason for their 
popularity:
'To the African villager he was the apostle of 
the new learning, preaching emancipation from 
the old law, and opening vistas of a more ideal 
life which was attainable at least by the young 
and enterprising.’-^
On many occasions due recognition has been paid to 
a missionary achievement in providing education and medical 
attention at a time when communications were almost non­
existent and the whole apparatus of government minimal.
Their presence and their activities in remote areas 
provided a major influence in the changes in tribal life 
which were already under way. Their teaching, with its 
uncompromising emphasis on individual responsibility, did 
much to undermine the hitherto unquestioned loyalty to
traditional institutions and customs. New attitudes led. 
in some cases to new ambitions and motivations, particularly 
in.respect of economic decisions. But' apart from these 
psychological influences the economic activities of the 
missions, also offered-an example to those Africans who 
worked with.or near them. Many missions organised their 
own plantations, thus providing an insight into the 
operations of a wage-earning economy and the processes of 
selling cash crops after they had been harvested. It is 
sometimes overlooked; that the Holy 'Ghost Bathers started 
plantations in the Bagamoyo area, some‘fifteen years before
Carl. Peters.arrived to make the treaties which marked the
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beginning of the colonial period., Farther afield, in the
remote area, of Rungwe, north of Lake Malawi, the Moravians
increased, their influence by building villages peopled by
their supporters ,- cultivating'plantations and establishing
■ 16their own trading post on the Lake Shore.
Nevertheless, it was literacy which provided the 
leaven of modernization and the steady increase in the 
number of publications in Swahili from the Mission-owned 
presses gave Africans the opportunity to become aware, of - 
the narrow Confines of their own traditional way of life.
In times of crisis.the missionaries provided comfort and 
advice and generally-showed', a capacity for'leadership; in 
the early days of the German rule it was sometimes difficult 
for. Africans to distinguish the mission from ’the govern­
ment ! . Their knowledge of Africans proved invaluable during 
the war; from the records of the UM.CA we learn that one of 
their number, was appointed District Officer at Korogwe by
the British Military Authorities.and. another commanded with
distinction a steamer on Lake Nyasa. (Malawi). Perhaps the
most outstanding contribution came from Bishop Frank Weston.
Concerned at the dubious methods adopted to recruit porters
he undertook to raise his own Carrier Corps. He was given
the local rank of major and subsequently commanded nearly
17two thousand men. 1
Thus the German colony in 1914 presented a picture
of a growing economy, an inadequate administrative framework
and a missionary presence steadily increasing its influence
in the rural areas. The War, which suddenly erupted onto
this scene, bringing chaos and misery, might well have been
kept out of East Africa, since the Governor, now Dr.H'. Schnee,
18would dearly have liked to opt for neutrality. However,
he was unable to restrain his military commander, von Lettow- 
Vorbeck, who at once organized a series of raids on the 
Uganda railway. The British reacted by invading the 
territory and a war of attrition followed. Owing to the 
blockade, the German commander had to rely on the resources 
of the colony during the campaign. Dr. Schnee for his part 
became resigned to the inevitable collapse of his admini­
stration and settled for a policy of non-co-operation with
his military commander, occasionally making dire predictions
19of a native uprising. There were probably good reasons
for his fears; in spite of the Dernburg reforms, corporal 
punishment was freely administered for a variety of minor 
offences.up to the outbreak of the War and it would not have 
been surprising if some old scores had been repaid when the 
opportunity occurred. Meanwhile all exports of crops came
to an end and the plantations were allowed to become over­
grown with,weeds. But it was the African peasant who 
suffered the most. Both sides took his cattle and his 
crops and as many able-bodied men as could be found were 
pressed into service as porters. ■ Men were always in short
supply for this duty since losses from desertion, sickness
. 20and death were very high.
Eventually von Lettow-Vorbeck was forced to leave
the colony and when he crossed the Ruvuma River with his
forces there was hope that there would be a steady return to
normal. But this was not to be. In Mozambique the Germans
were welcomed as liberators and thus were able to re-equip
themselves with captured Portuguese weapons, much to the
21annoyance of the British commander. Thus was the conflict
prolonged and. while it lasted little thought could be given 
to reconstruction. Some consolation, however, was offered 
in that the British missionaries, released from internment■ 
in Tabora, were able to return to their stations and offer, 
some hope that better days were imminent. But without 
supplies and equipment of any kind there was' little practical 
aid which they could offer. One of them, teaching at a. 
mission near Korogwe, describes the conditions she found, 
when she returned there in 1916 and her account gives some 
idea of what the War meant to the African villager:
'Even when they came back the teachers had a very 
difficult time at first. Their houses had been 
looted and had fallen down, and their schools and 
wattle and daub churches were just heaps of mud.
Though their people were delighted to welcome them 
back, rebuilding was not so easy, for most of the 
able-bodied men had been carried off as porters 
either by the Germans or the English, and those 
who had escaped, were afraid that they too would 
be captured if they were seen doing active work.1^
Nevertheless, not all areas were affected by the
fighting for the same length of time. In December 1916 a
civil administration was established and Hr. Horace Byatt
assumed charge of the. area lying to the East of the Mwanza-
25Tabora road, and north of the Central Line. ^ To assist him
some experienced officials were seconded to his staff from
British East Africa and South Africa. The military forces
also provided men to join him. Subsequently, in January
1919j the Administrator assumed responsibility for the whole.
of the area which was to become known as Tanganyika except:
for the districts still under Belgian control.
During this period most of the German-appointed
African officials were retained by the British and they
carried on with their duties as before. The local knowledge
and experience of the. police force which had served the
Germans -was found invaluable and all but a few were rein- 
24-stated. The military authorities retained control of
the railways and in spite of the damage which had been 
inflicted by the retreating Germans the Tanga line was 
working again by 1916 and the Central line a year later.
A Custodian of Enemy Property was appointed to control the 
German plantations and to dispose of the crops. As a 
temporary measure the German owners or their agents remained 
in charge of the day-to-day management if they so wished; 
where the plantations had been abandoned by their former 
owners the Custodian offered them 011 short term leases.
Since there were few British subjects of military age who
were not with the forces most of the lessees were of Greek
. . 25origin. ^
Meanwhile elsewhere the:: debate on , the future of 
the, country was taking place. As the War continued the 
British missionaries in particular began to campaign to . 
prevent Germany .ever regaining .control of her colony. The. 
Bishop of Zanzibar wrote an open letter to General Smuts' 
entitled "The Black Serfs of Prussia" and in Britain the 
UMCA published a pamphlet called- "Bond or Bree" in the hope 
that public sympathy would be aroused. Other contemporary 
accounts containing strong criticisms of German methods 
began to circulate. Thus it soon, became clear that although 
there was uncertainty about-which power would be responsible 
for the country the German administration would not return.
In reply to a German protest, about the wording of Article 
119 of the Peace Treaty between the Allies and Germany the ; 
Government drafted an Allied Note to the effect that the 
former colonial subjects were strongly opposed to being 
under German rule again.
In spite of the British government's public 
pronouncements, in private there was more argument. Since 
the Allies were prepared to accept President Wilson’s . 
principle of self-determination - at least in those cases 
where it did not cause a conflict with' their own special 
interests - the Colonial Office had asked Byatt whether it 
would be possible to hold a plebiscite in Tanganyika in 
order to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants. His 
reply was. not reassuring; he pointed out that the demands ■ 
of the military for labour and livestock and the heavy, 
casualties among the porters, had left the African peasant ■ 
farmer ’not particularly well disposed to the. British’.
He clearly implied that a plebiscite, might lead to a demand
■ 26 
for the restitution of Herman control. There is little
doubt that Africans who had exercised authority under the
Germans, the chiefs and minor officials, felt a good deal
more comfortable working for a European who could make up
.his mind when a wrong-doer was apprehended and order swift,
if harsh, retribution. To many Africans their new rulers
seemed amiable but undecided. In some districts, the British
officials knew only too well that their control was extremely
tenuous and that a light hand was necessary. Orde-Browne
in a memorandum warned that the lives of government officers
in the more remote areas would be at risk for some time to
come.^ P.E. Mitchell,, ordered to proceed on foot from-
Nyasaland (Malawi) to take"over the administration of Ufipa
..district, describes a. situation which was repeated many
times elsewhere in the territory as the new administration
assumed control:,
"In mid-1917', I arrived at a remote, unadministered 
part of the south east of German East Africa, 
seconded from my regiment with orders to set up 
at least a rudimentary civil authority. I. had 
my servants, an African sergeant, porters for my 
goods, and some twenty police uniforms and rifles 
■ and a little ammunition for them. Arrived at. 
the chosen place a. mission station, in itself 
typical of the sequence so frequent in those days - 
I summoned the local chiefs, explained that I was 
the government' and would they please provide me
with.twenty young men to be policemen?........
They were courteous and affable, provided my police 
recruits, and assured me that they understood all 
I had said and would obey the new laws. No doubt 
they did nothing of the sort; but why did they not 
gust knock me on the head, help themselves to the 
rifles, and have, nothing to do with this self- 
appointed government?U2g
The fact that the new British officials were the 
representatives of the Power which had driven the Germans
from the country earned them some respect at first although 
it was recognized as unlikely that such reflected glory 
would he particularly durable. Probably the majority of 
Africans contrasted the days of German rule with the chaos 
of the War years and were content to see the return of a 
more orderly state of affairs. In places bedevilled with 
parochial quarrels or the fear of witch-craft there was 
something reassuring in the presence once more of an 
impartial stranger representing the 'government'.
By 1919, there were 109 administrative officers
in the Territory and in nearly all districts they were the
representatives of all branches of government. Their life
was uncomfortable and their task of restoring law and order
made difficult by a severe famine, followed by epidemics of
small-pox and influenza. In Dodoma and: Kondoa Irangi,
parents pawned their children for food and it was several
years before families were reunited. In Masasi it was
reported that 'there was no food, left and people were
29existing by eating natural food in the wilderness.' The
same officer who made the report found that the. damage
caused by elephants made people disheartened and reluctant
5^0to plant crops when the drought ended.
Prom the reports of the period, it seems clear, 
that as soon as the famine was ended, priority was given 
to the task of selecting chiefs who would be recognized as 
native authorities and thereby expected to assist in the 
process of restoring normality. Administrative officers 
who found themselves bogged down with hundreds of competing 
claims and complained that many of those already recognized
56.
were thoroughly ineffectual. In some instances,the 
complaints were more serious; Barnes,in Kahama,described the 
Sultans in the western part of the district as being
70
* self-indulgent*existing on bribery and extortion.*
With administrative officers fully engaged in political 
matters and with the economy in ruins,the new government found
no tabula rasa which permitted the introduction of radical 
innovations. It has been observed elsewhere that the terms of
the Mandate afforded plenty of latitude in deciding land 
policies;^3 nevertheless,in practical terms the options were 
limited. Britain had agreed to recognize freehold titles granted 
by the G-ermans; since some of these were estates or plantations 
the dual system of agriculture,to some extent,was bound to 
continue. Many of the holders of freehold titles were not German
citizens and their rights had to be respected.Moreover, the
potential contribution of the estates to the economy could not 
be ignored; to some extent,their development depended on creating
confidence in the security of tenure over land.
Nevertheless, since he preferred the Uganda to the 
Kenya model, Byatt knew he needed Colonial Office support if
expansion of the non-African sector was to be halted or even 
delayed; in a despatch,he summarised the issues and sought
guidance.34 Qn leave in London in 1919,he discussed his views 
with Amery,whose main concern was to increase British influence 
in the area.35 ^ compromise was reached? German owners were to be
expropriated;further alienation was,for a time,to proceed slowly;
private corporations' would start * encouraging natives to grow 
produce for sale.* 36 Thus the stage was set for the even 
development of both sectors of the agricultural system.
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CHAPTER III
THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAND TENURE LAWS
The most direct-way that governments in Africa 
have been able to affect the course of white settlement is 
by the enacting of laws to regulate the occupation and 
transfer of land. Thus, in Tanganyika, the Land Ordinance 
and allied laws and orders which empowered the Governor to 
take decisions concerning land, alienation are central to any 
discussion of the question of the settlement of non-Africans 
and it is necessary to know how this legislation came into 
existence. With its aid., the Governor could exercise his 
discretion and controlled not only the extent of the settle­
ment but also the sectors of the Territory where it would be 
permitted.
African Land Rights
Several of the senior officials appointed to the 
new British administration of Tanganyika had previous service 
in Kenya and were well aware that whatever land policies were 
adopted, they were liable to lead to much controversy. 
Experience in Kenya had taught them that if land belonged 
to an African community but remained unoccupied it was 
difficult to refuse requests from would-be settlers who were 
prepared to make use of it-. Furthermore, they had found 
that an African's rights were by no means assured even when 
he was in lawful possession of land; a Court decision had
made it clear that any security of tenure under customary 
law had been undermined, by the Kenya Land Ordinance, 1915 
and the Order in. Council -of 1921.^ Even the provisional 
demarcation of Reserves had.offered little protection. Since 
they had not yet been formally established, the Kenya govern­
ment was quite: prepared to allow excisions to be made when 
it was expedient to do so. Thus part of the.Nandi Reserve 
in the Kipkarren area was excised to provide land for a 
soldier settlement scheme. , It was therefore ..possible that 
similar- inroads .into native-owned lands might occur in 
Tanganyika if a settler community ever became a powerful 
pressure group.
But in Tanganyika there was an important difference. 
The terms of the Mandate required the British government to 
respect the rights over land of the native population and the 
Permanent Mandates Commission would, it was believed, ensure 
that the terms were observed. The first task of the new 
administration was to discover how these rights could be 
identified and protected. This was no easy matter since 
there was a great diversity in the traditional laws and 
customs relating to land usage * Physical conditions were 
a major influence on local custom; soil fertility in 
particular determined agricultural practices in an area and 
they in turn played a part in' shaping the rules which 
gradually developed and which became accepted by a community. 
However, certain broad generalizations are possible. In 
most areas, individual rights in .land'were limited and 
ultimate ownership was vested in the-tribe, clan or family. 
Nevertheless, the individual could acquire a. right, of user
and this could not be challenged provided he cleared his
land and used; it in the proper way. When customary law
followed this pattern it was adequate provided two conditions
were met: first, that there was sufficient fertile land
available so that shifting cultivation could.be practised;
and, second, that perennial crops were not planted. Rules
based, on collective tenure were less popular once plantations.
of coffee or bananas were established and in some areas the
rights over such plantations were only a little short of
freehold. These crops need soils which are either
naturally fertile or at least have been improved and, as
elsewhere in the world, it is:.those who farm the most fertile
- , 2land who are the first to demand individual ownership.
Another- type of customary land- tenure existed in
certain parts of Western Tanganyika. 3Lt was feudal in
form and in many respects similar to the system existing in
Northern Nigeria and near-by Buganda. In Bukoba district,
where the best-known example occurred, the system was known 
■3as nyarubanja; the German administration had. approved of
it on the grounds that it could provide an incentive in the
development of African coffee growing. Uganda already
provided an impressive and relevant example of what might
4-be achieved by fear. Over the years, the status of the
occupiers of nyarubanja land gradually improved but no
' 5radical changes were made until after Independence.
Unless: there were exceptional reasons the administration
was never prepared to force the pace in changing native law
and custom and it was recognized that in the case of land
6tenure the issues were particularly complex:.
The Germans were prepared to acknowledge that
Africans enjoyed some form of rights over land and their
guide-lines were prescribed in the Imperial Decree of 1895*
All land was declared to be Crown Land but the right of the
Crown was subject to the rights of private, persons, chiefs-'
and African communities being observed. A local ordinance
the following year authorised the appointment of Land
Commissions for the purpose of advising on what land might
be suitable for alienation and of deciding the extent of
native reserves they thought necessary. lor the latter,
the observed rule was to set aside at least four times the
amount of land they found under cultivation. This was
supposed, to be sufficient to allow for s.hlfdin.g cultivation
as well as for a future increase in the African population.
In spite of these precautions, the extent of the land left
for the Africans was sometimes insufficient, as the Germans'
n
themselves admitted.
In the early days German settlers obtained, a 
freehold title over land alienated to them. , However, after 
1903 it became the practice fom the government to lease land 
for a term of twenty-five years. If he fulfilled certain 
development conditions, the lessee could apply to be granted 
a freehold title. It was also possible in some cases to 
acquire by prescription a freehold title; such instances 
most often occurred in the coastal areas and'concerned town 
plots or. coconut plantations.. In all, by 1914-, grants of 
freehold title amounted to about 1,300,000 acres of land.
Polldwing .the; decision taken earlier,already described 
freehold titles obtained before the publication of the Land
.Ordinance, 1923 were re cognized as valid, but if; 
the title holders were German nationals, they were obliged 
to surrender their■properties and leave the Territory. The 
Custodian of Enemy Property was empowered to dispose of these 
properties by auetion and to use the proceeds to compensate 
British nationals, most of them being Indian traders, who
8had outstanding claims against the German administration.
Not all of these properties were offered for sale again. A
number of estates, mostly undeveloped and situated in the
mountain areas near the Northern border, were restored to
9tribal ownership. The first annual report from the 
Territory had referred, to the problems which had been 
inherited in this area, complaining of the legacy of 'an . 
overcrowded and discontented, native community on the one hand 
and with large and valuable properties handicapped for lack . 
of sufficient labour on the other.1 ^  The restitutions 
which were made constituted a modest attempt to remove the 
first mentioned cause for: complaint; nevertheless, since 
the extent of .the problem was recognized it may seem strange 
that Byatt did not seize an opportunity which he. must have 
known would never recur by. handing back more estates than
he did. The reason is apparent from the Colonial. Office
11 • 
records. Since outright expropriation was ruled out the
properties had. to be purchased and since at this time the
Administration was unable to balance the Budget for the
Territory it meant that the British Treasury kept a watchful
eye on all expenditure. Thus, in spite of Colonial Office
approval for his plans, the Governor was compelled to
proceed cautiously; especially so, since the local Press
12was highly critical of his actions. The result was that .
a pattern of settlement, was established in the Arusha area 
with nearly one third of the habitable area in the hands' of 
settlers, described as constituting an iron ring around 
Mount Meru.'^
It was hoped that the second of the complaints 
quoted above would be. answered by ensuring that , the ex-German 
estates were auctioned as quickly as possible. A. shortage, 
of labour was not particularly a problem at this time and in 
fact the; Administration had allowed labour"recruiters from 
Kenya to operate in the Territory.. The real problem was 
the difficulty caused by the lack of investment in the 
estates which was .bound to persist until their future was 
decided. Delay had to be avoided and inevitably perhaps
some estates were sold at well below their real value and
. . 14soon exchanged hands again at much higher prices.
There was an interval of over two years between 
the issue of the original Order in Council of 1920 and the 
enactment of the Land Ordinance. When it was finally 
promulgated it provided the guide-lines for the land policies 
to be adopted by the.Administration and it consolidated the- 
pattern of land settlement which had been emerging ever 
since the Imperial Decree of 1895* If the environment was 
chiefly responsible for what could be grown in Tanganyika ' 
this one' law, which regulated land usage as well as land . 
tenure, determined the sort of people involved, and the means 
to be adopted in the development of agriculture in the years 
which followed. The Tanganyika Land Ordinance was drafted' 
in the' light of British experience in other parts of Africa,
66 •
notably Northern Nigeria, and on the interpretation of the
terms of the Mandate. The Northern Nigerian Land Ordinance
in turn had been based on the findings of the Lands Committee
which had investigated the matter shortly before the First
15.
World War. The Committee had. come to the somewhat;
ingenious conclusion that the 'ultimate' ownership of the
land had been vested in the chiefs but this had passed to
the British by conquest; nevertheless, the Report was
clearly of the opinion that the rights so acquired had to
be exercised for the use and common benefit of the natives.
The law based on these recommendations prescribed that.all
land whether occupied or unoccupied was subject to disposition
by the Governor but that he had to administer them according
16to the principles declared above. And since such
principles seemed to be similar to those expresed in the
terms of the Mandate iit was convenient, when the land law
for Tanganyika was framed, to make use of the Northern 
Nigerian example.
The wording of the Mandate was such that the 
administering authority was allowed considerable latitude 
in interpretation. Concerning land alienation, the 
following extracts are relevant:
Article 3 :
,The Mandatory shall be responsible for the peace 
order and good government of. the Territory, and 
shall, undertake to promote to the utmost the
material.and moral well-being and the social
progress of its inhabitants ....
Article 6 :
In the framing of laws relating to the holding, 
or transfer of land, the Mandatory .... shall 
respect the rights and safeguard the interestis 
of the native population. No native land may
be transferred without the previous consent of 
the public authorities and no real rights over 
. p native lands; in favour of non-natives may be 
created ..except .with, the same consent. ......
From the above it-is clear that there would have 
been little difficulty in justifying a policy.of alienating - 
land on a considerable scale providing it could be argued 
convincingly.,, that the/African population would obtain 
material benefit and social.progress as a result. Thus, 
with very broad terms, of reference, with directions which 
contained no reason for conflict with the .policies the 
British government wanted to see.adopted, the conditions of, 
the. Mandate, gave no cause for. international opinion to play 
,ah obvious part in determining the land policies adopted in
17
Tanganyika during the Mandate. 1 Direct control, was in the 
hands, of the Colonial Secretary;. he could determine what, 
legislation was enacted, he could, supplement the regulatory; 
effects of the land laws by issuing administrative 
instructions,, and he could get his decisions endorsed by 
seeking the collective approval of the Cabinet. But the 
laws, once approved, gave, wide powers to the Governor, and 
through him the Tanganyika administration was'able to 
restrict or encourage white; settlement as the needs of the 
Territory were perceived. All the. same, it was appreciated, 
in Dar es Salaam that the Colonial Secretary would expect, 
international criticism.not to be disregarded.
The Permanent Mandates Commission ■
. Although they were in general agreement with the 
land policies, members of the. P.M.C.- for a time expressed
concern about the security of tenure over land enjoyed by 
Africans and were instrumental in causing the laws to be 
changed. Otherwise, the Commission's powers were very 
limited. It could advise the League Council 'on all 
matters relating to the observance of the Mandates 1. It 
had. no power to render any decisions or to make direct 
recommendations to the Mandatories. It received an annual 
report from every Mandate which was examined in the presence 
of representatives from the Governments concerned. It could 
therefore inform itself on how policies were being imple­
mented but when it was dissatisfied, there was no method of 
taking direct action. However, both the League and the 
P.M.C. managed to exercise some influence; Lord Hailey was. 
himself, a member of the Commission when he wrote as follows:
'It is not surprising that many consider the 
value of the proceedings of the Commission 
and.. Council to lie in the. indirect influence 
of publicity rather than in the direct, 
influence over policy.'-^g
Perhaps this view overstates the influence of international
opinion at this time. However, Lord Lugard also considered
that the Commission performed, its function with success and
attributed its influence to three facts. It never
criticised a Mandatory directly, its opinions were always
expressed as the collective view of the members and finally
the members consistently maintained, an attitude of political
iq
impartiality. ' It would be easy enough to be cynical 
about his last point but nevertheless if today's delegates 
in the United Nations were permitted to adopt more, flexible 
attitudes on world problems it might well increase the 
authority of the. General'Assembly. Others, however, notably
the settlers in East Africa and their friends in London, 
were consistently critical of the Commission and all it 
stoexd for. They never lost an opportunity to point out 
that whereas Britain provided any information which was 
requested, and sought to act in accordance with the spirit 
of the, Mandate, other .powers often ignored, with impunity 
inquiries from the Commission and other institutions of 
the League.^
But although the- administration in Tanganyika was 
free to take, decisions on the, settlement issue providing 
the terms of the; Land Ordinance were observed, nevertheless 
in the. juridical sense- Britain as a Mandatory power did 
have less freedom of action than would have been the case 
had; Tanganyika, been a. colony or .a Protectorate. Shortly 
after the commencement of the Mandate, it was agreed that 
the. community of Tanganyika, was the owner of the land and
the British authorities were only trustees, possessing the.
21 'power of management. Thus, in contrast to the practice
adopted in British possessions elsewhere, land in Tanganyika, 
was hot alienated in perpetuity. There were certain 
exceptions to this rule allowed, which are mentioned below. 
Although the principle behind the rule is important it is 
necessary not to exaggerate■its significance. Bor however 
important it might be for a lawyer, to an African tribesman 
who found that his ancestral lands had been declared to be 
part of a settler's farm, there was little consolation for 
him to learn that the alienated land was only held on a 
ninety-nine year .lease. Leasehold, as opposed to freehold, 
might affect the. relationship between the Tanganyika
administration and the settler; in the African’s eyes 
the settler was there and was likely to remain there.
The, Mandate and the Land Ordinance.
The terms of the Mandate when they were, published 
did not escape criticism in Britain. Bor some it was very 
necessary to make specific guarantees to safeguard African 
rights over their land so that the problems which had arisen 
in Southern Rhodesia would be avoided. Concern was 
expressed by the. London-based League of Nations Union. 
Through the medium of the Times newspaper, the government 
was asked to seek an'amendment of■the wording of the Mandate 
so that. no. African could ever be dispossessed of land which 
he lawfully occupied. The Union was not without some 
influence and the incumbent Under-Secretary at the Colonial 
Office,' W. Ormsby-G.ore, had himself been a leading member 
until accepting office. Brom the minutes on the files it 
is clear that the best course was to refuse the-.demand 
without provoking a. confrontation and a deliberately non­
committal reply ended- the matter.' Nevertheless, the 
incident provided a warning to the Colonial Office that the 
land laws for the Territory in the course of preparation
would be expected to contain adequate safeguards for the
22African population.
The Land Ordinance which came into operation in 
1923, had the most direct bearing on land usage during the 
period of British administration. Its intentions were 
made, clear from .the preamble, which was as follows:
'Whereas it is expedient' that the existing 
customary rights of the natives of Tanganyika. 
Territory to use and enjoy the. land of the 
territory and the natural fruits thereof in 
sufficient quantities to enable them to provide 
for the sustenance of themselves, their families 
and. their posterity, should be assured, 
protected and preserved 1
But in addition' to protecting the rights over land which
Africans already enjoyed, the Ordinance was designed: to
secure the best possible use was made of land over which
anyone claimed that he had a title as a result of alienation
permitted, by the Government. This is made clear, not only
in the Ordinance but also, and more explicitly, in the Land
Regulations published in 1926. Holding on to undeveloped
land for speculative purposes had been common practice
throughout the British Empire and the Colonial Office had
several precedents for guidance in dealing with the problem
when it arose. The usual methods adopted in previous
cases had been either to impose a Land Tax on undeveloped
land or-to- give governments powers of re-possession if
23land remained undeveloped after a specific period. v The 
second method was followed in Tanganyika; the Land 
Regulations prescribed the different amounts of investment 
in the property which had to be undertaken within three 
years and five years of the grant being made. The 
Regulations only partly achieved their aim since it was 
perfectly legitimate for the lessee to put no money into 
his farming enterprise but to spend hiss funds in building 
a substantial dwelling house for himself. However this 
at least displayed some interest.in the property and was 
presumably better than leaving it derelict until a. 
purchaser could, be found.
v . its attempt to provide' some security of tenure
for. Africans, the hand Ordinance came in for considerable
24 .criticism■ - In order, to comply with the recommendations
of the P.M.C. the Ordinance was later amended so that it was
made quite clear that an African holding land, under .native
law and. custom hadi just, as good, a title as anyone holding a
■ 25lease in the. category of a right of occupancy. In mast;
cases, responsibility for the disposition of public lands 
rested.with the Governor. .The exception to this rule was 
when the. area in question exceeded five thousand acres, when 
the approval of the. Secretary of State had to be obtained. 
Provided there, was no devolution of the Governor’s powers to 
Boards^of Commissions haying non-officials as .members and 
providing the Governor was supported,by the Colonial 
Secretary. - or if necessary restrained - there Was no reason 
to suppose, that the principles of the, Mandate and the 
declarations, of intent by the British government would ever 
■.be overlooked. . For -it was not-only the provisions, of the 
Land Ordinance which afforded the Governor with, the means to 
control white, settlement. 1  Land Acquisition Ordinance was 
passed allowing the government to acquire any land, including 
that. held, under a right of occupancy, ■ if it:was.needed for: 
■’public purposes ’ . This term was specifically defined so 
as to include land required for the use of the native 
inhabitants.' And another law made■it. possible to control 
land transactions. Under the Law of Property and Convey­
ancing. Ordinance, ar native was prevented from transferring
' - ■ . 26 • • 
his land to a. non-native.
The powers to control land settlement and. land
usage which were thus acquired by the Tanganyika admini­
stration were welcomed in London. In response to a 
request the Land Ordinance had been made available in the 
House of Commons and when the subject came up for debate 
Colonel Wedgwood for. the Opposition commented as follows:
V.... the Landi Ordinance ... shows the right 
spirit. Once you have the fundamental land 
law you save the liberties of these people; 
you allow'them to work on their own land and 
you do not force them to go out to work for 
an employer.*27
In his. reply the spokesman for the government observed that 
he was glad, to hear that the. Colonel had been converted
'to one of. the oldest principles of Toryism 
namely peasant, proprietorship, the traditional 
stage between tribal ownership and individual
ownership .-^g
Neither comment shows any. insight into the crux: 
of the problem of how to convince the peasant farmer that; 
not only was he secure, in his title over land he occupied 
and utilised but also that the alienation of apparently 
unoccupied land would not proceed on such a scale that he 
and his children would find there was no new land left for; 
cultivation or that the opportunities for grazing cattle 
were badly affected. Similarly, the amendment to the 
Ordinance mentioned above, made at the instance of the P.M.C., 
failed to provide the necessary reassurance. Consequently 
when land was alienated for European settlers it became 
necessary to show that the tribal authorities agreed that 
it was■unoccupied at the time it was alienated or that, in 
cases where it was occupied, the residents were willing to 
move, in return for compensation. Where compensation was 
accepted, and paid, there is no indication that administrative
officers ever resorted to improper pressure to obtain
agreement. Nevertheless, it is more1than probable that
there were occasions when chiefs or a headman might see an
advantage in finding land for a potential settler. In such
cases they may well have Induced the occupant to relinquish
his land, particularly when they were able to allocate land
29elsewhere m  the same village.
This problem, and the growing awareness that it 
was impossible to convince Africans that alienated land 
ceased, to be tribal property, prompted the government to 
change, the procedures used in negotiating land alienations.
By 1938 previous instructions had been consolidated and 
incorporated into a new directive which was to be observed 
for the rest of the. colonial period.. The procedure to be
adopted was divided into three distinct stages. First, a 
preliminary report was necessary, in which the African re- 
eaction to the application would be recorded. The second 
stage consisted, of an inspection of the properties of those 
who would be required to move on receipt of compensation. 
Third there was the payment of compensation against the 
signatures of the recipients; ' it: had been found that there 
were instances in the past, when compensation had been 
negotiated and paid on an informal basis and subsequently 
the recipients felt that they had been unjustly moved from 
their land. Finally, as a safeguard against the criticism 
that non-African■settlement left the natives dispossessed and 
landless, the administrative officer making the inspection . 
was required to certify that other land was available for 
anyone who was being asked to move.
The Land Laws' and separate development-
As can be clearly seen in Southern Africa, the 
most striking example of political decisions affecting land 
usage occurs when a policy of separate development on a 
racial basis is adopted. To some extent and for; a time 
this policy was followed in Tanganyika and it is necessary 
to know how it came to.be accepted, and. the legal basis which 
supported it. Officials in Tanganyika in the nineteen- 
twenties perceived that complete segregation of races into 
settlement areas was clearly difficult to achieve since 
freehold titles to land obtained during the German period 
had been recognized as valid. Some of these parcels of land 
ha<d common boundaries and. formed large blocks but others 
were well scattered, and surrounded by African cultivation. 
Nevertheless, it was still possible to ensure that future 
alienations were confined to land adjoining other areas of 
non-African settlement. In other parts of British-ruled 
Africa where there had been substantial white settlement it 
had. been the practice to divide the available land into 
blocks either to be made available for settlement or for 
designation as native reserves with the ownership vested in 
tribal communities. To the Colonial Office the advantage 
in this- formal division of land in a territory under its 
charge was that it was easier to resist pressure from a 
Governor or a settler lobby demanding that more land should 
be made available for settlement. Many local administrators 
preferred separation on a racial basis. When' the races were 
intermingled a variety of disputes and tensions arose.
There was constant- ill-feeling caused - or so it seemed to, 
the European farmer - by repeated cases of trespass by ' . 
neighbouring Africans as well as their failure .to prevent; 
the spread of diseases affecting both crops and cattle. To 
the African, the European settler was always the mgeni,, an 
interloper who had no cause, to be aggressive about his so- 
called. rights, and particularly so when much of the land over 
which he claimed ownership;was left undeveloped.
It has.been suggested that the terms of the Mandate
endorsed the principle that there should be no separation of
51settlement on a racial basis. . A White Paper of .1938
states that it would be contrary to the terms of the Mandate
to depart from a. principle of equality of opportunity 'in
the disposal of all Crown (public), lands irrespective of
race, colour or religion. More support comes from; a
comment of the Territory's second Governor, Sir Donald
Cameron, who was convinced that the creation of reserves
55would be contrary to the Mandate. ^ On the other hand it 
would have been very easy to cite Article 6, extracts of 
which are quoted,above, and. argue that the creation of 
reserves was the best way of ■ safeguarding the interests of 
the native population. After all, in Kenya Dr. Arthur, the- 
missionary representing native interests, had pressed the 
government there for some time to.publish in the Official 
Gazette the details of the Reserve boundaries so that:- no 
more land could be excised and made available for new 
settlers. Thus it depended on whether reserves were to be 
considered as designating a particularly favourable area for 
European settlement or whether they were intended to prevent
land required in the future for. Africans being gradually. . 
infiltrated by European settlers. The administration in 
Tanganyika adopted, a policy of segregation in practice while 
deprecating it in principle. Applying a policy followed by 
the German administration, large areas of the country were 
closed to alienation; and in areas where alienation was 
permitted Africans never had access to sufficient capital 
to satisfy development conditions and. thus were effectively 
excluded.
It is quite certain that any strictly enforced 
division of the. land into areas reserved for different races 
would benefit no one and to try to achieve separation where 
interspersion had. already taken place would incur a pro­
hibitive cost. In fact it was pragmatism and not principle 
which guided the administration in this matter. As already 
explained, in the early nineteen-twenties it was necessary 
to make the existing estates profitable wherever they happened 
to be. This required the granting'of adequate security of 
title to the new owners so that they would be. willing to 
undertake the necessary development. Thus, the status quo 
was confirmed and the. interspersion of non-African estates 
and African settlements and shambas continued. T.o remove 
the- Europeans and Asians to land elsewhere would have 
delayed the recovery of the existing estates; to move the 
Africans in the neighbourhood would have needed military 
force's on sa scale which was not readily available. When 
questioned by the Parliamentary Select. Committee, the 
Territory's second Governor, Sir Donald Cameron, explained 
that separation of settlement on a racial basis: even if it
were desirable, was not a practical proposition. As be 
put it.,::.
'Y.ou must either refuse to grant land which is 
available and suitable because it is surrounded 
by natives, or, alternatively, you must move 
the natives. And ... if. you attempt to do the 
latter you will have to use armed force and you ’ 
will not succeed even then.1^
The physical environment rather than commercial 
or.' social considerations had produced this mixed pattern of 
settlement. Possibilities for settlement'in Tanganyika 
were, very different, from those found in Kenya where a 
comparatively compact area provided conditions not only 
suitable for mixed farming but also for Europeans *fco settle 
on a permanent basis. It was therefore.not surprising that 
the European settlers and their supporters demanded that, . 
this, area should be reserved for white settlement or that, 
the Kenya government agreed to their demands. Tanganyika 
in contrast, had-pockets of land with a development potential 
in widely scattered parts of the Territory with intervening 
areas which would never, attract risk capital. There were 
hopes, too, that a much greater variety of crops might be 
grown successfully than was the case in Kenya by making the 
best use of differing climatic conditions. Mindful of the 
collapse of the rubber industry, the administration 
encouraged diversification in case the well-established 
crops, such as coffee and sisal,, fell .on hard times.
However, after a time political reasons were to 
carry more weight than economic ones and in spite of a 
commonly-argued case for interspersion on educational 
grounds discussed later, the administration came to prefer 
the alienated land- to be concentrated and contiguous as far.
as possible. In view of the difficulties of implementing 
such a policy, of necessity the solution was a compromise 
and it is of interest not only because of its influence on 
the eventual settlement pattern but also because it throws 
some light on the relationship between the Colonial Secretary 
and. a Colonial Governor.
In the Report of the Hilton Young Commission 
investigating the: possibilities of Closer Union it had been 
recommended that ’so far. as possible, settled areas and 
native areas should be arranged in continuous blocks ... to 
build up homogeneous'native and non-native units for local 
government-. ’ ^  This suggestion was taken up by Mitchell, 
now Secretary for.Native. Affairs, and he persuaded the 1929 
Administrative Officers Conference to recommend that.certain 
provinces should be closed to alienation unless there were 
exceptional reasons for accepting an application. Mitchell 
argued that if the settlers ever obtained some measure of 
self-government,, the division he advocated would prevent, them 
from' interfering with the native authority system which was 
in the course of development. As he explained the position 
at a later date to the Joint Select Committee, he wanted to 
see Native Territories withdrawn from non-native politics 
and mixed areas where association was emphasised in every 
possible way.J^
Cameron proceeded cautiously with the proposal. 
First, he obtained comments on the value of white settlement 
from each of the provincial commissioners concerned and when 
he was' certain that they wanted to see no further increase 
he forwarded their comments to London together with his
despatch explaining that he. intended to- restrict further 
alienation in five provinces. The Colonial Secretary 
accepted his proposals and in order to prevent any back­
sliding at a future date directed that any further alien-
37ations in these provinces must be referred to him. Later
the same month London received another despatch with the:
information that, a leading settler had. observed that.' a.
Governor’s tenure of. office was very temporary and the
policy could be quickly changed when economic development
38was again given priority.^ The Office reacted by telling
Cameron to publish as an official notice a list of the
provinces closed to alienation and Drummond Shiels, the
Under-Secretary noted in a. minute::
’It gives some guarantee of permanence of this 
wise policy when other Governors reign in 
Tanganyika.. ' ^
Thus, a policy of limited separate development came to be
approved and Lord Hailey in his description of Tanganyika
merely mentions without further comment the need to preserve
4-0racial homogeneity. Settlers predictably opposed the
policy on the grounds that it might restrict opportunities 
for further settlement. The P.M.C. asked for a fuller 
explanation of the decision and. subsequently recorded their 
approval of the move. Thereafter, the policy remained 
unquestioned while there was any possibility of settler 
interests exerting an adverse effect on the native authority 
system. It was eventually abandoned when there was a change 
of emphasis from the need to protect. African ;interests to 
the aim of. achieving better land utilization. But this was 
for the future; for. the period of the Mandate the principles
expressed in its Instrument were, endorsed and elaborated by 
the LancL Ordinance and its amendments. Land utilization 
and the location of settlement meanwhile were controlled by 
the Regulations issued, under the Ordinance and by the 
administrative action described above.
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CHAPTER. IV
IMMIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE WARS
The Immigration Policy
It has been necessary to consider in some detail 
the aims and content of the Land Ordinance because it 
remained the basis for the alienation of land to non- 
Africans throughout the period that Tanganyika, was 
administered by Britain. Nevertheless, the law on its own 
could only be used, to exercise a negative effect on the 
changes in agricultural patterns which followed. Although 
the Ordinance'was drafted,- approved and made law, the local 
administration was still not compelled to adopt a policy of 
promoting white settlement. Why it did so requires an 
understanding of how policies were determined and what, 
factors influenced those who took the relevant decisions.
It soon becomes clear that various unrelated prescriptions 
and. demands contributed to the introduction of the several 
policies concerned with immigration in general and with non- 
African agricultural settlement in particular.
First, there were the provisions of the Mandate 
which made it difficult for the British administration to 
discriminate against potential immigrants on grounds of race 
or'nationality. Secondly, there was the need for some 
economic development and this, so it seemed at the time, 
could only be achieved with certainty if enterprise and 
capital were attracted from elsewhere. Finally, there were
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political and social advantages to be derived, from the 
presence of. settlers with-certain skills-and outlook, ah 
argument which .will be considered, in the next chapter. 
Whatever the reasons' for permitting the immigrants; of, 
various origins to enter the Territory, the effects of 
their presence were soon clearly observed. They brought 
with them -their own customs and cultures and while some of 
them contributed to -the' transformation of the growing urban 
areas others joined.the increasing number of settler farmers 
and set about changing, the landscape under ...their control .
The policies adopted by the administration 
depended^primarily on the ability and judgement of the. 
Governor of the Territory. Although any. new. legislation ■ 
or. policy of major importance required the approval of the 
Colonial'Secretary-there was little in the way of positive: 
and detailed direction from London. General principles ' 
were' expressed" in White Papers -and Reports from time to . 
time, but no Colonial Secretary would want, or- had the time, 
to supervise.'the detail of putting principle into practice1. 
In theory, the Governor-adopted, policies after consultation 
with his Executive' Council; if.he decided to go against: 
members'■ wishes he was required to.report the circumstances 
to the Colonial Secretary. From the records of meetings,, 
duringvthe inter-War years, there is little evidence of
• ■ ' ■ . i ■disagreement over- policies. . This is hardly surprising 
when it is remembered that;the Governor appointed the heads, 
of departments - in his civil service and until 1939 the; 
members of. the Council were strictly ex-officio appointments
When Cameron was.appointed Governor, he was
authorised to introduce a Legislative Council, with a 
membership of 13 officials and 7 nominated unofficials.
Once again the Governor was in a dominant position, for the. 
officials were obliged to support him and the unofficials 
were his own nominations; knowing this they might criticise 
government policy while remaining generally co-operative.
In the control of immigration, successive Governors
had, little opportunity to change the policies of their
predecessors. The basic law was the Immigration Ordinance
of 1924 and it was regarded by the administration as a means
of removing undesirable immigrants rather than as a method
of regulating the numbers entering the Territory. But
during the early nineteen-twenties the number of Indians
arriving began to cause concern and Ormsby-Gore, appearing
before the. P.M.C. as Britain's accredited representative,
warned members that as trustee for the Africans the.
Tanganyika, administration might be, obliged to restrict the
2entry of certain categories of immigrant. But for some 
time there was no real problem. The European settlers 
never pressed the administration to restrict Asian 
immigration with the same passion as their opposite numbers 
in Kenya; and enterprising Indians preferred to settle in 
Kenya or Uganda, where more promising opportunities for trade 
existed. Nevertheless, in the long term Tanganyika certainly 
seemed to offer a. lot. In a message to East African Indians 
the Aga Khan said:. 'Tanganyika is the one part of Africa 
which is an ideal field for Indian enterprise and energy.'
Many of his followers took his advice and the Ismaili Khoja- 
community became the most influential of the Asian groups in
the Territory. Official opinion was divided as to the
value of the Asian contribution. Whereas Cameron believed- -
Indian immigration was an asset since it provided much
needed clerks and artisans, Mitchell, his Secretary for
Native Affairs observed that the numbers from India were
too large to be easily assimilated and too many wanted! to
trade, an occupation in which they could only survive by
cheating the African. By 1930, over half the male adult ;
Indian population was engaged in trade and, as Cameron
himself acknowledged, almost all the wholesale trade was 
4in their hands. Restrictions on entry were imposed during
the second World War and never again entirely lifted. As-
Indians rightly feared, the ending of the Mandate made it
possible to continue restricting entry and there is little
doubt that a return to the more liberal pre-War position
would have resulted in far larger numbers arriving than were
5actually permitted. Without restrictions there would have 
been a much faster urban development and the scattered 
townships, minor settlements and trading centres would have 
grown very rapidly.^
Apart from imposing restrictions on Indian 
immigration, there was for a time during the inter-War period 
a possibility that restrictions might be imposed on German 
immigration. In London in 1934 there was some pressure on 
the Colonial Office to refuse entry to Tanganyika of any new 
German immigrants as soon as Hitler had carried out his
7notified intention of withdrawing from the League of Nations. 
At the time, .owing to the economic situation it seemed 
unlikely that there would ever be a large influx of European 
settlers and the idea was not followed up.
The Settlement Policy 1920 - 193;1
Although at first the Tanganyika government placed
little .restriction on Indian immigrants wishing to hecome
traders or artisans, there was reluctance to permit them to
acquire agricultural land. First, there was a request to
make land available for peasant farmers from the sub-continent...
The scheme, put forward by the Government of India was
intended to meet the. problem of.land, shortage at home and t.o
8develop the resources of the Territory. Before the terms
of the Mandate had been settled Byatt had been asked for. his
opinion and without hesitation had rejected the proposal,
asserting that as far as he knew there was no land available
on the scale envisaged. He had plenty of local backing for
his...view for. opposition-to the proposal came from every
quarter; it was perhaps the only time in East African
politics that the official view was supported by both settlers
■9and missionaries. ' Nevertheless, the Government of India
were always able to exercise influence in Whitehall and- they• 
did not abandon the idea until their own representative, , sent- 
to East Africa to investigate the position, reported as 
follows:
’The proposal to settle small cultivators in a 
special Indian reserve is in my opinion unsound 
both politically and economically; and I 
recommend that it should now be dropped.’-^
But if Byatt was successful in this instance in
preventing Indians acquiring land, he found it impossible
to stop them as individuals from buying the ex-German
properties which had to be offered for sale during the
first years of the Mandate. Nevertheless, the Tanganyika
. administration appears to have gone as far as possible to 
prevent Indians from' acquiring these properties without 
. infringing the terms of the' Mandate and- the fact that,
Indians were able to make purchases was largely due to the 
persistence of the India O f f i c e m  London. . Officials 
in, Tanganyika believed that Indian purchasers were only 
interested in the estates for speculative reasons and that :■ 
they would make no' effort to develop them. These suspicions, 
proved, to be justified'in a, number of cases and several 
•Indians resold their properties to German nationals as soon - 
as. the restrictions on their residence in'the. Territory were 
lifted.' However, there,were, some notable exceptions;
• Karimj ee, divan-jee and Company bought . several' plantations and:. -' 
retained a. major interest in the sisal industry..- But such 
instances were ■ rare, and as elsewhere in East Africa, each, 
racial group became closely identified with certain 
occupations. Government immigration and land tenure 
policies, contributed in bringing about this, social pattern.: 
in selling by auction the. ex-German estates , the 
first stage in the consolidation of a dual system. of.
- agriculture was completed. By 1 9 2 all save one of the
. . 12
properties scheduled for' liquidation had been auctioned.
Security of title for the new owners, brought development
and. in a few.years there' was a marked increase in production.
The transfer of the,, estates to new owners aroused no real
opposition and'in view of the financial position of the
Territory it was generally agreed that; the plantations ,
particularly the sisal estates, had. to be made more productive
1 x
as soon as possible.  ^ As Britain was required, to observe
existing titles over land Byatt was content, to see the old
estates pass into new hands except where a special case could
be: put forward. But once this had been done he had definite
ideas on the future development of the agricultural sector.
In London in.1922 he explained that ’the future of the
14-country lay in developing native cultivation only.’ Thus
it seems that at this stage Byatt endorsed the policy of a
dual system of agriculture only to the extent of accepting
previous alienations; further development would, occur when.
the African peasant farmer had been persuaded to grow cash
crops. Having successfully opposed, the Indian settlement
scheme he was able to resist a proposal to organise a. soldier
settlement scheme similar to the one started in Kenya. In
this case his opposition was not based on the lack of
available land but because large-scale farming was
impossible, .without sufficient capital and there was. no
indication that this would be provided. Although Byatt
was strongly criticised in the local press for his negative
IBattitude, he remained, adamant. . By the end of 1922, his 
caution was seen to be justified.since a sharp drop in 
prices, had brought hardship to many of the new settlers in 
Kenya.
But Byatt's policies were only acceptable if 
African agriculture did in fact expand as expected. Some 
early local successes encouraged him and his supporters 
although as a result his critics became more vocal than ever. 
Birst, there was a significant increase in groundnut 
production in the Tabora area; settlers soon complained 
that it was responsible for a reduction of recruiting .from
a district which provided their most efficient labour.
Next, the Chagga, with official encouragement, took to the
growing of arabica coffee in the Kilimanjaro area. By
1924, over 700,000 coffee bushes had been planted and of
these 140,000 were already producing a crop; and in the
same year the Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association was
formed with the aim of marketing the crop on a co-operative 
10basis. These developments led to bitter criticisms of 
Byatt and his officers and for a while some agitation to 
persuade tha British government to transfer’ the Kilimanjaro 
area* to Kenya..
In view of the continuing ill-feeling between 
government officials and settlers in Kenya during his term 
of office and the personal attacks on him appearing regularly 
in the local press, Byatt might be excused if he were 
prejudiced against any extension of white settlement, 
irrespective, of whether it was in the interests of the 
Territory or not. In fact, his objection was on practical 
rather than political grounds, as the following extract from 
a speech of his made in London after leaving Tanganyika 
clearly shows:
'When we extend, our railways we shall open up 
wonderful country in the Iringa and Rungwe 
districts which will hold numbers of 
European settlers without in any way 
interfering with native rights. But 
successful settlement can only take place, 
when railway communications afford a means 
of sending produce to market. It is no 
use growing wheat when you have to send it 
300 miles to the railway on the heads of 
porters.’
Unless he was being devious when he said this, 
it seems he was more anxious to protect potential settlers 
from the consequences of their own rashness rather than to
prevent them from .Obtaining land. It therefore seems to 
be an over-simplification to suggest that on taking.over 
from Byatt, 'Sir, Donald Game.ron altered the. policy of his 
pro-native predecessor to the extent, of supporting.the 
policy of white settlement in the southern paid of
: : -j o
Tanganyika and elsewhere. .  ■
What had happened was that ;Byatt•had.changed his . 
mind. ; For although African production had' increased, 
considerably in some parts of the Territory in far too many 
areas the response had been disappointing.. .This was .hardly
surprising at a time when the peasant farmer was being warned
• Ok ■ . . 19 ' v •
that growing food had. to be: given priority. ' . Subsequently
Cameron too reaffirmed this policy in a circular.-, to
administrative., officers making it abundantly clear that,
preventing famine had. to have•top priority. • But cotton
production in particular had failed to .expand at the rate <
expected. Communal plantations had not been a. success;
.thete was delay in finding suitably qualified Agricultural ;
Officers; and the report that in the Utete district in
Eastern province -' the- native only grows:cotton'because he
is: told.to-do so1 described a situation which existed in
Pi .
many other places. . Other'factors such as a. lack of 
feeder roads, fluctuating market.prices, unsatisfactory 
seed and. too few markets all contributed:to making it clear, 
that the development;of the cotton industry would take a ,■ 
long time. Before Cameron arrived, alienation' of land 
amounting to 26,000 acres took, place thereby. establishing . ,
the-principle that, more land would be made available for.
• 22’ ' ‘ non-Africans when circumstances justified it. These
allocations of land: aroused no; criticism either in the
British parliament or at the meetings of the P.M.C. when
the 1924 annual report was presented.
But the most important support for the principle
of increasing white, settlement came with the publication of
25the report of the East African Commission in 1925* Just
as the Land Ordinance provided the regulatory basis for- land
alienation, the recommendations of this Commission furnished.
the imprimatur making it possible for successive Governors
to promote non-African settlement at whatever pace they
thought best. Eor the Commission in its membership and
the manner of its appointment reflected the common approach
to Colonial matters adopted by all three political parties
24xn Brxtain at that time.
On the main issue of seeking means to promote
economic development the members were in general agreement
although in a separate statement one member recorded his
objections to any policy which increased unduly the
proportion of the African population working away from 
25their homes. All were agreed, that white settlement was
needed in places which were climatically suitable because,
as they explained 'East Africa can only progress economically
and socially on the basis of full and complete co-operation
between all the races.' In the Gase of Tanganyika the
Commission observed:
'... the north east and south west parts of the 
-Territory were suitable for European settlement 
capable of producing under skilled management 
valuable crops of coffee and maize.
It was recognized that it would be almost impossible to
grow cereals profitably in the south west unless a railway
was constructed and it was assumed, with misplaced confidence 
as: it turned out, that there would be no difficulty in 
financing such a project. The Commission recommended that 
£10 million should be found for the development of railways 
in East Africa and that the interest due on any money loaned 
for this development should be paid by the Imperial 
Exchequer. The Commission argued that not only was there 
a moral obligation to help East Africa but also railway 
development, would reduce unemployment charges at home.
The recommendations of the Commission are: of 
interest in that they indicate that, its chairman, Ormsby- 
Gore, had become converted to the dual policy as the means 
for development. Certainly on his past record it could 
have, been expected that he would have supported Byatt1 s 
earlier views. He had. once been dubbed 'an ultra— 
negrophile.' and was on record, as. saying that he would have
27liked to see East Africa developing on West African lines. 1 
It seems that he was favourably impressed by Lord Belamere 
and. for a time he was enthusiastic about prospects for 
settlement in south west Tanganyika.
The Report had. particularly important consequences 
for the course of white settlement in the Territory. In 
Kenya, and Uganda, the Commission had to accept what they 
found and could only recommend improvements; with Tanganyika 
there was a greater potential for changing the existing 
balance between the African and. non-African sectors, leading 
to a.similarity with either one of the other territories.
In adopting a. course mid-way between them, it cannot be said 
that the Commission made out a convincing case for their:
recommendations on purely economic grounds and it. is 
abundantly clear that other matters were taken into account. 
A- Mandate was ah entirely new concept in international . . , 
affairs and both in London and East. Africa many believed 
that the League of Nations was entitled, to demand the 
withdrawal of the. British administration from, Tanganyika. 
With Germany already pressing for a return of• hey colonies 
and her publicists'.taking every opportunity to emphasise 
the German economic achievements in Africa before .1914, it 
was by no means certain that the local administration could 
afford to wait for African production of cash crops to 
improve. If better results could not be left to the. chiefs
as in Uganda, an experienced and. well-staffed Agricultural
■ . 28 Department was necessary and this wags manifestly lacking.
.The Commission observed, that Britain.1 s security of title
was. best ensured by good administration and the opening, up
of the country-to all legitimate enterprise. > A-s a result
not.only would the African population benefit/from a. general
increase in economic activity,but■also, it was clearly
implied, its best interests were: served if British control
continued. Thus was policy adapted in the' light of past:
results and international uncertainties: and. the way wass
open to promote white settlement on a much larger scale
than had hitherto been attempted. But whereas at,"this
time African opinion in much of the Territory was not
averse to more. European settlements , as will be described -
later ,1' administrative officers , in the districts showed
more-concern. .Many were convinced that a settlement policy
had:to be determined, by the labour position; otherwise, a
conflict between settlers and officials, similar- to that 
which had recently occurred in Kenya, was inevitable. A 
resolution passed: at the 1924 Administrative. Officers 
Conference clearly expresses this view:
'This Conference is unable to reconcile the 
policies, of non-native and native development 
since any expansion in the latter direction 
must gravely reduce the labour supply for non­
native estates, as it had. in Uganda. In view 
therebf, this Conference entertains doubts as 
to the advisability of alienating more land 
for non-native development.^^
The East African Commission must have been aware
of these views but made little attempt to offer an answer.
It was already obvious that increased militancy from
settlers and estate managers could be expected and earlier
the same year the influential Tanga Planters Association had
met and passed, a. resolution 'that -government officials
should be empowered to make natives available for work
unless in possession of other visible means.' There was,
therefore, little, doubt that, the pressure on the government
for. help in providing labour would grow stronger as the
amount of investment in agriculture increased. Por the
51time beings no chronic labour shortage was expected. A
Poll Tax had been introduced in 1925 end this led to an 
increase in the number of African men. seeking work. Also, 
the practice of permitting labour recruiters from Kenya to 
operate in the Territory was curtailed. In 1924 all 
requests, from these recruiters were refused and the Annual 
Report for the year contained the observation that Kenya was 
wrong to suppose that the Territory would be relied upon to 
provide labour for another country whenever it was required.
Although the principle that fresh land could be
alienated for development was established, certain
limitations were at once imposed. First, in areas
admitted to be already overcrowded no applications were
considered. Secondly, the same rule applied in areas
where it was considered that racial harmony might suffer
if alienation was permitted; Masailand provided the most
obvious example of the application of this rule, presumably
because it was considered that it would take a genex^ation at
least to teach the Masai that stock theft was an
unprofitable pastime.  ^ Thirdly, xn certain other
districts where alienation would be permitted, it was
decided that applicants for land would not be permitted, to
54select any piece of land they desired. Instead, they
would only be allowed., to apply for those areas scheduled 
as being suitable, for alienation. The intention was to 
prevent would-be settlers from picking out the most fertile 
stretches of land for themselves and leaving the less 
attractive areas outside their proposed, boundaries. This 
had happened in the past, with the result that it was 
immediately obvious to any visitor that the white settlers 
occupied the good land and the Africans had been left in 
occupation of the poorer areas. Within a. short space of 
time the contrast became even more striking; with more 
capital and with different motivations the European farmers 
had little difficulty in improving their land, further and 
the Africans were left to make comparisons and consider 
whether their interests were being properly protected.
Although Cameron was not responsible for. a change 
in land settlement policy his method of implementation
showed that there was a different hand at the. helm. There
was a more, systematic approach to finding which tracts of
land were available for alienation and, once the choice had
been made, less, delay in negotiations with potential
settlers. Undoubtedly, the new Governor could have, adopted
a negative policy in respect of any policy he disagreed with
and on the settlement issue he could have seen to it that
the amount of.land, available for alienation was kept to a
minimum. That he did not do so is important, and it needs
an understanding of Cameron's own views and the part he
played in the alienations which followed. After all, he
had. come from the West Coast where he had: served under
Lugard whom he greatly admired. It was known that he was
an enthusiastic supporter of the pxdnciples of Indirect Rule
and a West African approach to development might have been
expected from him. But he also approved of Lugard's ideal
of the Dual Mandate and the need to combine the protection
of indigenous interests with the duty to develop colonial
resources-for the benefit of. the world.^ When the
Colonial Office demurred on receiving his proposals, for
developing the Territory he pointed out that 'he had not
been appointed Governor to sit on the land.'^ Eor.-
Cameron understood the business, of politics. He
appreciated that the recommendations of the East African
Commission had been accepted! in London by those who mattered
even Lord Milner had! found it necessary to issue a warning
57on the consequences of failing to develop the Territory. 1 
Either he had to implement the. policies as proposed or he 
had to provide good reasons, for rejecting them. Eor
although he. was well' aware,, of. African anxieties over the 
question of title to their land he also accepted the. force 
of the argument of the. Commission that in some areas the 
'.African population ■.was. very sparse, and: there was little or, 
no justification in leaving fertile land unoccupied and ' 
undeveloped.^^
In deciding-on the course to adopt Cameron had - 
surprisingly little .direction from London. Before sailing 
for East Africa’ ha: had had; discussions with members of the . 
Commission on' their return from East Africa. Presumably 
too he discussed.the settlement question with the. Colonial 
Secretary although it is clear, that he was given no precise 
instructions. ; - Even -when John -Scott, the acting Governor, 
before Cameron arrived, sent to the Office.a copy of the 
minutes of the 1924 Administrative Officers Conference with' 
its caveat on the question' of further alienation, from the, 
file now available it would seem that the.'warning was not 
worthy of comment. It was not',surprising that when looking 
back Cameron criticised, the officials,in London at the time 
for their lack of constructive thinking.^
Shortly after arriving^in Tanganyika., Cameron- was 
asked, by some potential settlers whether he was -prepared to 
let them obtain land in Iringa province, the area the 
Commission had considered suitable for white settlement, f 
..Lord Delamere had-already obtained, land In-the Iringa area 
and had formed, a company, Colonists Ltd., which, as its name 
implied, was aimed, at assisting and encouraging further 
European settlement. ; Later ,in the year, Delamere 
convened a conference at Tukuyu at which settlers fromr.
Eastern Africa and the Khodesias discussed ways of 
promoting settlement. In view of the increased interest 
in land alienation, Cameron decided to obtain clear 
instructions from London on the policy to be adopted. He 
also arranged for a survey of the area in case the Commission 
had been over-optimistic in their assessment of its potential. 
Not unsurprisingly in view of his past experience and the . 
absence of any guidance from the Office in the past, he 
explained in detail the instructions issued to his survey 
team.'4'2
Learning of these developments, the Tanga Planters. 
Association -was soon voicing its- fears that its members 
labour position would be in jeopardy. Attitudes to 
settlement in Tanganyika, were already quite different from 
Kenya, where any extension of settlement was welcomed .since 
it gave added weight to demands to be rid of Colonial Office 
control. In Tanganyika, economic advantages were more 
important than political aspirations, a consequence of the 
greater importance of plantation agriculture compared with 
mixed farming. Eor the former represented a business 
activity with the profit motive uppermost whereas the latter 
was often accompanied by a closer and more emotional 
identification with the land and the future of the Territory.
The Colonial Office reply to Cameron was cautious 
to the point of being obstructive. It was observed that if 
land for settlers was auctioned before the railway was 
constructed the successful bidder might feel that he had 
been cheated if the railway plan was abandoned or the 
alignment for it drastically changed. Therefore, it was
suggested, applications should he discouraged until the line 
had nearly reached Lake Nyasa. Oameron retorted that
people in the United Kingdom might be put off by official 
discouragement but this would not do as an answer to 
applicants already in East Africa. He suggested that either 
available land must be offered, for sale by auction or ’there 
must be a frank declaration at once that the. government does 
not propose to alienate any land at present.’ In the
Office it was left to Ormsby-Gore, now Under-Secretary, to 
decide; he ruled that the Governor should await the report 
of his survey team and should, if possible, delay the 
auctions until the route of the proposed railway was 
decided.^
This exchange., explains Cameron’s often quoted
remark that it was impossible to oppose non-native settle-
4-6ment in Tanganyika. In spite of his evident rapport
with Delamere he was* always prepared, and able, to resist
4-7settlers demands if he. thought them unjustified. But he
could not ignore the recommendations of a Parliamentary 
Commission which had been accepted by the British government; 
he. believed the Colonial Secretary must take the responsibility 
and- provide the explanation for his decision.
Having obtained some measure of support for his 
proposals Cameron used the occasion of the opening of the 
newly established Legislative Council to explain his 
settlement plans. He said that applications for land, in 
the southern highlands would be considered, adding that non­
native settlement would be encouraged wherever, land was 
available, the climate suitable and transport facilities
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48adequate. His: announcement was well received by settler
leaders since it met the demands made at the Tukuyu 
conference mentioned above.
The preliminary survey, which led to a number of
new alienations, was only the beginning. Cameron had
repeatedly said that there would be no hurried transfer of
land to settlers as had occurred in Kenya and Southern
Rhodesia. following the recommendations of the Hilton
Young Commission, Cameron appointed a Land Survey Team to
investigate the irascibilities for large-scale farming in
49every province deemed to be suitable. He announced that
further alienation of land would depend, on the recommendations 
of the Team. The members of the Team were all. officials and 
their predictably cautious attitude to white settlement, 
evidenced in the first report, caused disappointment among 
settlers. Mindful of this, in the second report the 
chairman, E.J. Bagshawe, justified his Team's policy of. 
caution, by quoting a warning contained in the Hilton Young 
report that 'it was vital to the future interests of the 
Territory and especially to those of the settler community 
to avoid unrest which land shortage would produce among the 
natives.' The Commission had observed that the African 
population would probably increase and that a generous area 
of land had to be set aside for this contingency; but, it 
was argued, there had^ to be a limit to the area reserved on 
this basis and 'native agriculture had to adbpt improved and 
more intensive methods of cultivation.' Bagshawe concluded 
that this involved the African peasant farmer in copying 
'the farming practices of his European neighbours who needed
for mixed- farming about 5?000 acres to make a. reasonable 
profit» Therefore, he argued, it was not too much to
set aside. 520 acres for each African family since they 
would need all of this amount of land as they came to adopt 
improved, methods of farming. In spite of setting aside 
plenty of land on this basis for the indigenous population 
Bagshawe and his team were able to recommend that substantial 
areas in the south-west could be alienated. It-indicated 
how sparse the native population was at that time. This 
Report, and the others which followed it prepared by the 
same Team, was adopted by the government and became the 
basis of the settlement policy. Nevertheless, other; 
factors besides the actual availability of land were taken 
into account; as already described a large portion of the 
Territory was declared, to be closed to the usual kind of 
non-African settlement, thereby causing a concentration of 
sisal plantations in a relatively small area and other kinds 
of plantations and mixed farming in those provinces open to 
applications.^
Excluding plots of land of under 100 acres, by the 
end* of 1951 there were 1,555 estates owned by non-Africans 
amounting to nearly 1.9 million acres. This total was 
divided almost equally between plantations and mixed farms 
and over one quarter of it represents land alienated! during 
Cameron's governorship (Table III).
Erom these figures it is evident that in spite of 
the publicity given to the opening up of the south west for 
non-African settlement, much of theland alienated was 
situated elsewhere in the Territory. In a Report commissioned
■TABLE ,111
■ ■ ’; LAND. ALIENATED TO NON-NATIVES 1925-1950
Year South-western 
area, (iringa , 
province)
Northern
province
Other Total
1925 1,320 1,279 7,268 9,867
1926., . 49,752 7,190 7,087 64,029,
1927 24,203 69,463 . 22,333 116,201
1928. 68,414; 40,107 ,46,307 134,828
1929 29,230 47,367 . 47,476 124,293
1950 ■ 9,355 10,880 37,232 57,467
Totals 182,276 176,486 167,923 326,685
(source: -Annual-Reports of the Land
Department (Government Printer, 
Dar es Salaam).,
by the Colonial Secretary, Sir Sydney Armitage' Smith made 
this apposite observation:
'When some 130 square miles of land in the 
Iringa province was put up for auction in 
1929, no bids were received .... 'suitable' 
land is not suitable for non-native 
development when it is inaccessible.1^
The settlement lobby which had. by now become active in
London was disappointed to learn that so few applications
for the new land were forthcoming and attributed the lack
of response to Cameron's policies. In fact, it was a
combination of several factors which made Tanganyika an
unattractive proposition for many potential settlers.
First, it seemed that Cameron only wanted a
limited number of.new settlers and was well aware of the
likely political cost of making the Territory dependent on
settler-production for economic development in the future.
He therefore tried, to strike a balance between the
obligation to follow the recommendations of the East Africa
Commission and his determination to prevent any increase in
settler political influence.  ^ Many of his comments on
white settlement could be construed as showing a lack of
sympathy where encouragement was needed and it was apparent
that he Intended to observe the native paramountcy principle:
elaborated in the Devonshire White Paper in spite of the fact
that Amery held different views. At meetings of the P.M.C.
he argued that white settlement was useful because it
provided the 'experimental factor' and would thus assist;
African development and that- the white farmers were not
54-real settlers, meaning colonists. On another occasion
he described much of the Territory's land as being 'quite
unfit for colonisation and there. could be no permanent
settlement of a European community unless its members: were
55
prepared to undertake all kinds of work.'-^ Such remarks
were, not calculated to encourage, a potential settler to make
a home in the Territory. But apart from such statements
it is impossible to know how many Europeans were put off by
tales of excessive delays on the part of the government in
carrying out surveys on land permitted for alienation.
Writing privately to Cameron, Sir Sydney Henn, the chairman
for the time: of the., Joint East Africa Board, mentioned that
he had’, received a letter from Tukuyu, which alleged that
thirty men had been waiting for up to two years for a decision
on their land applications and that 'it was such letters
which were seized, on by men like Joelson and used to spread
56the wrong ideas;. '
The second factor which discouraged settlement was
the. belief that an adequate supply of African Ebour might
not be forthcoming. Cameron was determined to prevent the
controversies which had followed the issue of the Northey
circulars in Kenya and he therefore drafted precise
instructions on the role of government officers in obtaining
recruits for private employers. District Commissioners
were told to encourage able-bodied Africans either to grow
cash crops at home or, to seek work on an estate; no attempt
was to be made to influence them in their choice but they
57should be 'exhorted' to opt for one of the alternatives. 
.Cameron maintained that he wanted the administration to 
adopt an attitude of strict neutrality in the matter 
although to some it seemed that his circular contained a
58bias towards persuading Africans to stay at home."^ The'
settlers certainly believed, that this was how it was
interpreted, and it was claimed 'that some administrative
officers ordered natives to stay at home and grow economic
crops.' During the period 1920 - 1929 the proportion
of cotton grown on plantations was being progressively
reduced as African farmers came to realise the advantages
in obtaining a. cash income. U lus when the East Africa
Standard-came out with the headline, 'The Cotton Menace
in Tanganyika1 , it was not referring to an imminent disaster
brought about by drought or disease but to the threat to
60the labour supply for the. plantations.
Moreover, on the. device of using taxation as a
means of making Africans earn wages, the Governor was
characteristically forthright. In a. memorandum on the
labour position in the Territory, he wrote: 'Coercion
of labour by pressure of direct taxation is little, if
anything, removed from the coercion of labour by force;
61the latter is the more honest course.' Thus his
approach to the labour problem differed from that of - Scott,
who had been acting Governor until his arrival. Whereas
the latter observed that the administration had a certain
obligation to help the non-native, plantation owners to
secure labour, Cameron decided that white settlement should
62proceed only as fast as the labour supply would permit.
Nevertheless, he acknowledged that if too many Africans were
persuaded to grow cash crops on their own account and
recruitment for the estates suffered, 'the Territory will.
65get a;bad name and capital will be driven away.' As
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more settlers obtained land the problem grew and. Bagshawe
in his Band Survey Reports warned that if all the land he
found available for alienation was occupied by settlers
there was no prospect of obtaining from the local population
the necessary labour force. The warning did not go
unheeded and.Cameron on several occasions made it clear
that the supply of labour for sisal plantations was his 
64-first concern. .Doubtless the problem was accentuated
by the widespread under-employment of labour at the time.
Plantation managers competed for labour by making the daily
tasks very light and consequently the output per man was 
65extremely low.
Thirdly, the problems caused, by the spatial
factor, particularly the remoteness of the south-west,
need to be considered. Ho doubt Armitage Smith was
correct in observing that settlers were unlikely to bid
for land which was. inaccessible. Cameron had made it
clear that white settlement in the south-west would only
be encouraged if the proposed railway was constructed.
His warning aroused little comment at first since there
seemed to be no doubt that the British government would
see that the recommendations of the East African Commission
were implemented for the reasons stated. Already the
necessary legislation had been passed to enable funds to
be borrowed with repayment guaranteed by the British 
66government. But then the Treasury unexpectedly refused
to provide, funds to meet interest charges in spite of the 
fact that similar aid had been given in the case of the 
Kampala extension in 1923- Thus either the Tanganyika
government would be saddled with the burden of paying
considerable sums annually or the line would have to be
operated at a profit almost at once; and this according
67to expert advice could never happen. Undeterred, the
government applied for two million pounds from the loan
fund for the project, stating in the application that the
Territory would be unable to meet the interest charges
from its own resources. Not surprisingly the Schuster
committee, appointed to consider the applications to make
use of the fund, turned down the proposal while recommending
68that a full survey should be carried out.
The set-back to the railway proposal enabled 
Cameron to proceed, more slowly with alienation in the south­
west without it appearing that he was now rejecting the 
dual policy. He explained his position as follows:
'There is not the slightest prospect of the 
railway being built at present if Tanganyika 
has to bear the burden of the debt charges ... 
until more railways are built it would be 
impossible to alienate more land.'^
In this statement he implied that the initiative
rested with London; later, however, he admitted that
Britain would only help if a strong case was presented
and in his view this was not possible. Nevertheless, he
took care to comply with the recommendation of the Hilton
Young Commission that a full economic survey should be
carried out and a route for the line to be decided after
70more information was available.' Thus in 1930 the 
Governor appointed his friend, Henn, as chairman of a 
commission to consider several possible alignments.
(see Appendix ii and Map III). By this time, the
Colonial Development Act, 1929 had- been passed: and it was - 
possible for Britain to pay the. interest charges on colonial 
loans.. - . . .
Nevertheless,, although the railway plan had been
■thwarted by problems of finance, there was no complete,
cessation of. settlement in the=south-west. ' As the settlers
established there well knew, the: absence of a railway was. no
longer an .obstacle to large scale farming in every case.
Since 1924 when the Commission report was written, motor. ,
transport was'introducing another dimension. A new road
from Dodoma to the Ruaha. river was ready by the end of 1923,
and a pontoon made it; possible to take vehicles across the
river. At once -an enterprising' trader started a. passenger.
service and forwarding agency between Dodoma and the southern
highlands. Two years later the route for a better road
from Iringa to Northern Rhodesia, was. surveyed. ; In 1930 a
bridge was built -in place, of the Ruaha pontoon,, an improve- -
ment amply justified:, by the increase in road traffic. 'Bor
while Cameron was Governor the consumption of motor fuel
■increased, by more than five-fold. Some areas otherwise
suitable for settlement, such as Upper Babaga;(south of
Iringa. township) remained isolated, with the roads: often
becoming impassable, after h'eayy rains; elsewhere, .the closing.'
of roads during ’ the rainy season was no more'-than a temporary
inconvenience. , It is significant that when Cameron drafted.;
a. memorandum for the Joint .Select' Committee, he explained.'
that European settlement on a Ganger scale was impossible
* - 71because the amount of land, available was limited.( He 
made no reference to the failure to construct the railway. .
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It seems that for a particular, type of. settler,, the . .:
remoteness: of the south-west made: the area unattractive, 
at-least until after: the Depression. Much depended on . 
what crops settlers intended, to grow and how anxious they 
were; to obtain the maximum returns on their, investment. ■
' Those. who produced, little, .either because they were 
prepared: to live frugally or because, they had. private 
means , ' were., not. particularly interested in the transport, 
cost factors. Others1 who were satisfied, were those: growing 
.crops- of a high'value: relative: to.'their weight or, as,, in. 
the case, of the Germans, those enjoying a special relation­
ship with a. trading company which would arrange transport 
..for their; clients., •
; V' More’serious for the-enterprising settler was the
general uncertainty over the price he might expect for. any 
crop he could produce. Although Cameron was fortunate in 
that ..there was a general ■ recovery , in world trade , which „ > 
lasted for most of his time in. Tanganyika-, it was: by now 
weli. known that farming' in the Territory was. oust as difficult 
as in most other- parts of tropical;'Africa. ■The settlers 
had. found that except for. relatively-8 short periods; it was: 
...always: more difficult to sell, crops than to grow- them. 
Mitchell, speaking in. London in 1931,. echoed the:; disillusion-'
. ment of many settler farmers when, he- said:.
1 It is difficult to think of a single, raw. ■
-material which is not over-produced already ,
.. • - and either restricted' in production or
, controlled .by. some government scheme .and., 
so prevented.from conferring-on Europe those- 
extraordinary benefits Which the:, raw •>
. .materials. of Africa were ] supposed,, to confer.’
Although Mitchell was speaking during -the; Depression he
.described- a,.state of affairs which existed only too often 
in East Africa, during, the; period between the .World Wars.
It was .an inevitable situation at a time when little 
diversification in the. type: of. crop produced was. possible 
and. when: domestic markets, were virtually non-existent. .
/...- In the sale . of products .overseas, Tanganyika
;might, have been at an even greater disadvantage than the
other East; African territories owing to the .conditions of
the:.'Mandate. which demanded the observance' of. an ’open-door*
policy. As it turned out the British connection secured
several advantages for the Territory. Exports to. Britain
were given the same preferential treatment as those from
the Dominions and Colonies; and in commercial treaties
with other .powers Britain often managed to obtain concessions
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for. Tanganyika, exports. ^ The figures in Table IV give- an 
indication of the pattern of trade during the period of the 
Mandate and, from-them it is evident that there must be 
reservations- when, describing the Tanganyika colonial economy . 
as being.' * complementary1. to that of the metropolitan 
country. There were no restrictions.imposed on the 
Tanganyika government making it necessary to direct the 
greater part, of the" export trade to Britain; and,- more 
important, there could.be no preference, granted for imports 
from Britain owing to the. provisions, of the Congo Basin 
treaties. Nevertheless, it was certainly the intention to. 
develop the: Tanganyika economy in a way that would make it 
complementary to the industrialised nations. At the - 
Governors1' Conference in' 1935* Sir.Harold MacMichael stated • 
that ’ it-, was undesirable to accelerate the Industrialization
1 - rJABLE- IV.
PERCENTAGE OE VALUE' OE TOTAL DOMESTIC
EXPORTS TO DIEEERENT COUNTRIES OET 
. DESTINATION '
Average Average • Year
' 1920-24 1923-29 1933
United Kingdom 24.-1 18.6 31-3
Kenya/Uganda ' . 26.9 . 28.9 22.9
Rest of Commonwealth '22.4 11.3 14.4
Foreign countries - 26.6 42.0 31 *4
(source:. Annual Trade Reports?
Government X^rinter, Dar 
es Salaam);
Year
1939
37.1
23.4 
. 13,3
26.2
of East Africa1 and added that it would be a country of
primary produce for many years to come; and the same view
was expressed, by the Oolonial Secretary in the House of 
74-Commons .1
What is of particular relevance to the settlement
pattern is the steady increase in imports, particularly of
agricultural products, from Kenya and. Uganda. Not only did
the trend provide an additional argument for. Lord Chesham
and his supporters, as described later, but also it was not'
overlooked by Cameron; when he wrote that the establishing
of a sugar'industry in Moshi district was an achievement.
giving him particular satisfaction, he no doubt expected
the product to replace some of the sugar imported from 
75Uganda. ^ Common tariffs had been introduced in 1922 and
in 192.7 a full customs union had been created providing an
advantage for the better-organized producers of Kenya and
Uganda. In the arguments which ensued, the Tanganyika
administration maintained, not very convincingly, that the
arrangements were not detrimental to the Territory1s
interests and the. P.M.C., after requesting information,
76seemed unwilling to investigate the matter further. The
fact remains that the Territory!s balance of trade with
77Kenya and Uganda steadily deteriorated.
Next, there was the reluctance of both the British 
and Tanganyika governments to provide any financial help for 
new settlers. In accordance with the recommendation of the 
Hilton Young Commission that more positive support for 
settlers should be provided, Cameron appointed a committee 
of his. Legislative Council !to submit proposals in connection
with land development and the provision of financial 
assistance to settlers and planters.1^  In addition to 
other recommendations, the committee proposed that an 
Agricultural Development Loan fund should be created in order 
to help potential settlers who had. insufficient capital to 
start farming. This and the other measures were necessary, 
the committee concluded, because any further development in .. 
the Territory depended on further investment in the non- 
African farming sector. Certainly, loans for settlers could 
have been justified more at this time than any other for it 
happened that the publication of the committee1s report 
followed shortly after the publication of. a booklet setting
79out the prospects for tea-growing m  the Southern Highlands; 
even more than in the case of. coffee-growing, the tea planter 
needed adequate capital support to tide him over the years 
before his bushes began to yield and. give him some return.
In Kenya, the. Land Bank was to start the following year.* and, 
in Southern Rhodesia it was already operating; Camerons 
rejection of this,' together, with the other proposals of the 
committee, was just one more indication that at. this time 
there wouid be no official encouiragement for further settle­
ment. There is little doubt that if loans had, been 
obtainable there would have been more applications for some 
of the land known.to be available.
Before sending his..- comments on the committee^
proposals to London, Cameron discussed, them at length with
his. Executive Council and he was able to end his. despatch
with the assurance that the members were unanimous in their
80support for his views. His despatch amounted to a total
117-
rejection o£ the committee's proposals for four reasons.
Eirst, no facts had been offered to support the contention 
that further development depended on increased investment 
in the non-African sector; second, funds for supporting 
white settlers would not be a charge on the general revenue
o n
of the Territory; third, if the British government
intended, to provide funds they should be used to construct 
the. railway to the south-west and. this would by itself 
encourage settlement; finally, a rapid increase in settle­
ment might endanger the supply of labour for the sisal 
industry. In a. second despatch written the same day
Oameron again referred to the report, observing that the 
aims of the Committee were 'primarily political, the desire
oh the. unofficial element being to increase the number of
8 oEuropeans in the Territory.'
In the Colonial Office, Cameron's hostility to 
attempts to encourage settlement were supported and it was 
noted that whereas Colonial Development Eunda might be used 
to construct the railway it would be., improper to use them 
to aid new settlers from Britain. Passfield, who had 
succeeded. Amery, noted that the Governor's views were sound 
and added, with a. vagueness no doubt intentional, 'that when 
the time comes, road, development might be coupled, with a
83
railway.' And so, in spite of the recommendation of the 
Hilton Young Commission that settlement should be encouraged, 
it was decided to adopt none of the measures which were 
deemed necessary to make the Territory attractive to new 
settlers.
Einally, the durability of Britain's mandate over
the Territory was the subject of so much debate and
speculation that it Was only to be expected that private
investors would, look for safer havens for their money.
In spite of Amery's forthright assertions that Tanganyika
was part of the British Empire and Cameron's public statement
that the Mandate could not be terminated, the doubts over
the Territory's future persisted. Eor the E.M.C. took note
of legal advice given to them to the effect that a mandated
territory was never ceded to the mandatory and this ruling
encouraged the German and Italian delegates at the League- of
Nations to argue that the system of mandates was no more than'
84-a temporary arrangement. In Britain there were sections
of the. Liberal and Labour parties in favour of restoring
Tanganyika to Germany. The Liberal leader, Sir Archibald
Sinclair, thought that it was a. question of justice that all
European countries should be allowed to possess colonies
while a group of Labour M.P.s argued that if it was untrue
that Germany had mismanaged her colonies there was no reason
85for not handing them back.  ^ When Hitler came to power and
the character of his regime became known much of the support
for. these arguments was diminished. Instead,, other
proposals were heard to the effect that Tanganyika might be
handed over as part of a general settlement with the German 
86dictator. Colonies were still considered a necessity in
most circles and it was feared that failure to satisfy 
German demands would lead to a renewal of the conflict 
broken off in 1918. Thus the Daily Mail in 1954-: argued 
that steps must be taken at once to give Germany elbow room;
and as late-,as 1937 the Observer .was prepared to. publish
an article which stated:: .
' 1 In 1918 the. .'.(British) Empire was big enough.
Yet we'added German colonies to it. (Is) . ' '
' the youth of this country to be sacrificed in
' "war to prevent Germany having colonies when 
everyone else is allowed to have colonies?’g^
It is of interest to look back,’at these manifestations of
moral indignation at the supposedly selfish attitudes, of
successive’ British governments and. to observe, how it was
generally.accepted at that time- that it was more important -
to satisfy Germany's need- for prestige than to take into
account the interests of the colonial subjects. This was
partly due to there'being 110 clear appreciation of how such
interests, were . best served, and partly to the growing fear
- Qg
that the conflict which ended in 1918. would be .renewed.
But the apparent willingness to consider ending 
the Mandate caused dismay in the. Colonial Office and in ■ 
the. Secretariat in Bar. es Salaam.- The more militant 
Germans, in ...the Territory were encouraged to. believe that 
British public opinion would support a transfer of authority- 
to’Germany and potential investors of other nationalities, ■ 
whether interested'In-farming or .light industry, had second 
thoughts before parting.with their money. for the newcomer 
to East Africa, Kenya seemed more- attractive, with.title to 
land more secure, a durable government, markets more 
accessible and an administration which unequivocally 
favoured , settlement... . . . .
Se111er Pre s sure Group s
As might be. expected, Cameron became .progressively
less popular with the British settler community as it 
became clear that his professed support for European 
settlement meant very little In practice. His pre­
occupation with his plans for. African political development
convinced the settlers and plantation managers that he had
89little: time to spare for their, problems. The steps
taken to improve, communications met with only qualified
approval; although there was satisfaction at the extension
of the Tanga lines from Moshi to Arusha, it was only too
evident that Cameron showed little enthusiasm for the
proposed south-west railway, which, if constructed, would
have made, it necessary to attract new settlers in order to 
90make it pay. Consequently, support from British settlers
for: the plans for. closer union with Kenya increased, as did
calls for* their rejection from articulate Asians and Africans.
It was in Northern province that most of the
opposition to Cameron was concentrated. To the dismay of
the Colonial Office at times the Governor seemed to en^ joy
the hostility he provoked and it was duly noted there that:
91some of his opponents were by no means extremists. For
his part, Cameron dismissed the criticism from settlers as
92
being irrational and exaggerated. As proof of his support
for the dual system, in 1929 he arranged the publication of
his recommendations to London for funds to promote research
95to benefit the sisal and coffee industries. However, he 
always took the' trouble to try and retain the confidence of 
the Asian and African communities. In this he was 
successful, by his public disputes with the settlers, his 
obvious reluctance to encourage white, settlement, and), his 
opposition to closer union.
Nevertheless, although opposition to the Governor 
and his policies provided a. common cause for British 
unofficial opinion, settler political organization remained 
fragmented and impotent. The spatial factor made' it 
necessary for any political association to be. tied, to a 
particular locality, and involved in parochial rather than 
territorial problems. Thus there came into existence a 
number of Farmer/Planter Associations which usually operated 
within the. confines of. an administrative district. An 
exception was the European Constitutional Association, 
founded in 1928, but this was specifically designed to 
achieve.: a united outlook on matters affecting the future of 
the Territory rather than in.influencing the policies of the 
local administration. However, the local Associations 
usually held annual meetings, which provided opportunities 
to voice complaints and. to seek the support of the unofficial 
members of .the Legislative Council. As might be expected 
from meetings dominated by British settlers, in 1930 
resolutions were passed approving of the principle of closer 
union providing that. a. substantial degree of local autonomy 
was granted and: deploring the refusal of the British govern­
ment to allow settlers in all three territories to be
associated with the local administrations in sharing the
94trusteeship for the African inhabitants. Two years
before, at the 1928 meeting, Cameron's settlement policy came 
in for strong criticism on the grounds that the measures, 
adopted were insufficient and unsatisfactory-. The Governor 
was. urged to establish a Land Board to facilitate settle­
ment.’ and to invite non-officials to become members of it.
Gameron took pains to answer the criticisms in detail and 
he had his observations issued as a. circular letter so that 
there would be no misunderstanding, of his attitude.^ He
observed that there were no funds to assist European settle­
ment and the government received no grant-in-aid for this 
purpose, such as had been given to certain other British- 
administered territories; he went oh to explain that 
although it was possible to tax Europeans in order to 
finance white . settlement it would be. improper to tax. Indians 
and Africans ,in order to provide aid to European settlers. 
His arguments were impressive.but the magisterial style of 
the circular was not calculated to increase his popularity, 
it is of interest to note -that his successor, Sir Stewart
Symes, who was reputed to be more sympathetic to settler
96 ■aspirations, fully supported this view. But although 
he ruled.out aid to settlers from the general revenue of 
the Territory, Symes favoured what he termed 'a judicious 
promotion of British settlement1, provided the numbers were 
limited and only settlers of good standing were accepted.
In the Colonial Office the minutes, dealing with his despatch 
contain the observation that since he was continuing 
Cameron’s policies, no further directive was necessary.^
It is a commonplace to contrast the minimal 
influence exercised by the Tanganyika settlers with the 
very different situation in Kenya and to explain the 
contrast in terms of the many national origins of the 
Tanganyika settlers and their relative lack of numbers.
But there were other reasons which' were equally, if not 
more, important. First, the Kenya settlers secured from
the government early in the nineteen-twenties the right to
be consulted* 'Government by agreement' as it was termed,
was obtained largely through the efforts of Delamere. By
the time the Tanganyika settlers were sufficiently numerous
to demand more from their administration there was no one of
the calibre of that remarkable man to speak for them.
Secondly, and closely allied to the first point, in Kenya,
settlers exercised influence and obtained the detailed
information about government policies as a result of the
membership of unofficials on a number of important committees
98and boards; this was not the case in Tanganyika.' Third, 
after 1919 the European unofficial members of the 
Legislative Council were elected whereas in Tanganyika 
they were nominated by the Governor until the electoral 
system applying to all races was introduced shortly before 
Independence. Consequently, Cameron and his successors 
were never unnerved by settler criticism and were confident 
of support from London. Before the Joint Select Committee, 
Cameron pointed out that the term settler was used 
emotively and often, he implied, inappropriately:
'Every European is either an official, a 
missionary or. a settler. The Iringa people 
talk of themselves as farmers ... when you 
get politically minded you use the term 
settler.'
This observation was misleading, because by no 
means all non-official Europeans unconnected with the 
Missions considered themselves to be settlers. Very few 
of the commercial community and only some professional men 
would have, been prepared to place themselves in this 
category. Theoccupational breakdown of the European
population during the period,gives some indication of the .
number of true settlers, and explains why Cameron was often
inclined to ignore their demands (Table: V).
In the face of Cameron's indifference, the
settlers often reacted by lobbying individual M.P.s, the
Joint Africa Board or the London Chamber of Commerce. The
second named, for a time also represented British interests
in the fthodesias and Nya sal and. and had been founded in 1926
with the aim of uniting all interests in East Africa in
support of a common policy of development. It was recognized
as a negotiating body by the Colonial Office and always
included members of both Houses of Parliament on its
executive committee. Nevertheless,, its influence on the
determination of Tanganyika policies seems to have been
minimal and. it was: sometimes split by internal dissensions."3"00
The other body, the London Chamber of Commerce was never an
ardent supporter'of settler, interests on political matters
and therefore little use as a means of putting pressure on 
101Cameron.
However, there was one organisation which 
exercised a powerful influence over the Tanganyika, 
administration throughout this period, namely the .
Tanganyika. Sisal Growers Association; this was hardly
.surprising, in view of the importance of sisal to the
102 ' economy. The Association,, formed in 1930 was soon
powerful enough to speak for the whole industry.. Then
in 1934*9 & statutory body, the Sisal Board.,, was created
and came to act on the recommendations of the T.S.G.A.
The Board was authorised.to consider applications for land
TABLE V
OCCUPATIONS OF MALE: ADULT 
EUROPEANS 1921-1951
Occupation 1921 % 1951 %
Public Administration 602 41 1*075 . 24
Agriculture 284 19 1,081 24
Commercial 146 10 455 10
Professional 327 22 722 16
Other . 124 8 1,167 26
Totals 1,483 100 4,480 100
(source: Reports on the census of
non-native population, 1921 
and 1931; Government Printer, 
Bar es Salaam)
specifically required for sisal growing and to make 
recommendations to the Governor after considering the 
suitability of the area and the experience and financial 
backing of the applicant. Thus the influence of the 
T.S.G.A. through the Board was considerable; it was able 
to oppose expansion when there was a danger of over­
production and by the imposition of a cess it obtained
105funds to further the interests of the industry.
Furthermore, the sisal growers were represented in the
Legislative Council to a degree which many settlers thought
over-generous and liacMichael in particular was criticised.
for failing to take other interests into account when
104making new nominations.
In contrast to the local organization of the
industry, which was no mean feat in view of the different
nationalities and political views of those who controlled
it, there was less; unity among the London representatives.
It was not until 1941 that a Sisal Growers Association was
started in London, with the aim of promoting research into
new uses for sisal and of protecting the growers' interests
in fiscal matters. Growers and shippers were represented
on the committee of this Association but since the interests
of the two groups did not always coincide it was disbanded
after six years and replaced by a committee representing
growers' only. But if there was no formal representative
body it would be unwise to overlook the influence of men
like Alfred. Wigglesworth, the head, of a. firm with wide-
ranging interests in hard fibres in different parts of the 
105world. ^ In Tanganyika, Wigglesworth had gone into
partnership with Johann Franz and Walter Schoeller to form 
Amboni Estates Ltd., one of the most successful of the 
Territory's producers.'3'00
By the outbreak of the second World War there 
were 131 sisal estates, in the .Territory; the nationalities 
of those controlling these estates is given in Table VI.
. A. further break-down of the figures reveals that, 
at the outbreak of the War in 1939 local interests 
controlled nearly half the production and.British interests 
in London controlled a quarter. It was therefore to be 
expected that representations to the Tanganyika government 
would more suitably come from the. local Association rather 
than,through the City via the Colonial Secretary..
The Depression
By the end of 193° tbe down-turn in world trade 
began to affect the Territory and the prices of most, 
products fell sharply. The Depression severely jolted 
the settlers' confidence since they could never again argue 
convincingly that they alone could provide the required 
impetus for: further economic development. The delaying 
tactics of Cameron during the years of prosperity aimed 
at preventing a labour shortage,’ also ensured! that further 
expansion of nonrrAfrican farming was effectively prevented 
until after the second World War. A number of settlers who 
obtained land shortly before the slump were not sufficiently 
firmly established to continue in business when the drop in 
prices occurred. On the other hand, it was soon evident
TABLE VI
INTEREST IN THE SISAL INDUSTRY BY-
NATIONALITY IN 1959 ' ' ■
Control of Estates Percentage of Total
Production
British 32.8
Indian . 18.4 .
German. '. 18.1'
Greek 17.6
Others 13*1
Total ' 100.0' -
. . • (source: I A. Wiggle sworth and Co
Monthly- Fibre Report).
that when times were.bad the African sector could display a 
remarkable resilience. In 1931* & ’grow more crops' 
campaign was instituted in the knowledge that prices of 
produce might be lower. However, it was hoped that better 
supervised marketing arrangements would provide some 
compensation for the growers. The response to the 
campaign, in terms of production, was surprisingly good 
and the results enabled the Territory to survive the 
Depression without retrenchment on an even greater scale. 
Nevertheless, increased; acreages of cultivation in the 
peasant farming sector brought other problems in view of
107the inadequate arrangements made to prevent soil erosion. 1 
Certainly one of the more significant results of the 
campaign was the dramatic increase in cotton production in 
Lake province, and thereafter Sukumaland supplanted Eastern 
province as the most important area for this crop. Yields 
never again fell to pre-Depression levels, for the campaign 
coincided with the introduction of better seed, developed 
over the years to suit local conditions.
In the plantation sector, both coffee and sisal 
producers were badly hit by the general drop in prices.
Sisal had averaged £23 per ton in 1938 but was soon down 
to little over £11. By 1931* many of the plantations were 
in difficulties and were either indebted to the banks or to 
the Usagara Company which was backed by the German govern­
ment. Some of the sisal growers had to give up and in 
order to prevent any further reduction in the industry the
T 0 PiT.S.G.A. asked the government for a subsidy of £5 per ton.
The Association argued that without a subsidy fresh planting
would be postponed, causing unemployment at once and 
stagnation when prices recovered. No help was forth­
coming and. both the sisal and the coffee growers had to 
accept prices which were barely sufficient to meet 
production costs. By 1932 wage rates had been lowered 
and, not surprisingly, recruitment of new labour was sharply
reduced; there was also a steep increase in the number of
109desertions from sisal estates. The T.J3.G.A. appealed
to the government for help in obtaining recruits but after 
reference to London the request was rejected. The tea 
industry was also affected but was better able to survive 
as a result of the international quota system; by keeping 
to the agreement the Territory was limited to a maximum 
acreage of 2,900 acres until 1938 a figure which was 
considered, by the growers to be reasonably generous. With 
lower, prices being received, for the main crops there was an 
inevitable reduction in revenue and. a consequent lack of 
funds for any development.
Prospects for agriculture after the Depression
By the end of 1935 throughout East Africa there 
were signs that prosperity was returning. In Tanganyika, 
although the owners and managers of estates had had to 
contend with severely reduced receipts for their crops it 
is of interest to observe that the rationale of the 'grow 
more crops' campaign had. been accepted in the non-African 
sector as well; Table VII shows that production increased 
as. prices fell. Nevertheless, when world markets improved
TA B LE  V II  
P rinc ipa l Crops by Q uantity  1924-1939
SISAL (tons) COFFEE (tons) COTTON (bales) GROUNDNUTS(tons)
( sources Annual Reports,Department of Agriculture; 
Government Printer,Dar es Salaam)
there was no rapid recovery in the Territory and development
in each sector of the agricultural system was hampered by
different but equally intractable problems.
If it was to expand, the non-African sector
needed private investment on a. substantial scale; this did
not materialise because a number of factors destroyed
confidence and persuaded potential investors that ventures
elsewhere would be more likely to succeed. This state of
affairs was due partly to government policies and partly to
circumstances over, which no control was possible. In the
latter category, the Territory suffered from adverse
publicity when the usual hazards of tropical agriculture
were.augmented by a. series of locust invasions from both
north and south and which in the course of a single day
110could ruin a farmer. Second, although sisal prices
had, staged a modest recovery, there was still, little profit
in growing coffee, owing to over-production in South 
111America. Many farmers uprooted their coffee and planted
tea, thus taking up the permitted quota already described
112and leaving little scope for further investment. On
the. other hand there were opportunities for diversification;
papain and pyrethrum were being grown successfully, the
prospects for tobacco growing were brighter and. for the
farmers in the Southern Highlands province the increased
activity in the Lupa goldfield led to new markets for cereals
115and dairy products. ^
But government actions and omissions continued to 
affect the course of white settlement. The Governors who 
followed Cameron seemed to have been more favourably
disposed to an increase in the number of settlers, 
particularly in view of the German threat, if they were 
British nationals. Nevertheless, there was no relaxation 
of the rule that newcomers either should possess a 
substantial amount of capital or should enjoy an assured 
income. Second, in spite of the uncertainty caused by 
German colonial ambitions already described, no authori­
tative and convincing declaration was ever made to the
effect that British control, would never be voluntarily 
114ended. In such circumstances, no British national
could invest with confidence in any enterprise in the
Territory. Finally, there was once again some doubt as
to whether the labour supply would be adequate. During
the Depression many owners and managers had. been forced to
lay off a. number of their employees; some had been
compelled to close down altogether and found themselves
unable to pay the wages due. As a consequence, employment,
in African eyes, no longer guaranteed security; moreover,
the 'grow more crops' campaign had led to an increase in the
number of African farmers cultivating cash crops and many
former labourers from estates found it more congenial to
stay at home. Others were attracted by the increased
activity in the goldfields and had no desire to return to
agricultural employment. Thus when the plantations and
estates could, again be operated profitably, a labour shortage
occurred. In view of past controversies, MacMichael, who
had followed Symes, appointed a. committee to investigate
115the labour position. ^ As might have been expected, the 
committee found that there was no shortage of men who were
available for work but that the majority evinced no wish 
to obtain regular employment. The remedy, according to 
members, was to make work conditions more attractive and 
use employed labour more economically. The report formed 
the basis of the Governor's reply to a Colonial Office 
inquiry into labour conditions in the African dependencies.
The major problem in the African sector was, as
already described, the need to introduce measures to halt
erosion. The extent of, the problem was now recognized and
it was realised that there was no chance of repairing past
damage while the African communities remained confined within
the same areas which had been cultivated in German times.
Although little could be done to change the situation until
more capital was provided, the first step was to make known
the extent of the problem. If new land was to be brought
under cultivation, the tsetse fly had to be controlled and
domestic water supplies had to be provided in selected areas.
A start was made with the creation of a Tsetse Research
Department, mainly financed by funds provided under the
Colonial Development Act of 1929 and the difficulties
involved became better appreciated. Instead of the fly-
belts, receding as the population increased, it was found
that there was a constant movement in progress, some belts
being in the process of spreading while others diminished.
Where the fly gained ground the population with their cattle
moved elsewhere causing over-crowding, over-grazing and
116severe soil erosion. In other areas, where there was
no fly problem it was the lack of water for domestic purposes 
which prevented people moving to new land, the result being
that over-cultivation led to diminishing annual yields 
per acre.
To deal with these problems it was recognized, 
that there would be a need., to; co-ordinsste the development 
policies of the government departments concerned with 
agriculture and animal husbandry as well as to create a 
new department to plan water development policies. Also* 
in spite -of the road building programme already undertaken 
the-Territory's particularly difficult spatial problem -, 
required a relatively greater expenditure on communications 
than elsewhere'in East Africa. Aware of these competing 
demands on the totally inadequate resources available, it 
. became increasingly obvious that a co-ordinated develop- 
'ment plan was necessary. . The'first step in devising such 
, a plan was taken in 1938 when it. was announced that, a 
Development Committee, would be appointed. In this way 
the government'of the Territory anticipated by some two 
years;the. conversion of the official classes in London to: 
the realization that development in such circumstances was 
synonymous with good government.
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P.M.Cl 4th .session p. 147; subsequently the 
League of Nations Council accepted the view 
that the termination of Mandated was not /■*.
possible, 'League, Official Journal VI-,1926,
P. 1363. , ■ f ;v. ' ■,
Sinclair, II.C. 315 col.- 1147 and P. Snowden, C-
'Give Germany her c o l o n i e s The Nation (New " ’".H
York),July 1926.;- also -Lord Arnold H.L. 107,
694, 695 • V"J'; _ v"V ■
See K. Peiling, Lhe Llfe of Neville. Chamberlain,
(London,, 1947) » p • 300.
Observer, 8 February 1957 ♦ / - \ : \
See the decidedly ambivalent guidance in the .. "f, i-i" 
Labour Party manifestoV 1919» which appears ' , ': • r f
to condemii)' imperialism.,/Which seeka to If ’ " f :
dominafother races' asi well as 'a selfish . ^
and insular non-interventionism'. f, h
E.g., Magor Lead's attack on the. government " If
for failing 4;o promote research.and encourage 
increased production in the sisal industry, >/ vA-;-
L.L.C., 2nd sess. 1927-28. . f ' v-'l . -11"
. &
•Much of the: purpose of railway, extension is 
>to increase white settlement rather than ,
providing facilities for Africans ’. .• Lord 
Lugafdl P.M.Cf Vlth sess. 18th meeting, « ill
7 July 1925. ‘ , 1 , ‘ Ifl.
'"i
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/'was^re'^plye^.toi-teq^es-t Amer-y to replace 
Cameron 1'1 &jyd ’’Mossmade a;somewhat 
Unconvincing/attempt td explain his position 
at this, meeting when ,he. subsequently commented 
on the proceedings;. >l*LvC;;. Ind sess. 1927-28. 
For an account of the frictibn between Governor 
 ^ ; and. settlera/ see Daily Mail 7 March -1929.
: > Cameron, despatch dated 10' August 1929;
1 Ihe ' Usanibara Planters Association is a 
.moderate and rational1 body who do not engage 
in polltical agitation * , CO 691/104.
Legislative. Council Paper if Ihe. Imperial 
Colonial Development Act (I9^9T*15MP13656, 
item 15 *1/1" I ’""'’ I - ‘
Evidence to' Joint Select Committee, bp.pit., 
vol. 3? App. 7r P«^  :;26;. , the suggestion .that 
local settlers Should be ^ associated with'.; the 
■ British ghvefnm duty of ,trusteeship , had
been made;'In Future Policy In_Regard to 
A Eastern lifrica, cmd. 2904 (1927). ' • .
Circular 1^985/^1*5 dated 8 May 1929, filed 
with CO 691/104/29489.
Lt.'Colonel 8ir Stewart Symes, (.1878-1962) 
became Governor in May 1931.1
Symes, despatch/dated 6 August 1932 (CO 691/125).
(a) Bo unoffiGials',were appointed to the 
. Governors Executive Council until 1959; in 
Kenya, provision for appointments to the 
 ^Executive Council of a- number of unofficials 
.. had. been made in 1919.
: ( h ) ; 1 • •.(inAEenya)...: a practice in
Council of . ref erring all questions 
/; of; Importance to select committees in which 
A\ the official majority is' seldom retained.1 
;/;;Hiltdii:i.Yp-ung Report, p. 89. •
. Evidence, Joint Select Committee, op.cit.V 
>nipafa.; 1971V . ”
»; ?E.g.j/oyer the issue of introducing income 
taxin.Kenya. . ./
Ihe Chairman-1 of /the East African section of 
> ; the;London/C 'Commerce, Sir, H. leggett,
supported plantations but was not in favour of 
; white; settlement -per seV: as is shown by his 
memorandum to the Joint Select Committee,
1  Vol. Ill,: p. 47* ' ' ....
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The Association was founded;by Major (later 
Sir William) Lead., MLGv* who became a member 
of the Executive Council in .1939*
Subsequently its influence was extended by 
its control of labour recruitment (Silabu) 
and by operating a produce inspectorate.
E.g., MacMichael’s appointment of Major King 
in 1935 was criticized by the Maize Growers 
Association, for whereas the mixed farmers 
were unrepresented there"were two members, 
representing the sisal industry. Kenya
Weekly News, 3 January 1936.
Lord Milner, when C.S., had appointed; 
Wiggiesworth his adviser on Tanganyika sisal . 
matters. Later Wiggiesworth was chairman of 
the imperial institute Committee on Vegetable 
Fibres. ■ ",
Johann. Franz, a. Swiss national, managed a 
.. sisal estate in Tanganyika before the first 
.World. War,. Wiggles worth,.had interests in
two. other estates in the : Territory, Kikwetui 
, and Ruvu Estates Ltd. He had other and 
major interests in sisal in Mozambique.
According to a later Director of Agriculture 
the campaign was a disaster since soil 
■ conservation measures were entirely inadequate, 
T.L.C., 20th sess., 1946-46, p. 42.
In Kenya maize growers received a subsidy 
;until prices recovered.
Symes reported his refusal to assist 
plantation recruitment (despatch 804 dated 
12 August 1932) and the C.S. (Cunliffe-Lister) 
agreed with him. > The sisal labour force was 
10°/o under strength and Symes reported that 
; Lead, had warned him that desertions were 
averaging 40$.
E.. g., during the period 1928/30 there were 
four.locust invasions from the north and one, 
Desert locusts, from the south; Agricultural 
Department A;R. 1929/30.
The selling price of coffee halved between 
• 1928 and 1934.
The tea quota was increased to 4,95° acres 
in 1938; the quota permitted about 60$ of 
the crop to be exported.
113• • About 800 non-Africans and 17,000 Africans
’ were engaged in;gold mining in the Lupa area 
in 1935f:Vsee Report of the Committee Appointed 
to Consider'and Advise on Questions Relating to 
the Supply and Welfare of Native Labour in the 
Tanganyika Territory CDar es Salaam 1938)> p. 50«
114'i* ) The. uncertainty .was the consequence of Baldwin's 
statement:in 1936 that no transfer would be made 
without.reference to Parliament; II.C. 311, col. 
552. Until-November :1938, no assurance could be 
, given because, the ending of the mandate was a 
distinct:^possibility; see Daily Telegraph,
5 July 1972,: 'Colonial Office tried to conceal 
.Africa.offer to Hitler*.
113, t -Report of: .Committee on Native Labour, op.cit.; 
also Colonial Secretary's despatch (circular) 
dated 24 August 1937*
, 1 1 6 . 'E.g., the Chiefdom of 'Tinde, Shiny anga- district, 
where in twenty years the population had fallen 
by over 50$; see N. Vicars Harris, East African 
Annual, 1934/55 and CO 691/25088.
CHAPTER V
THE SETTLEMENT POLICY: THE OTHER. FACTORS
The argument over the need to increase European
* \ 
settlement lasted until the onset of the Depression
dampened, for a time anyway, any enthusiasm for African
financial adventures. The issue was confused, not so
much by conflicting predictions of future economic benefits
as by other arguments unrelated to any strategy for
increasing the production of crops for export. Throughout
East Africa there were those who believed that the.social
and- political implications of increasing the numerical
strength of the European community: far outweighed any
economic consideration. However extraordinary it may
seem in retrospect there is no doubt that a considerable
body of opinion1 was prepared to argue that white settlement
had. an educational value. To others the most important
need was to take steps to encourage new. settlers of British
origin-in order to. counteract the influence of the Germans
who returned, to the Territory after 1925.
Those who believed that white settlement had a 
modernizing effect on African society based their arguments 
on two propositions. First, by what was termed the 
'demonstration effect', it was suggested that the African 
peasant farmer, seeing: the industry and expertise of his 
European neighbour, would learn from him either by working 
for him for a time or by following his example. The 
argument was much Used by those who disliked the segregation
of races implicit in the creation of 'reserves' and 
'scheduled areas'. Others thought that it was cheaper 
and less likely to lead to friction if the peasant farmer 
adopted improved.practices by voluntary imitation rather 
than by being compelled to observe regulations imposed by 
the Department of Agriculture. 'The best school for the
African is a good European estate,' observed Sir Edward
1 , ■.■■■■ -v *■
Grigg; Cameron too supported-the argument and in a letter
to Lugard he mentioned that.even the Kenya settlers
performed, a useful purpose by setting a good example to the
Africans.. Later, he arranged for 'a European with a good
deal of financial:backing in London', as he explained to
the:JointSelect Committee, to be given a lease of land in
the remote district of Songea, partly to provide employment
and partly to.provide, an example./' When questioned further
he maintained that,the example of the European farmer was
:' ’ ' lL - ; ' •
only of value if he was successful. This point had
already been emphasised by the Hilton Young Commission
which had commented: 1
'Governments ,ought to take account of their 
responsibility for-controlling, the quality ,of 
settlers ...(they) should be men who have not 
only the material resources necessary for 
; success but. also the ..qualities-... to earn 
/ confidence and respect. . The, quality of the 
: early settlers in these territories is almost
as important to the. government, as the quality 
■. of its own officials..
This, argument is of some.importance because the policy
being advocated was followed with some care by successive
Governors in Tanganyika. The high standard required of
-potential settlers had an important influence on the pattern
O f  land usage. For whereas in Kenya, Grigg was prepared
to offer landtoitalian peasantswho would have farmed 
intensively c omparativeiy small acreages, in, ’Tanganyika , 
the ' basis.: of any approval, of a .settler1 s'. application for. 
land was that hehad tHenecessary resources to survive 
.during bad. yearseveil if this 'meant ’ that fthe total amount: 
of alienations was .thereby reduced. The result of this 
. policy was that in,spite of: the Land Regulations, the settler 
■ with private means often left much of. his land undeveloped, ’ 
consequently' causing some resentment among Africans dn 
places, where new land was in short supply. 7 vThere were 
other consequences of a. calculated1 policy’ of impressing the , 
Afric.an that the European settler possessed superior skills. . 
:lt reinforced: the .widely held belief that social contacts ; . 
should be kept to a, minimum; / it provided a basis:.for, 
rationalizing some forms of discrimination; and it led to 
some/anomalies similar/to those which embarrass the South'/; 
African.government';oftoday in. their attempt to present.a 
logical, racial,policy. 1 Thus.Cypriot Greeks, who. often 
presented an image.,of being far too enterprising to be. ..... 
members of the squirearchy had to be explained as being- 
distinct from wazungu (Europeans), whereas white Americans 
could be . included in the term.' ' The Boer community of.
Northern province also caused problems in that many parentsi 
neglected to ensure that their children received even a 
rudimentary education and the, government had to introduce: ; s 
measures to remedy the. position. ,/ . Finally, the/policy of
reinforcing settler prestige led to problems of jurisdiction; 
a, government spokesman had to admit that a native authority- 
had no powers to arrest an offender residing;:.oh a-settler's
- Q
farm-land. If the native authority system was destined
to increase in prestige and influence, problems of this
nature would inevitably lead to political conflict. As
described in Chapter III, steps were taken to prevent this
happening by closing some provinces to ordinary forms of
non-African settlement, a policy which was not formally
10..abandoned until 1953* It is therefore evident that
Gameron believed that his plans for the development of
African local government were too important to permit
unqualified support.for the contact argument.
The theory was examined with some care by the
East Africa Commission and the, following extracts illustrate
members1 thinking:
'the native, advances in civilization, in 
physique, in skill and in independence by 
contact with European enterprise.’
and. later,
'it. is inconsistent with the economic progress 
of the whole country that he (the native; should 
be allowed to. stagnate in a native reserve, 
leaving all the work to the women, the men 
doing nothing.
Both statements were considered to be accurate observations 
by nearly all the settlers, in East A-frica and by not a few 
officials as well. Ihe fact of improvement in physique of 
those who became contract labourers was the only part of the 
statements which was in any way measurable and the remainder 
wasspure speculation. But the second statement in 
particular expressed in a comparatively restrained way the 
European view of the African who stayed at home. One 
traveller in Kenya, shortly before 1914- wrote of brawny 
savages covered in oil, existing on the efforts of their
women-kind hhdlweaker .brethren.' Others-used harsher 
epithets' to-describe this state of affairs.*^ . Even the 
P.M.C.- became, concerned as to. whether' the Tanganyika
administration was doing enough to prevent the exploitation
■' • • 14. ‘ ' ,
of women; As a consequence there were continuous vocal
and passionate demands from settlers ,in Kenya and,Tanganyika
for more, white settlement so. that,more. Africans,^ couldtbenefit
from the^ : advantagesvof discipline and wage earning. .
But equally vocal were these who held.the opposing 
view,, the missionaries who believed that p>roiohged absence 
from-home, working :pn plantations or'farms, led to the 
collapse of family life and, the of facials; who argued ,that. • 
a shortage of'men. in the Villages might delay the development 
of a'Viable form of .local government. Their solution was 
to modernize:'the community as a whole rather than to improve: 
the: individual. In the; Commission's report it is described 
as the tribal control theory and its aims explained by one 
member of the Commission in a . separate memorandum. -lake 
. the contact, theory it not only attracted1enthusiastic support 
but also,it could,never be proved to be sound or otherwise; 
icomments. on either theory-have often been'exaggerated or 
reductionist and generalizations are meaningless. Eor 
example, it will not be disputed^that the African labourer 
on a sisal plantation was unlikely to learn anything abouth 
farming practices which would be of value to him; against .
; this can be argued that,, there was value in the.experience 
gained from receiving a regular wage and meeting .people 
from other African communities. The labourer obtaining v , 
employment on a settler’s farm often moved there with his
family and the consequent feudal relationship was no.doubt 
educative in some respects; at least it provided a' change 
from the restrictions of tribal society..
The qualified support British officials gave to . 
the 1 contact1 theory illustrates the empirical approach so 
often adopted in colonial policy.. It was believed that 
Unless there were obvious disad.vanta.ges for communities as 
a whole, it was necessary to provide opportunities for . 
employment and. for observing European methods of organizing 
work. . Hence the apparent contradictions in the views 
expressed by Mitchell who, with.his knowledge1 of local 
conditions was always able to command respect for his: 
opinions. He was a firm supporter; of the decision to 
restrict settlement in the.'native1 areas, thereby implying' 
that the advantages of 'contact' were of secondary 
importance..' At the same time he recognized and supported 
the African desire to obtain regular employment within easy 
reach of the home. Writing of Ufipa during the early days 
of British administration he commented::
'...the district slowly fell to pieces for lack 
of any investment of capital, any enterprise 
which might have brought some productivity, 
some inducement to stay at home... the chiefs 
and elders had their own remedy which they 
urged on every occasion. • Get us some Europeans 
to come and settle and cultivate here, so that 
people can earn wages near their homes.
Barnes, in charge of Njombe in Southern .Highlands province,
reported that chiefs and people told him that 'there was a
general advantage to have European settlers in the vicinity
T O
providing a ready market for produce and lioour.' It 
seems that, these comments represent an accurate assessment 
of African opinion at that time in any district which was
Isolated or sparsely populated; but there was little or no 
.support for any proposal to provide land for settlers in 
those areas where land. for. grazing was already short or- 
where it appeared that there was no land left for expanding 
cultivation in the future.
Both missionaries and administrative officers were 
anxious to preserve the cohesion of the tribal communities 
in which they worked and their support for a.certain amount 
of. alienation, with its consequent employment opportunities* 
is understandable. The alternative was apparent when a 
large proportion of the younger men was recruited for. work 
elsewhere in the Territory. The popularity of such work 
varied from district to district and the reasons, for leaving 
home were not always economic.. In Rungwe district, for 1 
example, where African farmers by 1930 were producing 
considerable quantities of cash crops and where a number: of 
large estates had been developed, an unusually large number
-JQ
of young males preferred to seek work outside the district. J 
In part, this can be attributed to the understandable desire 
to escape from tribal discipline and the anxieties caused 
by witchcraft, particularly prevalent in this area.. Equally 
important, however, was the need to observe what has been 
described as 'one of the fundamental principles underlying
Nyakyusa society, the spatial segregation of.parents and
20 ' children'. It was a rule which became increasingly
difficult to obey as the population grew and unoccupied
land, became scarce.
The German"threat
.If the opposing arguments ever 'the contact theory ; 
appeared to be evenly balanced,- the other political factor 
was. less complicated* Anglo-German antagonism between the 
Wars stemmed from resentment of the Treaty. of Versailles on , 
the one hand and fears.of a resurgent Germany seeking revenge 
on the other. It distorted the bases of policy-making for 
two .decades In places utterly remote from Europe, and in 
/Tanganyika led to'decisions being taken which had little . 
bearing on economic factors,. kor the British this was no 
new situation; a generation earlier policy at different 
ends; of Africa had: been determined by bding subordinated to 
the need to. protect the route to India. The; argument
that strategic advantage could best be secured by the 
occupation of1territory varied in .its persuasive influence. ; 
With the lossedIncurred: in the East African campaign,fresh 
ih the memory of the British official classes, there was 
widespread support for the acceptance of the Mandate in 
order to prevent a repetition of that conflict. If this 
proposition was sound, and if the Mandate might be'ended, 
then the position must be consolidated by incorporating 
the Territory in an East African dominion. But the opposing 
arguments also attracted support. lirst, provided British 
control of the seas could be maintained,, a  potential enemy 
was at, a disadvantage if his forces were, dispersed among 
colonial outposts; , consequently, it was argued, there was -: 
no harm in Germany occupying territory in Africa. Secondly, 
it was desirable to remove the causes of conflict'rather than
to accept them as inevitable and thus it was better to 
secure a detente with Germany even if this required the 
return of the former colonies., Both these arguments were 
hotly disputed, the first on the grounds of the growing 
potential of aircraft and the consequent threat to shipping 
and the second because it under-rated German expansionist 
ambitions.
These conflicting,views and German national 
consciousness influenced settlement policies and aroused 
considerable interest in the alienation of land in the 
Territory. Within a few years of German nationals being 
permitted, to return to Tanganyika,,it became apparent that 
they might soon form the maqor part of the settler population. 
They were hard-working and not easily discouraged by the 
difficult conditions they encountered. Those who had lived 
in East Africa before 1914* were sustained by the memory of 
past achievements while others.were.eneouraged: by the support 
of the German colonial organizations, created in the nineteen- 
twentieSj anxious to make amends for the traumatic events of 
1918 and to reconstruct Germany's position as a world power.
At first, the.leaders were agreed on the policies to be 
adopted. First, it was necessary to nail the 'colonial 
guilt' lie so that Germany could become qualified in the 
eyes of the world to become a colonial power again. Second, 
following the geopolitik, advocated by Haushofer, it was 
necessary to break out of the boundaries of 'encircled'
Germany and the,logical direction was to expand in Africa 
again. Under the leadership of two ex-colonial Governors, 
the German Colonial Society* published a mass of literature
and held meetings throughout Germany before the collapse of 
the Weimar Republic.. But these efforts aroused little 
support, ;from the public and from,the references to colonies 
in Mein Kampf there, was;little hope of support from the 
Nazis. As time passed spokesmen.for the movement began to 
present different views on why colonies were needed. Whereas 
Solf, an ex-minister, for Colonies, said they were needed
for political reasons, Hgalmar Schapht argued that they
. ■ 22 
were necessary for Germany's economic survival. In 192?
a German member was appointed to the P.M.C. arid he, and his
successor, took every opportunity to make known German
aspirations and anxieties. , ' " .
In.Tanganyika many pre-War settlers returned as 
soon as they were allowed entry and quite a few were able 
*to obtain land in. the districts where they had previously ; 
lived. Others went to the Southern Highlands province as 
soon as land became available there to become the first ' 
settlers, in the^  Mufindi area, some 80 miles south of 
Iringa•^  Several, went further south, to Mfoozi near
Mbeya, and an eye-witness reported seeing some fifty German 
families squatting on land they had pegged out, awaiting 
the government surveyor. He observed that although they 
had had no time to erect temporary shelters they had already 
planted nurseries.of coffee seedlings. They were confident 
that If they were able to obtain some kind Of title over a 
piece of .land they would be able to obtain enough funds
.from German land banks to pay expenses for one year's
‘ ' ■■'■ 24 -.development. ■ Other groups of German nationals went to
Oldeani, Arusha and Moshi while others, with no desire to 
farm,' settled in Tanga and Bar es Salaam. Whereas those 
with previous experience in Africa wanted their own estate 
at once, the new recruit from Germany was usually sent to 
another German settler to learn about local conditions. By 
1928, there were, more German settlers than British in many 
of the more important districts; a German language newspaper 
was started; and the Usagara Company and its affiliates 
such as the Uhehe Company provided financial aid for German 
farmers in the form of mortgages and credit as well as 
paying above-market prices for crops sold through them.
Backed by the German government, the Usagara Company became 
the third largest importer.of goods into the Territory.
With support from Germany and with the increase in the 
German community maintained its position was assured; for 
in the eleven years from 192.5? 3068 German nationals were 
recorded as entering Tanganyika to take up residence.
These developments inevitably caused anxiety in 
both Britain and East Africa and to some extent affected 
settlement policies. Once Cameron had over-ruled his 
Executive Council, no doubt with the approval of the.
Colonial Secretary, and German nationals were allowed.to 
return and obtain land, it was not considered worth . 
incurring criticism by taking discriminatory action against 
them.-^ When later Germany left the League of Nations and 
a further opportunity occurred of checking German settlement, 
as already described, no action was taken. As the British 
in Tanganyika, well* knew many of the European settlers In 
the^Territory who by nationality were Poles, Czechs or
Lithuanians were in fact German by culture and sentiment,
intensively loyal to the Fatherland. Their attitude to
the Tanganyika, administration was bound to be affected by
the state of Anglo-German relations in Europe.
Amery was well aware of the possibility of
conflict with Germany again at some future date and took
pains to emphasise the strategic implications of the Mandate.
As he described later, he was impressed by Smuts' warning
to the War Cabinet z.
'German aims are not really colonial, but are 
dominated by far-reaching conceptions of world 
politics. Not colonies, but military power 
and strategic position for exercising world 
; power in future, are her real aims.'gg
Since Amery was at the Colonisd Office for most of the time
that Cameron was Governor it must be presumed that the latter
was well aware of .the views he held. Cameron's own
attitude was unexceptional since when land in the Southern
Highlands was offered to settlers he noted that he would
27have liked 'to see Britishers first off the mark.' f It., 
had not been expectedthat German nationals in such relatively 
large numbers would have, taken advantage of. the offers and 
soon questions were being asked both in the House of Commons 
and in the Tanganyika Legislative Council. As Cameron 
himself remarked when invited to attend a meeting of the 
Joint East Africa Board, the British Government and the 
City were unable to assist potential British settlers
whereas the German government and Hamburg were giving
P'ft ■
financial assistance.
The official view: in the Colonial Office played 
an influential part in determining government policy. In
the. summer of 1927, Sir Hubert Gough acting.on behalf of
East African commercial interests, began negotiations with
the Colonial Office to obtain support for a settlement
scheme for ex-servicemen; in the first instance it was
planned to settle fifty families in Southern Highlands
province, providing .the British government agreed to offer
29some financial assistance. ■, The officials rn the East
Africa.department were: strongly opposed to the plan, as
the minutes reveal.. Although Gough claimed that Cameron
agreed in principle with the objects of the scheme providing.
the Association assumed financial responsibility for the
settlers, in the Office it was observed that it was unlikely
that the Governor would have supported such.ra scheme and
anyway it.would be contrary to the terms of the Mandate to
xq .
provide funds for it. . But when legal advice,on this
point was obtained, it was found that some forms of aid
would not be improper. Nevertheless, Strachey, who had
been involved, with the East African department since the
inception of the Mandate, remained unimpressed, minutingr
'I cannot see what good,they (the settlers) will 
be to T.T. If the experiment is tried I fully 
expect it to be a failure .. it is the result, 
of-a lot of nonsense talked by Mr. Joelson.1^
He advised Ormsby-Gore. that the Scheme should be dis­
couraged and. the latter agreed, observing that 'it was 
only the Germans who were there before going back. .1 do 
not anticipate any new ones coming.' Unable, to obtain any 
firm promise of assistance Gough had to be content with the 
assurance that his scheme would be considered further when 
he had formed his Association. Not surprisingly, twelve
months passed with no progress in the plans being.made.
‘/./Medh'while*' following -the' meeting, attended - by 1 ,
Cameron,/the/ Joint, East Africa.Board formed its own committee 
to promote/settlement in. Tanganyika, When this too 
failed to achieve'anything the chairman resigned and a new ; 
commiftee was formed to include Gough. In January 1929? 
it reported that 'the Colonial Office was prepared to do 
everything in its power but settlement was blocked by the 
antagonistic attitude Of Sir Donald Cameron^ ..The 
Office seems to have, attempted to attach the blame to 
Cameron.on the basis, of a despatch the previous year in 
Which he had stated that although he was in sympathy with 
the Object ,of the scheme it would be safer to proceed by 
following, normal,,settlement policies.^ Early in 1929
members, of the. committee had the opportunity to hear, for 
themselyes. .Camerpn's .views on the. scheme when he attended. 
a;/mee.tihgvat/'the Colonial Office called by Ormsby-Gore.
It 'was duly no ted/that unofficials in Tanganyika, were not 
concerned so much.at the possibility of German political . 
control as by the immediate problems caused by German,
-settlers: receiving subsidies: and development aid from their 
home eountry. Cameron,/ asked, to comment on criticisms: of -
iVhi^./set;tlpjhe^ "replied by? giving details of the
;amount; of land alienated since his arrival. in Tanganyika 
and-O^plainedl how; the ;need, foraccurate surveys, and: improved
/communications often.caused delays in making more land ,
xn ■ . .■ . ’ > /■ - .
available.• The other two/matters discussed illustrated
•how*logislWbipti/'previously enacted could be used by civil
seryants. to' preveht. decisions, being taken in haste. The
meeting noted:.-that1 the Overseas Development Act of 1921
permitted; the: British government to provide funds: for 
colonial settlers if the sum allocated was matched by a 
similar 'amount given by an Overseas government or some 
private undertaking. If.the Tanganyika government provided 
funds: for British settlers, Cameron explained, under the 
terms of the Mandate a. similar sum might have to be found 
for German settlers and thus the ..aim of Gough's scheme 
would be frustrated. The other difficulty concerned the 
Tanganyika Land Ordinance which, prescribed that land for 
alienation had. to be offered by auction. If a general 
amendment to the. Ordinance was made before Gough's company 
was formed, there was the possibility that there would only 
be a German syndicate, able to take advantage of the change. 
When shortly before' this meeting Gough met Cameron again-, 
he explained he had backers in the City who would support 
his scheme, but they wanted to remain anonymous until the 
Tanganyika, government made a firm offer of land. Thus a 
stalemate had been reached and all that was decided was that 
Gough should seek further details from the Tanganyika 
government so that planning couLd continue.
Thus another year passed with no progress in 
Gough's settlement scheme. Meanwhile the I.E.A.B. had 
persuaded itself that the German threat had been exaggerated 
and was consequently less inclined to offer support for the 
proposal. ^  Eor his part, Cameron had never seen any cause
for alarm;, he- maintained that after 1927 Tanganyika held 
little attraction to German settlers; and many were put off 
by the Government's, insistence that plots for alienation 
should not be less than 2,000 a c r e s . ^  Eventually, Gough
could wait no longer and submitted a formal application to 
the Colonial Office for a grant of land in an area south of 
Iringa. Cameron, asked for his comments, agreed to reserve 
the land as requested for a reasonable period adding that he 
would need a grant from the British government to provide : 
the necessary services. Having offered to. co-operate he 
put on record his own opinion of the enterpriser
•My personal view of farming in the Iringa province 
is that with ;the lack of a railway and improved 
permanent crops it is definitely wrong to encourage 
any European to settle here and the local government 
should be careful not to identify,itself with any 
such encouragement.'^
Passfield, who had succeeded Amery, minuted, that he fully .
agreed with Cameron and negotiations with Gough came to.an
end. It was not till after the Depression that interest
in the scheme Was revived as a result of initiative by
Lord Chesham. He was instrumental in forming a company
which obtained a Right of Occupancy over 110,000 acres in
Iringa district, in the same area which had interested
Gough.^ ■
The Chesham scheme is of interest because its
acceptance by the Tanganyika government amounted to an
evident change of policy. The East African Commission and 
subsequent government statements had justified white settle­
ment by relying on theargument that it was only by encouraging 
large-scale capital-intensive farming that the country's 
resources could be speedily developed. The supporters of 
the new'scheme never suggested that profitability was the 
foremost aim but instead that a pleasant way of life would 
be secured by those who applied and were found acceptable by 
the sponsors. The holding was divided and sub-let in lots
of approximately- 7 00 acres each and apart from being the 
.’landlord' the .’company loaned equipment and offered advice : 
and assistance. 'In ;general,~the aim was to encourage the - 
tenants to grow, cereals on one-third of their holdings and 
reserve the rest for pasturing cattle.^
-If'll- In-the ^ Colonial Office, the project was viewed, with 
much pessimism. ’ Bruce Hut.t, the district offider at Iringa 
had submitted;a report, with the observation that .the scheme 
would fail since.: the grazing, was extremely poor and others 
who had: tried ranching there had come to grief. Hutt/. 
pointed out that the Company had asked for 150,000 acres 
but of this some 40,000 had been excised in deference, to 
the wxshes of the local tribe. .. The area in question was 
the most fertile portion of the land applied for. A minute 
on the Colonial Office file noted that in Chesham's 
brochure giving details of the scheme 'the section relating 
to markets was typically scanty and unconvincing.
But these, views were not for the world at large. 
When Duff Cooper wrote to Ormsby Gore and asked whether 
Army Officers retiring from.the service might be advised
to invest their savings in the scheme, the reply, drafted
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according to Bottomley's directions, gave nothing away.
Ironically, theCoionial"Secretary had to face a barrage of
criticism in the House of. Commons for having permitted the
sponsors to receive especially favoured treatment. Why,
Members asked, had the rule's requiring an auction. before
alienation been ignored? One questioner described the
transaction, as; handing over to a single company miles of
extremely fertile land. Another implied that the Colonial
Secretary had evidently succumbed to pressure as a result
IL'Z
of the applicant's friends m  high places. . More 
embarrassing was the international reaction when it was 
recalled, that an application from a German company for 
4,000 acres at Mbozi had been refused. The Governor
was therefore asked to furnish a full report of the .circum­
stances in order to reply to criticism. The P.M.C. were
also interested in the scheme and asked for a description
45of how native interests were, to be protected."^
There seems little doubt that the scheme as it 
was, presented would never have been approved had it not 
been for the progressively worsening relations between 
Britain and Germany and the danger, as it seemed to those 
with an interest in the Territory, that Tanganyika might be 
sacrificed to secure an improvement in them. The manner 
in which the negotiations with Cheshara were conducted 
indicate that MacMichael used his initiative and the
Colonial Office was compelled, with reluctance to support
46 ,
his actions. It is of interest to note that officials
were more concerned with the legality of making the
applicant a direct grant of the land in question, than with
the soundness of the enterprise and their anxiety proved
justified when the Colonial Secretary had. to face, the
House of Commons. Whether MacMichael believed the scheme
would succeed is not known, but from his despatch, he
evidently felt strongly about the contrast between British
and German' settlement in the Southern,Highlands; whereas
many of the British settlers were absentee landlords,
.residing in Kenya and leaving their Tanganyika estates
undeveloped,, the Germans in the same area worked hard to
make their farms profitable. At least the Chesham scheme
had;the merit of attempting to7 secure a greater British
presence in the area. But with a scheme amateurishly
conceived and, as it turned out, inefficiently managed,
only the most sanguine could ever have believed that it
would become an effective counter-weight to the militant
manifestations of German nationalism in near-by Mufindi.^
Although in the pod:-Depression period the tensions
between Britain and Germany were obvious enough -in Europe,
in Tanganyika there were other considerations and it is
difficult to make any useful generalizations. There were
periods of fierce antagonism between British and German
settlers, often sparked off by isolated incidents being
48given more attention by the Press than they deserved.
Certainly many British were alarmed when a branch of the
Nazi party was formed and there was even more concern when
it was rumoured that German citizens were smuggling arms
49into the country. German farmers were often unpopular
because they ostensibly lived well and enjoyed subsidies
and help from German trading companies. Por their part,
many Germans resented the anti-German comments appearing
50regularly in East Africa. At the same time the German 
community was itself deeply divided for there was no love 
lost between the ambitious members of the Nazi party and. 
the ex-officials and aristocrats who had made their way 
back to Tanganyika and wanted to forget the problems of - 
Europe. , Moreover, Europeans in up-country districts had 
too much in common to permit national rivalries to become 
too important.
V\ But; in Germany the Nazi party progressively
extended; its control arid there were inevitable, repercussions 
in Tanganyika,; 3* Troost, the local leader, appointed a 
• Judge, of Honour1 to enable Germans to settle disputes 
between themselves without recourse to the normal courts. 
Likewise, in the economic activities normal in settler life 
there was a tendency to encourage withdrawal. In 1937 the 
Governor reported,-that many Germans were now living in self-
contained agricultural communities, financed by their.own
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companies- By this time three different political
organizations were active and requiring the attention of
the administration.%  Pirst, there was the Nazi party itself,
responsible for political leadership; second, the German
,Xbuth Movement, dimed at recruiting members for,the Party;
thirdly, the Deutscher;Bund:' which all German nationals were
permitted to join and which1had cultural as well.as political
and. economic aims.^ ,
f Although, the Nazi, party was instrumental in
encouraging,an even greater sense of national consciousness
among the German community, it also acted as a restraining
influence on the wilder members., The Colonial Office was -
particularly incensed-to learn that Africans were being
told that!the hut and poll tax they paid, would be abolished
when the Germans took control and MacMichael was told that
he would b e ,supported if he wanted to ban the Nazi party,
a move already taken in South West Africa. However, the
correspondence coincided with a visit by an important party
official .from Germany who addressed anumber of meetings and
warned his listeners,that provocative actions and statements.
by them would be counter-productive.-^ Assurances of
co-operation were given to government officials and no
action against the party was taken. But the sight of
uniformed Nazis continued to give alarm to visitors who
duly reported what they saw to the Colonial Office.
Consequently, when MacMichael was in London in 19379 he
was persuaded to introduce legislation banning the wearing
of para-military uniforms or the displaying of flags unless
54exemption was granted.
But. although; the German and British communities 
were able to co-exist, in London and Bar es Salaam the 
implications of a substantial increase in the German 
population were recognized and every year the immigration, 
figures were studied with care. However, in spite of the 
often-expressed alarm, the total number of Germans arriving 
never outnumbered the British total to any substantial 
degree as the figures in Table VIII indicate. Nevertheless, 
for some the respective totals were too close for comfort 
and it was feared that if ever the Germans came to make up 
the "majority of the European population of the Territory, 
it would become much more difficult to prevent Germany 
regaining.control. Meanwhile, as already described, 
official statements in Britain concerning the Territory's 
future only served to arouse speculation. Mindful of the 
adverse effect on investment, Ormsby-Gore,.who had become 
Colonial Secretary,in 1936, attempted to restore confidence 
with some stirring declarations.^ Eventually Hitler came 
to realize that the issue of the colonies was a useful 
bargaining counter and he made up for his previous lack of
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■ - BRITISH AND. GERMAN NATIONALS ENTERING 
" TANGANYIKA 1953r-1957
Year British German
■1933 , 'f -  ^;■ - ; ■ 226. 248 ,
1934 .. ’ :i \ : 260 ' 244 .
1933.. - "r ’ 359 . ^ 197
. r .y - ■ 363; 249
241 ” '.253
Vi (source: Tanganyika Annual
Reports, Ilv.M.S.0. 
London).
interest by making a formal demand for the return of the 
territories under German control before the War.^ In 
response to the threat, in London the Colonial Defence 
League was formed, with the stated object as being 'to 
stress the human, moral and political objections to the 
surrender of colonial or mandated territories.' Among 
the names, of those who lent their, support to the cause 
were nearly all the leading statesman and officials who 
had had a special concern with the African dependencies ;
c n
during the previous two d e c a d e s . I n  Kenya a society 
was formed with similar if more limited aims, the 
Tanganyika. Defence League; and in keeping with the Colony's 
reputation for dramatic gestures in times of political 
controversy, the new association proclaimed its intention 
of preventing, by fohce if necessary, the transfer of 
Tanganyika, to Germany. As a result of the international 
situation, in Dar es Salaam the issue of closer union was 
resurrected and the proposal attracted more support than 
before.
The deterioration in Anglo-German relations 
affected white .settlement in Tanganyika, probably in more 
ways than one. There is evidence to suggest that a 
considerable number of potential settlers decided against 
investing in farming in the Territory while the future of 
the Mandate was uncertain. There is also the likelihood 
that by 1958 the Tanganyika administration was: doing nothing 
to encourage settlement, to say the least. It is known 
that there was a division of opinion among officials in view 
of the international situation. One view was that non- 
African settlement was necessary for the future development
of the Territory and had to he encouraged; others maintained 
that since German settlers were more enterprising and better, 
supported, by their home government either it must be accepted 
that they would soon form the majority of the non-African 
farming community or the British government had to approve 
one of two courses of action. These amounted either to 
declaring that further alienation of land in Tanganyika would
cease or that imperial ..funds would, be available to assist
■ ■ 58
settlers- from Britain or the Dominions. In the Colonial
Office minutes,the arguments were summarised and considered 
but. no firm decision reached; it was assumed, that it would 
be impossible to justify in public any government aid.for 
settlers in Tanganyika and to stop settlement altogether 
would incur the criticism that economic development was 
being deliberately prevented. The solution, proposed was 
to suggest to the Tanganyika, government that it might be . 
wise to move slowly in dealing with any new alienations 
rather than to refuse them outright. Certainly, to stop 
further alienation might have been construed as ah over­
reaction to a situation which as yet posed no real threat 
to,the British administration;although by 1959 there were 
more German than British settler farmers, as Table IX 
indicates, there were several other nationalities represented 
in this sector of the agricultural system.
The outbreak of the second 'World War finally put
an end to speculation about the Territory's future. Within
a day or so, all but a few of the,German males in the
50
Territory had been-arrested• and interned.*^ Once again 
the non-African sector of the agricultural system was
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TABLE IX.
NATIONAL ORIGINS 01 HOLDERS 01
AGRICULTURAL AND PASTORAL LAND
ON 1ST- JANUARY' 1939
Nationality Number of
holdings
Leasehold Freehold Total
British 44-0 4-83,84-8 304,388 788,236
British Indian 278 88,873 187,434- 276,307
German 554 . 500,335 176,016 4-76,351
Greek 225 116,622 76,179 192,801
Missions- 4-06 34-, 168 56,908 91,076
Others ■ 195 128,668 165,503 , 294,171
Total 2,096 \ 1,152,514- 966,4-28 2,118,942
(source: Annual Reports Department of 
Lands and Mines, 1958; Government 
Printer, Dar es Salaam)
immediately affected; German-ovmed farms were placed in 
the charge either of a neighbouring British- fairer or of 
an official appointed by the Custodian of Enemy Property# 
But - although for the next-few years development activity 
came to a stand-still, standards of public administration 
declined and a maig© shortage• developed, at least the 
Territory was fortunate in that it escaped becoming a 
battle-field for a second time*
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CHAPTER VI
THE MANDATE IN RETROSPECT
The outbreak of the second World.War is a 
convenient ■ point in time for stock-taking. Like the war 
of 1914 it caused, a hiatus in the development of the 
Territory although.’ this time there was no complete break­
down of government and services. Consequently, some 
degree of continuity was maintained and planning for the 
future was.still possible. But the background to planning 
was quite different, for. at last there was an end to two 
obsessions which had influenced the British administration 
for the first twenty years;, firstly, the need to safeguard 
the African way of life even at the expense of economic 
development and secondly the need for vigilance in countering 
German adventurism. Land usage was directly affected by the 
ending of the period of depressed economic conditions which 
had; been responsible for the stifling of initiative and the 
curtailing of investment. With the War the supervision by 
the P.M.C. came to. an. end. Although the records give, the 
impression that its debates were never particularly inspiring 
and the attitudes of its members were often a shade too 
legalistic so that the broader issues were overlooked, as a 
body it had. performed a useful function. It had always 
demanded and usually obtained a great deal of factual 
material from the British administration and this had made 
it possible to condxict informed discussions on the policies 
being adopted.1 More important, the ever-present threat
that it might require an explanation of why a particular 
policy was adopted provided reason and stimulus to resist 
any group, however influential, intent on obtaining 
decisions contrary to the best interests of the African 
inhabitants.
In the preceding chapters’ the decisions which 
concerned the settlement of non-Africans in Tanganyika . 
have been considered chronologically for ease of narration 
but have been separated into two broad divisions of those 
policies designed to modernize the .economy and those which 
were primarily political in object. No complete, 
separation is, of course,'ever possible and all the : 
policies.mentioned can be shown to have a bearing on the 
relationship between the different communities and the 
environment. In pursuing economic ends white settlement 
had to be adapted to the dictates of the environment, the 
fertile areas being scattered and there being insufficient 
funds available to provide good communications, to improve 
water supplies or, to clear tsetse fly from areas of high- 
potential. On the other hand, the primarily political 
decision to extend the Tanga line to Arusha made it possible, 
to alienate a fertile stretch of country for settlers to 
grow cereals and thereby bring about changes in the land­
scape in this area. Again, government policies could have 
a negative effect in that where the landscape might have ■ 
been changed the agents of change were prevented from 
obtaining a title over the land. Generally speaking* 
during the inter-War period decisions to refuse applications 
for land were based either on the observations of the Land
Development Surveys conducted between 1928 and 1932, or. on
Cameron's declaration, supported by the Colonial Secretary
as already described, that large blocks of the Territory
2were to be considered as primarily native areas. Never­
theless , the environment played an equally important part, in 
the development of the agricultural pattern of the period 
since there were, few of the areas closed to alienation which 
might be termed by Europeans as being climatically pleasant j 
therefore there was no great demand’ for the policy to be 
changed. One of the few exceptions was Buha in Western 
province, which was added to the restricted areas .in 1933;' 
whereas most administrative officers agreed .with the closure 
orders previously issued there was less support for the 
decision to extendi the restriction to this remote area where 
an inward-looking community badly needed some contact with the 
outside, world.
And so, by 1938 the settlement pattern showed 
that alienations to non-natives were mainly concentrated 
within four provinces, namely Eastern, Northern, Southern 
Highlands.and Tanga; there were also several sisal 
plantations located in Lindi district forming an isolated 
but compact block of alienated land, The total amount of 
land occupied by non-Africans amounted to some two million 
acres, about half as much again as in 1913 (see Table IX).
In the introduction it was noted that significant 
' changes occurred in the role of the colonial bureaucracy 
during the forty years of British rule. During the inter- 
War years the civil service,, was very much the government and 
the ruling element in the local political system. Thus
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there; panh^ separation •leiweeh policy and ■ , ' '
bdministratioh on. a. geographical.basis, with policy being 
decided in London, and implemented, .according; to local \
needs, in bar es Salaam. As described above, the local 
administration enjoyed, a great deal of Platitude in talcing 1 ^
decisions affecting settlement and had? to;..'deal' 
variety;' of pressure groups and institutions-as ' did' the-- 
Colonial Office itself. But if ;the Tanganyika, ■admihistratipn 
was more than an agent of the- British governments of the .
period-- it is-useful to observe how it interpreted the -
various .declarations of ■ policy ^affecting settlement, made" 
from time to time in London. \ : — p
The first two Governors were able/to; take decisions! 
with immeasurable consequences. / Although they could.;not. , 
prevent the dual system of agriculture’continuing they 
could:determine the extent of the peasant.farmers1 entry ; ;
into the market economy and therefore; cpntroi the amount. /
of/support fpr either .sector. Their respective attitudes 
to economic development were affected by the demands of the 
day; unlike -Byatt, Qameron was not faced ;by annual.budget; - ;
deficits and was'therefore able to.give political stability 
priority over increased'productivity.; The'recommendations 
of. the East African Commission were never in donflict with; 
this aim since, all that they required was .that non-*African 
agriculture should be developed pari passu with .native 
agriculture. This only required equal Consideration of ., ; % 
the need, of all communities and this was not a,, concept 
which could be measured with- any precision.Inconsistency,; 
where.it arose, was for the Golonidl Qffice %o deal .with;; ;
it . was obvious• -that!e’quai consideration of the needs of 
• all, communities was a policy which was hound to conflict ' 
with the principle of native paramountey as stated in the 
Devonshire ''White--Paper i
: -The: decision. to obtain economic development 
through the:expansion of two agricultural systems rather 
than;: one Was of spme importance ..to Cameron., It made it 
possible to obtain an increased production of cash crops 
1 .without exerting'too much pressure on African communities 
, in an-atteiapt to induce a ;rapid change in traditional- 
practices. The declared aim of protecting indigenous 
culture apd, creating African-operated institutions was .no. 
romantic ideal. Much, of British colonial1 practice was. ; ! . 
based on indian'.experiences and Cameron and his supporters 
knew it; was ■■necessary, to . avoid the mistakes which had been- *- V  
made there. -Whatever the terms used to describe the 
problems of the sub-continent it was apparent’:, that it was"!\1 
the contradictions of modernization, which had. caused \ 
frustration and/stoked the fires of nationalism.! Similar/ !
mistakes, could be? avoided in Tanganyika- provided- the-native; 1 ,
authority system furnished the means;.to allow.-an acceptable ; 
change in traditional society; the. change-to a market. , 
economy was apcomplished' without exploitation and misery 
and African demands for a European-type education could-be 
successfully resisted. : ; - .  ^: ; .■ /
; In order to achieve the first of these; objectives -■ 
Gamei^on concentrated on handing; over clearly'.d'e'fihedi. , -  
dxeputi-Ve powers tcU traditional rulers ahd he and his / - ;
officials spent much of their time in trying; to ensure that J !.
the new native Authorities developed according to plan.
The effort thus .expended was often criticised by British 
settlers who believed that economic development should be
given priority and the system of indirect administration
• 5
was both costly and inefficient, , The second objective,
which required that many more Africans should enter the
money economy, needed a careful supervision of marketing
arrangements as well as government encouragement to grow
cash crops. Mitchell, when Secretary, Native Affairs,
supported the proposal to start African co-operative
societies which, he argued, would complement the'native
authority system by,modernizing traditional economic
, 6practices without substituting control by. foreigners.
In addition, the government attempted to protect producers 
by instituting. Produce Markets to ensure that a fair price, 
was paid in cash instead of,the practice of barter. ■ ; 
Pinally, several: attempts were made, with no great success, 
to provide an education for Africans appropriate for local 
conditions. . ; /
Gameron and his successors were well served by 
the British Colonial ethos with its implicit, assumption 
that the primary duty of the government official.was to 
protect the interests of dependent peoples in' any dealings 
they might have with other aliens.; It was assumed without 
question that this-was., no temporary expedient; the duty 
would remain until such time, as the indigenous people 
changed, or shpwed that they wanted to change, their 
traditional ways., . The apparent enthusiasm for assuming; 
this protective role was largely engendered by the writings
bf the functionalist anthropologists, notably1 Malinowski, 
with the re suit that/ Africans were abl e to cho o'se - wheth.er 
to come into contact with a.modern economy or-to avoid it.
The choice, thus offered was a fact, but it was a;fact which 
existed by force of cirbumstanbes'. Por if; there had been 
.a plainly visible source of wealth to be exploited it would 
have, bben; alrnqst.’ impossible for! the, administration -to justify 
a: situation/thereby the;\majprityi'-o!f the population lived in,
. peace and in'poverty outside the;market economy. Thus, in 
contrast With Kenyav/where,the.^symptoms of - underdevelopment - 
were already^becoming apparent ,; Tanganyika remained 
undeveloped-' ,-v (.These .terms are dealt with at: greater 
length in Chapter "XIII). As yet there/were no signs of the, 
emergence of new structures or classes; instead, the 
existing local, structures had. been preserved and strengthened 
by the formal powers .conferred.on chiefsi Whereas in Kenya 
and Uganda after the,Depression there was already evident 
some African resentment at’ the perceived limitations in 
opportunities, in Tanganyika there was little "opposition to 
the established-ordei*. The contrast between Kenya and. 
Tanganyika in race .relatipnsrwas so obvious , to any visitor 
that to describe it became a commoiiplace. r In the case of . 
Kenya the difference was usually explained in terms of land 
alienation but it is: important not to" overlook the greater 
impact of a,market economy in Kenya and Uganda and the many 
Consequences of this.impact. In Uganda, a comparatively 
small amount of land was alienated and yet racial tensions 
before 1940 were almost hs acute as Kenya. Again, in 
Tanganyika most of the-instances/of conflict .with a racial
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basis.during, this period, occurred in.Moshi. district where
the Chagga, growing Arabic a coffee,,, had very definitely
■ . ‘ " . -■ 9 1 :
entered the market economy. : ,r
Government policies, and African reaction ■>=
V . Some of the reasons why -the Tanganyika situation 
was-different can be’deduced from the■preceding chapters.
It is;evident - that events bef ore the Mandate and subsequent 
factors combined with/.the environment to influence the course 
of economic development and the evolving pattem.of land 
usage * While world markets were buoyant'there was every 
reason to exploit the natural resources of the Territory 
to the maximum by encouraging any; kind of agricultural 
enterprise which was socially and politically acceptable.
When the effects of the Depression:coincided with increased 
political. uncertainties,: there was/a,sound-argument for 
insisting on increased output from the African sector in 
order to counteract the effects of a reduction in private 
investment- But- ah increased/contribution from the African 
sector required: not only activity in the extension services 
but.also a. carefully formulated policy on the amount of 
interference in traditional life styleswhich would be , 
tolerated by the people themselves and by world opinion.
While Gainer on was Governor, .there was a steady 
^expansion.of the Department ;of Agriculture; the increased 
funds made available1 to the Department, a fact which can be 
ascertained from the annual estimates,, led to increased 
extension work in the' African sector. Although the 1930
Annual Report'explains that ’there is no definite boundary 
between what is done for the planter and for the native 
farmer*, from the disposition of staff and. from the 
description of their duties, it seems Clear that most
. 10
activity was within the African sector.
When settler spokesmen criticised these develop­
ments, Cameron at first was able to justify the increased 
expenditure by the results .which were, obtained.'1''1' , However, 
after a time it was evident that expectations had been over- 
optimistic. Progress ih cotton production was particularly 
disappointing and various reasons were suggested. The
remedy, a greater degree of compulsion, was unacceptable;. 
without it no widespread' change;in traditional economic 
practices could be expected 'in less than a generation. 
Cameron firmly believed in persuasion only and. the 1926 
circular on agriculture and labour makes it clear that 
there was no necessity for the peasant farmer to produce 
crops for sale. ^ Writing to Oldham, Gameron remarked::
•you cannot force him (the-African), to produce as do the 1 
Belgians. Those who suspected that such tolerance was 
misplaced in a country which was poor and undeveloped were 
told that toleration, if that was the correct description 
of the policy, was based, on prudence rather than sentiment. 
Gameron was. writing only twenty, years after the Maji Maji 
rebellion which, it was believed had its origins in the 
forced production of: cotton. The use of force,,was impract­
icable if there,was, probest over a wide area and it would 
have been embarrassing to let it be known that it was 
necessary in a mandated territory; . The ideal way,..bo deal
with the problem was to persuade the native authorities 
that particular policies were right and necessary and then 
induce them to ensure that they Were implemented. . No doubt 
this was done successfully on many occasions, but there were 
plenty of instances where the native authorities were 
reluctant to appear to be the agents of government policy
15
or were unable to do so for/other reasons. A striking 
example of the subtleties of local politics occurred in Fare 
district during the:second World War when a plan to introduce 
a graduated local rate (mbiru) destined to finance a schools 
expansion programme, had to be abandoned when,, the chiefs 
withdrew their support for the scheme. /.Such instances 
demonstrated:, the limitations of the native authority system , 
andultimately, of the- extent of British control.
' Nevertheless:, it was tempting to make comparisons.. 
with French methods in another mandated territory, the 
Gameroons. Peasant agricultural production had been 
successfully increased, the infrastructure had been improved 
by the massive use of forced labour,and an ambitious public 
works programme had been financed from local resources. It
was observed that in a British colony, such plans would have
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to be met, from loan funds. { Since there was never
sufficient, aid from this source to satisfy anything like the
demands received, the result was that many worth-while, plans
could not be implemented. Thus it was a fear of the
possible African reaction to coercion which, for most of
this period,, inhibited the Tanganyika government from taking
more'positive action to increase production in the African
agricultural sector. There was a notable exception when
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;E. .Harrison, oh being, appointed Director of Agriculture, 
introduced bis 'grow more.crops campaigdp/with-the 
implication that at times coercion, would have, to; be used.
-But he made his proposals at atime-when financially the 
Territory was in a desperate situation'-and' it.-/was recognized , 
that extraordinary: measures were chiled;-for; / Once the 
Bepression seemed to be over, and1 the .situation in;the 
Territory had , improved it was,possible to relax the- pressure 
and rely on there being .no sighificant , drop;;in:..output,. y 
While the campaign was being.conducted there were cases of 
officials, over-stepping the law; in. order to obtain resUl-ts. 
but.they were aware.that they would receive no;support if ' 
.unwelcome publicity resulted. _ -7i:Thus the; British .attitude 
stahdslih sharp7 contrast to the /Erehch policy on this /issue. ; ; 
When a Erench official was reported on as a ’'man of •_ 
quantity1 it, was no doubt to, be taken as a mark of
approval; in a British report such an observation would
'' . . 7 . .  p i  -
have been considered somewhat eccentric.
\ The evident lack of any sustained drive to 
eradicate the subsistence.; economy met with the approval 
ofvthe fieldt administrative officers ,and it was belteved 
that there were good reasons for proceedingslowly. / ; it/at.-/■ / 
time -.wfeen/the: ^ Mandate It self//was-tip .question' it was believed 
to/;be7m6peimportant, be retain--the'-:support of the African,, , 
population and it is^evident from MacMichael^ s despatches... 
that. ih/.har \esi if was recognised that the Germans//
in the Territory were by no heans unpopular*/ /
1 As already mentiohed', the greater productivity ;/ v 
which resulted/fromtarrispnls campaign -focussed, attention/// 
"'/'.I' /- v"
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on the need for stricter measures to prevent soil erosion.
Since the practices recommended' were never accepted with . ■
any- enthusiasm, widespread;, e'niorcement was. only possible if
coercion was. used. This would have, led tola great deal .
more, conflict than" demands for increasing productivity where
at least a pecuniary advantage could be-expected. A-s a;
result, the basis of the prescribed policy was patience-
combined with persuasion* with the. main /effort directed, td
the: introduction of contour ridging. By 1937 several
native authorities had been persuaded or cajoled, enough to
introduce soil conservation, rules .but there was little
evidence that they were, recognized by the public as being
.essential. Elsewhere,in.East Africa there was a similar
problem and/likewise the wisdom .of relying on persuasion was
recognized as this observation by Mitchell .clearly shows::
'It is idle to suppose that; what we have-to do 
can be done by unreasoning and unexplained.
■ compulsion, by punishment, or the use of force., 
except that in: appropriate circumstances and 
with public, . opinion behind us, individuals can- 
be prosecuted,and punished for breach of rules 
of good husbandry.^ "
There were good reasons to; claim that it was not necessary 
to risk a hostile reaction;, after all, it was argued, 
when the: deterioration.to/the land became obvious even the 
most conservative of chiefs would, agree to enforce improve- - 
ment. measures.. The ^ example of Ukara island, where over­
population was. accompanied by carefully-applied soil 
conservation measures demonstrated what could be done.
Tribal turn-outs in-Sukumaland;, where large numbers of tax­
payers provided., free, labour for ten days each year for. 
bush-clearing projects were not unpopular. ^ Finally, the
ever-present problem of' inadequate funds severely restricted 
remedial measures; although in 1931 an advisory committee 
on soil erosion was formed it concluded that .its activities" 
would have to be limited to .publicity, education and 
persuasion in order to preserve what remained rather than, 
to repair damage already, inflicted. In the eight years 
which followed a variety of practical measures were adopted I 
(see Appendix-iii) although according to the critics they 
were never followed, with ’’sufficientdetermination.; /
Increased government activity was the cause of one 
of the most widespread examples1of erosion. . The Veterinary 
Department, by providing a means of curing a number of 
diseases, were primarily responsible for the large increase, 
in the cattle population. " At the same time the many attempts 
to introduce cattle:taxes or compulsory.culling usually met 
with unanimous Opposition. . Rather than risk.incurring the 
hostility of the cattle-owning bribes, many officials took 
the somewhat cynical view that nature, in the form of 
periodic droughts would eventually do what the government 
was reluctant to do. They were dramatically proved right 
in 1949* when in the'- Sukumaland districts 1,500,000 cattle 
died or had to be slaughtered out of a total of 2,500,000. 
Consequently, in spite of the various measures-'described on 
paper designed to improve grazing opportunities and to 
protect the soil fx^ om being' exposed to the danger of erosion 
. there, was neither. recognition :by the, Africans nor determin­
ation by the government that something had,, to; be done. In 
fact, the African: pastoralist. preferred. the semi-arid 
conditions inducedby over-rgraz.ins since a permanent grass
cover.usually provided a harbour, f Or ticks, worms and flies 
But once, the scanty.grass cover was removed, often the soil 
became, hard au'd compacted and unable to accept or retain 
moisture, The.damage.was obvious enough, but while the 
practice of communal range bndunrestricted individual 
ownership: of stock, was the -rule, any more positive, action 
by the government-incurred political risks. Inevitably 
the settlement • lobby-contrasted- the desertr-like conditions 
in many of the areas of African occupation with the examples 
of more-careful iand-usage ;in most - but not all - areas .. 
alienated:to, non-Af ri o a hswhite settlement, so it was 
claimed^, would make the best use of the natural resources 
of the Territory.
Capital expenditure and the spatial factor
v. EconomicVdevelopment during the. period.was 
<hindered'-’'by."the "limited amount of investment , the poor returns 
:obtainedfrom-exports and the, spatial factors, which caused 
: problems • which could onlybesolved when improvements 
occurred-:ih;tbb other areas preventing progress.
' ^Eunds from external; sources were in three > 
categories . Eirst ,: there 'v/ere direct grants and loans
'from' Treasury.;,;' loans raised by public
subscription and iastly , loans and "grants, made under the 
/Colonial, development. Act 1929 .^ ;^ This Act created a 
Development .EUnd..,\ from . which;Tanganyika., received' reasonably- 
.generous allocations, exceeding those made to the other 
: East African territories * „ .DeverthelePs, the Public Debt
rose steadiiy and by 1938 the .charge on it amounted to
about twenty per cent of the ordinary public expenditure.
, Flore important, the lack of private investment
prevented any rapid Change from a subsistence economy.
While the future of the Territory remained uncertain, British
investors preferred Kenya and there was little investment
29emanating from other countries during this period,.
The reliance on agriculture, and sisal in
particular, to provide the founcfetion of a sound economy
has already been described. It was, not until 1935 that
the absolute predominance of agricultural products diminished
■50as a consequence of the development of mineral resources.x 
While world prices for all crops remained low, the 
Territorial revenues suffered as well. Short of funds,, 
there was little chance of solving the problems of the 
spatial factor. . The Depression, and in particular the 
levy on official salaries, combined to prevent any expansion 
of the civil service; the findings of Sir Sydney:Afmitage 
Smith in his inquiry into the Territory's finances in 1932 .
ensured that not only would the social services be cut back 
but also that little could be done in the immediate future 
to deal with the overcrowding - increased production-soil 
exhaustion syndrome.^ lor much of Tanganyika's problem 
was caused by its being under-populated and over-crowded.
As Gillman pointed out in his perceptive account of. the size 
and! distribution of the population of the Territory, two , 
thirds of the African population lived in one tenth of the, 
area.^V Using the figures obtained in a recent census, he 
noted that whereas the mean density of the population was
was only 5-5 poz* square kilometre,-in four widely dispersed 
areas the figure rose to over 2^ 0. per square kilometre.^
The fact that the centres of population were situated at 
different corners of the Territory made it necessary to 
construct and maintain an expansive road, system which for 
long distances served very few people. furthermore, unless 
feeder roads were constructed to link the fertile pockets of 
land to the main roadi system there was little likelihood of 
the peasant farmer in such places being persuaded to grow 
cash crops.
:finally, the Territory's rail- system constituted 
another drain on, the sparse resources available for develop­
ment and consequently was one of the major causes of the 
relatively slow change from a subsistence economy, first, 
there were- the far-reaching implications of the spatial 
factor which, however, obvious, are so often overlooked.
The track alignments, as with the road routes, often 
traversed/ miles of countryside possessing no potential for 
producing any freight to be carried. . furthermore, witlh 
the capital situated at the coast there was a permanent 
disbalance of traffic;, there were’..no inland towns of any 
size to which imports flowed from the coast. , Again, the 
high cost of operating and maintaining the Central line was 
aggravated by the.environment. ' The railway administration 
was always confronted by the problem of either too little or 
too much water; torrential downpours.caused flooding of 
stretches of track and wash-aways of embankments and'bridges 
or else,., on the section between Dodoma and Tabora,: water 
was in.such short supply that the routine maintenance of
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locomotives was hampered. Development projects were costly 
and sometimes failed dismally to come up to expectations, . 
such as the line aimed at opening up fertile areas in 
Singidadistrict.?^^' Even the Moshi-Arusha extension, 
constructed/ to: placate -the settlers in Northern province 
at a time when there was much agitation to secure the transfer 
of the area to Kenya, failed to achieve the profitability, 
expected; many farmers found it more convenient to continue 
to bring their produce; by road to Moshi for onward 
transmission.
. Secondly, settler interests in Kenya were well ' 
represented on the railway board and, were anxious to see : 
no change in the uneconomic freight rates aimed at assisting, 
farmers in the Highlands growing cereals. Their aims 
could best be achieved, if the profitability of the Kenya 
Uganda line could, be increased, even if this: had to be done 
at the expense of the Tanganyika railway. As is.well 
known, in spite of powerful official support, they failed 
in their attempt to prevent the construction of the Tabora- 
Mwanza line;:*^ however, they succeeded in ensuring that... 
most of the Kilimanjaro produce should be sent to Mombasa 
rather than Tanga, with the result that the northern line 
ran at a considerable loss. Kilindini (Mombasa) was the 
more convenient port and statistics made it clear that the 
provision of two’ways to the Coast for the Kilimanjaro, 
traffic incurred an expense which was not.justified at this 
time. Finally, the chances of the railways being run 
.profitably received another blow when the Belgian authorities 
decided in 1931 -to. route their copper exports via the west
coast. In terms of profitability, the .details given in: 
Appendix v. give:, some indication of the importance, first 
of copper and later, of sisal; the consequences were far- 
reaching because the railways had to be supported by 
subsidies from the Territory's revenue and loan funds,, 
thereby diverting.resources which could have been employed ,: 
elsewhere. Thus a combination of political influences and 
environmental difficulties added to,the problem of finding 
funds for. economic development.
White settlement and: colonial policy :
The problems of land.usage1 in the African, sector 
and the lack of an adequate supply ofcapital only served to 
emphasise the need to ensure that the non-African agricultural 
sector continued to contribute to the growth of the economy. 
Although it was generally admitted that private investment . 
/was/needed and had to-be encouraged, the measures to attract, 
it were: never more than half-hearted and often aroused deep 
misgivings. \ Thus, in contrast to the. policies adopted with 
• the- aim-..-of.',increasing production in the African sector, where, 
the relevant/issues can be,clearly perceived, the policies 
which determined:, the pace ; of. development in the non-African 
sector were infiuenced-by a variety of political and economic.
.factors and: were hotly debated.: Furthermore, this sector
. of’ the agricultural system .could .never be treated as an 
entity, for the problems and needs of the plantation manager 
and.-the settler, .practising mixed, farming were very different .. ■ 
nndiii was hot always easy for the Tanganyika government to
take into account, the:variety of interests which demanded 
satisfaction. But where there is a conflict of interest, 
regulation is necessary and the actions' and perceptions of 
the administrators need to be studied. .
The:kernel of theproblem was that after 1925? 
the British in Tanganyika were faced with a multiple 
dilemma• To step.up the development of the. non-African 
sector, taken as a whole., might have provided faster economic 
development but, for. reasons' already described, would have 
led to conflict with the -fulfilment of the 'protective1 role. 
If however; emphasis was placed on. expanding "they plantation 
sector, there would emerge all the disadvantages stemming 
from having the Territory's economy tied to the fortunes of 
the sisal industry. , And yet if European settlement was 
encouraged, thereby leading to balanced growth and the 
assumed advantages from 'contact V, there was the danger 
that the Germans would soon form the majority of the . 
European community and the Mandate would be in jeopardy.
It was only by Britain remaining in control that the East 
African Dominion, with its. consequent strategic advantages, 
could be created. . . Moreover, those involved m .the 
administration of the Territory, either in Britain or in 
Tanganyika, were never in doubt that the continuation of 
the- Mandate served the best interests of the indigenous 
inhabitants.
Thus the. settlement issue was crucial to the 
political development of the Territory and until the last 
vestiges of, the imperial rivalries of the nineteenth 
century were extinguished it could not be reduced to: an
argument on economic or social advantages. Consequently, 
it:is somewhat unrealistic to suggest that with British 
colonial policy there,was only disagreement over method 
;rather than.:.prineiple because oolonial administrators, 
.,pfO'4mtAbIans'/and representatives of financial and commercial 
: interests all ,G,ame from the; same: background and therefore 
/made similar assumptions about.the system. - If: this was 
irf fact' the^generai rrUle ,/ Tanganyika must be noted as the 
exception; f or: there .was- no geheral agreement as to the extent 
/and ime nature-'fon-Affican..participation in the economic 
activities of -the ierriforyv/ • . It5 was because;-.the guide- 
;lines were neter precisely defined/in public to the 
satisfaction of air‘:'int'ere4ts^that--/the settlement, policy / . 
was:fundamentally affected by ■ a/:sebies of extraneous events. 
/For noisuchj. definition/was ’ possible while economic consider­
ations were subordinated to the/pressures :,of the inter- v 
.national/situation and while; ttiere were differing viewpoints 
on the" strategic.implications/bf/retaining the Mandate, y 
./There is^no./othbr/.explanation/ lor theconsistent lack of. 
/success_of/the l.E.i,B.!4/Witb! Its poilfical and financial 
connexion's? in obtaining assistance and encouragement for: "■
British/ settlers/during "the; four: yqars following the ,
publication of the Report of the•East African Commission. 
Economic interests, - as the 'Gdiomiesionlappreciated", could 
.not be ignored because to■do so might call,into' question ' /
; Britain' s ; competence t.o. administer the .Territory. But 
/bnce^a modicum of success .with the Dual policy was assured 
strategic interests/could again .take priority and if it : - 
was not always clear as to how they affected the settlement
issue >.it' was because there was: no agreement . as to the -
effect of-increasing the number Of British settlers.. While
some argued that such ah :increase. 'could only, under-pin
British influence, Others were., convinced that in a period
of economic uncertainty; it might be counter-productive,.
with the/German settlers'being ’prepared to continue farming-
unprofitably where the, British, settlers would/give1 up. •.
With these divisions .of opinion,’a policy of proceeding
cautiously.had its attractions and this .suited the
humanitarian lobby who feared that,the-Territory would go
the way of ’Kenya. ' : And so, for at time, the exigencies of
international affairs exerted their influence and we are
reminded of Victorian imperial policy thus described:
\ l:It was not the pomps or profits, of governing 
/ . Africa/which moved; the. ruling .elite,/but/the 
cold-rules for national -safety, handed, on from 
' Pitt , Palmerston and Disraeli. ’ ^  ■.
The doubts about the value; of settlement made it 
possible during the periodunderreview for the issue to 
be determined primarily by.the decisions taken by Cameron, 
by the perception of events in the Colonial Office and 
subsequently by the psychological’ and economic effects of 
the Depression. ..Added to this, it is necessary.to take, 
into account what.can only be termed the . dimension of 
accident. - Once' a' large area of the Territory had been 
found to be suitable for alienation it was only a matter 
of time before Cameron was’ replaced by someone who was 
prepared to allocate more resources in order to encourage 
settlement. But Cameroh1s departure coincided, with the 
worst effects of the Depression being felt in the Territory 
and the general lack of confidence in farming kept new
settlement to a minimum.
CamerOn had little difficulty in gaining the 
approval, of the Colonial Office for his- settlement policies. 
Contrary to some views, itv.is apparent from the minutes on 
the files that the 'officials in the East .Africa, department, 
usually found: themselves in agreement with him and criticism 
was; in most cases, restricted to matters of detail. Never­
theless, in spite of the support of the permanent officials;, 
it is surprising that he did not come into, open conflict 
with Ameby on the settlement issue; the latterfs determin­
ation to create a'British dominion of East Africa had to he 
based on the settlement of more British nationals in the 
Territory and this was bound to threaten Cameron's plans 
for African development. .. At the same time he had already 
given assurances that settlement, would be permitted in 
areas found suitable, by Bagshawe's committee and undue delay 
in allowing alienations would have led to much criticism..
But as it turned out,.it waspossible to keep some check on
the rate of new settlement by the delays which occurred in
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carrying out surveys of the new farms• How much of the
delay was deliberate is impossible to assess, but at the
time it was never suggested that the reason for delays,
namely staff shortages, was insurmountable. The consequences
of delay, at a time when settlement could have proceeded
.quickiy? were1 not. insignificant; without an approved survey,
no Right of Occupancy could be issued'and without the formal
title to land that this.provided the average settler was
unable to obtain loans, for developing his farm. Thus
‘settlement was effectively restricted to those who had
adequate capital resources of their own or to those who 
had no intention of.doing more' than satisfy the minimum 
development requirements.
Amery, like Grigg, was no doubt aware of
Cameron1s reluctance to encourage white settlement, and in \
view of his interest in the strategic factor it might have
been expected that he would have directed Cameron to move
faster. As it was,-there y/ere three separate events and
factors-which precluded interference from London. : First,
there was the assumption by Amery and, Grigg that there was
no real obstacle to the plan for. closer union and when this
had. been achieved.-there would be time; enough to. organize
more- settlement in Tanganyika. In fact, there was,an
advantage in delay because while matters moved, slowly there
was;less likelihood of too many Germans entering the
Territory. It was this confidence that the issue was as
good, as. settled which provides the answer to Amery's
otherwise inexplicable carelessness in failing to ensure.
that the members of the Hilton Young Commission were:
favourably disposed towards the principle of closer union
4-2before, their selection was approved. Too late it was
realised that only the. chairman was likely to; agree with 
a plan which would lead to an increase in the power of the 
Kenya settlers and a last minute attempt to appoint another 
member whose views were similar to Amery's was turned down 
by the Cabinet on the grounds that the Commission was large
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enough already.. . And so the Report when it was published 
clearly demonstrated the divided views on colonial policy 
prevalent at this time, the chairman being compelled, to
submit\a minority report of bis own, on the major issue. 
Amery tried to make amends by sending Sir Samuel Wilson 
to East Africa, but in the heated debate which ensued, the 
imperial objective of closer union was/thrust .into the 
-background and without the political consequences of some 
form of federation there was no chance of the Tanganyika 
settlers receiving more support."
.Secondly, there.was the unexpected removal of 
Amery from, the Colonial Office as a consequence .of. the, 
labour victory in the 1929 General Election. In his 1927 
White'Paper, Amery had already indicated that settlers in 
East Africa could.expect to be. associated with the duties 
of trusteeship over the Africans, and this could only mean
that they could expect to have, a greater share in deciding
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policies. Passfield,, succeeding Amery rejected the idea
and firmly restated the paramountcy principle. Grigg was
replaced by Byrne and it was soon obvious in Kenya that
the. Influence of the settlers was .much reduced. The Board
.of Agriculture there was reformed and, much of the aid to
white settlers- withdrawn. It was .common knowledge that
Oldham was- able to exercise a great deal of influence in
the Colonial Office and that he was firmly oppbsed not only
to7 'closer union1 but.also to any support for the settlers'
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aims. - Aware of the developments, Cameron was able to
ignore the Hilton Young Commission's observation that more
aid should be provided for settlers; he therefore rejected
the. recommendations : of the 193° legislative Council
committee which, if implemented, would have led to some
increase in white settlement as soon as the worst effects
of the Depression were abated. In spite of the local
animosity against,him, he was confident that-, he was 
.supported in London.
Finally, there was the part played by Ormsby-
Gore in the proceedings. As chairman of the East Africa
Commission he had been convinced of the necessity for
increased white settlement in the Territory. As Under
Secretary in the Colonial Office when the Report was
published and being responsible for East African affairs
there, he was in the strongest possible position to see
that his recommendations were implemented. Yet apparently
he did little to contest the Treasury’s refusal to help
over the railway to the south-west and within two years of
his Report he is on record with the observation that
Tanganyika-needed sisal planters but not small ,settlers as 
> 46in Kenya. Thus whatever he might have said in public 
it seems he remained unconvinced as to the advantages of 
white settlement. In 1928 he was the chairman /of a 
meeting at the Colonial Office attended by officials and 
members of the J/.E.A.B., at which criticisms were made of , 
the Tanganyika, government's settlement policies. He gave
no indications of.his own views but said that he would pass
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on the opinions expressed to the Governor. '
At first sight perhaps, it might, seem that British 
policies on the settlement issue can be described as a 
series of vacillations, with the Colonial Office.placing 
the blame for inaction on the Governor and the latter 
giving assurances of his assistance.as soon as,Britain 
agreed to provide'aid to make settlement viable. In fact 
in retrospect, the policies were consistent and easy to
summarise,. -' But because at the time there were imponder­
ables it was never, possible to predict with any degree of 
certainty the exact amount of alienation which would be 
allowed. , There was, therefore, little which successive 
Governors could add to the 1926 .circular on. agriculture, 
and labour and throughout :.the period the policy it 
prescribed remained the corner-stone of the government1s 
position on white settlement. , •
As the effects of the land alienation which took 
place at the beginning of his term of office became 
apparent, Cameron believed the real priorities became . 
increasingly obvious. ' First it was recognized that 
economic well-being of the Territory would, for some time, 
depend on plantation crops, particularly sisal; it was 
therefore necessary to ensure that the estates continued 
to obtain an adequate supply of labourers. Second,-it 
seemed to Cameron that the consequences of expanding the 
mixed-farming sector were of doubtful economic value and; 
the political and social gains and losses were evenly 
balanced. It was therefore necessary to restrict or aifc 
least not encourage the expansion of this sector in order; 
to'protect the sisal industry. :As Cameron explained his 
position:
* The :danger is always present in my mind which 
may be caused to the premier and most valuable 
^industry in the country the cultivation of sisal 
by the diversion of labour to less robust forms 
of agricultural enterprise.'^
Although it was pointed out to him that experience.else­
where had shown that labour somehow materialised once it 
was known that vacancies existed, Cameron was .convinced'
that in the circumstances then existing ,in the Territory 
if settlement proceeded too quickly the opportunity cost 
would-he unjustified. Furthermore, any signs of increased 
pressure .on the chiefs to help the labour recruiters was 
bound to arouse criticism from the humanitarian'lobby at
'• v  4 . 9
Westminster.. - . .
As a consequence, it was logical to oppose the 
many insistent demands for government aid for new settlers. 
Refusal was easy enough to justify since there was never 
sufficient funds to meet the very obvious needs of the 
Territory./, Cameron made it clear that .for the time being 
the government would only encourage•the expansion of the 
plantation sector. " -To the Joint Select Committee he 
wrote, as follows:
.'Some of the settlement has been precarious and 
. unprofitable. The view that the country is hot 
one for individual enterprise but, for plantation 
effort on a large scale is again being expressed.
But after ten years of British administration it was still 
too early to decide to favour one sector at the expense of 
the other and; the Joint Select Committee were unable to come 
to any definite conclusions on the subject. Statistics 
proved little apart from showing that the dual policy was 
indeed being followed and should satisfy those who were 
anxious to see that no great reliance was placed on 
results from any one sector (see Table X). Nevertheless, 
they reveal that Cameron was correct in his contention that . 
sisal had proved to be the backbone of the economy and 
that the interests of the sisal growers had to be safe­
guarded • However, it is difficult to assess the extent 
of his influence on the, development of the non-African, .
PERCENTAGE PROPORTION OF CASH CROPS 
- - ERQM EACH SECTOR,, 1925-1935 .
1923 , 1927 1931 1953
African; . , / ' v 61 48 42 ; .49
, Sisal .. ‘ 25 40 49 40
Other non-
African 14= 12 9 11
(sourcC: Annual Reports,
Department of 
Agriculture; 
Government Print er, 
Dar es Salaam)/
agricultural sector as a whole. , If a less determined 
Governor had been appointed to succeed Byatt, there is 
still no certainty that /the 'scale of white settlement 
would have increased: to any appreciable degree. . But what . 
is clear,from'the correspondence, between Dar es Salaam and 
the Colonial Office is that .the comment in the J.E.A.B.- 
minutes that Cameron was antagonistic to white settlement 
is- nearer the mark than. some accounts of the -period 
suggest.^ For whatever Cameron said in public or wrote 
later, it is clear that he distinguished European-owned 
plantation development from the smaller-scale mixed farming 
usually based, on the settler's own resources. He gave 
qualified support to the dual policy in that he recognized 
the value of the heavily capitalised plantation sector; in 
the . case of the mixed-farming sector he supported settlement 
where the 'contact '■ theory could be seen to be valid and 
opposed it where it might hinder his plans for African 
political development. To' his critics who claimed that 
he had reneged on his declaration in 1926 that he supported 
a policy of white settlement he needed only to point to the 
qualification he had added at the time.to the effect that: 
adequate transport‘facilities had to be provided if settle­
ment was to. be encouraged. In the case of cereal crops 
this meant a railway, which'in turn required the approval 
and assistance of the home government. But, as* has been 
described, with no sustained, pressure being exerted on the 
official classes in London, there was never any likelihood 
either of. the railway to the south-west being constructed 
or any form of subsidy being approved to help British
settlers. , ■ , A;
The policy of making the sisal industry the basis 
of. economic growth in the Territory was; continued by 
Cameron's successors and the bigger, companies, through the 
T.S.G.A.were able to exercise, considerable influence.- 
They, were able to prevent any new- plantations being started 
at a time when over-production would, have resulted. Also, 
they were able to resist proposals which might have led to 
a fusion, in the case of this crop, between the two agri­
cultural sectors. , In 1937? a scheme with some official 
backing was. launched whereby Africans living near estates 
would grOw sisal and sell to the .plantations on * pre-arranged 
terms:. The’ arguments for'the scheme .were evenly balanced 
and possibly its supporters would have succeeded if the 
industry had been earning bigger profits. But for too long 
it had. been a buyers' market. The effects were evident 
in the reaction to the,installation of a sisal processing 
plant in Tanga, in 1934; it was not long before commercial 
interests in London persuaded the owners to close it down 
and sell the -equipment to a firm in, Japan. The recovery 
in the price paid was not sustained and by 1938 had again 
,dipped below £20 per ton. Output from Indonesia had
steadily increased and by this-time.was nearly equal to the
54- A ■
total production of East Africa. There was, therefore,
little incentive to invest in replanting and still less for
the Territorial government to put public funds into sisal
production. The record of company profits in Table XI
provides good reason for pessimism at that time.
On the other hand, no viable alternative was in
TABLE XI
DIVIDENDS. PAID. BY TANGANYIKA SISAL 
COMPANIES.: QUOTED QN THE LONDON , 
STOCK EXCHANGE, 1921-1940*
Year E.A. Sisal Bird & Co.
Plantations
1921-1923 nil - nil
1924 nil= 1 . 5%
1925 nil
1926-1935 nil nil
4936 ,,, 2°M - . nil .
1937 74#®-" nil
1938-1940 : nil; nil
*. three other companies.obtained a quotation in 1938,.
but none of them had paid a dividend by 1940
@ paid on reduced capital
(source: The Stock Exchange Official
Year Book)
sight.. Other forms of commercial farming had also suffered 
badly during the Depression and a combination of the 
conditions and events already described served to make 
farming on a large scale a precarious existence. Gillman, 
probably the country's leading expert of the day on such 
problems considered that white settlement might not be
55able.to survive unless generous subsidies were offered. 
Nevertheless, by 1938 it was generally agreed that commercial 
agriculture had to be based on a. number of crops and it 
seemed possible that the contribution of the settler farmer 
might become as important as that of the owners of the sisal 
estates. This possibility was to exert considerable 
influence on the members of the Central Development Committee, 
which in turn provided the recommendations on which 
development was based after 1943*
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// ;BHlXiDING FOR. THE FUTURE \ !
The^end' of the second world war signalled the; A 
‘beginning of- a\period of comparatively rapid development of - 
the resources of the Territory. This was possible, partly:' 
because world trade'Was buoyant and" partly, because 'compared/ 
with the prevwar;period, more funds were made available for 
increasing, the, output from the agricultural .’sector. These 1 •'
funds were either in the form of - private investment or were; • 
receipts by the government in the. form of loans, grants and 
revenue;. , Emphasis, on the need to increase output, led to 
suppbrd fSbr ,a .policy/of encouraging white settlement and 
much new. land was .alienated and brought into use. Thus 
settlers ,ahd plantation-ownerSv African farmers and public V/ 
.'Corpbratiphs, to ge.;bherv played . a; part in bringing about ./•: 
/substantial pHanges to the landscape. ; <.
, :. The ' development plans which provided, the frame-
work for. Changes,.in land use, affected :all sections of-the, / . 
agricultural .system; in turn,’ the. plans ..were affected: by 
the three.,factors described below, which can "be ppmmarisedi 
thus:; the new f  orm- of ;.international, control, now exercised ; 
by the•TrusteeshipyGpuncil, increased assistance and 
direction by .Britain and. the consequences of the creation 
of the Eas t . Af ri can .Hi gh Commi s si on.
The Trusteeship Agreement •
At the end of 1946, Britain's mandate terminated 
and as a result of negotiations with the U.*N. Trusteeship 
Council it was accepted that Britain should continue .to 
administer the Territory under a new agreement. This 
development did not make it necessary to amend any of the 
territorial ordinances affecting land! tenure and to‘ the 
ordinary citizen these juridical changes were of no great 
importance. However, to some of the resident settlers 
the continuation of international control caused much 
disappointment since they believed that the defeat of 
Germany provided the opportunity to declare the Territory 
a Crown colony .and thereby ensure that British control 
would, continue indefinitely. This in turn would make itb 
possible to provide the means to promote white settlement 
as had/been done in Kenya some twenty years previously.
- On the important question of safeguarding African
rights over land, the new Agreement was worded much the same
1
as the Mandate Instrument. But m  some of the other 
Articles there were changes which were to have an important 
bearing on the relationship between the different racial 
communities and between each of them and the Tanganyika 
government. And, as so often in the past, it was the 
potentially explosive issue of land alienation which often 
affected this relationship. These are some of the more 
significant changes. ' First, in common with agreements 
for the other Trust territories, it was categorically 
stated that the administering authority was obliged to
develop institutions.'towards self-government or 
independence.' Second,: the Trusteeship Council was 
empowered to send Visiting Missions to the Territory, 
thus permitting those who represented the Council, not 
only to. gain first-hand information but’ also to bring to 
the local scene: some- of• the tensions and attitudes which 
were part of current international conflict. The Missions 
visited, the Territory, every three, years and the reports 
they submitted did much -to,stimulate political consciousness. 
Third, Britain was required 'to develop the participation 
of the inhabitants of Tanganyika in the government of the
Zl
Territory.' - Not surprisingly, the British government's 
interpretation of the word 'inhabitant' became a matter of 
s.ome:;controversy.^ In. particular it has to be seen in 
contrast with Article 8, in which the term 'the native 
population' is used in order to provide, protection for 
theE; in land matters. .; Thus; it "was- decided there was a 
duty to provide equal treatment -and protection - for 
members of all races who could’be classed as inhabitants.
But’ What was intended to safeguard individual rights was 
soon being utilised to protect community rights and the 
settlers together .with other- minorities were accorded 
.formal recognition1 of .the influence they already exerted.
The interpretation provided a firm support for the expedient 
policy of multi-racialism which was now developed. Finally, 
Article 10. of the Agreement made it obligatory for the 
administering, authority to develop the economy of the ’’ 
country*. . The Tanganyika government found this prescription 
most useful when answering criticisms for having alienated
land, to non-Africans.
' The- British government-, and Tanganyika after .194-5
. A t t i m e -  when the outcome of the 'War was still 
unceirtain,' British, colonial policy , had undergone a marked 
change . In.. a White Taper published in 1940, it was stated 
that after the. war aid to dependent territories would not 
only be on a more substantial shale but also would be ■ 
allowed for meeting recurrent as well as capital costs. 
Thus,.the poorer parts of the Empire would no longer be 
restricted to providing those services which could be
,/ • • ■ ' . ; rp , -
maintained from local resources. Following the- White 
Paper, Acts of Parliament provided Colonial- Development and 
Welfare Funds which, in allocations to Tanganyika, began to 
make possible changes in the population distribution and in 
land utilization as will be described later. The Overseas 
Resources Development Act 1948 created the Overseas Food 
Corporation and the Colonial Development Corporation, both 
of which by their activities in Tanganyika were able to 
change in a dramatic manner the landscapes of parts of 
Central, Western, Southern and Southern Highlands provinces 
As well as the effects of increased aid on 
agricultural development in Tanganyika, the result, of the 
. General Election of 1945 also played a part in changing the 
x^elationship between the ..Colonial Office and every 
dependent territory administered by Britain. In the case 
of Tanganyika, local officials became aware: of the fact 
that their development philosophy would be rigorously
examined; by the new Labour government. In 1943 the Labour
Party had published a detailed statement setting out a
colonial policy and the chief architect of this endeavour
had been Arthur Creech Jones, now Under Secretary at the 
' 8Colonial Office. Since George Hall, the Colonial
Secretary, was soon fully occupied with the problems of
Palestine, his Under Secretary was left to attend to African
problems. Creech Jones brought with him to the Colonial
Office a great deal more knowledge and experience than any
of his immediate predecessors; before taking office he had
been chairman of the Fabian Colonial Bureau, Labour spokesman
on colonial affairs in the House of Commons and a member of
at least one Colonial Office committee. Furthermore, when
later he became Colonial Secretary he:appointed
experienced members of the Fabian Colonial Bureau to
9various Colonial Office Committees. With this capacity to 
observe.what was being done in different parts of Africa the 
new ministers in the Colonial Office were well aware of the 
difficulty in balancing political with economic consider­
ations. Certainly they had to face the task of.justifying 
their decisions to those of their supporters who found it 
necessary to voice the disquiet felt by many Africans when 
there was any increase in the numbers of white settlers.
But Creech Jones, although willing to give assurances that 
the Colonial Office would watch the position carefully, also 
made it clear to the Fabian Colonial •; Bureau that he 
believed that European settlement had greatly contributed; 
to the development of Kenya; it was thus only to be 
expected that further settlement in Tanganyika would meet
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with .his approval.. Two years later when criticisms 
of colonial rule had become more persistent, he said as 
follows: . . ‘ •
. the spirit of nationalism might be harnessed 
for development but often tended to be destructive 
and violent;, . it had to be met by paying heed not 
only to social needs which the authorities can 
supply but also-to opportunities for/self -fy
expression ... every colony must see that the 
‘ ■ social services now customary in Europe cannot • 
be sustained on primitive peasant economies.-^ •
“; \ \ _ v;In. Q?ahganyi,fc&.i/'the’plansifor agricultural
development had already, been based on this argument-.. T}pe 
.difficult environment combined with traditional farming 
methods which were not going to be i changed over-night, made 
it unlikely that any substantial increase in the cash 
earnings of Africans was immediately possible. Without 
moreXwekith, the revenue' would not be forthcoming to pay 
for improved sociai.services. 1 In fact., the post-war 
planners argued that the output of cash crops from; the 
African sector, was likely to fall until remedial measures 
were applied. . The dual system therefore not only had 
to be retained but also, further entrenched' by encouraging 
the enlargement .of the non-African sector.- It was not 
only the- need for additional revenue which .prompted this, 
course Of . action..': -'Foodproduction. had failed to keep pace 
with the rate of population increase and,..either more food 
crops had-, to be grown., on * a .commercial basis or funds had to 
be diverted from development projects to pay fdr require­
ments to be imported. Growing more food was the obvious 
choice and immediately after the.war this Was achieved by 
the payment of:acreage grants to maize growers and by 
alienating 1and to the Irgest: consumer, the sisal industry?
so,"that many estates; could, produce enough for their own 
requirements. ^ . As xt turned out, the African sector 
managed a steady increase in maize output during the years 
which followed and with hindsight it began to* seeim that the 
dangers of shortages had been exaggerated. Gertainly, as 
the problems caused by famines receded, observers unfamiliar 
with conditions in more remote districts began to criticise 
the government’s apparent obsession with the needs, for
14-Territorial and even district self^suffxciency in food.
But.experiences in dealing with famines during the rains in
the years before all-weather roads were constructed gave
good reason for caution;, furthermore, in view of the.
recommendations made to the Kenya government.that maize.
growing, over and.'above self-sufficiency should not be
encouraged, it could not be assumedthat deficiencies, could
■ ' 15be made good from that quarter.. .
In other. ways too, conditions in Kenya affected
policy in Tanganyika. Mitchell had already warned London
in a seminal despatch that intractable problems had to be
faced:' ' •
'At the present-time characteristics common to 
all areas of dense African population Include 
over-crowding, excessive pressure on the land, 
erosion and loss .of fertility and a severe 
'struggle to maintain the existing very inadequate 
standard of living ... East Africa is barely able 
. to support itself in'foodr at the present time., 
and would indeed be a-large importer were it not 
for the production;from European farms.
The importance of this.despatch was three-fold.
First, it provided ample justification for the alienation
of more .land to settler farmers until a more politically
acceptable form of large’ scale.agriculture could be shown
to provide a viable alternative, Second, since the 
deterioration in the African sector it described was also 
occurring, in Tanganyika, it made, it necessary to devise, 
development plans which included schemes to improve specific 
danger areas as well as attempting to increase production in 
this sector by methods of general application. Finally, 
the despatch made a deep impression on a British Cabinet. 
Minister and as. a consequence great changes occurred in 
Tanganyika. The Minister, John-Strachey, was to become the 
architect of the Groundnut; Scheme which itself was the, 
precursor of a third system of agricultural production, 
farming by public corporations. It was Mitchell’s despatch 
which was to be uased when Strachey sought the approval of 
the Housa of Commons for the enterprise. After quoting from' 
the despatch he added:
'What is. the use of providing schools for people 
: whose primitive methods of production condemn
them to evergrowing malnutrition? What is 
needed, is, as.Sir Philip .Mitchell put it, this 
breakaway from methods which form no. basis on 
which .to extend, and. develop life.
Thus the influence of metropolitan Britain on land 
usage in Tanganyika was three-fold. , First, there was the 
close supervision of policy affecting alienation of land to 
non-Africans. Second, there was. the financial aid made - 
available to the majority of dependent territories but which 
was very important to Tanganyika in view of the lack of local 
resources and the absence of>borrowing powers being enjoyed 
by African or municipal authorities.' (see Appendix viii) 
Finally, there was the determination to intervene.directly 
by employing machinery•oh a very large scale in a vain attempt 
to overcome the imperatives of a. harsh environment.
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The East Africa High Commission v
One consequence of the change to Trusteeship 
status- was the. possibility of achieving closer union between'
‘ the three- East African territories without any question of . 
legality being, raised. However, the new> Agreement made it 
clear that certain conditions had. to be observed and the 1 
British government emphasised that the proposed inter- 
' territorial .organization was aimed at achieving administrative 
efficiexicy and economic development and not at fostering 
political unity. -In Tanganyika;, as in Uganda, there .was , 
still' some suspicion that, the Kenya settlers would dominate \ 
the organization but after protracted negotiations the
proposal-to>create;a High Commission was accepted, against
'"' l ' "18"' ■.. some opposition, by the Legislative Council. It
consisted df the Governors of the three territori es,
supported by a Central Legislative Assembly responsible for *
a defined range of services. • Extreme caution was adopted
before any of its powers were enlarged. TJje natural
resources services of the High Commission were of consider- -
able benefit to Tanganyika and both directly and indirectly
affected land usage and settlement;’ the industrial licencing
system, regulated by the East African Industrial Council,
may have had a less beneficial effect on economic develop-
on ■ment. Finally, the creation of the High Commission led •
not only to a number of new common interests but also a
keener awareness of political events throughout the region. '
In particular, the Emergency in Kenya in 1952 profoundly
affected the balance of power between the communities in
Tanganyika and the rapid political development of the 
Territory could hot be ignored in Kenya.
Tanganyika in 1945 .
The institutions, and their representatives, 
described above provided the external factors which from 
time to time contributed to.the development policies 
adopted by the Tanganyika government; there was also the 
situation in the Territory itself as perceived by those 
responsible for planning for the future. For in spite of 
memories of the years of the Depression, in 1945 there was 
every, reason for confidence. The German threat, which had 
for solong deterred private investors, had been, removed and 
both.agricultural/sectors had managed to live with the 
difficulties, imposed by war-time restrictions:and shortages. 
In the case of the'major crops there/had been no marketing 
problems since the whole crop produced in each case was, 
purchased by Britain.at a fixed price, an arrangement which 
.was continued through.1945 and 1946. During the war years 
sisal production increased considerably; in contrast cotton 
production went down when the peasant farmer found he could 
obtain high prices for cereal crops. For both the 
plantations and the mixed farms there were by 1945 some 
serious obstacles to any further expansion, caused by a 
shortage of labour, a shortage of foodstuffs for feeding 
labour .and a general scarcity of machinery and-equipment.
To meet these problems District Production Committees in 
the non-native areas made efforts to induce settlers to
increase,production of cereals and Labour Utilization 
Boards-were instituted to control the use of labour on 
estates.
To the planners, these difficulties seemed to be. 
of a temporary nature and.the steps taken to resolve them 
were .expectedi to be successful. In fact it was sometimes 
suggested/that; the . labour shortage, was an advantage at, a 
time when a large number of soldiers had to be re-settled 
into civilian life and it was not forgotten that in the 
last fullL years before the War. there had been an unemploy- 
ment;problem.. There was every hope- that funds for 
,de-ye'-lppmentr would be on an unprecedented scale as a result 
of aid from Britain and from increased Territorial revenues. 
On the other hand, the geographical problems still remained 
and,it was. impossible to predict.whether the Increased 
resources for development would; make;, any appreciable 
difference. The Implications of the spatial factor may 
seem obvious enough but the huge cost of meeting- the problem 
is sometimes overlooked when comparisons are made-between 
Tanganyika and countries where the population is more .. 
concentrated. In the case of sisal, the most profitable 
crop at this time, expansion was essentially limited; to . 
those, areas. close to existing railway lines, or to the coast/ 
' line / (Map IV );; in the caseof cereal crops? once war-time 
shortages /were ended the transport factor was bound to limit 
production on a. commercial basis. One important reason for 
this was/the lack of urban growth during the inter-war 
period; , while this may have been an advantage for the 
colonial administration "in that it delayed, political'1
development it also left the grower of cereal crops with
22very limited local markets. However, the position was 
changing rapidly; whereas in 1952 there were only six 
towns with a population of 5,00° °r over, by 1952 there 
were sixteen and the process of moving to the towns was 
to continue at an accelerated rate.
In the preparation of plans it was necessary to 
take, into account the increase in the African population 
which was taking place. Although no accurate•estimate 
could be made when the plans were prepared, the 1948 Census- 
figures were in accord with what had.been generally 
predicted: since 1928 the population had. increased from.
4.7 million to 7*4 million, a mean annual increase, of 
slightly over two per cent,. 'p.: ■
It was obvious that an increasing population would 
worsen the problem of soil, erosion and. if. it also led. to a 
shortage of land, there would be political repercussions.
It was therefore more necessary than ever before to accept . 
the. expense of opening up new land and to increase agri­
cultural production to help meet this expense. The 
planners were helped to some, extent by the much-improved 
road system, which had been developed during the years after 
the Depression. Better roads not only stimulated interest 
in growing cash crops b.ut; also- lessened the-dangers caused 
by recurrent famines., On the other hand a factor which 
would make a sizeable inroad- into development funds was the 
greatly increased* cost and complexity, of the processes Of 
government. For it was not only the technical services/ 
which had to be expanded; the increasingly critical
attitudes to colonialism in the international community 
made it imperative that a substantial slice of the funds 
to be' made available should be allocated to expanding the 
system of African education and to improving the social 
services. Also, in spite of the improvements to the road 
system mentioned above, it was still not adequate to sustain 
a more developed economy., It only required a slender 
increase in the number of heavy vehicles during the rains 
to turn an otherwise satisfactory murram road into a quag­
mire. As crop tonnage increased, traffic likewise increased
and in spite of the money and effort spent on them^the roads
27> ' 'deteriorated. ^ Increased government activity in the many
directions now planned required a reorganization of the
machinery of government by a process of devolution. From
the beginning of 1948 each official member of the Executive
Council was made directly responsible to the Governor for a
department or group of departments, thereby relieving the
Chief Secretary of some of his responsibilities. More
important, from the economic standpoint it became necessary
more than ever before to. encourage all forms of private
investment in order to create the wealth to support the
enlarged.government structure. If as a consequence there
was an increase in the number of European settlers, there
were,.it was recognized^bbvious political risks; but, it
was. argued, there were also risks in delaying development
measures or in concentrating on raising the productivity
of the peasant farmer without proper heed of the consequences.
The dangers are. described in the following passage’in the
Report which set out the development plan for the next ten
yearst
’Over the greater part of the country the soil is 
poor and the rainfall is often badly, distributed. 
Nearly two-thirds of the Territory is closed- to 
cultivation owing to the presence of tsetse-'
- infested bush. The-result is over-cultivation 
in the remaining areas with consequent soil " 
deterioration .and annually diminishing returns.
On numerous Occasions in.the past economic ■ r 
depressions/arising out of.circumstances beyond 
the Territory's control, or the need for maximum 
production for war purposes, have led to the soil 
being worked to an extent which has materially 
weakened its productive capacity; and there are 
signs over. practically the whole of these areas 
of desiccation, erosion, destruction of forest 
and the general impoverishment of the soil., 
Evidence is accumulating On all. sides to indicate . 
that a continuance of the present practice of land 
exploitation will lead to conditions which spell
disaster .'2 .^
The Development proposals.
As already described, serious planning for the 
economic development of the Territory began before the War. 
with the appointment of a Committee given the duty of 
describing the problem and giving"recommendations on what 
needed to be. done. The Report,, described below, was 
published two years later and became the basis for post-war 
planning.strategy. Its influence therefore on the course" 
of non-African settlement for the rest of the colonial 
. period was considerable and the circumstances which led to 
the appointment of the Committee are of some interest.
: In 1958? Sir Mark Young replaced MacMichael and
was soon to set about reassuring the unofficial members of 
his .Legislative Council that settler interests would not be 
neglected. As he said:
'It has been thought, and to some extent it is 
still thought today.,, that-the attitude of this 
government towards the settlement of non-natives 
is unsympathetic and even verges on the 
antagonistic. T do not think there is much 
justification for this view. Honr-native 
settlement is not to be considered as inimical 
to the interests of the native population ...
I propose to appoint a committee to examine 
and report on methods , . .. for the development 
of the Territory by natives and non-natives.'2^
Following his statement, in a despatch to the
Colonial Secretary, Ybung contrasted conditions in the
Territory with those in French West Africa where better
services, for the native, population were provided. He
drew attention to 'the disproportionate ratio of.its
resources to its needs' and explained that in his view
only a searching inquiry into development problems could
improve the situation. The inquiry, he-suggested should*
be conducted by a Central Development Committee of officials
and unofficials.which would be assisted by Provincial
26committees, also of mixed composition. In the Colonial 
Office his initiative was welcomed, as being opportune since 
at the' time the Mandate itself.was in question- from the 
minutes it seems that there was no interest expressed in the 
composition of the committees which would be preparing the 
plans. Young was therefore able to proceed as he intended 
and not . surprisingly, in view of his statement to 
Legislative Council cited above, settler interests were well 
represented on the Central and Provincial c o m m i t t e e s I n  
particular,* the unofficial members of the former were 
accustomed to express their criticisms in a forthright way
and were able to ensure that the Report in due course
• 28 reflected their views on what needed to be done.
The Report was published in 1940 and at that time . 
there was little interest in the observations it made. ' 
Emphasis was laid’ on/the need, for better communications, 
more determined exploitation of the natural resources, 
better use to be made of ,the. under-populated areas and: • 
greater productivity from the African communities. It 
:was suggested that Africans should'be trained to replace 
Europeans and Asians in government service, a move which, 
it was • acknowledged, would require more investment in African . 
education. ' On the question'of non-African settlement? members 
were in favour of a further alientation of land and like the 
Taylor committee of 1930 they recommended the creation of a 
Land Bank and a Land.Settlement Board. Perhaps the - 
Committee realised, that in view of the criticisms of the . 
findings of the Taylor committee a better case Would have 
to be presented- if the continuation of' the dual policy was 
to be accepted. In the Report it was argued that in times 
of economic depression the settler farmer would have to 
increase production in order to meet his expenses' whereas 
the peasant' farmerbeing a landed proprietor, merely ceased 
to produce cash crops, until prices improved. It was 
observed that when- the years 1928 and 1931 were compared 
sisal production increased significantly whereas there was/ 
a fifty per cent drop in cotton production. Furthermore, 
if soil erosion was, a-major problem, one of the worst areas 
was the Uluguru rbgion of Eastern province where no economic 
crops were grown; pressure on African peasants in such 
areas to grow crops for sale-would' only make.the situation 
worse. The fear that further settlement would cause a
labour shortage was unfounded; the' Labour Committee of 
19.37 had concluded that the shortage then existing'was 
caused primarily by the 'grow more crops' campaign. The 
answer, the Committee maintained, was to adopt a policy of* 
interpenetration1, in order to = provide education and 
employment for Africans living close to alienated land; 
with this observation members showed that they fully 
.supported the 'contact theory' described by the East 
African Commission in 1923* ’
An increase in non-African settlement, as 
recommended by the Committee, was to cause changes in the 
landscape in many parts of the Territory. But there is 
need to mention one suggestion which, when implemented was 
to cause more' obvious.change; this followed the Committee's 
concern for the development and conservation of water 
resources;. Shortly after the .end Of the War, a Department 
of Water Development was created and by its operations it
was able to contribute to the making of changes, in land
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usage m  many places;.. .
Although it was recognized that no action towards 
implementing the report was possible until the end of. the . 
War was- in sight,.some feared that it might be treated as 
just one more report *which could be conveniently forgotten. 
Thus,. in 1944- Lord .Chesham tabled a question in the House of 
Lords asking what steps 'were to-be taken to implement the 
recommendations and a debate ensued. The majority of those 
who spoke supported, the findings but it was noticeable that 
there were reservations over the issue of further white 
settlement./ In Tanganyika, a small department had been
established in the Secretariat in 194-3, with .the task of 
planning in detail a post-twar ..development program. The r 
officials concerned concluded that their planning was 
limited by three factors: manpower (technical, supervisory
and unskilled), equipment and finance. However, once the 
financial position had been clarified by a-further statement 
from London, a Planning Committee was appointed to supervise 
the, work of the development branch. ^  In 1944 it published 
a Report, recommending priorities for the allocation of 
f u n d s i t  was emphasised, hopefully, that other 
recommendations would follow once policy decisions concerning 
land, settlement and land usage had been-announced. Most, of 
the projects had been recommended by the-Central Development 
Committee although; there was now added; provision for, 
improving the marketing of produce.sold by Africans, 
described as 'one of the Territory's most urgent :and 
important problems . O u t  of a total, proposed expenditure 
of £12..6 million, .£5*2 million, had been promised as a grant 
from the Colonial Development Pund.,
The Colonial Office view was that, among other 
reasons the Report was unsatisfactory because insufficient 
funds had been allocated to schemes for increasing the 
wealth of the Territory.^. The comment is not without 
significance; for if‘absolute priority was to be given.to 
economic development there was ample justification for. 
encouraging non-African investment in agriculture since at - 
the time this seemed the quickest and surest way of 
achieving this, objective.. In addition to this observation, 
the Tanganyika .government was informed that the grant,from
the C.D. and W. Pund. would he increased. Soon an added 
fillip to the plans was given by the decision to allocate 
for development the. Agricultural Development Pund, which 
had accumulated from bulk sales of cotton and coffee during 
the war.
In Tanganyika,;it was decided to 'Create a separate 
organization to plan and implement the development projects, 
with,a Development Commission with strong, non-official 
representation to supervise the task. This time, the 
membership of the Commission did., attract some interest in 
Parliament and the Colonial. Secretary was asked to make sure
that non-officials and Africans.webe associated with the1
. : . . /  ., , v  ■ ' . 30
planning of the spending of money received.from Britain.
When the membership of,the Commission was announced it was
seen that one' Asian; and one African, were included.
The Commission had a two-fold task; first, it 
had to draw up a comprehensive development plan for a ten- 
year period and second, ,to supervise the implementing of 
plans once approved. In the Commission's report it was 
clear that the views of the Central.-Development Committee- 
on agricultural development were accepted; provision of 
funds for both a Land Bank and for. a Land Settlement Board, 
were included as well as a number of schemes designed to 
Improve African agriculture.> Although support "was to be 
offered to both sectors of the dual system, it was clearly . 
intended that in deference to the Colonial Office view, a 
major effort' would be made to introduce change in the 
African Sector. Whereas in the previous plan,.. 5-8 per' 
cent of the total had been .allocated to ‘ Conservation and
.Development of Natural Resources' , now it was--intended to . 
allocate 1? per cent of a larger amount; (the hew total 
estimated development expenditure over ten years was £18 
million),. Even so, the amount was still only two thirds 
of what was to be. devoted to:road improvement, illustrating 
how. the spatial, problem continued to affect, if not 
determine, the pace of development. Eurthermore, funds 
.had. to be set aside from the total for Railway development; 
one item of major expenditure was the new branch line to 
Mpandh, ah enterprise which, like the Singida line before 
the-War, failed miserably "to justify itself.
- - The Colonial Office was satisfied that the
Commission had selected.the right priorities and the Plan, 
subject to two additions being made, was approved.^ A 
firm promise^ of a total sum of, £'5,250,000 was given,
supplemented by a further grant of £3,500,000 for inter-
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territorial schemes. Iiowever xn London it was still
doubted whether there would ever be an adequate supply of.
.unskilled labour to work on -such a wide variety of projects
and; assurances from the Governor to this: effect: were met 
40with disbelief. .. Not only was the Groundnut. . Scheme 
about-to: be launched but also the extent of the expected 
expansion, of the sisal industry was impossible to predict. 
It was however the spatial factor and not a shortage of 
labour which' caused the revision of the Plan. In 1950, 
owing, to the rise in capital costs as well as for other 
reasons it,was found necessary to add considerably to the 
funds; to be spent on the roads programme.^
■ The increased, tempo of economic development which
followed was primarily.due.-to! the external factors mentioned 
above; the: nature, of the development was determined by, 
above all else, the;recommendations of the two committees 
and the Development.Commission and for this reason they are 
of more than a passing interest. Their.proposals were / 
never exclusively concerned with;the allocation of funds 
and. the;selection of priorities. Por example, it was the 
1944 committee' which- recommended the setting up of an 
authoritative commission to investigate the,need to re-; 
distribute tribal and alienated land in Northern province, 
a proposal which was.to have important political conseque- 
nces. Meanwhile, as the outstanding points in the Plan
were being settled, recruitment of new'-shaft proceeded 
apace and the civil service rapidly expanded. ^ A new 
era was .beginning. : : .
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CHAPTER,VIII
NON-AFRICAN AGRICULTURE AFTER. THE SECOND WORLD WAR
In the Territory, the news of the Labour party's 
victory in the 1945 General Election caused dismay to the 
European leaders hoping that, in the post-war world more 
encouragement to potential settlers would be given. Instead, 
there was not only .uncertainty as to whether any new 
alienations would be. approved but also, there was the 
possibility that most of the ex-German estates might revert 
to tribal ownership. , The' lather doubt. .was dispelled when 
it was announced that 'the Colonial Secretary had agreed to 
take over the German estates at a fair valuation for 
occupation by Africans and Europeans-in accordance with 
local needs .' It was. decided. that neither ■ ballot nor 
auction had proved to be satisfactory ways of allocating 
estates to new settlers and instead the newly-formed Land 
Settlement Board would be responsible, for selecting suitable 
tenants. In areas where there was already a land shortage
certain estates reverted to tribal ownership while, in some
*' • 2 cases the original German owners were.allowed to re-possess.
Those estates which were freehold were converted to lease­
hold, and issued on a Right of Occupancy to. new tenants.^
On the question of the alienation of new land; the 
first official comment on the recommendations of the Central 
Development Committee appeared in 1944-, when, the Governor,
Sir Wilfrid Jackson said, that he was in favour, of encouraging
Z j .  1 ■' '  ■
settlement. He added, however, that there had to be *a
scrupulous regard for the. rights and.interests, as.well as 
the future, needs of the African population.1 By 1 future 
needs', he explained, he meant 'possible new types of. African 
land settlement', presumably such as had been tried at 
Kingolwira (see Appendix vii)
Confirmation from the British government that 
alienation of new land was permitted, came with a despatch
from George Hall, Colonial Secretary in the new Labour
5  ' ' V  " "  ' -
government. Re-alienations and new alienations were
allowed provided the following four principles were observed:
the land was not, nor likely to be, required for native
occupation; alienation was not likely to involve an element
of continuing subsidization; that Africans compelled to move
would be given land,elsewhere; that there was no selecting
the best land for.alienation.-
These reservations were' presumably to meet expected
criticism in Britain rather than give precise direction to
the course of' non-African settlement in the future; either
they accorded with the practice and intentions of the
Tanganyika government yor,, in the case of the last point, it
was impossible to enforce. Nevertheless, it could be argued
that it was important to place them on record in case, the
colonial administration ever lost control of the settlement
policy, as had already/happened iii Kenya.
And so, with London approval for non-African
settlement, the Tanganyika government was able to follow the
proposals made by the Committee. Henceforth non-African
settlement was to be encouraged, a Land Settlement Board was
appointed and a Land Bank established. . As related in the
previous chapter., funds, were provided for both institutions.
The Land Settlement Board
The Board; was given, ;the .responsihility of-arranging ' 
for the disposal of the,ex-German estates and for taking, ; 
decisions in respect of new alienations of land. The powers' 
of the Board were considerable and its decisions were likely 
to have far-reaching consequences. ' However, there was no. 
danger that its actions’would conflict with government policy; 
members of the Board were at first all Europeans, of British 
nationality and an,official majority was maintained.,;
•' Between. 1948 and 1951 fhe major task of the Board 
was.to dispose of the ex-German properties.-, First, 
pamphlets were published describing;, the properties available 
and. district selection committees- were appointed,to investigate 
the qualifications of the applicants.. Credit was given for. 
past farming .experience or service in the Armed Forces. It 
v/as announced that all leases would run for 35 years only,. , 
a decision’which, as explained later, was to be strongly 
criticised. In most, cases the estates being offered 
followed the boundaries of the former German properties; an 
exception was made in.the case of;the Oideani estates where 
the area was sub-divided into, thirty mixed farms of some 
.840 acres each.
The re-allocation of these properties to new 
owners was criticised by the first Visiting Mission 
representing the Trusteeship Council, and in the Report it 
submitted it was. recommended that as a general policy the 
former German estates should be handed back to African owner­
ship. -The Tanganyika; government, rejecting the proposal,
pointed-.out that the estates in question were among the 
most productive in- the territory and. to place them in 
inexperienced hands would lead, to a decrease in output
which in turn would, adversely affect the financial position
'. •- Q ■ ■ 1 '
of,the country.. / _ ,
But the same argument could hardly, he used to
justify new alienations., which, when they were begun also A.
led'to criticism from the. same source. The Mission made
no distinction between plantation development and mixed
farming and merely observed, that ’European colonization
should be kept to. the barest minimum consistent with the
,:.f. - q
development of' the territory *. • She observation,. mild
enough as it was, probably was included to satisfy the
10critics of both ..types of agriculture. ; A. reply was
hardly needed but the Tanganyika government took the
opportunity to place on record, the view that f!it was by
non-rindigenous.:. effort in areas where there was no land
shortage that a; rapid expansion of the social services
11
could be made possible.’ In fact, there was the more 
material reason why non-African settlement had to be 
encouraged which was based on the warnings contained in 
Mitchell’s despatch cited in the preceding chapter.
Although the Development Plan contained measures which were, 
expected, to lead to a substantial improvement in African 
agriculture it was realised, that it might take a long time 
to obtain results. On the other, hand, large scale farming 
involving the commercial production of cereals provided not 
only regular employment but also the domestic means to meet 
food shortages.
Thus the policy being implemented by the Land 
Settlement Board ,as a consequence of the British acceptance 
of the proposals of the Central Development Committee 
represented, a break with the morecautious pre-War approach 
to alienation and the change did not go unnoticed. In a 
memorandum in 1948, the Fabian Colonial Bureau Advisory 
Committee warned Creech Jones that the recommendations of 
the Central Development Committee ’were diametrically opposed 
to the advice given by Cameron on alienation.' The Committee 
was not convinced that there was any place for the European
as a mixed farmer in the Territory, And yet, as' the
memorandum explained:.
’The Land Settlement Board which is now operating 
is based on those recommendations and is apparently
engaged in a study of the possibility of supplementing
the 1940 proposals for new European settlement.
Thus without public discussion or public announce­
ment an important change of policy appears to be 
taking place.’^
In a subsequent discussion of the matter with the Committee,
Creech Jones emphasised the need to develop the Territory
and gave assurances that the situation would be carefully
watched. But the Bureau too maintained its interest in
the matter and two years later was again expressing concern
at the policy being adopted. On this occasion exception
was taken to a statement by the Territory's Member for Lands
and Mines to.the effect that the Land Settlement Board had
fixed a target of 100 farms of 1000 acres a year and this
alienation of land could be continued indefinitely. ^ The
Colonial Secretary was able to reply that changes were
already being made or would be made and that these would
meet the criticism from the Bureau. For in the same year
the. Land Settlement Board was reconstituted and renamed
the Land Utilization Board, ' fhe Member for Local
Government.and an African were, appointed members of the :
new Board thus ensuring that the political implications
of the alienation issue would be given more consideration.
Announcing this change, fwihing explained that in future,
the policy to be adopted by the government would make sure
that any land would be developed in.the common interest of 
-ISall communities. ^ The following year, another African 
member was appointed to the Board; and shortly afterwards 
the Governor explained, that the; Board 'was continuing its 
programme of investigation' and that the three local ■ 
committees of. the Board in Eastern, Northern and Southern
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Highlands provinces all,now included Africans as members., (
Whereas the. old Board had-seeded to concentrate
on the settlement of non-Africans, the new Board.had much
wider interests in how suitable agricultural land was used.
As explained below, economic as well as political factors,
made this change necessary., Lhe terms of reference for.
the newBoard give an indication of the variety of specific
problems they were expected to examine:
The. preparation of plans for making the best use 
of potential development areas. .
Selecting areas suitable for, alienation to non- 
. ,Africans. ’
Selecting persons suitable to receive a Bight.
■ of Occupancy;
Ensuring that conditions of Rights of Occupancy 
were observed.
■ Recommending measures to reform African land.tenure.
Ihe Land Bank
fhe introduction Of an agricultural credit 
scheme was the surest, way to promote the development of 
estate farming in the Territory., Without a means of 
obtaining.a low-interest loan a settler.restricted the 
development of his land to that amount of his own capital , 
he was prepared to put at risk. Political- uncertainties 
prior to.19399 the hazards of. tropical agriculture and the 
possibility of failing market prices were all restraining 
influences. . Settlers who. were pensioners often had little 
capital to invest and in cases where they had obtained land 
which was marginal and. then failed to develop it there was 
little point in revoking the lease for failure to comply 
with the Land Regulations. But .once it was possible to 
obtain a loan from the Land Bank, estate agriculture became 
an attractive proposition for a more enterprising type of 
settler and more development and better land usage resulted.
Before the second World.War there had: been two 
valid,objections to the proposal for. a Land Bank. . If the 
Bank'was funded by the British taxpayer it was assumed that 
he would expect its services to be used for helping British 
settlers and such;discrimination was impossible under the 
Conditions Of the Mandate; and if the funds came from the 
local taxpayers who before the War were predominantly 
African there was little Justification for providing a 
service which, would be almost exclusively enjoyed by non- 
Africans. \ ■ - " •
■ After, the War, with the increased emphasis on i : 
productivity, it seemed that improved large-scale farming 
helped the whole country and the provision of capital was 
the means to achieve this improvement. Thus, the creation 
of the; Land; Bank; , recommended, by the Central Development 
.Committee, was approved and £200,000 provided for it out 
of the' G.D. and W. grant. The.capital on which the Bank 
based its operations had to be increased at regular 
intervals to permit an expansion of its lending activities.
' There was, however? no lack of confidence in. the way it was . 
operated. . By 1958 the capital had risen to £1,200,000., 
the sum being provided by government, grants, by loans 
raised by public - subscription and, by overdrafts provided 
by;commercial banks. . , During the period interest rates
charged by the.Land Bank rose steadily, at any time varying
> IQ
with the length of time before repayment became necessary.
The. annual -amount .’of loans granted is given in Table XEX
and the,sums, indicate the valuable measure of.support the
Bank gave to the non-African sector.
The settlement policy implemented
• With the Board to investigate applications and 
with the Bank t©>.support the new settler, alienations were 
able to made at a steady rate. An examination of non- 
African . settlement in 194-6, (see Table XIII) reveals a 
pattern which can be described as dividing the eight 
provinces almost equally between 1 settled,' and 'native1 
areas j as Cameron and Mitchell had hoped wouldhappen.
TABLE XII
LOANS GRANTED BY THE LAMB BANK 
.1949-1958
Year. Total of loans
granted
' •' . £
1949 91,045
1950 126,060
1951 149,166'.
1952 •,' 81,867
1953 249,312
1954 187,94.0' .
1955 ... 134,577
1956 . . .  191,771
, 1957 : 294-,355
■ 1958 %  4-81,568
(source: Annual. Reports, the Land
Bank; Government Printer, 
Dar es Balaam)
TABLE XIII
AVAILABILITY OF LAND AND. NON-AFRICAN 
HOLDINGS OF AGRICULTURAL AND PASTORAL 
LAND BY PROVINCES, -31 DECEMBER 194-6. \
1. 2. 3- ; 4-..' ■' 5-
Province Population Land area Total land Non-African
density per for use and area . holders of
so.mile (a) occupation occupied by land 
(b) ~ 7" non-Africans
. (million (acres) ' :
acres) , '
Tanga 38 7*63 570,305 371
Southern
Highlands 18.5 22.54- 4-09,138 378
Northern 17.5 18* 11 363,4-4-7 563
Eastern 22 22.4-1 330,623. 4-4-2
Southern 17 31-01 124-,093 120
Western 12 .’5 34-.30 (.20,84^ 8 . 84-
Lake 4*7 , 22.11 22,4-07 126
Central 22 22.26 5,4-17 53
(a) based, on 194-8 census figures
(b) total land area, less the area designated
or planned to be designated as Game Reserves, 
Forest Reserves or both.
(source: Annual Report, Department of .
Land and Mines, 194-6; Government 
Printer, Dar es Salaam)
This,was in part the consequence of .the restrictions on 
alienation in certain areas which were not finally and 
formally lifted until 1953• / Much of.the land in Central, 
Western and Lake provinces occupied by non-Africans had 
been handed over to the various Christian missions . . 
operating there. '
Further comment on the Table is necessary in 
that it provides little indication of the potential amount, 
of land available for alienation in 194-6 and still less of 
the possibilities of increasing the numbers of non-African 
settlers in-each province. Whereas good arable land could 
be allocated in viable units of,600 acres, marginal land 
Would only be sought for cattle ranching, for which much 
larger areas would be needed by a lessee. For example, 
it will be observed from the Table that Northern and 
Southern Highlands provinces were approximately equal in 
their respective population densities, and available land 
areas. In addition,,in both provinces there "ware localities 
of overcrowding where alienation of even small areas would 
have been politically undesirable. But here the 
resemblance ends., because climatic conditions determined 
whether particular areas .would be attractive to potential 
settlers for the kind of farming they wished,to practise.
Thus the difference in settlement potential can best be 
Judged by comparing the different proportions of the 
respective provinces in which the rainfall was likely to 
make some form of arable farming reasonably profitable. • 
Whereas in Northern province arable farming could, only 'be'-" 
conducted in three relatively small areas where a combination
of climate and.(fertile Soil>was .present, in the Southern 
Highlands the areas where rainfall was likely to he 
adequate Were .-larger and,, spread; throughout the .province. 
fn:Tanga proVinpe top, decisibhs: to permit further ■ 
alienations were;not easy to(take. On the'one hand,
sisal for the ,f orseeable future' would provide the basis 
of economic progress for the Territory and seemed to: thrive 
on poor-quality .abils ; : vthus there .was - every, reason to 
suppose that there;,would be no great demands for such land 
to be reserved 'for. African .smallholdings. On the other, 
some 70 per cant of the sisal labour force were, locally 
horn or now resident in the province and wanted* to live 
outside the estates where they worked but near the perimeters* 
Thus^  Over-crQW<iing>voccurred and. expansion of. existing 
estates waO(difficult. : ' :
‘ , •'-.•-.’A 'final' comment, :-on the Table concerns the figures ;
in column:5,<which refer to land in -freehold possession"as 
■•(well, -as rights.\bf. occupancy. ( ' -^ t the‘time there was no 
accurate record; of -the. amount of land in the Territory 
(classed asfreehold, hut in 1951 the total: was estimated 
at slightly / under a million acres. Nearlyone third
of these .freehold.properties were situated in Tanga 
province and much,of the remainder in Eastern-and Northern 
•(provinces*./' ■•.'’ v ■ (," . . ■ ■ ■ . •  = -
With crops.continuing;to command good prices 
after the War (there was no lack of applications for land..
In 194-9, the Governor made it known that in response to 
demand, much new land had been,alienated. Further 
alienation followed and the achievement of the Land
Settlement Board can be summarised by describing what was 
done between 194-9 • and 1952 in respect of alienations to 
individuals or private companies. Three provinces, in 
particular were affected:'
:(i) North Province. In 194*9, 22 farms were/ 
offered at 01 Joro and 15 applications for 
■ these were., approved; at 01 Molog, West 
Kilimanjaro, 4- new farms were allocated;
. . a few alienations in Mbulu district were
approved;' following the recommendations 
of the Arusha-Moshi Lands Commission,; 
approximately 125,000 acres in the Sanya 
Corridor area , were set:, aside for alienation 
for ranching and dairying purposes. Also 
in 194*9 three blocks, each of 100,000 acres 
v .. at Essimingor were made available for large 
, v.. scale ranching schemes. " After a few years
a tenant was found for one block1 and. the 
government used the remainder for its own 
trials. In 1951, 8 new farms offered in 
the area north of Kilimanjaro led. to tenants . 
being found for six of them. '
(ii) Southern Highlands Province. . In Iringa 
■ district., the tsetse-infested area .of Mloa-
( Idodi was opened up for would-be tobacco
' farmers,. Some settlement was permitted at
: Usangu, Mbeya district. In 1952, the Chesham 
enterprise (Southern Highlands Estates) was 
re-alienated to a new owner. Finally, a 
pilot scheme(was started at Dabaga, south of 
Iringa township and subsequently, expanded; 
much,of this:cold, damp area was sparsely 
populated and therefore particularly suitable 
for settlement and 3,arge scale farming.
(iii) Eastern- Fro vine e. In "194-9 9 8 new farms in 
the.Wami valley were made available. The
. following 'year, ;53 n;ew farms' were laid: out
at flagole and leased mainly to Arab and'Asian 
farmers.; In 1951,-ten farms of 1000 acres 
,; each were made available at Iisower.o and . a
Ah; ■ V'■ further,two- in the Wami valley.2^
From the. Reports of. the Land Settlement Board, it 
is evident that considerable care was taken:in the selection
of applicants for land; for example.., in 194-9, only 113 .
applications were,approved out of a total of more than 600
received. Apparently, as in the nineteen thirties, it was
believed important that settlers should project;the correct 
image. But there Whs,,still a sufficient number of suitable 
applicants willing-to try their hand at tropical farming
and by 1953, the.amount of land in non-African hands had
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risen to about three million acres. This, compared with
a total of about two million acres in 1939. In terms of
Rights of Occupancies, the-consequences of the government's
post-war land policy can be.observed from the figures given
in Table XIV, which cover the period during which the fastest
expansion of the non-African sector occurred. Although.the
increase in the total,area, of land alienated was substantial,
(by I960, .the figure was 2,489,000 acres) the number of
settlers did not increase proportionately; the total number
of holders of longr-term Rights of Occupancy for arable or
pastoral purposes in I960 is recorded as being 1,666, an
increase of 613 over the figure for 1946. The national
origins of the.leaseholders in I960 were as follows:
British 470;. Asian 287; Greek 279;; others 630. The
last-mentioned figure includes 265 leases held by missions
and 35 held by Africans. * .
The increase in the amount of land selected for 
commercial farming denotes a potential for a significant 
alteration in the land usage pattern. Although considerable 
change did occur, more might have taken place if technical 
and political factors had. not intruded. For a better 
understanding of the intentions.behind much.of the 
alienation, it is necessary to study the Annual Reports to 
the United Nations which gave details of the different types 
of enterprise carried out on alienated land. Extracts from
the data provided(are given in Appendix ix and they 
offer a fairly composite picture of alienation after 1946. 
From these figures it will be noted that after 1953, there 
was a reduction in the number of new leases,granted annually 
to private individuals. Partly this was caused-by a fall 
in demand for land.,and partly because it was no longer 
government policy to encourage hew settlement, as had been 
done by the Land Settlement Board until it was reformed in 
19.50. Nevertheless, alienations were still approved and - 
as can be seen from Table XII - the Land Bank was progress­
ively extending its aid to farmers -who lacked capital.
Changes in settlement policy
Prom this, description of events, there can.be 110 
doubt that the.decision of the British government to permit 
new alienations was the first step in the causal chain 
leading to many new estates being created and not a few of 
the older ones being extended. But while Twining was 
Governor, commercial farming was also affected by. changes 
in government' land policy and to complete the picture these 
changes must be mentioned. They concerned, three matters: 
the.change of emphasis from land ownership to land'usage; 
second, and following from the first, the ending of , , 
restrictions on where' land could be; alienated; and, 
finally, the question of permitting long leases.
The replacement of the Land Settlement Board by 
the Land Utilization Board was, it is clear, more than' Just 
a change of name.. It was prompted by a growing concern
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that by encouraging Africans to grow cash crops and by 
the modest development of an industrial base, the govern­
ment was inviting the risk of food shortages in all but 
exceptionally good years.. At the same time the problems 
of the Groundnut Scheme clearly•demonstrated the 
difficulties to be encountered in large scale arable 
'farming in much of the Territory. It was therefore 
decided to encourage the full use of land of high potential 
irrespective of where it was situated and regardless of the 
race of the person prepared to use i t I t  was not only 
the pragmatists who supported this argument; others saw it 
as a logical extension of the,principle of'multi-racialism 
in that all inhabitants of the Territory ought to have equal 
opportunities in making use of its resources. At the same 
time it was decided to ensure that once land had been 
alienated, the development clauses in, the leases were 
properly observed. : A new. inspectorate was established, 
and.,,the staff, known as Land Rangers, began making visits 
to any estate where it was believed that no development was 
taking place. The more demanding 1948 Land Regulations 
'(see. Appendix x) ? had now come in force and by I960 nearly , 
half of the occupiers (of alienated land were subject to. 
them. Nevertheless, there were still a number of settlers 
who continued' to regard farming as a secondary source of 
income and. the Chesham scheme in particular showed no signs 
of developing into a viable enterprise. In background 
and attitudes, the tenants in 1951 accorded with what
Chesham would have thought desirable; at least half of ;
■' ' -24
.them continued to make use of an honorary military title.
The decision to encourage the more intensive 
development of alienated land would, it was believed, 
provide adequate Justification.for further alienation.
The second change in policy, the removal of,the pre-war 
restrictions on settlement in certain areas, was aimed at 
widening the choice for prospective applicants for. land.
In future, it was explained, land might be. applied for in 
any province in the Territory without special conditions 
being imposed* In part, this was a logical extension of 
the argument for the first' change; /also, however, it 
happened because it was thought that there was no longer 
any valid reason for restricting non-African settlement in 
certain provinces. Cameron and Mitchell had argued 
successfully for their policy of limited separation because 
they wanted the native authorities and any form of African 
local government which replaced.them, to evolve in their 
own way without outside interference- Now, at Creech 
Jones' insistence, democratic local councils were to be 
created in the colonial territories and in Tanganyika this 
was to lead in 1953 Vo a local government system based on 
English practice and organization. With the rejection of 
the former policy involving a gradual transformation and 
modernization of.native authorities, there was no longer 
any need to support the principle o f ,separate development. 
The new policy in.respect of alienation was explained as 
follows:
'The old theory...endeavouring to keep non- 
African farming areas segregated from mainly 
African zones has been abandoned,.. It is now 
accepted that the health, Wealth and general 
interests of the African are not best served 
by leaving him in isolation surrounded by great 
tracts of undeveloped land which may be needed 
for his anticipated progeuy.^cy
The effects of this change in policy can be Judged from' 
Table XIV which:compares the situation before and after 
the; period of greatest activity in alienating land; it 
is, clear that there was no rush to take advantage of the 
change•
Nevertheless, by emphasising the need for. better 
land usage the government gave notice,to its critics that 
it was believed necessary to encourage any move which led 
to increased productivity even when this made it necessary 
to alienate more land to; non-Africans. If after 1952 the 
demand for arable land had continued at the same level as’;- 
in previous years,, there might have been a more pronounced 
change in the.geographical distribution of non-African 
settlement.
. The decision to re-introduce 99 year leases,was
a victory for settler-power or for commo.ns.ense - depending
26on the readers’ preferences. When the,.Land Settlement. 
Board was established after the War, members .were persuaded 
by the Tanganyika government to limit leases to 33 year 
periods. ( . In London, this limitation was, welcomed and
the Colonial Secretary insisted that it should' be observed,. 
Predictably, the decision was bitterly.criticised by the 
Northern Province Council, which at that time represented , 
settler opinion. -Kenya settlers were soon adding their 
-weight to the protest and their leader,. Sir Alfred Vincent, 
.in a letter to. Creech Jones complained.that to restrict 
leases to 33 years 'strikes at the very root of white 'V
settlement in Tanganyika'; and has given rise to a great
. . .29 - 1
deal of misgiving.1 Oh the other hand, African spokesmen
TABLE XIV
ACREAGES UNDER BIGHTS QE OCCUPANCY 
FOR ARABLE . AND-PASTORAL USE:, 1946 AND' . 1956
Province
T946
Number Acres
1956
Number. Acres
Lake-
Central
Southern
Western -
Northern
Eastern
Southern
Highlands
Tanga ;
63
28
88
69
238
226.
287
54-
5,202 
•: 1,924 
53,798 
18,433 
196,984 
123,684
338,739
49,274
74
.50
136
94
359.
420
331
108
17,908 
205,319* 
253,064* 
262,961* 
501,172 
386,665
440,072 . 
308,962
1,053 788,038 1,572 2,376,123
Including land alienated for the groundnuts . 
scheme' as follows:'
Central 150,000 acres; Southern 154,000 
' acres;; Western 180,728 acres.
(source: Annual Reports.
Department of Lands 
and Mines y 1946 and 
1956.; . Government 
Printer,. Dar es Salaam)
meeting the 1948 Visiting Mission had wanted the 33 year 
rule to remain and had the Mission's support for this 
practice. In having to decide, Creech Jones had to 
balance:the political argument against the effects on 
development and came to a compromise solution. The ex- 
German estates in Northern province, alienated for 33 years 
would remain on that basis but elsewhere in the Territory 
leases could be extended for the longer period. The 1958 
Visiting Mission again requested 33 year leases but the 
Tanganyika, government was adamant; such leases, it was 
explained, 'were generally unattractive as an investment 
.proposition and contrary to good land use in that it tempts
owners to mine the land, leaving it in a worse condition
' A"' *>0than it was at the beginning of the lease.' The decision
was crucial to the course of white settlement. Either the 
.estate farmer was a resident, with a stake in the future of 
-the Territory or he was a bird of passage, on a, par with 
the expatriate civil, servant or the manager of a London- 
based business. . • / V
The majority of the new settlers were British 
and, as in the past, Many of them Came looking forward to 
a life of interest more than expecting to make a fortune. 
Many 'soon found that, however hard they worked, they were 
lucky at the end of:the year if they found that, they were 
not.out of pocket; the number of leases revoked each year 
,gives an.indication of(how many decided to give up.^ The 
following examples.illustrate two- extremes of success and 
failure:: . . .
- 01 Molog, Northern province.'■ . \
"The eight farms here; occupy 10,000 acres. In 
1952, the land was covered with Iantana and sage 
bush to a height of seven to eight feet.. ( It was 
not used by the. Masai owing to the high bush. By 
1957, we were producing £50,000 wheat, £15,000 
barley and £15,000 pyrethrum and using a labour 
force of 400. The total capital invested amounts 
to £200,000."
Mpwapwa,. Central province
"I obtained .a right of occupancy over 2,000 acres 
near Mpw.apwa. Although half the land turned out 
to be unusable bush on a rocky hillside there was 
a permanent water supply. , On irrigated land I 
was able to grow, on 50 acres, papain, chillies, 
vegetables, maize, sorghum and castor. Successive 
droughts ruined crops planted elsewhere on the farm. 
After four years, during which time my annual loss 
averaged £2,000, I gave up and the.farm was taken 
over by the Land Bank and re-let to a previous 
owner,
Between . these extremes ,' there was a great variety 
of less spectacular achievements. ./ As a general mile, where 
the climate permitted the growing of perennial crops, 
estate farming was assured of success and investment and 
development followed. In terms of,.increased.production, 
of both cereals for home consumption and cash crops for. 
export, the decision to, permit new alienations after 1945: 
seemed amply Justified. Although ,sisal remained the 
mainstay of the economy and. provided the major .share of the 
total contribution to production, made by the non-African 
sector, it was believed necessary to diversify and encourage 
other less lucrative forms of commercial farming. After 
194-5 little support, for the ‘contact’ theory was heard. 
Nevertheless * with an .increased number of Africans now 
interested in obtaining a regular wage, there was the 
undiminished advantage ih the scattered nature of
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alienations whereby employment opportunities were/available /: 
for those who wanted (to remain living In their own tribal 
■ . community . ■ All the same, it was the development of a few
crops-, described below, which provided a rebuttal to the 
political objections to the non-African agricultural sector.
(,-:■• Sisal: . 1945-1961 (
' (. The period under review included the golden age
:AA of the sisal Industry. During the six years following the
/ .. War there was a dramatic increase in output and profit-
, ability which.in. turn encouraged further investment and :
. provided added revenue for the Territory., The expansion
which took place after 1945•can be Judged from the details 
 ^ given.(in Appendix J^ii^ .
( ; / A;7: The sharp increase in value of the exported crop
./ .. - was (partly due to the higher-than-expected world- demand A
, 1 ;.( . and partly the result of the devaluation of the pound in
, ; 1949• Soon afterwards a further.fillip to prices appeared
•' . as a consequence of the Korean war and the unexpected delay
in restoring production on the Indonesian estates. More 
land and more investment were needed in order to make the .
A -most of a favourable opportunity which was not expected to
A last long. ■ The. first requirement was met by the govern-
a ment in that suitable land was made available where possible.
During the period 1951-1956.the area planted,with sisal for 
A the first time was almost equal to that being cleared and
■.replanted (see Appendix xiii); the increased acreage of'
■A' . sisal amounted to a major change in the landscape in those
areas where estates were concentrated. .
. . The. sec ond requirement, increased investment, was. 
also(available to pay for new planting and for new machinery. 
In view of the history of the industry, investment usually 
had to be. funded from profits and/ its extent was. dependent 
on past success* During the critical post-war period when 
investment decisions had to be taken, the profitability of 
the;industry might have been higher if the growers had.been 
released from the bulk.purchase contract they had concluded ' 
with the British Ministry of Supply. Nevertheless, it, 
must not be assumed that this agreement was responsible for 
limiting investment in the industry at this time of rising 
world prices. ■ The agreement selling price was raised 
three times between 1946 and 1948, making it roughly 
comparable with ruling world prices; moreover, since no 
one could foresee the events which caused the sudden rise 
in world price, it is not at all certain that investment 
on a. larger scale would have taken place or whether.it 
would have been practicable. ■
. ( '.The government derived much benefit from the
yearp of profitability and, Inevitably, it was suggested
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that it might have taken more. Appendix xiii gives' 
details of the percentage of profits paid in taxes by the 
leading estates; during the best years, 1950-1953, an 
export tax was also levied and the additional revenue from 
this, source amounted to £2-5 million.- Since it was known 
that planting on.a substantial scale was taking place in 
Brazil, a heavier tax.burden would almost certainly have 
■reduced the amount of new planting. .('As it was, there 
were several other factors which placed a restraint on
over-ambitious planting- plans. First, there was always 
the possibility that with,all the'other; development projects 
being undertaken, there would.be a shortage of unskilled 
labour. An unexpected, factor, the Groundnut Scheme.had 
intruded since the Central Development Committee had so 
confidently predicted, that there would be no shortage after, , 
the. War and much of the potential supply of labour was 
attracted to the three areas made available for-the Overseas 
Food Corporation. Furthermore, the daily task performed 
by the unskilled labourer had diminished and for a labour- 
intensive industry the effects were significant.^ '
Remedial measures were two-fold, and both, eventually proved 
successful:: recruiting became better organized with the
creation of the Growers own agency (SILABU) and mechanization 
measures supplanted some of the work done by hand. Tractors 
were used for ripping up old plantings preparatory to their 
being ploughed into the soil and mechanized weeding 
processes were, adopted. These latter measures were only 
possible with new planting when the double-row lay-out was 
followed enabling a tractor to pass between the wider rows.
But cutting still-had to be done by hand and the sisal when 
cut had to be carried to the nearest:collecting point. Never­
theless, the effects of limited mechanization were 
considerable; as the. figures in Appendix xiii.malce clear, 
with barely any addition to the number of adult males 
employed during the post war period, an 85$ increase in 
crop production was possible.^
The second factor causing restrictions on output 
was the effect of the loss of soil fertility.. Although,
as.stated above, sisal flourishes on poor soils, it was 
appreciated that/plants on exhausted soils soon led to 
• declining yields and' deficiency diseases. With land 
alienation increasingly becoming a political issue it 
became progressively more difficult, for estates to obtain 
permission to extend their boundaries and bring new land 
under cultivation. However, only some estates were 
adversely affected; the majority had sufficient reserves 
of fallow or unplanted land for use when required. A 
summary of the planting achievements during the years of 
expansion is provided in Appendix xiii.
The third factor has already been mentioned 
elsewhere, the fact that the location of the industry 
depended.on communications with the outside world. Although 
the government assumed- that better roads and new railways 
would lead to the planting of sisal in new areas, during 
the colonial period the demand for land for sisal was
determined by accessibility to the ports of Tanga, Dar es
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Salaam, Lindi and Iitwara. ( In spite of increased planting 
/in Eastern .province in places served by the Central Line, 
Tanga remained the home of the industry and the greatest 
concentration of estates was to be. found within forty miles 
of that town. The location of the estates throughout the 
Territory can be Judged from the relevant Table in 
Appendix xiii.
Sisal-was not only the most’ valuable export from 
the Territory during the period under, review; it also made 
Tanganyika the largest producer of the fibre in the World. 
Ownership of the.industry remained diffuse, being in the
M A P IV
TANGANYIKA RAILWAYS 
AND ALIENATED LAND 1948
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abnra ;-Kinyangini/lKiqoma
Tanga//
Dar es 
Salaam
LINES OPEN.
LINES CLOSED.
LINES UNDER CONSTR. 
ALIENATED LAND
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hahdh . of (Greeks (32$),(.British. (31$)v Asians (24$) and 
nationals of at' least 'four' otlier states. Unlike the 
,siOal: industry in Brazil ;it was not;a smallholders 
'enterprise' but at (the: same time-it never grew into a 
5typical- plantation/industry whereby(privately-owned 
estate%were .gradually taken/ over by: companies financed , 
by( pubiic(:s.ubscriptionLv/ ;it; remained a heavily Capitalised, 
somewhat speculative enterprise, success being dependent on 
the (demand for.- two insignificant commodities, binder , twine 
and baler twine . . ’ :. '
Other crops from estates and,plantations .
Although(sisal: retained; its leading position 
throughout the colonial period, the more important Of the 
other, crops produced onrestates also require mention.
In the case of coffee, the total production from ; 
estates, increased steadily after 1950 as a consequence of 
investment in new planting. 1 In 1954-» most of the 242 
estates selling .their Crop/(through T.G.G.A. were in private 
ownership. At this time good quality beans fetched high, 
prices and the larger and better-managed estates were 
making high profits* Even the average sized estate with 
l6o acres of matureAbbshes -was able to show a net profit, 
of between £1500 and £2000 per annum (see Appendix ix). 
Nevertheless, there was some reduction in investment in 
^owner-operated estates;, during the period of uncertainty 
before independencef cat the. same time overhead irrigation, 
which required a heavy capital Outlay, was tried and found
■ \V'-v Aprv') /  ■ \ ’-/ ' , ,  ■' 261.
successful. A. It (was/not long .before; a number of estate' 
owners were following suit and. a substantial increase in 
production (resulted.,, . By the end of the colonial period .-■ 
the estates were producing /about one quarter of the total : •
of mild (arabica) coffee exported.and were utilizing:
18,470 acres of land for this purpose.2,/ As a crop it 
remained fairly labour-intensive and only moderately ;'A 
capital intensive. It therefore v/as well suited to , ( .(
production' by the individual settier-farmer and’not ; ■ 
unexpectedly most of the coffee estates were to be found 
in Northern province, the centre of European political 
activity". ■( ,( /
Tea was a plantation crop which remained entirely 
in non-African hands until the end of the. colonial period. (
The crop was. grown in four areas: the-/Usambaras, Mufindi,
Tukuyu and Uweinba-Eupembe. Some estates, were owned and ; :
managed by individual settlers,, often, with the business 
registered as1 a private company; either they accepted the *
risk involved in the expense of erecting their own factory 
or they arranged to sell their leaf to a larger concern.
The largest organization, the Tanganyika Tea Company, owned 
estates in Tukuyu- and Mufindi, and processed their leaf in ‘
" '■ . 3 9  ' > . / I ' "  " ' ' •
three, factories.■ : The company had managed the Mufindi
estates for the.; Custodian of Enemy Prpperty during'(the; War ( 
and was subsequently able, to gain, control of them when the. 
time came for their disposal. With the * ending of the pre- 
War quoth system a rapid expansion,(of the /estates:took place ‘ 
particularly in the//bsambaras,... Iii Mufindi( and Tukuyu, ,s.
expansion was limited'to utilising the land already.alienated (,
in view of the strong demand for land by Africans in the 
neighbourhood of the estates. This restriction was of 
particular'importance in Mufindi, for only about a half of 
the land in the company's possession was climatically 
suitable for growing tea; the mists (n.yahenge) which 
provided for much of the year the moisture for the tea 
bushes was prevalent only in. a very-localised area. The
fact that much of their land was of no value for tea' 
growing caused no concern to the company; forest plant­
ations were needed to provide wood fuel for the two 
factories when other supplies were exhausted and grass 
lands were required for the herds which were kept.to supply 
labourers' rations. Nevertheless, the knowledge that land 
was not being utilized for the prime activity of the company 
made it difficult to convince African opinion' that it was
necessary for such a large area of good land to be retained
noby a foreign company.
Although the government attempted to introduce an 
African smallholders scheme .there were several major 
obstacles. Not only was it difficult to provide the. tea 
producers with adequate.guarantees that leaf would be 
supplied to them regularly in due course, without which 
they were reluctant toinvest in new equipment to process 
large amounts; also, they feared that they would be buying: 
their own leaf, picked.at hight on their more isolated 
estates. Thus, when the; local nationalists looked for 
situations which could be exploited to their advantage, 
the tea industry was particularly vulnerable; not only 
did it .seem that Africans were prevented from participating
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(in Kenya a smallholders scheme was. already in existence) 
but also all the higher managerial:posts were held by 
Europeans, ' \In the/case -of. this crop, in spite of the value 
of the product the amount of land actually directly utilised 
was very limited; by'1959, the total area planted with tea 
was only 15*334- acres, ;of which 7*4*75 acres could, be termed 
.'mature'1,, ’3V575 acres aemi^mature and. 4-,284- acres immature.
The - industry, was a gOod example of the skilful exploitation y 
of the natural resources by a'small group of dedicated 
experts with • little .' interest,, in, or •understanding. of the 
political.'undertones of the.situation they were creating.
Sugar was- another crop with which non-African 
enterprise made an important contribution1 to the economy.'
The:government kept a firm, control over the industry with.. • 
the aim of securing for producers a . fair, return on the 
capital they expended. "'Being more capital intensive than 
:tea.it .was a typical plantation crop and one which did not 
readily:;iend itself; to an arrangement.^allowing smallholder 
particlpafiohh -; It was not only that high standards of 
cultivation were, required': also,. cropping had to be care­
fully planned in order to produce.a regular, supply oficane 
for the factory. Until,the end of the period under review 
:the main producer was the Tanganyika:Planting Company near 
Moshi . . Production ims ; maintained, .and expanded by making
use of the Pangani river to supplement the inadequate annual 
rainfall. In addition to this company there were a number 
of small plantations producing jaggery for a local market.
Host of these were in Eastern province and the. remainder 
in Lake province . : : ' ;/.■•'/.' /." ' -. ..
In 194-6 it was thought to he enough if the • ' 
‘existing company undertook to increase production. In 
return, the government agreed to control imports and to 
organize/the marketing of.the crop.. Eurther planting on 
a substantial scale took place on the estate .‘and production 
increased accordingly. However,, it was never anticipated 
that demand would rise even, faster, from 8.4 lbs. per caput, 
in 1953 to 13*5 lbs • in 1962. This increase led: to an
even larger shortfall in production and the monopoly .of
' ■ -- ' ^ ’ . 4-1 . .
the existing estate: had to be ended. Eventually, some
13,000 acres were alienated for cane-production near
Missenye (West Lake, province)^ a decision which ardused
opposition from local political leaders. Elsewhere,,.
several river valleys were investigated, but the flood
danger was the limiting factor until adequate data could •
be collected. In the end a ‘site in the Kilombero valley
was.selOcted for a major project, with the aim of making
the Territory, self-sufficient within a few years.
The development.of tobacco farming in the 
Territory provided an example of how different racial 
groups became associated with different methods of producing 
the same commodity. ' Whereas flue-cured tobacco,, first, 
Ehlers and later Virginia, was grown* by the settler-farmer, 
both fire-cured and coil tobacco, were regarded as ''African1 
crops. . It was only after the failure of the. groundnuts 
scheme that the cleared land at Urambo provided an 
opportunity to organize the production of flue-cured 
tobacco by both European and African tenant farmers. \
Until then, Iringa was the sole area of the flue-cured 
industry. '■ The element of, risk was. always present and
the industry was heset with difficulties, both financial . 
and technical. Although things improved after the growers 
union took over the marketing arrangements in 1949, the . 
sale of the crop was always difficult until the change-over, 
to growing Virginia was accomplished in the mrd-fifties.
The technical problems, were two-fold. / Eirst, adequate 
measures'to prevent soil deterioration were seldom taken; 
most of the growers were of Greek origin, many of them 
anxious to obtain ■ ea quick return in order to invest the 
profit in commercial enterprises. .Their attitude was. 
compounded by.a government policy of alienating areas of
land to them which were often far too small to prevent
' . . 44 ' * '
suitable land being over-utilised. Consequently, in
.spite, of protests from Agricultural Officers, the practice . 
of 'tobacco-mining' continued. Second, the expansion of 
the.industry was restricted by a shortage of wood fuel, 
needed in quantity for the ctiring process*. , Eventually, ■ 
growers were required by law to plant their own fuel 
reserves, a measure■which provided no short-term solution. 
The total amount of production remained steady, limited by 
the technical factors, the quota which could be accepted by 
the East African Tobacco Company and the uncertain prospects 
of selling in a-highly competitive world market.- .
In the preceding chapter it was observed that the 
commercial production of cereals became increasingly 
necessary to match the growing population and many settlers 
were persuaded to meet/this need by the,cultivation of 
wheat and maize. Erom data collected in 1958, it .is 
evident.that a much larger proportion of land on estates
was used for' growing cereals ^  particularly maize, than.
, . . 45
for any other crop excepting sisal.-. •
Wheat production was never enough to satisfy 
local demand and wheat flour was regularly imported from. 
Kenya. , The area in the Territory where wheat could be 
successfully grown.was limited, since it only thrived at 
altitudes exceeding 4,000 feet.. Crops grown in the most 
favourable areas, West Kilimanjaro and Oldeani, were 
subject to stem rusts and settlers growing the crop in 
Iringa district usually obtained totally uneconomic yields. 
A certain amount was grown by Africans, but yields were low 
and the total amount they produced.amounted to. about one- 
tenfh of that obtained from the non-African sector. . One 
curious ecological effect of growing wheat oh a large 
scale in Northern province was the. recurring problem of 
crop depredation by the Sudan Dioch (.Quelea quelea).
After feeding on grain, these tiny birds are able to 
multiply rapidly and whereas the African farmer could: 
make use of children to drive them off his shamba, there 
was no way of ejecting them from a large field of grain. 
Thus large' scale cultivation in this instance introduced 
a problem almost as serious as the locust menace before 
the War. ; Some of the flocks were estimated to number 
over two million birds and an idea of the damage they 
could do can be gauged from the fact that a million birds 
could eat the equivalent of 6^0 bags of wheat in a day.
The remedy, to attack them either when they were roosting
or when they settled in their breeding grounds, required
: 47 . ’
great ingenuity. .
Many settlers grew maiae‘ as a cash crop and it 
will he remembered that one of the?reasons advanced for 
alienating more land was the. need to encourage the. 
commercial production of cereals; it was only by govern­
ment action' that it was possible to; change, the situation 
whereby the Territory was dependent on imports of maize 
for. four years out of five. The Crops (Increased 
Production). Ordinance, a wartime measure, remained in 
force afterwards and its provision’s -continued to be . 
administered by District Production. Committees, composed 
of settlers and officials. A system of guaranteed minimum 
returns encouraged settlers to cultivate maize on. marginal 
land. Maize,, like rice, had to be sold to the Grain 
Storage Department at a fixed price and the Department 
arranged for reserves to be stored in various parts of the 
Territory. The aim was not merely self-sufficiency; it 
was intended to produce an exportable surplus in most years. 
In 1955, when this seemed assured.,, the guaranteed return 
arrangement was ended; for a short time a support price 
system was adopted to cushion the effect of the change.
In .the Agricultural Department Annual Report for 1955 it 
was admitted- that the guaranteed price arrangement 'came 
to.be used, quite unintentionally, as a basis for granting 
short terra credit'. In that year £70,000 was paid out to 
farmers in this way.
With increased production and with the ending of
the fixed price,the profit margin to maize growers dropped 
zlqfry 25 P®3? cent. However it continued to be a popular 
crop with settlers and in 1958 a quarter of the .non-African
farmers of Eastern and Northern provinces claimed that. 
growing cereals, which in most cases meant maize, was 
their predominant farming activity.. Until 1955? and . 
perhaps for some time afterwards, this relatively, small
number of non-African farmers were producing 40 per cent
• - 80 . *>*'" • of.the marketed maize. As a crop it was moderately,
capital-intensive', since to obtain good yields a higher
outlay on fertiliser is necessary than in the case of soya
or sorghum. ‘But it is not particularly labour-intensive
and the total labour required was at the time found to be
about one third of that needed for a similar area of
groundnuts• When grown in quantity, the principal problem
as with sisal,- was the means of moving the crop; thus the
presence of a large local market was often a powerful
81 ■ ' / .
stimulus to production.
Finally, many of the European and Asian farmers 
kept.cattleeither as a primary source of income or as a 
means of supplementing income from crops. Ranching., 
seemed to become more popular after 1955 and the majority 
of grants of land for this purpose occurred after that 
year. Some indication of the importance of ranching can , 
be gained from the -1-1958 census figures which show that of
the 898 respondents to the questionnaire, 391 kept herds
■ 82 : 
of cattle* Certainly animal husbandry badly needed
improving in the.Territory and there was little hope of
this happening while.the majority of African cattle owners
keptvtheir stock for prestige and social purposes. In
spite of the increased ranching activity after 1-955* the
World Bank Mission estimated that in 1959 a further 60,000
head of. cattle., were needed annually to replace Imports
: ■* ' C.7. ..
of slaughter cattle from Kenya. At the same time as 
ranching activity increased, dairy farming also became 
important. In the Arusha-Moshi area some eighty European 
owned farms produced milk in quantity, the collection and 
sale being arranged by the Tanganyika Farmers Association. 
A similar organization started in Iringa district, but it 
was never as successful as the Northern province scheme.
In terms of land usage, pastoral farming by non- 
Africans had two.important implications. First, in the 
case of ranching, -large areas of land had to be made 
available; it was only by intelligent pasture management 
that the carrying.capacity of the land could be increased. 
Thus.by the end of the period, over a quarter of the 
alienated land was being used as pasture. Second,, since 
ranching was usually confined, to areas unsuitable for 
arable farming, the government could rebut with confidence 
the often repeated allegation that the more fertile areas 
were.selected for. alienation to non-Africans. The 1957
Visiting Mission attempted to distinguish alienation of 
arable and pastoral land respectively with the following 
figures::
'The total amount of alienated land ... represents 
; •approximately 1.6 percent of the total land
available and suitable for agricultural and 
pastoral purposes; it represents just under 
4 per cent of the total land being used for both 
arable and pastoral: purposes; and. the .alienated 
arable land represents about; 5 per cant of the 
.total land being used for arable purposes at the 
present time.',^
Acknowledging the contribution made by the 
settlers, the same Mission feared that the government was-
still not taking seriously the dangers caused by the' 
'explosive' issue of alienation. It suggested that in 
future when alienation was necessary for economic, develop­
ment,‘preference should be given to large companies with
Which Africans living in the vicinity of their operations
■ ‘ 56could be associated. The facile assumption that there
,were plenty of private investors’ anxious to operate in the
Territory ■ bears. little relation to fact. ' But at least
the-comment indicated that a distinction was now being drawn
between the settler's farm and the plantation. Within the
Territory the importance of plantation agriculture had been
an accepted fact since.Cameron's time and with the approach
of independence It became, increasingly apparent that this
was the only part of the non-African agricultural sector
58which was: likely to be' allowed to expand in the future.^
Both the Royal Commission and the World Bank
Mission, recognized the importance of the non-African sector
59to the economy. Neither report suggests that there was
any significant opportunity cost involved insofar as land
usage was concerned. : From the foregoing description it
is clear that not all land occupied by the immigrant races
was effectively utilized. ‘ But where conditions were
favourable for growing perennial crops the occupiers usually
.made the best possible use of the situation and produced more
than would have been possible if their land had been divided
into smallholdings. . As a general rule, where alienated land
was insufficiently developed, there was no land shortage in
60the adjacent;African areas. In some instances the Land 
Regulations might have been invoked to ensure that develop­
ment took place; but in doing so caution was necessary,
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since there was little point in revoking a Right of Occupancy 
unless it was certain that others could make better use of 
the land.
When independence became certain, a number of the 
less developed estates in the more marginal areas were 
abandoned by their owners if no purchasers could be 
found; in the Land Bank annual report for I960 it was 
observed that farms in Northern province and in the 
Mufindi area were changing hands at very low prices. There 
followed a substantial reduction in the number of Europeans 
engaged in farming (1563 in 1958 and 1105 in 1963) and an 
accompanying reduction in the employment of agricultural 
labour. Nevertheless, there was no reduction in the 
aggregate amount of investment in commercial farming and 
during this period there was a substantial increase in 
the acreage under cultivation on alienated land,mainly
61due to increased production of wheat,sugar and seed beans.
For the first few years after independence the non-African 
sector managed to continue as before*
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CHAPTER IX
CHANGE IN THE AFRICAN SECTOR' .
Introduction
The successive Colonial Secretaries of the:- 
Labour government of 1945 may have started with,doubts . 
over the widdom of supporting expansion in; the non-African 
agricultural sector. Nevertheless, once they had accepted 
the arguments in favour of such a policy, they were positive 
enough in defending it. At the same time it was 
repeatedly made clear to the Tanganyika government that 
resources and effort had to be directed toward improving, 
the African sector. The various schemes and items in the 
Development.Plan indicate the way it was thought that 
improvement was possible. As recruitment proceeded after 
the war and as more officers became available for field work, 
the means to implement the plans became available.
The three major, objectives in the African sector 
after 1945 were as follows. . First, in view of the fears 
of a food, shortage, to insist that farmers could supply 
their own needs. Second, where it was practicable, they 
were to be encouraged to grow suitable cash crops, in order 
to overcome all the disadvantages associated with a 
subsistence economy. Third, in achieving these two 
objectives measures had to be found to protect the fertility 
of the soils found in the Territory which for the most part 
were vulnerable to bad treatment. Moreover, improvement
measures had to be adopted in. those areas where soil- erosion 
was already making even subsistence farming difficult.
To achieve these, aims there was an’ unknown amount 
of good land which could be; made productive and. there was 
a reserve of labour which was under-employed. The main 
instrument for making use of these- was the Department of 
Agriculture, through the research and extension services 
it was able to provide. A large increase in.staff was 
necessary and recruitment'and training took time; however 
the numbers employed-rose steadily, the total number of 
personnel in the. five, major grades increasing from 883 in - 
1950 to 2 ,2 5 7 in I960.1 : V "v’
But the other 'natural resources' departments 
were also fully Involved ,and, as marketing produce became 
more important, so did the Department of Go-operative 
Development. District and provincial 'teams' were, 
'introduced under the chairmanship of the senior, admini­
strative officer in order;to co-ordinate development plans. 
The role, of the district commissioner changed perceptibly; 
although his responsibility for law and order remained, less 
of. his time was now spent on tax collection and more on 
co-Ordinating departmental activities,. This required his 
attendance at'an ever-increasing.number of committees as 
well as devoting time to the supervision of more ambitious 
development plans being undertaken by his native authority.
v Improving peasant agriculture , -
The short-comings. of traditional farming practices
were well known and have been frequently described.- They 
were summarised in the World Bank Mission Report as follows: 
primitive methods and resistance to* change 
. lack of managerial ability
poor equipment and lack of capital 
no interest in economic incentives.
2restrictions imposed by.customary land tenure.
The interesting point about this summary is that it was 
written at the end. of the colonial period after fifteen . 
years.of intensive effort to improve the/existing system.
Was, therefore, any worthwhile progress ever achieved, or. 
ever believed to be attainable? Although accurate figures 
cannot be obtained, it would seem that the subsistence sector 
represented about 59 per cent of the total agricultural 
production throughout the period and there was little to 
suggest that its share would diminish unless new policies 
were adopted. On the other hand, there was a steady 
increase in the value and quantity of cash crops produced 
by African farmers throughout the last decade of the 
colonial period (see Table XV). It was argued that the 
growing popularity of cash crops would have a demonstration 
effect and furthermore with the rapid increase in 
opportunities for education there would be a greater demand 
for consumer goods. In some areas it was evident that 
people wanted better homes, constructed with permanent 
materials. Elsewhere money was needed as never before to 
pay taxes, to contribute to paying school,fees of relatives 
and to buy cattle for prestige and social purposes.
Increased production of cash crops.did not lead
fo an appreciable increase in the total acreage, cultivated; 
it has been, estimated that during the period 1945*^1960,
this rose by 900,000.acres in the African sector* about
■ 1 ' 4
half an acre, per taxpayer. It has been suggested that.,
in Sukumaland the amount of land cultivated by the average
household actually declined, from 6;66 acres to 5-7 acres. ■
This is somewhat surprising in view of the increase in the
use of tractors and ox-ploughs; it can be explained by the
fact that the subsequent weeding is not reduced by the, use
of ploughs and in fact sometimes is .increased.
7 A combination,of factors can explain the rapid 
increase,in cotton production in Sukumaland after 1945 and 
can be summarised;as follows. A rapidly increasing rural 
population; a growing awareness of the need for cash; new 
and more; fertile land becoming available; better agri­
cultural. practices once effective supervision was 
organized; the provision, after years of research at the 
cotton experimental station.- at Ukiriguru, of a seed suitable 
for local conditions; finally, a mobilization of effort, 
stemming from the co-operative movement.. Elsewhere," it
was found that there was little enthusiasm for innovation; 
those who were responsible for extension policy knew that 
to reform peasant farming methods a social revolution was 
necessary and. this was unlikely to occur within the context 
of the existing political structure... In this respect the 
Territory was no different from/other British-administered 
lands in Africa, a fact recognized by the Colonial Office.. * 
when regional research into the problem was organized.^
If the rise in output created optimism,'there
was no cause for complacency. With the lack of consumer
goods, during the war years, production of cash crops had.
fallen and comparisons with 1945/46 figures were hound to
show some'-improvement. But the doubt remained that rural
incomes for. the majority.of peasant farmers would never
match urban wages or even those which could be earned
working on an estate. In the banana-growing areas, four
acres under cultivation could sustain seven persons,
produce: enough finger-millet for social occasions.and
provide an annual income from a cash crop; in Sukumaland,
six, acres under cultivation could.provide a similar standard
of living, although, with less certainty. In the case of
the. former, there would be no available land for extending
the cultivated area; in Sukumaland, an increased acreage
planted -would, in the more densely populated areas, lead
to a reduction in the amount of land in fallow. Until
adequate^use of fertilisers became common practice, this
n
could,be counter-productive. Elsewhere, soil regeneration 
took even longer .and the-long resting period required for 
the poorer soils was a substantial discouragement when 
farmers contemplated planting larger acreages. The damage 
to the land caused by the increased productivity drive, 
launched during the Depression, had provided a lesson.which 
could not be ignored. To. avoid any repetition, time was 
needed, for experiment and planning, as well as for winning 
collaboration from that section of the.community most 
suspicious of change.
. With so much of the Territory's land area under-
utilized, some planned movement to uninhabited areas was 
possible. The. choices open to the planners were as ; 
follows: * either families.were to be persuaded to move 
to a designated area where they would continue to cultivate 
as in the past or else they could be offered new land on 
condition that they became participants in schemes-in which 
they were required to accept a certain amount of direction. 
But. the chances of Group farming schemes succeeding;always 
seemed .in doubt; the pre-war experiment.at Kingolwira had 
collapsed and the participants had returned to their own 
communities; more recent examples of Group farming in - 
Northern Rhodesia and Kenya1 gave no■cause for encouragement. 
Nevertheless, the search continued for an adequate 
substitute for peasant farming in the traditional manner 
and the Royal Commission was.able to give a cautious welcome 
to the efforts of the Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation 
(TAC) described in more detail in the following chapter.
The post-war policy for the development of the 
African sector, can be discerned as falling, into two distinct 
phases. At first, there was a concentration of effort on 
provincial schemes,. aimed at the conservation and rehabi-, 
litation of soil conditions in selected localities. The 
plans for.these were based on the recommendations of the 
Central Development Committee and pre-War reports; the 
expenditure, estimated to be necessary for them is described 
in the Ten-Xear Development Plan and the revision, published 
•in 1950. In most of the schemes (some of the more 
important are described in the following paragraph), the 
- major policies adopted were to ' introduce rules to. prevent;
further deterioration of the land and to settle elsewhere 
some of the population of the over-crowded areas. Once 
these objectives were attained, it was intended to 
concentrate on increasing productivity.
The second phase began in 1956. Officials in 
the Department of Agriculture headquarters were well aware 
of the unpopularity incurred by their field staff in 
enforcing regulations. . They were, therefore, receptive to 
the idea that a 'focal point approach* should be adopted, 
with staff concentrated in those areas found to be receptive 
to advice. At the same time the African members of 
Legislative Council, anxious to see an increase in revenues 
in order to improve the social services, submitted a list 
of projects which would lead to increased productivity^
Many of these suggestions were implemented .and a. re-deploy­
ment of staff took place. As a consequence of the policies 
followed in both phases some significant changes in the 
landscape occurred.
Phase one: the provincial schemes
In order to achieve the aims described above, it 
was necessary to provide inducements in the form of servicces 
water supplies, roads and new land.-- Plans therefore had 
to be prepared on an integrated basis, involving a number 
of different government departments. With the exception 
of the Mbulu scheme, which was partly financed by O.D. and 
W. funds, all the provincial schemes were financed from the 
Agricultural Development Fund, supplemented by funds from.
the native treasuries .of the district or districts in which 
the plans; were implemented. ; , ' '
(i) The Sukumaland development scheme. The. five, 
administrative districts known as Sukumaland. were the
scene of the colonial government's most ambitipus project
' - 8 ‘- '• ' 'for rehabilitation and resettlement. Even before the.
War, it was a matter for concern that as the human and 
. cattle population, rose so had the fertility o,f the soil 
decreased. The main proposals embodied in. the scheme can 
be summarised thus:; to prevent further loss of soil 
fertility; to introduce improved agricultural methods; 
to encourage increased production of both food and -cash 
crops; to introduce livestock control; finally, to 
transfer some of,the population from the overcrowded areas. 
Since these proposals required the co-operation of officials 
and native authorities in a number of districts, a re­
organization' of existing political structures was also 
. necessary. . Although during the nineteen-thirties, a , 
political federation of Sukuma chiefs had been proposed, 
no real progress had been made. After the War, Donald 
Malcolm-, an administrative -officer who had previously made 
a detailed ;study of the area, was given the. task of 
constructing the political and administrative framework 
which would sustain the development programme. Recognizing 
hbat radical changes in traditional practices could never 
be .achieved by the edicts of a colonial administration, he . 
sought’to make full Use of the authority and prestige of 
the Sukuma chiefs. All the chiefs in the five districts 
were made members of a federal council which deliberated and
introduced the legislation considered necessary. The 
council of chiefs would be expected to accept responsibility 
for policies and every member would have to explain the 
decisions taken when he returned home. . The chiefs woulb 
be advised as to the best course of action by a team of 
specialists who became resident at Malya, the new head-, 
quarters of the development scheme.
: But although the Sukuma chief enjoyed more 
prestige than most of his counterparts elsewhere in the 
Territoryit was in nobody!s interest that he should 
appear to be the mouthpiece of the government. There was, 
therefore, a need for popular representatives to take a 
share of the responsibility for policies and it was pain­
fully clear that the democratic element in the council was 
inadequate. Although each chiefdom sent 'councillors' 
they were usually nominated by the chief :and often related 
to him. The allowances paid for attendance at meetings 
were generous and the duty was therefore a popular one.
Hans Cory, a government sociologist, was asked to find an 
answer to the problem. His solution rejected - Cameron's 
philosophy of building on 'native institutions' and instead
was based on, as he explained it, .'the necessity for
t q
complete emancipation from traditional institutions'. He 
proposed the creation of an elaborate system of parish, 
sub-chiefdom and chiefdom councils. The parish councils 
at the base of the pyramid consisted of members chosen by 
direct elections. Elections were conducted.in a rough 
and ready manner but the councillors usually represented 
the.popular choice at the time.^ The difficulty was to
sustain a popular,interest in the councils once the 
excitement of the, elections was over.,
But it was soon apparent' that there-was a world 
of difference between recognizing, the existence of real 
representatives and persuading them to share in the 
responsibility for irksome regulations. It^needed=the 
framework of party organization to sell the new policies 
and ironically, when parties did appear the new.leaders 
found it good tactics .to oppose rather, than support the 
measures for the improvement of the land. Rules unfairly 
applied led to grievances and both the T.A.A. and the Sukuma
Union flourished on the discontent which the government
- •' ' 11 seemed unable to remedy. v 1
. This, of, course, is obvious with the advantage 
of hindsight. At the time the only obvious facts were 
the deterioration of the soil, the patent need for,culling 
and the opportunity, with mqre funds and staff than ever 
before, to do something about the problems. Norman Rounce, 
ah experienced and energetic Agricultural Officer, was 
responsible for working out the details of the plans for 
improvement. The.remedies he advocated were in two 
categories.. First, there were the indirect measures; a 
large number of Agricultural Instructors were to be trained, 
the native'authorities were to be converted and school 
teachers were to instruct in new techniques in both primary 
and secondary schools. Direct ..measures he .proposed • 
included providing water points, re-settlement, soil 
conservation rules and 'the rational utilization of stock 
products'. By the last-mentioned measure he expected
more than a culling programme to reduce the ever-increasing 
herds; he was anxious to see the Use. of manure on the land, 
now made necessary as shifting cultivation became less 
possible. Although Rounce, like most other officials would 
have preferred to rely on persuasion in the task of reform, 
he was adamant in insisting that.compulsion was Justified."^ 
A plethora of rules and' orders followed,1 restricting many 
customary activities in order to protect the countryside.
The.Instructors were unable to enforce so. many regulations 
with any degree of uniformity; the fact that some offenders 
were prosecuted while neighbouring.farmers equally at fault 
were left alone gave rise to rumours of corruption. There 
was even less uncertainty about the resentment caused by 
arrogant and threatening behaviour and some.natiye 
authorities feared that unless there was a change of
policy organized opposition to chiefs'and government would
14 :■ ' ' -
grow rapidly. 'The compulsory de-stocking regulations:
were even more unpopular and the gulf between African and
European seemed Unbridgeable. . While the ownership•of
cattle maintained-such* a'powerful social significance there
was no possibility of mutual understanding and), even the most
loyal native authprities were not, ipre'pared to support the
government proposals for the reduction of herds. When
the Deputy Provincial Commissioner explained to the Maswa
native authorities that-they were free to choose the actual
number of cattle in the district which had to be offered
for sale provided .they accepted responsibility for the
decision he was told that .1 if he was the government it was
his duty to give am order.i y  , This is what happened, for
there seemed little, chance that the solution would again 
be provided for the government by natural causes; the 
prolonged drought in 1949-50 which had caused the death 
of 600,000 head of cattle was never a disaster in the eyes 
of. the conservationists., ' ,
As: African, reaction to the various regulations 
became increasingly hostile' and nationalism gained support, 
the authorities were made aware of.the stick they were 
creating to beat their own backs. Twining, after paying 
a visit to Lake province in 1954? recorded, that the
Sukumaland scheme was a classic example of how not to do
things: ; •.
'It has undoubtedly done a great deal of good, 
but it has never been properly put across tO: .- 
the people who, as far as I can make out, co-
■. operate only to the minimum and then with
reluctance...
Although in the light of four years of disturbances which 
followed, there is much truth in this observation, never­
theless it is difficult to* believe that any amount of 
.explanation would have convinced the Sukuma peasant that 
the .three major evils - destocking, cattle tax and cotton 
cess - had to be patiently endured.. The remedies, Twining 
suggested, were development committees and better public 
relations; in the particular circumstances of the time 
these were hardly likely to make any appreciable change. 
Instead,, the will to enforce many of the regulations- began 
to .evaporate* By 1955 many" of the cultivation rules were, 
no longer enforced and for a time tie-ridging and manuring 
in particular were not practised. The de-stocking 
regulations were less rigorously applied than they should
have Been in view of the .damage doing ■ done to the land. J
In spite of the outcry against thi sunp opular regulation 
the cattle population! BeWeen'-1956 and 1954-. rose' by 40 p * :
per cent. But there was ho dramatic about-turn in 
government policy because;, coinciding' with the leas , v
vigorous application pf the. rules , there .was a progressive. • 
reduction in the .importances of the, Bederal.Council. In 
1955'a policy of devolution was adopted; district councils 
had been -.established “and = the, development plan was " broken 
down into.Its component parts at district level. In the. 
following financial year, 1956/57? 'the Sukumaland scheme 
officially came to .an end.-- - v "
Nevertheless, the pyramid of councils, constructed 
in .order to obtain-.pub,li.c development ■-,
policies, continued in .^existence. - ihe many rule's and ' 
regulations toovwere still there although they were .
. Becoming increasingly difficult to enforce. fo the 
Provincial Commissioner,; S.A. 1.Walden:, l95S was ’.the end'
• • ' :’V  ■■ " \ r  ' ’ 18
of an era of paternalism.1 . -.describing the increasing 
opposition to government policiest he wrote: .
Mhe: upsurge ,of nationalism and the consuming :*
...; desire of .agitators : to seize upon anything 
unpopular • has' -I'bd yto' /widdspr.e.ad 'resentment •
: ■. being actively,’ fostered against much salutary 
and worthwhile-legislation. As a result the 
’ Sukumaland Pederal Gouncil decided at its 1 , 
meeting in November to cancel much of its/ 
natural resources legislation i ..' noticeable 
that .those who led the agitation, "against, cattle . 
dipping and: rinderpest innoculatioh were .not- 
cattle owners ,
The’Provincial Commissioner la' comments, were intended to
draw attention1to the irresponsibility. of nationalist
politicians. But they also made it clear that the
restrictions necessary to save the land could only he 
.enforced by a government acceptable to the people. .
The solid achievements of the Sukumaland scheme 
have always been overshadowed by the political events of 
the.period. ..Nevertheless, much was accomplished. The 
land area utilised in 1945 was 8,000 square miles; by 
1957? with the transfer of population to Geita district 
and the peripheral areas of Shinyanga and Maswa districts, 
the total land area used had increased to' 13,000 square 
miles. Settlement had been successfully carried out in . 
areas heavily infested with tsetse fly and sleeping sickness 
kept under control. A large.number of dams, hafirs and 
bore-holes had been provided and in spite of the growing 
opposition to any form of government initiative, many of 
the anti-erosion measures were accepted and retained.
Although these achievements, would have led to some increase 
.in cotton production the extent of the Increase was largely 
due to' the factors mentioned earlier. " With the .co-ordinated 
plan supervised by the team of experts based at Malya, the 
aim of'increasing production without causing further damage 
to; the land was largely satisfied.. It was unfortunate 
that much of the extra money which went into the. farmers1 
, pockets was spent On acquiring cattle, which otherwise 
would have been slaughtered. Increased.production provided 
the means to seek ways-of further development; the Lint and 
Seed Marketing Board offered funds for experimenting with 
mechanical equipment' and several local authorities 
attempted to run ploughing schemes.
On the other hand, the provincial administration
never won the overt support of the chiefs for the need
to enforce the rules the experts required. It was clear
to all that in Tanganyika, the principles of indirect rule
were of limited application only. Second, the plan to win
the support of a younger, better-educated generation also
came to nothing. The school agricultural syllabus was
too inflexible, there were too few trained teachers and
there.was a rapidly, growing tradition that at school only
academic achievement counted* Furthermore, better public
relations advocated by Twining came too late to be effective
in the battle for 'hearts and minds'. A. few years later
the newspaper 'Ukulima wa Kisasa' and the radio programmes
on farming matters made a significant impact. Finally,
there was no'progress with the intractable problem of
attitudes to the ownership of land; while grazing land
was held in common, there was no reason to limit the number
of cattle' owned and while arable land had no value in itself
there was no incentive to improve it or even plant fruit 
20trees. Gory describes the Sukuma chief as 'being
21responsible for the fertility of.corn, cattle and mankind.'
Is the absence of 'soil1 from this list not without 
significance?
(,ii) The Uluguru Land.Usage Scheme. The Uluguru mountain
area, to the, south of Moro'goro had been the object of
22
concern before the War. In 1947, £50,000 had been 
allocated' from the Agricultural Development Fund for 
remedial measures. A report by an Agricultural Officer 
is of interest because the problems he described were to
290
be found over and over again in East Africa; at: that/ time;
'The fertility of the 'land was.'rapidly destroyed. , *
due to the removal of .the surface soil by sheet 
• erosion... each family cultivated four or five 
times as much land as was necessary thirty years 
ago,and cannot carry all the population at present 
. living there.;,. the luguru are living at a level 
of marginal.subsistence with an average, cash 1 
income of shs. 70/- per annum.*23
The remedy prescribed was a reafforestation programme and
the construction of bench terraces., to , save: what remained
of the surface soil. .But since land protected/by terraces
was not obviously more fertile than other land there; was
very little co-operation from the people. > Nor could ;
adequate support from the native authority be secured.
Owing to the existence of a rival faction the' chief's
authority' was limited. .. Consequently, rules to compel
compliance were- introduced; .and these had to be enforced
by Agricultural Instructors who, it .was alleged, were far :
from • incorruptible., ’ 1
■ : - /. However , progress was made in tree planting and
in establishing, experimental plots with the object of
finding a suitable permanent crop. Terracing remained.
unpopular and In 1993 a determined effort was made to ■
secure support for the practice by an. education programme.
The official view of this effort was optimistic; it was
confidently believed that -'the absence, of serious opposition
to the scheme can be directly ascribed to careful preparatory.
publicity in all three areas.1 This apparent harmony,
if it ever existed., proved to be of short duration* With ■
the founding of TANIX in. 1954* a more critical and united
opposition to the scheme appeared. The ubiquitous
Agricultural Instructors were the obvious targets of
criticism as they persisted, with threats and exhortation, 
to apply the terracing, policy. There were demonstrations : 
and one' serious riot, the.hillsides .were deliberately fired 
andwnany terraces destroyed. Without co-operation there 
.was no point in continuing and the scheme officially came, 
to an end in mid 1959 without any change of heart being 
evident. The Provincial' Commissioner had already
pronounced the epitaph with- the observation that ‘after
' ' 25ten years hard work there is little result.' ^
(iii) ; The Usambara-Pare schemes. Two other schemes, in 
the north-east corner, of the Territory, are also of interest. 
The farming practised in the Usambara mountain area had 
caused concern for many, years and after the War the first 
priority, was aimed at the., rehabilitation of the Mlalo 
Basin area. This was a relatively dry area of some 60 
square miles; its problem was overcrowding and deterior­
ating soil conditions. Prom the start of the scheme in 
194-7, government officers were met with hostility and 
suspicion. This perhaps was not surprising, since the 
remedy consisted of introducing a number of restrictions 
which were bound to cause resentment. Cultivation on the 
steeper slopes was forbidden; the valleys were planted with 
elephant grass; the stall feeding of cattle was advocated 
and grazing of animals on hillsides was.prohibited. As 
with the Ulughru scheme, the only way the measures might 
have been made acceptable was to obtain the active support 
of the chief. In this case this proved impossible; his 
authority turned out to be too,fragile to-survive the
tensions which were generated and he was forced to resign 
in favour of his son. The answer was to turn away from 
the traditional authority and establish a representative 
council. Unfortunately, by the time this was in being, 
opposition to the scheme was widespread.
; But the scheme provided the government with
experience which turned out to be useful when in 1950 the
measures adopted were extended to apply to the whole
Usambara area. The major aim of this larger scheme was to
combine the introduction of better farming practices in the
mountain areas with the transfer of some of the population
to the relatively unoccupied plains below. To encourage
a conservative people to co-operate, farmers were provided
with a ploughing service at sub-economic prices as well as
26other social services. Once again, it proved difficult 
to gain voluntary acceptance of the many regulations deemed 
necessary. Until 1955* official reports of progress were 
optimistic, in the belief that the peasant farmers of the 
area would eventually comply with the rules, either through 
force of habit or because improvement to soil conditions 
became obvious for all to see.. Where there was opposition, 
it was discounted as being ’politically inspired'.^ The 
Erqvincial Commissioners' reports for 1955 and for 1956 
continued to give the impression that apart from the Korogwe 
division the scheme was accepted everywhere. However, in 
the following year it was reported that the penal sanctions 
in the conservation rules had been abandoned; .and in the 
report for 1958 the following despairing.observation was
made.: ■ ■ ■ .
1.-the removal of sanctions has left its mark 
' on the countryside. Some of the steepest 
. hillsides have been laid bare and there.is 
hardly a tie-ridge to be seen outside the 
school shambas.^g
As.with the majority of such.schemes, in the tense
political situation which developed shortly before
independence, no. government initiative was .acceptable
unless the material gains were.obvious and immediate. .
In the neighbouring Pare district, similar' . 
problems existed, but the method of dealing with them 
was .different. Mindful of the hostile reaction to a 
graduated rate a few years before, the government decided 
to rely oh persuasion only. Conservation measures were 
explained as a follow-up to a mass literacy .programme and 
amounted to stall feeding of cattle, the planting of 
barrier:hedges and. the reafforestation of hill-tops. , 
People were attracted to leave the mountain areas by a 
subsidised mechanical cultivation scheme established on. 
•the plains. With no enforcement measures at the behest 
of the government there were never the same opportunities 
of confrontation to be exploited by the 1situationists*1
Phase two! . the productivity schemes.
The change in policy, from an emphasis on 
rehabilitatioh to a, drive for increased productivity, was 
welcomed in the Department of Agriculture for the reasons 
already mentioned. - But it -neyer "led .to a. cessation of 
departmental activity in all the areas of the provincial
schemes; Sukumaland, for example, with its vast potential
for increased cotton production,, required a large number.
of extension staff to be retained there. Elsewhere,,
staff were concentrated in areas where there was not only
a potential for increased productivity but also the
probability of co-operation from farmers. The 'focal
point approach', the fore-runner of later attempts,in East
Africa to create 'growth-pole' areas, was aimed at
increasing the production of cash crops as quickly as
possible. Although in some instarices pilot projects
were instituted, it was not often that sufficient time was
allowed for a proper evaluation. There were dangers in -
this sudden haste to increase output. In view of the
devastation caused by the post-Depression 'grow more crops'
campaign, a certain amount of caution-was necessary. Instead,
the emphasis on production and the unpopularity of the soil
conservation measures made it convenient to ignore the loss
of soil fertility which would occur unless good husbandry 
29was practised. To implement the new policy, a re-deploy­
ment of the available extension staff was necessary and it. 
was soon apparent that plans for concentrating s^aff in 
receptive areas could not always be achieved. In all,
85 projects were selected for implementation; if they 
were to be properly investigated and supervised,either 
more personnel had to be recruited ahd trained or some 
schemes had to be postponed. The project in the cotton 
growing areas of Kilosa district provides ail example of 
what was done. The aim in this case was to double the 
cotton yield and increase output accordingly/ the. method
of achieving this aim was to provide.a series of 
demonstrations, to encourage approved farming practices 
and to organise the supply of inputs. Eventually, it 
was found possible to provide one field assistant for every 
200 farmers.
The new policy placed emphasis on the expansion
of coffee production. Of the total implemented, 43 schemes
were concerned with this crop and the production of arabica
rose substantially, particularly in the Southern Highlands.
Subsequently, the emphasis changed from increasing the area
planted to improving output and quality. The extension
staff remained fully engaged, not only in providing advice
but also in organizing the supply of materials and equipment
to those farmers who were not entirely convinced that they 
30were necessary. .
The change to the focal point approach provided
a substantial increase in the output of cash crops; in
retrospect it seems difficult to justify in terms of cost;
benefit the, continued use of large numbers of extension
staff on some of the schemes; on the other hand it could
be argued that in,tropical agriculture, immediate success
is not always forthcoming.
The focal point approach, as it developed in some
areas,, aimed at changing attitudes as much as at increasing
quantities of produce. The demonstration effect of the
increasing prosperity of those who co-operated was considered 
31important."^ Tribal traditions set store on conformity 
and reinforced suspicion of change; where individual 
initiative aroused derision or unpopularity, it was 
necessary to offer, encouragement and give support. The
aim was .’total development; by organizing adult literacy 
and hygiene classes in the.same'area, it was the governr 
ment's aim to.'complement tHe demonstration effect of the ‘ 
successful farmer and also to show that if local leaders ? 
were far-sighted enough.to take advantages of the services 
which could ..be supplied, the' whole community, would benefit.
;The African sector:: ' the balance sheet
T3±e increase in the production of cash crops 
after 1945 in the African.sector: was, no less substantial , 
than in the estates..:aiid plantation sector. The factors 
which'^  contributed to this increase can be summarised thus; 
an increased interest in obtaining a cash return; better 
techniques,and knowledge; an increase in the population; 
the effects of the development schemes and subsequent 
policies aimed at increasing the volume of exports. Food 
production also increased at an adequate rate and govern­
ment control over marketing of staple crops was progress- 
ively\relaxed. An indication of the increase in the 
value of, export crops is evident in the figures given in 
Table XV. Since’ by I960 tea was the only crop, which was 
entirely produced on estates, it will be seen that there- 
was a substantial increase in the cash inflow into the 
African sector; it is also obvious that apart from sisal, 
the contribution to the’ economy from estates had. become 
much, less important.
On the other, hand, several factors caused dis­
quiet; there was the generally low standard of, farming
.TABLE XV
. TERRITORIAL EXPORTS OF THE SIX CROPS 
OP GREATEST VALUE 1950 AND' I960 '
Item, ' ■ 1950
’ (£000) :
Sisal 11,846
Coffee 3,471
Lint cotton 1,443
Sunflower 3.58
Pulses 322 ■
Tobacco 233
(source:
Item . . I960
(£000):
. ' Sisal . . 15,442
' Lint cotton 8,827 !
Coffee :/ 7,326 " :
Cashew nuts 2,126
Tea ' . 1,151
Groundnuts 1,053
Annual Trade Reports,
<1950- and I960; Government 
Printer, Bar bs Salaam)
techniques observed- by the World Bank Mission, cited above; 
the soil conservation measures continued to be resisted or 
at best barely tolerated; and the increasing population 
made it necessary to devote time! and, space, to growing more 
f;ood crops. The amount of fertile, uninhabited and 
climatically suitable land was obviously finite; the 
technical - problems of irrigated cultivation, particularly 
.alkalinity and salinity, had, yet to be resolved; with 
independence looming ahead, agricultural officers predicted 
that a popular-based government would be more interested in 
the short-term advantages to be gained from increasing 
output than in the long-term necessity of maintaining soil 
fertility. finally,•there had been high hopes of several 
benefits to be derived from the introduction of mechanization 
into the African sector; these proved to be just as ill- 
founded as the optimistic predictions for the groundnut 
scheme, described in the next chapter..
In making generalizations about these experiments 
with mechanization, a degree of caution is necessary. It 
was soon to become conventional wisdom to point out the 
drawbacks of using tractors where the return was uncertain; 
the high cost and effort involved in the complete clearing 
of land, essential if damage to implements was to be 
avoided; the cost and difficulty of maintaining equipment 
in remote.places; the need to charge farmers an economic 
rate for tractor use and their reluctance to pay the 
charges damanded^^ finally, the financial and opportunity 
cost in providing technically qualified and responsible 
personnel to supervise schemes which often were not on a
sufficiently large scale to justify such costs. All 
these factors provided powerful arguments against the 
use of tractors; however, not all of them were universally 
applicable and’ most of them represented problems which, 
with perseverance could be resolved.
The .type of crop being cultivated was relevant 
and the attitudes.and goals of the farmers who grew it.
The use of tractors for the cultivation.of cotton by 
peasant farmers was often uneconomic because the family 
was unwilling to weed and sometimes even to harvest a 
larger area, than that traditionally cultivated. Costs 
were affected by the terrain, the lay-out of plo.ts and by 
the. soil conditions; easy-worked soils..could be ploughed 
by light wheeled tractors for which the maintenance costs 
were comparatively low. With so many different variables 
to .be, considered, the government adopted a cautious approach 
a number of schemes were started as pilot projects., 
financed by Native Authorities. The Rufiji scheme, 
started in 1948, was one of the more successful. Its 
object: was to increase the production of rice in an area 
: where Cultivation was known to be limited by dependence 
on the hoe. . In order to keep costs low, farmers agreed 
t.o group/their holdings in blocks and to form societies
X/L
in order to pay the fees in advance. Even so, in 1952, 
in spite of careful supervision, raised fees and,a record 
area ploughed amounting to 7,720 acres, the official view 
was bhat 'much had to be done to put the scheme on an
' : ' XC, ' ' :
economic basis*. ^ Other schemes, less well-managed and 
on a smaller scale were even more costly to keep running; :
it was therefore no surprise when the Director of .Agri- ■ 
culture announced that,, support for tractor schemes had 
been withdrawn..^ The Rufiji scheme was handed over to 
the native authority, but when in 1956 the fees were 
raised to sixty shillings per acre, very few orders “were 
forthcoming and the ..scheme was wound up.
It took another.ten years for the lesson to be 
understood, that: labour was plentiful but capital was in 
short supplyV The tractor was•a status symbol, a visible 
proof'of modernity; in taking,decisions.on its usefulness, 
political as well as economic; factors had to be considered* 
Secondly, in spite of the evidence, many remained 
unconvinced that the tractor .could not be made cost- 
effective, particularly when there were examples of African 
entrepreneurs providing a hire service with, their own 
tractors. But for the schemes started by both government 
and by native authorities there were psychological as well 
as technical- factors to be taken-into account; the proper 
care of expensive equipment could only be based on personal, 
ownership, professionalism or dedication and without any 
of these.being present no tractor scheme could succeed, 
however favourable the circumstances.
■But in the meantime the growing popularity of 
the ox-plough-had provided a’far safer alternative to the 
tractor.^ Moreover, there was plenty of evidence to 
suggest that therelwas ■roomVfoh improvement in the' African 
sector by using the extension; services and -retaining the 
traditional farming units of production. Bor. example, 
it was argued that it was only a question of time before
farmers appreciated the need to adopt better methods, 
with'coffee, it was estimated that a ninety per cent 
increase, in the amount produced was possible without any 
more bushes being planted. Not only was an increased 
quantity'expected; With better husbandry and improved 
preparation of the beans, higher prices couldbe obtained. ^  
Nor improving the cotton crop, the action required was 
even more evident. First, yields could be considerably 
increased, if proper weeding took place. Next, it was 
necessary to convince-farmers that yields could be increased 
by early planting. . finally, tie-ridging, despite its 
unpopularity could be demonstrated to prove that, if 
practised, yields could be increased by 15-20 per cent.
But there were two problems during the colonial 
period which continued to limit progress and for which no 
answers could be found. One concerned the lack of 
capital available to the peasant farmer and the difficulty, 
he experienced in obtaining credit facilities. The.other, 
the absence, of any real ownership over the land he 
cultivated. - The two are clearly inter-related; being 
unable to offer his land as a security, the average farmer 
was unable to borrow enough to purchase labour-tsaving 
implements, the direct inputs needed for producing cash 
crops, or funds for paying wages to casual labour hired 
to help out at times of peak activity. A few were 
fortunate enough to take advantage of the measures the 
government introduced. Two loan funds were started,
40but the results were disappointing. A large number
of small loans were required for the purposes:, described
above; instead, for ease of administration,, comparatively 
large amounts of money were lent, often for projects which 
were over-ambitious and which ended'in the borrowers being 
unable to repay their loans. In theory, the co-operatives
could administer such, loans, recovering from the borrowers
v ’ . .■ 41,
when theywere paid for.their crop sales. In practice^ .
there were still many defaulters,. with losses being borne 
by the other members of .the society. In a period of 
transition this was. inevitable.. When the parish councils 
were started in Sukumaland many of the councillors elected 
were lineage heads or chiefs - relations, thus confirming 
the continuity of the traditional authority pattern; like­
wise the leadership of the,co-operatives often fell into
the hands of similar dignitaries, who voted each other
- 42loans and later combined to resist demands for repayment. ■ 
Officials.supervising the societies argued that if the 
committee members were blatantly corrupt, they would be 
replaced by others; but until this happened it was 
impossible to expand the system of loan schemes operated 
by these means. furthermore, the individual.farmer/member 
of the societies -.'.of'ten displayed great. ingenuity in 
avoiding repayment of borrowed money; relying on the 
bonds of-the extended family the borrower would transfer 
his crop to a relative and through him obtain full payment 
of the proceeds.
- But",the. lack of capital can never fully explain 
the' relative poverty of the peasant farmer. To those who 
owned some cattle and intended to continue to cultivate . 
six acres of land /without help from hired labour, the need
to borrow money was unimportant - once a few labour-saving 
implements had been obtained. instead, the capital he 
required was. in -the form of improvements to. the land itself 
and these, once introduced, would lead to increased 
profitability in.the future; much was possible if the 
effort was made to plant some permanent crops, some trees 
to act as wind-breaks, to take some soil-^conservation 
measures, to prepare, some pastures and adopt a different 
attitude to animal husbandry.
But to offer such prescriptions was, clearly .
impracticable until there was a chhnge in attitude toward
land ownership and. some support for a change in customary
law affecting land tenure. Until this occurred, there
could be little interest in land improvement or in-the.
adoption of more enterprising farming methods. This theme
was elaborated by . the. Royal, Commission and became the basis
of their most important recommendation. However, the
Report makes it clear that it was accepted that changes
would be resisted by many Africans who believed that the
existing.situation whereby land was owned by the tribal
community offered sure security. This fact had been
recognised when the Land Ordinance Was drafted and became
4 4
the declared basis of policy affecting land tenure.
Although the government of Tanganyika agreed with the 
Royal Commission, in the twilight of colonial rule there 
was little enthusiasm for new initiatives.and the inevitable 
opposition which would follow. Thus, it was argued; it 
might be better to await a change in attitude to land 
tenure instead of trying to direct.and influence public 
opinion. There, were already signs that land ownership
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on an individual basis was becoming accepted. On the
other hand, if conservation rules could not be applied, the 
government had a clear, duty to seek a way to arouse interest 
ih protecting the land through the spur of ownership.
Bowing to the political realities of the times, the gover- 
nme.aAdid'• no;,more '-than publish in a White paper a cautious 
exploration /of the idea of private ownership. ; No more 
was '-possible-,but the contrast. between the Territory- and 
Kenya is striking. in : the latter, the Swynnerton Plan 
published in 195ZK Lad based the development of African 
agriculture on, among other factors, the individual owner­
ship of land, and energetic steps had been taken to 
/implement, this-policy. There was already among Africans 
much interest'inlsechring a proper title to land, not: only - 
in’-the rich coffee lands but; also in’some of the pastoral 
areas farther* west., \  v- . , A ’V A  • A - 1 .
/, t -•4s':^ heicbl6hial--peribd .came to an' end in. Tanganyika 
; it was apparent ./that the achievements1 in the improvement 
of the African sector had been purchased"at the price of, '
’the ending- of acceptance of the political status fqub. 
’improvement was .synonymous with interference. .As a result;. • 
.^the'^tribailuniohsj' the ,’T.A.A. _ and eventually T.APN.U.- 
gained -support; in the countryside. by Showing themselves as ■
wiliing to -, take up complaints And to mobilize opposition
,A-A A -  A " / tin ' ■ ■-/ •. - .
to official policies. ‘ The .colonial, bureaucracy, even
if it had been more flexible and more attuned to public
. opinion, could never have , been able to. react with enough
speed to disarm such opposition! .. The/ Iringa .Dipping
.Scheme provides a clear example of the rapid mobilization
of opposition to what had been a highly valued service.
It is incorrect-to suggest that the aims of the scheme had 
been insufficiently explained-to the cattle owners; the 
officials who established the scheme knew.the local people 
well and refused to extend the scheme into, any area until 
there was unanimous acceptance of the obligations imposed. 
Nevertheless, in 1957 as a result of growing unrest and 
lack of confidence in the scheme the Whole operation was . .
' 4 9  ■ :v .V .... f  . ’■■■ ■ ■ ' '
abandoned. J
This -event in the Southern Highlands, the unrest -,/ 
in Sukumaland, the riot in/the Ulugurus and the increasing.. 
opposition to regulations;.in the Usambaras: four widely A
separated areas, where communities lived which only a few 
years previously had little:.,in common with each other and 
werd essentially inwardly-focussed. . -Since African reaction 
to improvement by regulation was to have a significant 
effect on government policy, some further comment is necessary 
A /  The generally 'accepted explanation is that the A
peasant farmer everywhere is suspicious of innovation and 
the Africans of this category in Tanganyika were no .. 
exception. Although the term 'peasant' has been used to 
describe the smallholder farmer, its use is concerned with 
the mode of production and-. associated land tenure rather 
than implying the existence of a peasant culture. .During 
the decade preceding independence, there was no universal
resistance to exhortations to change traditional practices
A 50 ■ . - "■ ■ ■ ' '
or adopt. new methods..A The acceptance of .innovations
often depended., on the personality of the .Agricultural Officer
attempting to introduce them and the degree of tact shown
by bis subordinate staff; sometimes the crucial factor.
was the support he was given by' the native authority and
his subordinates. It is significant that in the areas
where resistance to government measures was most pronounced,
the legitimacy of the native authorities was being
51challenged by opposing factions. Two other factors 
help to blur the'picture of universal hostility to a well- 
intentioned but insensitive colonial bureaucracy. Responses 
differed according to the types of crop being grown; 
whereas advice concerning cash crops was usually---followed, 
suggestions for improving yields of food crops were more 
often ignored. There was. an understandable dislike of 
innovations, which, if wrong, put the whole family at risk. 
Again, responses varied according to the prevailing view 
about putting capita! at risk; many farmers were unwilling 
to spend money on inputs such as fertilisers in order to 
increase the eventual return when there were so many other 
factors which might cause-the loss of-the entire crop.
Nevertheless, the rising tide of nationalism and 
the well-publicised instances of hostility to government 
initiatives in promoting the ’improvement1 strategy 
stimulated the search for more effective ways of gaining 
the confidence of the peasant farmer. Rersuasion rather 
than regulation became the watch-word and the speed with 
which the natural resources departments adopted a 1low- 
profile ’ image meant losing the initiative which had to 
come from a centralised authority and which, in the case 
of Tanganyika, remained a major factor in determining Man’s 
relationship with his environment. In 1959 the coffee
'grower's of Buha, .(Western province) put the policy to the 
test when by almost unanimous consent, they asked.for rules 
to be introduced which would ensure that the coffee grown 
there reached a reasonable standard. Their request was 
.'.refused .by the Director of .Agriculture because the rules 
would have/to be enforced by staff-from his department:.:
1 and'to this* he would not agree.. The significance5 of 
this decision was two-fold. It/showed the growing A. 
Importance of the .political factor when change in, land /. :
. ..usage practices was contemplated; , .it* also gave notice to 
' the officials' on the -spot that the'days of the colonial 
system . of government were numbered. .With political A 
’objection to expansion- of the nonlifrican sector and with 
:: the: likelihood: of slow improvement in the "African sector, 
more: reliance had to be .placed in the large-scale, 
•'.'enterprises in which the 'Government was more directly 
/‘concerned.^ A": ,A •. ’ A'/ ,:A
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CHAPITER, X
' : ' - LARGE'SCALE AGRICUITURE AFTER 19^5: ■
• THE PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. •
After 1945? the experiments in commercial farming, 
.financed by public funds provided the. basis for the develop­
ment of the third sector of the agricultural’ system. The- . . 
enterprises were on a sufficiently large scale to make 
substantial changes in the landscape; furthermore, although 
the results were often disappointing, the experience gained 
could be used, for: seeking alternative's to traditional farming 
practices. State^financed farming provided a way of 
combining the advantages of estate farming with none of 
the:political disadvantages associated with non-African 
ownership..
The Overseas Eood . Corporation . :
The groundnut adventure in Tanganyika deserves 
its' own special niche in British,colonial history.' It 
.was based on an imaginative plan which might have succeeded 
if a more cautious and more flexible approach .had been 
adopted. It ended in neither triumph nor tragedy, the' 
only losses being a few reputations and a lot of money . .
supplied by the British tax-payer. Fortuitously, it 
provided•a valuable boost to the Tanganyika economy; if 
the production of groundnuts had been the only objective 
there was ;little reason for selecting, the Territory for
the' enterprise, i More important, it provided a foundation 
on which a variety of undertakings could he developed and 
a great deal of information obtained. There are already 
several accounts of the economic .aspects of the. Scheme and 
the.political, controversy which arose in Britain when
■' - , V  p
predictions were proved wrong. . ; However, from the stand­
point of noting'the activities of ■ Man. as an agent of 
geographical, change, more needs to be said. For once the 
Territory had been selected for.the main thrust of the 
enterprise there still remained the task of selecting the 
site, or sites, from a number which would have been suitable. 
What emerges is an example of ’possibilism1 on a very large 
scale. In the greater part of the three areas eventually 
selected, man had only passed by, collecting honey or 
hunting wild animals. How, within a brief. period all 
was changed; the tsetse fly was expelled, bore-holes.were 
sunk, services and shops established. All was possible 
while the political will remained to provide the funds to 
support life in unfavoured environments. When.the original 
scheme collapsed and the financial input was reduced, the 
majority of the residents were compelled to move elsewhere; 
nevertheless, some support was givenpthroughout the remainder 
of the colonial period and it was recognized that if it had 
been totally ended it was only, a matter of -time before the 
fly and the bush returned.
.Except for the initial stages, the scheme was 
managed by the British Overseas Food Corporation and its 
publicly declared objective was to provide' edible oils for' 
consumption in Britain. Three sites were selected in
Tanganyika; at Kongwa (Central province), at Urambo 
(Western province), and at Nachingwea (Southern province). 
The project was a 'dramatic and costly failure,/Summed up 
in the official explanation in what must rank as a master­
piece of understatement:
'the original aims of the scheme have proved 
incapable of fulfilment.'^
An account of the events which occurred is unnecessary,
but a brief summary is- given in Appendix xi. - Nevertheless,
certain questions need to be answered since the enterprise
caused a substantial change in some landscapes and had a
considerable effect, on the'development of the third sector
.of the agricultural system,, in which the government, or
government-established corporations, were directly involved
in farming. First then, was the reason for.failure the
method of farming which was adopted? Second, if the
primary objective was to grow groundnuts, were the most
suitable sites chosen - or is it yet another example of
land usage being determined by political rather than
physical conditions? For if in a vast, under-populated
country the sites, Kongwa excepted, provide examples of
.the average conditions with which the arable farmer has
to contend,.the OFC and TAQ experiences underline the fact
.that adequate inputs of capital and expertise, cannot
guarantee success..
■ At first, criticism of the OFC operation was
directed at the clearing and cultivating techniques which 
had been adopted. Thus, when failure was imminent it was 
an apparent over-indulgence in mechanization which was . . - 
blamed for the disappointing results. As one account of
the scheme explained at the time:
'The bubble of mechanization has been pricked 
and .... the OFG has taken to heart the (view) 
that mechanization has a place in agriculture 
..but only a very small place because of its 
heavy cost.
This view was repeatedly expressed in subsequent accounts 
of the enterprise although, the more perceptive qualified 
their comment by adding 'in marginal areas'. It was a 
combination of several.factors which led to failure at 
Kongwa and disappointing results in the other areas. Not 
all of these factors, could have been foreseen before the 
plans were implemented. For instance, the authors of the 
plan were justified in assuming that machinery suitable for 
the various operations would be procured, would be expertly 
used and properly maintained.. This was not the case, 
because those in charge were ordered to press ahead regard­
less, of cost or consequences. And so, when problems arose 
it was inevitable that interest should be directed toward
6the techniques employed rather than the sites themselves.
These however, were far from ideal and it is necessary to
’know why they were selected.
The reasoning of- the Wakefield Mission is apparent
in the following passage from the Report:
'areas of sparse population unencumbered by 
native or other rights, are necessary if 
operations are to be started quickly.
, Uninhabited, tsetse infested and waterless
• areas, therefore, offer special attraction 
to the project provided the soil is suitable 
and the rainfall adequate...'^
■ It had already been argued that machinery was to be used
on a-grand scale and therefore large expanses of land had
to be foUnd. But the larger, the area involved, the more
likely native rights would he present and would have to 
he considered; this to the Mission meant delay which had 
to be avoided at all costs. Consequently, the least, 
inhabited area was the best for the purposes of the enter­
prise. The fact that the larger the area, the more likely 
the possibility that the soil characteristics and even the 
rainfall pattern might show variations was never considered. 
Nevertheless, the possibility of drought was not entirely 
ignored although the following.observation proved to be 
over-optimistic.:
'... the ill effects of short droughts can be 
largely mitigated by the adoption of soil 
conservation measures and the application of 
other principles of good farming...'g
These principles are explained elsewhere in the Report. The
Mission had been particularly impressed by the sandy, red,
loams they had been shown at Kongwa and felt sure that they
were, or could be made, very suitable for growing- groundnuts.
It' was observed that the soil to some extent lacked humus;
however, this, defect could be remedied and when in addition
the land had been properly - contoured and furrowed it was
argued, that it would be capable of retaining enough moisture
to tide a crop over the.short droughts which had to be
expected. It was'recognized that Kongwa was in a
particularly dry area but it was argued that if the
recommended measures were adopted, groundnuts could be grown
successfully.. The Mission came to this conclusion after a
visit to a settler's’ farm at Mlale, adjoining the Kongwa
plain. Although the visit took place during a year in
which the effects of drought were particularly severe, they
were shown groundnuts being grown and were much impressed
by'sample checks carried out in ..their presence.
Several other sites were investigated and they, 
are described in the Mission's report.- With the exception 
of Urambo and Nachingwea,. all;the sites required- the removal 
of a number of Africans resident on them- unless:operations 
on each site were restricted to one or two units only-.
This., arrangement would have, added considerably to the. 
administrative costs of the scheme, and was not favoured...
On the' other;"hand, ;the' Mission strongly recommended that 
thereshould, be more than one site- and that the areas 
selected- should be located within different rainfall regimes, 
so that, local: droughts . would not,; spoil the entire crop.
Even so-, it still seems remarkable that in spite of the- - 
vastness of the Territory and the very sparse population , 
throughout much, of. it,, tlie mission, should have selected the 
Kongwa area as one of the places for the s c h e m e I t '  clearly 
lies v/ithin that , area of ,.the Territory where’;the .'’rains -'are-* ■ 
most likely to f ail ( see MapI). / In adding an extra hazard . 
to,an enterprise alreadyyreplete-with unknown factors the . 
mission left" itself open to the suspicion that it attached 
or was too- easily persuaded to attach, undue weight to . the , -. 
.advantage of selecting a 'relatively Uninhabited area. 
Possibly, the help provided by the Department of Agriculture 
was counter-productive; Wakefield acknowledged.the value of 
the, preliminary investigations undertaken before the visit 
of .the Mission which,resulted in the members 'being taken 
to areas of suitable terrain' , - ■ ■
. In'.London, the Ministry of - Pood had to decide 
whether, to .accept the, Mission's recommendations. A
'Special Section' was established;; to- consider the Report and 
they duly observed that 'the,evidence concerning rainfall is
perhaps not wholly satisfactory and leaves an element,of.
11 ' doubt*. Other counsels,prevailed and the fact that this
warning was ignored proved to be a very expensive error..- It
soon turned out that- the years at Kongwa when the crop would
not be at risk due to drought were the exceptions rather
than the rule. In the White Paper outlining new plans for .
the OPO, it was observed:
'In 1952/5 , the drought which prevailed in 
varying degrees over the whole of Tanganyika 
were particularly severe at Kongwa ... in.
1955/5ZI* the rainfall has'been patchy and some 
loss seems inevitable ... at. Kongwa uncertain 
rainfall in the area makes any further investment ■ 
too hazardous for anyone; to undertake. '-^2
Most of the responsibility for the choice of Kongwa was 
assigned to Wakefield' since in the mission, he alone had
15previous experience of farming conditions in the Territory. •/ 
The conventional explanation, that he was given misleading 
information on his visit, to Bain's farm at ,Mlale lacks 
credibility. While/there, he was shown groundnuts being 
successfully cultivated; it is a fact that the. sample yields 
which so impressed him there, amounting to 1000-12.00 lbs. 
per acre, were never in the most favourable conditions at 
any time achieved by any unit of the OPO farming in that.' 
area. Perhaps he disregarded the great difference in 
climatic conditions between Mlale and the Kongwa plains 
stretching below and this difference was;enough to affect 
the cultivation of groundnuts. But it. must be remembered 
that the reasons for the unsuitability of Kongwa were not 
immediately apparent. Even after a year of concentrated
•experiment and,observation,.the OFC technical advisers
. . ' V : ■ . , . p h
were still satisfied that the site was suitable, r Firm
conclusions, were difficult to arrive at because the effects
of rainfall, were so unpredictable; thus the TIachehje unit
at Kongwa, which in the 1951/52 season received a seemingly
inadequate ambunt of rain over much of the area planted..
with groundnuts, obtained the highest yield per acre. In
fact, it became increasingly clear that it was a combination -.
of factors which had to be taken into account: the quantity
of the rainfall, the timing of the precipitation in relation.
to the growth cycle of the crop and the degree of soil
17 '
compaction which followed the rains. 1 . It was. this complex 
relationship more than 'the uncertain rainfallmentioned 
in the extract from.the White Paper quoted .above which made 
large scale production an extremely risky enterprise.
As the nature of the problems became clearer there
was every reason, for the OFG Board to adopt a less ambitious ■
timetable until more information was available. When, for
reasons of political expediency, it was decided to implement.
the Wakefield recommendations with the least possible delay ,
no objections had been raised. It was confidently expected
that with ali the resources which were to be made available,
any difficulty could be surmounted* Two members of the
mission which selected the sites, Wakefield and Rosa, were
appointed to the OFC Board and thus shared the responsibility
for the decision to press ahead regardless of what mistakes
might be made. v Addressing a meeting of soil:scientists
Wakefield explained the position-as follows:
'Urgency was the keynote; the usual series , \
. of experiment and pilot project could not 
be awaited. It had to be all or nothing.'^g
, . ' ' ~ v". ; ?' " - 320.
/ • • And in'.the same Address he explained how he'had come "to ii •
• ' support the, project: " ■
' The. groundnut- scheme appealed to me ,as . 
f ■ • providing/the opportunity, for the economic - ;:-
application of scientific .principles on a •'
very grand basis•’
But the application'of scientific principles must he
concerned; with ■experiment, and observation and it was this ;
■ basic contradiction which was to lead to so much trouble.
Later in the same year it seems that Wakefield began.to
counsel a more cautious approach to further development*
Now'he found it difficult to explain his change of heart >
.to the other'members of the Board. / With,the scheme running
into trouble, disagreement ensued and became public knowledge V
In Britain, criticism of the scheme increased and in 194-9
. Strachey announced in the House of Commons that he had
terminated the appointments of both Wakefield and Rosa.
'"He explained that they were not being.made scapegoats for
the failure of the enterprise but that there was • a. need to .
strengthen the Board for the future*. Not'surprisingly?
this explanation failed to satisfy the opposition. The.
fierce argument., in the. political arena. Over, the, wisdom of / '
the scheme and Strachey1s handling of.the affair ;had the
effect of, inducing, in the years which followed, a cautious t
approach to. subsequent proposals for using public.,
corporations for development/projects. At the heart of. . '
the problem was the difficultyCwhich occurs, in any democracy,' ; • .
the inability.to win support for schemes involving heavy
expenditure.unle ss the;action contemplated can be shown to
be in the public interest. Thus. no one. questioned the '. ■ ‘
.primary aim of the acheme as outlined by the Wakefield mission,
namely to make up the deficiency.in edible oils in Britain
and to obtain groundnuts at a lower price than had to be
20paid for them elsewhere. Such arguments may have had
the desired effect of quietening domestic criticism but it 
left the. official classes with the uneasy feeling that world 
opinion might see little difference between self-interest 
and exploitation. It was one thing for private enterprise 
to seek.profits in dependent territories; the colonial 
government, it was believed would safeguard the interests 
of the native inhabitants and could expect support and 
encouragement from the Colonial Office, But in this case 
the entrepreneur was the metropolitan government1 itself, 
a situation which in the House of Commons was observed with
either cynical amusement or deep misgiving according to the
' ' 21 political leanings of those who spoke.
But although Britain's need', provided the
r
opportunity for launching the enterprise, it seems probable 
that .the needs of the Territory were also considered. If 
the primary aim was to obtain groundnuts as a matter of 
urgency, there were more certain ways of obtaining them at 
much less financial risk. First, in Nigeria, owing to a 
shortage of rolling stock as a result of the War, a vast 
stock.of groundnuts had accumulated at Kano railhead and 
this was being moved'very slowly. Two years after the
Scheme had been in operation in East Africa a large stock
'22" - ' ’ ' still awaited removal.. Not only would it have been
easier to obtain rolling stock than the Complicated
machinery needed for Tanganyika; also, it would have been
possible to increase production in West Africa with far
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• quicker, and more certain results.. Second, it is worth: 
noting Jthat the Wakefield.;. Mission, observed that. a ‘ .
substantial , propor.tipn of the British government * s 
requirements could be obtained if; Tanganyika farmers 
were offered a price guaranteed for: three years.. This 
suggestion was ignored in the White Paper which, followed 
the Report.- . Neither, of the. two sources mentioned above 
would: have provided1 more than a', partial solution to the . 
shortage but together’ they offered a far.safer alternative.
/v -The British government was won over by'Strachey1s 
optimism;;..-here at last there. was the opportunity to effect 
a dramatic transformation of uninhabited, inhospitable areas 
of territories for which Britain was responsible. . Where
there were doubts they were quickly dispelled by Strachey 
and the sceptics; were silenced by a mixture of enthusiasm 
and idealism rather than by solid reasoning. Others.too 
caught.his mood and showed the- same optimism;; one senior 
. government official in Tanganyika resigned his appointment 
in order to join the -scheme because, he informed Creech 
Jones, he thought fit would go down in history as the 
greatest experiment in civilisation ever conceived and 
ever attempted to date. ' - v .
Even when things began to go ’wrong, Strachey 
sought. to win-support, because the scheme provided the 
opportunity to justify colonial rule and the means for 
an economic,, take-off in- a hopelessly undeveloped territory.
It was the unfortunate mention of the advantage to be 
gained by the British housewife which made it infinitely 
more difficult to locate the scheme in parts of the Territory
where it might have succeeded.
The Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation
Following.the publication of the 1951 White Paper,:
the OFC operations were progressively run down. Between
.1951 and 1954 some of the assets and equipment were sold and
25the number of employees much reduced. ^ In 1954? the TAC 
was created in .'order to continue operations in all three 
areas. The new Corporation was not expected to operate 
profitably'for some 'time and it was arranged for the annual 
deficits to be met by the. British government. Profitability 
was not the only concern of the Corporation; ; experimental 
work was to continue with the consequence that it was
impossible to estimate the; return on capital in respect of
. . 26the solely commercial operations.
Only.a brief description of the.Corporation's
activities is necessary since the details are available
' 27 ■'elsewhere. (  . During the first six years it existed, the
Corporation managed farming schemes in the three areas of
the former OFC scheme, a cattle ranch at Ruvu, near Dar
es 'Balaam, and a tobacco, scheme at Lupa Tingatinga; in
conjunction with the FAG it also managed the Rufiji Basin
Survey., More needs to be said about the achievements in
the ex-OFC areas; the practical problems which had to be
faced provided experience 'useful in the future and the
social and political aspects of the operations offer an
insight into the. attitudes of African farmers at the time
and into post-independence ideology.
By 1952, the farming area at Nachingwea. consisted - 
of approximately 1 5 jQQO acres, divided into twenty farms, 
each under a European' manager. Seventeen farms-were ’paid 
labour1 units, ranging' in size fr.dm 200- to 1 ,800 acres. ■ The 
remaining three were developed as African tenants farms, 
each .under an experienced manager. The average size of 
each farm was twenty acres. .The Corporation provided, 
goods and services for, the tenants, deducting the costs . 
when purchasing their crops. . ’ u. . ' . '
Gradually, experience provided the necessary 
information, which, had it been available, might have made 
the OFC enterprise a viable concern. With groundnut crops, 
rosette continued to play havoc Until in 1954, a disease-.
■ , - p o
resistant seed was introduced. In addition to groundnuts, 
maize, sorghum and soya bean were found to be suitable crops 
in this area, each of them placing different demands on the 
farmers and their advisers*
It was'found that groundnuts needed a high level 
of technical and managerial ability for growing and marketing 
the crop, a dependence on manual labour and no expensive' 
measures to counteract loss of soil fertility. Maize was 
reliable and variations In annual yields were smaller than 
with the other crops; costs of production were comparatively 
low but soil fertility needed, conserving-. Sorghum was ---. 
found to be the easiest crop to grow but the returns were 
comparatively low and it often suffered from pest damage. . 
Finally, soya beans had many advantages over the other-three 
crops; as a crop it stored well, was relatively free frOni 
danger from pests and diseases and.production costs were
low;; technical and managerial:ability were necessary 
when the crop was planted and ..harvested. -.
R.F. 'Lord has provided detailed comparisons of 
the costs of producing the major:crops during the period 
1954—19.57• He also has compared the results obtained
from the operating of medium-sized.estates in the same area. 
His figures, therefore not only indicate what.sort of return 
the smallholder, tenant might expect but also offer a 
Comparison between smallholder and estate farming;.. It 
must be concluded that in the particular, circumstances •;
■which, existed in this area, there was nor great gain in 
the usual economies of scale. The. large estates, under 
expert management and with the TAC resources at hand, were.
. unable to prove that farming in this way was a sound i , ■
commercial proposition. - it confirms, the view that settlers 
farming outside the favoured areas were unlikely to become 
wealthy from their farming activity. . On smallholdings, 
the use of tractors,; in spite of careful•supervision was 
shown to. be a doubtful asset. The position was well 
described by the comment:
'success ... was not due to mechanization 
but to a really profitable crop, farmed 
intensively.'^q
Another fact which was to'represent ;a pattern
repeated after independence was the high rate of turnover
of tenant farmers, not only at Nachingwea but also at Kongwa
In the first mentioned, only one third of the tenants -
.recruited during the period 1952-56 stayed for a third year
31and five years later the position had not changed.v The 
chief complaints were the lack of social life, the irksome
supervision, which was‘exercised, the high cost of:the
compulsory services and the disappointing return- after a.-
lot of hard, work* The same complaints were to he heard
from the residents in some of the post-independence settle- 
32'ment schemes. ..
The events at Kongwa provide an example of the 
environment finally succeeding in determining the pattern 
of land iisage. At first a settlement scheme for tenant 
farmers similar .to the Nachingwea system was attempted on 
half the land; on the other half the TAG managed a cattle 
ranch. . Arable farming, could not be made a commercial 
success and eventually the tenant farmers took,to ranching 
under supervision and cultivating enough to provide their 
own food. ; Certainly ranching had more chance.of succeeding 
than growing crops' commercially. Although its chances of 
success were likely to,improve, it was not an enterprise 
likely to show quick profits and it was; evident that it 
would- take a long time to repay the amortisation and
-XT, ,
interest charges. ^ •
Finally, of the three areas, it was at Urambo 
that the most successful examples of supervised farming 
were to be found. Although maize and groundnuts; were 
still grown, the major crop was flue-cured-tobacco. The 
area was divided into, three types of unit: large farms
(1200 acres), medium (150-200 acres), and a farming settle­
ment scheme. The amount of tobacco grown varied from an. 
average of five acres in the settlement scheme to sixty in 
the large farms. At first, all the large farms were leased 
to,Europeans but by 1964, two large farms and eleven medium-
sized farms were.tenanted by Africans. The attitude to
the scheme shown by the tenants was noticeably different
from, experience at Nachingwea and the majority remained
satisfied. with their .choice in spite of the hard work
necessary and the usual close supervision. At Urambo,
not only were the rewards higher but also there was the
■54opportunity for an improvement in status.^ Nearly half 
the work performed at Urambo was by the use of paid, 
seasonal labourers; the tenants had to develop'managerial 
as well as technical skills. The importance of the project 
is three-fold.. First, it represented, at last, a meeting 
place for the racially based'sectors of the agricultural 
system; on the settlement European and African farmers 
were facing similar problems and producing the same crop. 
Second, it offered a viable alternative to the plantation 
as the means of growing flue-cured tobacco, thus ending 
what had been a European monopoly in its production.
Finally, it provided another example of how African enter­
prise in agriculture might have developed if the consequences 
of the reaction to colonial rule had been different. The 
concept of the 'master-growerr was bound to conflict with 
the egalitarian ethos which became part of the .Tanzanian 
version of African socialism and the project came to an 
end. - in that form - in 1965* . '
The Colonial Development' Corporation . ; - .
The Corporation was .created in 1947 and, like 
the OFC, was able to bring, about, notable changes in the
landscape of the Territory.- Its aims’ were explained by
Creech 0ones-as follows: ' ’ , . •
1..... total borrowing powers of the order of
£100. million. It will operate on commercial 
■ principles.- Its object will be to.establish 
or ‘ assist any enterprise in the c61ohi.es: which 
is designed to increase the general productive 
capacity. _ ' 'V*"',' , , . ■ . '
In Tanganyika, the major agricultural enterprise undertaken
by this Corporation, was the development of wattle planting
in Njorribe district. After the War, when wattle, was fetching
high.prices,-the.government had commissioned a private
company to. start a project, there;., in much, of the district
:the soil was poor and a higher than average number,of young
men left home and sought-employment elsewhere. By 1948 the;
company had run into difficulties and.the scheme was taken
over by the C.D.C.v. - With good management progress was rapid
and the countryside was soon transformed as the trees grew.
The scheme consisted of five units and a farm for producing
food for the labour force:. By 1956, 32,000 acres were -
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planted with.wattle and 600 acres with pines. ■
Originally, it had been intended that the 
Corporation would make use of some 56,000 acres of land in 
the district* HOwever, the '. Bena, who•lived in this area, 
were.'opposed to planting on . this scale and it was eventually 
agreed that 20,000 acres should be planted by the people 
themselves. For their part, the Corporation agreed to 
prepare, land.for planting and.to buy the bark when it was 
ready for stripping. The scheme'represented an opportunity 
for peasant farmers to cultivate a cash crop in an area where* 
subsistence farming predominated and. many Africans were
willing-, to participate. . However.,- since the scheme co-incided 
with:an upsurge in the demand ..for independence, many farmers 
were reluctant to be seen to co-operate with an enterprise 
being promoted ,by the colonial government. Consequently, 
progress was. not as fast as had been anticipated. f Looking 
ahead., the Corporation had to settle two other problems; 
Njombe-was far from .any potential market for the wood fuel 
which remained'once' the. bark.had been stripped and. secondly, : 
.there.was always the uncertainty as to whether the price 
for tannin'extract would make, the venture viable.. Never-, 
theless, the factory was built according to schedule and 
processing started in 1959* By this time the C.D.G. project 
had been merged with a private company thereby ensuring that 
the project was adequately capitalized.
' W  The Wattle scheme,.; like the other. enterprises . . ■
managed by public'corporations, provided an example of how 
a landscape in the Territory could, be changed once .outside 
resources on a sufficient scale were, provided* It differed 
from the TAG and OFC schemes in that it was concentrated in 
one area, it was easy to control and the aim was to'establish 
a profitable' enterprise. , Both the corporations existing at 
the end of the colonial period were tolerated by neighbouring 
Africans and the opportunities of obtaining employment were 
welcomed. If, support for them was'only luke-warm it was ■ 
because the majority saw little difference between the 
corporations and any other large company. The management 
at the time was in the hands - of Europeans and local leader­
ship was insufficiently associated with the decision-making 
processes. All the same, the emerging leaders of the
nationalist movement were aware of the distinction, 
between the corporations and private enterprise and 
pressed for future development to be undertaken by 
institutions such as the former, which, it was thought, 
were less likely to oppose their political aspirations. .
Government Farms
It will be noted that the government's involvement 
in the TAG enterprise was brought about by extraneous 
circumstances; if the aims of the OFC had been achieved, 
there would have been no need to create, the local 
Corporation. Thus, in order to ascertain the Official 
attitude to direct investment in commercial agriculture, 
it is necessary to consider the appropriate post-war 
development plans and the way they were implemented.
In spite of their.professed anxiety at the 
possibility of food.shortages, both the Central Development 
Committee and.subsequently the Development Commission based 
their plans on the assumption that any increased production 
would be forthcoming from private enterprise. Nevertheless 
the Department of Agriculture received generous, allocations 
for experiments in irrigation and mechanized cultivation 
and if their schemes proved viable, there was no reason why , 
they could not be expanded into profitable farming enter­
prises. The wording of the Department's annual reports is 
indicative of how matters developed; until 1952 a section 
of each report is entitled 'Government Food Farms', whereas 
in subsequent reports, after the closure of Kilangali the
remainder are termed.'pilot schemes After a. few
years these schemes'were also ended and it was. only too 
apparent that- the official view was that the functions of 
the Department should be confined to research and extension 
activities and that commercial farming was best left to 
private enterprise.^,.
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CHAPTER XI,
; V THE PRESSURES Off NATIONALISM ' " ^
The five years of dialogue between .the colonial 
government and the Tanganyika African National Union ended 
as suddenly as it had begun, with the obtaining of \
independence; it is- a remarkable story of how a small 
group of Africans from different parts of the Territory 
organised a mass movement and kept it united until their 
purpose was achieved. Colonial policies affecting land 
usage are central to these events; aiid in turn the changes 
in the political system subsequently affected the pattern of 
land usage hitherto accepted. :
After 194-5, direct support for the African sector 
of the agricultural.system consisted of the allocation of 
funds .for rural improvement, the deployment of the majority 
of natural resources, staff for extension work in improving 
traditional forms of farming and in promoting new forms of 
marketing crops through co-operative, structures... Direct 
support for the non-African; sector consisted of creating 
the Land Bank and protecting1the rights associated with the 
possession of property. Whereas before the War the district' 
commissioner, in the eyes of most Africans, was.there to 
protect their interests, he now appeared to have become the 
champion of a sriiali minority. The government's reply to 
such criticism was based on the requirements of the Trustee­
ship Agreement whereby the rights of.all.the inhabitants of 
the Territory had to be protected. :Africans viewed matters
differently and were apt to lose confidence in a district 
(commissioner who appeared too ready to listen to. settlers' 
complaints. But doubts concerning the impartiality of 
government officials were soon compounded with outright 
hostility, provoked by a number of policies designed'to 
bring improvement in agricultural practices. In such 
conditions it was- easy to resurrect old fears over 
alienation- and .it. is therefore understandable that the 
rural population were soon.mobilized, in support of new 
. leaders.
There-are already several accounts of the develop- 
. rnent of TANll as a ' mass, party and’.how it achieved a dominant 
position within a few years of its creation. The advent 
of a, vigorous nationalist movement was no surprise; with- 
most of world opinion adopting a critical view of 
continuing colonialism, .with the fact of the Trusteeship • 
Agreement, with positive encouragement from newly 
independent countries, there' was reason enough for such 
a development.. The effects of past government policies 
were also important. Increased opportunities for higher 
education not only provided more competent staff for 
government service but also stimulated interest in the 
ideals of.western democracy with its. emphasis on the 
rights.of. the individual;, and greater interest in the 
money economy led to an influx into the urban centres, 
providing foci of., opposition to the government and eroding 
the; position of traditional authority . ■'
. But these, modernising processes were at work in 
other parts of Africa arid they do little more than provide
a reason why a nationalist party, dedicated to achieving 
independence, should-he established. It is, however, 
less obvious why, within a space of a few years, almost ,
the-whole of the African.population of the Territory 
supported that party and no effective opposition to it 
could be organized. In spite of ,the fact that the 
majority of the branch officials were inexperienced and 
lacked organizing ability, TANU. emerged from the elitist 
TAA as the driving force behind a. mass movement, with 
African support in town and countryside mobilized to an 
extent that nationalist, leaders, in Kenya and Uganda never 
managed to achieve.
The usual explanation for, this difference is 
based', on a comparison between the tribal, composition in 
African society in the three territories. Thus it is 
argued that in Tanganyika there were a far larger number 
of; tribal .communities, none of them being powerful enough 
to arouse fear oh jealousy and thus threaten the unity of 
the"nationalist.movement. ■: Even when in some-areas tribal
..patriotism was assiduously fostered, it never came into 
conflict with the -TANU twin aims of independence and 
national unity. : Nevertheless, the explanation given 
above is not entirely satisfactory since there is no 
significant difference in the proportion of the leading 
■tribal groups to the remainder of the populations, of the 
respective territories (see TAble XVI). It is suggested 
-that since national integration, like modernization, depends 
on communicationsit is equally important to take into 
account the location of the tribal groupings, a factor
TABLE XVI
THE LARGEST TRIBAL GROUP IN EACH. 
OF THE EAST AEHIGAN. DEPENDENCIES 
1957—1962
Tribe p. of total. African 
population ;■
Kenya
Uganda;
Kikiiyu
Baganda
Tanganyika ' Sukuma
19.8
16.5'
12.6
(source:. E.A. Statistical Abstracts; .
figures relate to censuses 
in Tanganyika, 1957> Uganda, 
1959, and Kenya, 1962).
which is often overlooked. The fact that the Sukuma 
were situated almost on the periphery of. the Territory, 
in a physical environment which supported a form of 
farming which at that time provided a modest return when 
compared with the coffee-growing areas-, not only affected 
inter-tribal relationships but also, for the reason which 
follows, affected, the rate of, change in the process of 
national integration.
In Kenya and. Uganda, the capital cities, the 
centres of political life, are situated in fertile areas 
supporting large populations and in which cash crops were 
grown, thereby providing wealth which in turn led to 
better-than average chances of education. Wealth also 
led to increased commercial activity and more contact 
with Asian entrepreneurs; in the case of Nairobi, there 
were opportunities for cpntact with the large European 
population resident on land adjacent to the city. In 
both cases, the physical environment becomes progressively 
harsher the further one goes from the capitals and the 
tribal communities, with some exceptions, less affected by 
the pressures of modernization. Nairobi and Kampala are 
typical 1core-areas1, and it is from such areas in^the past 
■that many nation states have grown. In the case of both 
Kenya and Uganda, it was events within the core area which 
largely determined the content of the political:dialogue 
between nationalist leaders and the colonial administrations 
In both cases, too,, the land, surrounding the capitals was 
occupied by the•largest and most .influential tribal groups 
in the territories. Thus, b y ’1954-V whereas Kenya had been
shaken by the. Kikuyu revolt and Uganda disturbed by the 
events leading to the exile and subsequent recall of the 
Kabaka, Dar es Salaam was living up to its name as the 
haven of peace.
For this state of affairs the location of 
Tanganyika*s,capital city at the coast was an important 
factor. Communications are always the key to modernization 
and: a net-work based on the circumference rather than the 
centre is inevitably less effective. Tanganyika had no. 
single core area and the communities most susceptible to 
modernisation were to be found on the periphery, with their 
own rapidly growing urban centres such as Tanga, Moshi and 
Bukoba. The. isolation of the capital has always been 
recognized and been'the subject of debate. The Germans 
intended to transfer their capital to Tabora as soon as 
the Central Line was open and the street plan there was 
designed accordingly. For a.time the British considered 
a. move to Morogoro, but by the nineteen fifties the amount 
of public expenditure on government building in Par es Salaam
L\.
made the- move difficult to justify. The isolation of the 
city was accentuated by the temperament and attitudes-of 
the Zaramo, the tribal community .inhabiting the surrounding
countryside and in 1956 forming about two fifths of the
■ 5city's population. The majority were Moslems and at 
this.time showed' little interest in acquiring a formal 
education, probably as a consequence of the -Islamic 
influence. Lack of education more than outweighed the 
potential modernizing effect that should have been derived 
from close contact between the city population and the 
inhabitants of the surrounding countryside.
But this did not mean that the city population 
was apathetic in' political matters;.’ . There was widespread 
poverty aiid unemployment among the African population 
together with the. visibly high standards, of living enjoyed , 
-by the Asian and .European residents and there were the 
usual bruising encounters which.pccur when peoples of 
different races and cultures live together. To the 
majority of Africans in the city,, any change ,in government 
could only be for the better.. It was not surprising that, 
in 1957 the city could be described as 'almost 100. per cent, 
a TANU town..1 ■ . Nevertheless, this focus . of nationalism 
remained' in isolation and.distinct-from those.examples where 
'a core area and a national nucleus generated the processes
’ • g .
of political integration.1 However, the case of Ruf.iji 
district needs to be mentioned since it provides an example•
1 at variance, with this general picture.. This rice-growing 
area had close; commercial contacts with the capital and 
provided a;- large; proper tion of the highly-politicised dock' 
labour force. ■ Either as a .consequence of these factors 
or because the district was the. home of Bibi Titi Mohamed, 
the colourful leader-..of TANU’s womens section, Rufiji. 
district was mobilized to support TANU at a comparatively 
early date. , -v/'. 7 : ■ ; -
" ■ .From the'above, it is evident that the location
of the capital, although inconvenient for'administrators, 
contributed to the delay-in organizing concerted opposition 
to. colonial rule. But when a campaign for independence 
was eventually launched, its rapid success can only be 
explained by observing a combination■of circumstances
existing within,the Territory and events elsewhere which 
altered British attitudes toward the nationalist movement. . 
At the time', within the Territory, many of the. Afnican 
communities were entering a stage of transition; <even in . 
remote rural areas a better-educated generation was 
beginning to question traditional values and -to seek new 
forms'of association without, as yet demanding any change 
in .the system of government or the social order as they. 
perceived them. But-modernization, whether measured in 
terms of indices such as literacy, urbanization or exposure 
to ..mass media, or by. the development of interest groups, 
growing differentiation or change-in economic practices, 
does not necessarily proceed hand in hand with national 
integration. They are discrete processes and not only 
modernization does not.necessarily assist the other but 
also on occasions it can impede its px'ogress. Thus the 
timing, of the growth of nationalism in Tanganyika is crucial 
to the understanding of its success. The emerging leaders 
of the national movement were to. find that they were well.
received in rural areas which might have been expected to.
'be indifferent to the message they brought. •
This fact can be explained by observing.the 
diverse effects of the modernizing process during the 
critical years, 1951-1960. First.,, the' growth of 
nationalism depended primarily on communications and the 
expectations which were aroused. As' already described, 
the location of the capital, the immense distances and the 
consequent difficulty for those, interested in; politics- to 
be informed, were obstacles which were only being surmounted 
after 1956* was some five years later that the mass
media began to make any impact. On the other hand, the 
rapid growth of the smaller towns was substantial enough 
to, provide local centres which provided information and 
ideas for the surrounding areas and in some cases undoubtedly 
compensated for the remoteness of the capital. As the 
ecbnomy diversified, many Africans were attracted to these 
towns, finding employment in the burgeoning service industries, 
and commercial enterprises. For the twenty years after 
the end of the second world war, the population in these 
urban centres increased at a rate- of six per cent. per 
annum.^ In all of them there were to be found Africans 
living far from their own tribal areas and more inclined to 
discuss national rather than parochial affairs. Throughout, 
the Territory, opposition to colonial rule itself, as 
opposed to specific policies, was organized in the towns.
But these urban centres might well have remained 
isolated from the surrounding countryside. The successful 
immigrant to the towns was.often able to earn more in a 
month than the peasant farmer obtained in a year and there 
was always the possibility that the differences in life­
styles might lead to rivalry and envy. In time, this might 
have resulted in the reinforcing of parochial attitudes in 
the rural .areas, in fact a* repetition of the tension between 
town and country, or core and periphery, reported in many 
different parts of.the world. There seem to be two 
reasons why this was not the case in Tanganyika; the 
characteristics of the new urban dwellers and the increasing 
mobility of the population. The move to the towns only 
occurred after -194-5 and the recent arrivals retained their
links with the countryside. Although most African town- 
dwellers retained-some association with a tribal community - 
the right to return one., day and obtain land in the tribal 
area was the most effective old age pension.scheme which 
could have been devised in the existing circumstances - 
the newcomersif they came from villages not more than a 
day's journey away, were able to maintain face-to-face 
contacts with friends and relatives. As roads improved 
a vast network of bus services came into existence; at the 
same time there was a substantial increase in the number of 
bicycles. The importance of the urban-rural link in 
promoting social:change needs emphasising although its 
effects can only be judged intuitively.10 The variations 
in the composition of the African population in the towns, 
which can be judged from Table XVII, gives some indication 
of the link between town and countryside.
In addition to this rapport between.town and 
village* the nationalist movement was undoubtedly aided by 
the, delay in the emergence of an African middle class; if 
it had existed in more strength at this time it might well 
have exercised a divisive influence in seeking to advance 
sectional interests. The fact that there were few wealthy 
Africans can be attributed to the lack of oppox^tunities to
. 12obtain higher education or commercial experience. It .
was also due to the. nature of tribal society, to the 
observance, of obligations to the extended family and the 
widely held attitude that it was socially unacceptable to 
try too hard to make money. Nyei'ere explained this point
TABLE XVII
PERCENTAGES OF URBAN POPULATIONS OF TRIBES
OQQUPYING ADJOINING OR. SURROUNDING LAND,
- -~'v' . 11
... • , 1 9 5 Z  '
■'■Town „ Neighbouring % of tribe(s)
.. -tribe(s) -in- town
Morogoro :. . Luguru 55
Tanga • - Digo/Bohdei/Sambaa 4-5
Mo Shi Chagga 41
Iringa ' ' ; Hehe. , 40
Tabora . ‘ : Nyamwezi - 50.5
(source: East Africa Statistical
Department 1958 ' )
of view as follows:.
’■•••the very desire to accumulate it (personal 
' wealth) must be interpreted as a vote of no 
confidence in the social system. For when a 
society is so organised that it cares about 
. its individuals, then, provided he is willing 
to work, no individual within that society 
should worry about what will happen to him 
tomorrow if he does not hoard wealth today.* ^
Nevertheless, a class of more enterprising African was 
beginning to appear by the end of the pre-independence 
decade, particularly in the more fertile areas. One can 
only speculate as to the effects of the individualization 
of land ownership which might have followed had the govern-' -
TZJ.
meat's White Paper of 1958 been implemented. Four
examples serve to illustrate the changes taking place.In 1957 
At Ismani, Iringa district (mentioned in an earlier chapter),, 
the majority of farmers had little or no capital and 
over half of them cultivated less than ten acres. Some, 
however, obtained loans and purchased tractors or ox-ploughs, 
which they hired out to their neighbours. Gradually, the 
more capable accumulated land until they could claim 
possession of plots of two hundred acres. These farmers 
often employed their neighbours as casual labourers when 
there was work to be done; sometimes they leased to friends 
part of their holding on an annual basis. Thus inequalities 
developed, but since there was no landless class resident 
in the area there was little conflict. At "first it was 
believed by Agricultural Officers that Ismani would rapidly 
lose its fertility and when this occurred, some of the 
inequality would disappear. Nevertheless, it is significant 
that Ismani in 1971 was one of the few areas in the country
15where, .opposition to. Utj amaa settlements was evident. ^ -In;.
Northern province, in coffee growing areas there was also 
a marked degree of differences' in wealth, but .again there- 
were very few Africans who worked for other Africans on a 
permanent basis. In Western province in the Luiche delta, 
landless peasants from Buha worked on a share-cropping basis 
for Ujiji landownex*s. In Sukumaland,. some farmers employed 
contract labour to help with-the cotton.harvest; much of 
this labour force came from Burundi and Returned there,, 
after payment., V ,From these examples it is evident that 
without a substantial section of-a rural population being 
unwilling or unable to acquire land .there was little likeli-v 
hood of the growth- of divergent attitudes in territorial 
political matters. Attitudes on cattle ownership at this 
time arevalso of interest; although'those who owned large 
herds made use of an unfairly large proportion of communal 
grazing land and- were responsible for a great deal of the 
erosion which occurred,,there was little or no popular 
support for the government’s attempts to introduce Cattle 
taxes or to insist on compulsory culling.
In the towns, in spite of the. disparities in 
wealth between the. salaried clerk and the under-employed 
casual labourer,.such differentials were accepted as 
inevitable while the existing order remained. The wealthy' 
African toka-dweller had to, suffer endless visitations from 
indigent relatives; , but at least this was. better than 
living too comfortably, in his tribal environment and finding 
that envy could--explode into witchcraft.. In fact,, the 
colonial period=ended before there were enough well-paid
Africans to make it.possible to refer to a 'middle-class!;
in 1952,' of. the Africans in paid employment only 2.7 per '
■ cent. of. males 'and 0.3 per- cent, of females received more
than shs. 150/- per -month'* The threat to the existing
order, was perceived, but it took time to provide remedies;
in Twining' s. view a property-owning'African middle-class
would emerge as the. result of the provision of revolving
funds for miscellaneous loans. '
•In the tactics they adopted, the nationalists were
anxious to rebut the Governor's assertion that they repre-
18sented no one but. themselves. To g a m  support among
peoples of different cultures, attainments, and religions 
issues had to be selected which could be easily understood 
- and which would arouse, fear, or resentment. The educated 
elite and the urban poor could be won over without difficulty 
with the•prospect of material rewards following Africanisation 
of the civil service and more job opportunities. The rural 
peasant,, particularly those content with 'target' or 
subsistence economies heeded to be impressed by other 
arguments. These were conveniently at hand and the 
opportunity they provided used to good effect. The 
issues? As might be expected, from the previous chapters 
they were the need to reduce the influence of European 
settlers in political matters, the continuing alienation 
of.land and the.practice of evicting Africans from their 
ancestral home-lands. . All these points could be illustrated 
in one example, the Meru. Land Case;. the chronicle of the 
events, as the government sought to resolve the problem it 
had created for itself, made an unexpected impact on rural
communities; often-many miles from the place where the 
conflict arose. Other issues, too were raised by local 
■leaders, often without.the support of the national leader­
ship. Nevertheless,.if they could be utilized to arouse 
resentment and suspicion, the'message to the peasant 
farmers was clear enough; that, to be ruled by another 
country was humiliating and only by obtaining self govern­
ment' could African- interests' be properly protected. This 
was the message constantly hammered home by Nyerere, echoing 
Nehru's comment a.decade before that nationalism was 
essentially 1 an anti movement'. . The numerous issues 
raised by local leaders provided examples of alleged mis- 
' government ;■■ the TANU.. declaration of intent provided the 
remedy. .Consequently, support was soon forthcoming, even 
from/that section of the community which- in the nature of 
things.could be expected to remain parochially-minded and 
intractably'apathetic.
; Many of. the issues described below arose ,as a 
,consequence"of government policies-in the past aimed at 
•achieving better land usage. In addition, however, the 
■ spatial factor added.another dimension in that without 
the rapidly improving system of roads, and the- means to 
make use of it, the political mobilization of the African, 
population on a substantial scale .would have been difficult, 
if hot impossible to organize. ,.
• The Me.ru' land Case i, ■ . „ -
.Every ;U.N. Visiting Mission.-to the Territory drew
attention to the disquiet caused by.land .alienation, but
it is in the 1954 report.that the fullest treatment is
given to the.land policies of the government affecting
Northern Province. It was here that tensions were most
noticeable, partly because of the proximity of Kenya and
partly due to a rapidly increasing African population
finding difficulty in obtaining enough suitable arable land
(see Table XVIII). In the past on several occasions the
government had acquired land previously occupied by settlers
and had made it available, for African occupation. The
Arusha-Moshi Lands Commission, already mentioned, was yet
one more attempt to meet the needs of an increasing African
20
population and to make the best use of the land.
The most controversial part of the Commissioner's 
Report concerned, the area known as the Sanya corridor, part 
of the plain lying between the mountain features of Meru 
and Kilimanjaro. In the opinion of: the experts, it was 
necessary to segregate the European and African residents 
by creating a homogeneous block of alienated land in the 
northern part of the area'.-. Once this had been done, 
compulsory dipping would be introduced and cattle, ranching 
on more efficient lines-achieved. In the official view, 
it was necessary ’to build up a ranching industry on modern
lines on a considerable scale and: a meat industry which is
‘ ‘ - 21 urgently required in the Territory.'
The 'European' residents- of the area at the time 
were mixed British and Afrikaners, the latter being the 
descendants of a group which settled in German East Africa 
after the.-Boer War; ‘ the Africans- there were some 530 Meru
TABLE XVIII
' LAND USAGE IN ARUSHA 
AND. MOSHI. DISTRICTS -
• Arusha . ~ Troshi
SQ *m » $ sq .m. %
Forest areas . 198 17*95 755. 56 .63
Roads- 4 .36 10 .49
Other 35 3*17 50 2.49
Alienated ,397 35*99 . . ' '274 13.65
Balance 469 .42.53 938 46.74*
1,103 100.00 2,007 100.00
(source:. Visiting Mission Report, 1954-)
22- - ' ■ taxpayers and their-dependants. Much of the land was
unoccupied for part of the year when it. was not. in use by
nomadic Masai. Once the scheme was implemented, the four
areas of Oldonyo Sambu, Engare Nairobi, Engare Nanyuki and.
Sanya Juu would be a continuous block of alienated land,■
with a fenced corridor to allow the Masai to pass through.
to their southern grazing area. The Meru who were required
to move were to be offered compensation and found land in
the Kingori area, to.the south, where a piped water supply
, 23 ■and other .services.would be provided. Some European-
occupied land in the Usa area would be returned ;to the Meru
and farther east more land held by settlers would be
acquired for use by the Chagga. The Meru' chief, at:the
time the sole native authority, agreed with the. proposals
and in June 194-9 the- Government announced that the scheme;
would be implemented. From Map V, it is quite .clear what
the scheme aimed to achieve; African settlement between, the
two mountain forest ..reserves would in future be confined to
-the southern area only.. ;
But it was - soon apparent that the Meru remained
resolutely opposed to the scheme and were determined to.
refuse to move. The chief's support for the scheme did
little to assist .the; government's case since his appointment
a few years previously had been strongly- challenged and. his
position was still not secure. . In practical terms it meant
giving up good grazing, land and access to some salt pans
24used by the Meru in pre-colonial days; in political
terms the racial segregation .which would be achieved by 
implementing the scheme was a.matter for much suspicion. '■
M A P  V
T A N G A N Y IK A  
The Sanya Corridor
K I L I M A N J A R O  
F O R E S T  
V W <  R E S E R V E
Arusha
Detail from map com piled by Dept, o f Lands &  Surveys Dar es Salaam
The focus of opposition in the first instance, was the
branch of the T!.A.A . at Arusha; its secretary, Kirilo
Japhet, was- later to appear as a petitioner on behalf of
the Meru before the•Trusteeship Council.  ^ B y 1950? the
chief too.;had ■ changed his mind and wrote to the Provincial
.Commissioner requesting him to obtain, permission for the
25Meru living' in Engare Nanyuki to be allowed to.remain. x 
His conversion did little, to help'him regain his popularity 
and within a few years he was compelled to resign. In 
January 1951? the Meru Citizens'Union was formed and it was 
this organization which collected, funds for sending Japhet 
to. New York' and which persistently lobbied members of the . 
U.N. missions visiting- the Territory. - ' . ■"
. In mid 1951? the Member for Local Government 
visited Arusha•and told the Meru that the government 
intended.to proceed with the scheme. Since it was clear 
that the Meru were, not to be persuaded, legislation was 
necessary to enable government to evict those who. continued 
to refuse'to move. A Bill, introduced into Legislative 
Council was passed without opposition, the Meru were 
forcibly evicted and their huts and store-houses burned 
down. The land in question and the unoccupied parts of . 
the adjoining area were divided into thirteen’farming units 
amounting to 7&?000 acres; these were all alienated during 
1952 and 1955 on 99 year leases.
Ironically, after all the controversy, cattle- 
ranching in the area was never a success and thus the basic 
aim of the scheme never achieved. . Exposed to the hostility 
of their African neighbours, the new settlers were reluctant
to commit themselves to investment to the extent required 
by the development clauses in their l©ases. By the end 
of 1954-? four of the leases , had been revoked for lack of
development and a new committee was appointed to reconsider
27 • , •
the scheme. As a result, four adjqinrng units were re­
divided, the northern part being;offere.d for alienation 
again and the southern part reverting to tribal occupation 
..by ,M.eru and Chagga. / Over the next few years other units 
also fellvacant and were also re-occupied by the Meru.
At the time, it seemed that substantial economic 
benefit might result from the scheme and' the decision to 
go ahead regardless of opposition was proof of a deter­
mination to comply with Article Ten of the Trusteeship
o  o  ■ j ■ .
Agreement. Although it was- admitted that the Meru
required to. move were unwilling to do so, it was pointed 
out that they were, being offered- generous compensation and, 
it was thought, their reluctance would disappear as soon 
as it was clear that the. government was determined to 
proceed. Furthermore, it. was argued, opposition came, 
not from the residents of the area,, but from nationalist . 
politicians who' were known to be accepting-advice from 
’subversive1 leaders of the K.A.U. Other factors, it was 
claimed -r made the government1 s case overwhelming: the
consent of the native., authority had been freely given and. 
his. subsequent, change of mind could, be disregarded; the 
’fact that much of the:land from which they were required to 
move did not ’traditionally’ belong to the Meru; the
. Kingoir- area was more fertile and would grow better crops; 
that unbiassed observers accepted that the scheme was
' , 50
advantageous to the community as a whole 5f that the
European-'farmers, required to move, accepted the fact and had
complied;, filially,, the unanimous approval of Legislative .
51
Council was obtained before any evictions took place. 
Nevertheless, it required no great perception even at the 
time to realise that the enterprise was open to a most 
unfavourable interpretation; in effect, it required the 
mass removal of Africans, against their will, by a European- 
controlled government in order to make land available for 
European settlers. ..This description of the scheme was used 
so often and to such good effect that it was repeated later 
in otherwise objective accounts of the period. Commenting
on the incident after his retirement, Twining admitted that 
'/it was a psychological'mistake ■ to force the issues when the 
strength of the Meru opposition had. been displayed, but at . 
the time there was a conviction of the rightness of the easel 
What made it doubly difficult for the government to reverse 
its policy was the support for the proposals given by 
Legislative Council. That this should have been forth­
coming was .no surprise; the European members wanted 'strong' 
government and racially segregated blocks in that part of 
Northern province, ;the Asians were indifferent and the
Africans, influenced/by past differences, unprepared to
: " 54
offer support to the T.A.A. and its allies. •,
. . If the .attitude of the Tanganyika government is
understandable, it is less.easy to discern why the Colonial 
Office .allowed-the Governor to remain , set on a''collision 
coursey Incidents in the history of Britain itself, such 
as, the evictions of. the Highland crofters and the Durham
miners provide, if nothing else, one. obvious lesson*, once 
force is used to. remove families from their homes, the 
legalities of the situation are forgotten and only: resentment 
remains. With the groundnut scheme in ruins, any claim that 
the economic justifications behind the move were paramount, 
was hardly.likely to be greeted with enthusiasm. It .must., 
have, also been known that there were other areas of the 
Territory .suitable for ranching and these could have been 
developed with much less trouble. Moreover, although the 
details were not made public until 1953? the government had 
by now adopted a settlement policy incorporating the view 
that racial segregation was unnecessary.^ The plans for 
.the Sanya area clearly contradicted the policy being adopted 
elsewhere.
Obviously there were immense technical difficulties’ 
in introducing a successful ranching scheme in an area still 
grazed, by cattle herded in the traditional African manner. 
Although this was the argument used to justify’the., scheme, 
probably the government was equally influenced by political 
pressures. The ever-increasing number of stock thefts from 
settlers’• farms in the area and the difficulty in recovering 
stolen animals were factors already endangering racial 
harmony.^ It was believed that the arrest of .cattle 
thieves would be made easier once a degree of racial 
segregation was achieved.
' Nevertheless, in the Colonial Office it was the 
potential economic gain which made the scheme acceptable. 
Before the evictions took place, a petition to the Colonial 
Secretary received the reply that he fully supported the'
■■■ 3 7  ( ’ ■Territorial government. f Soon afterwards, Lennox Boyd
had. to answer some awkward questions in the. House of Commons
,v • - ’ 3 3
and. must have wished that the matter had been handled ,better.
The main interest in the Meru incident is no longer 
in assessing the accuracy of conflicting accounts but in 
noting the manner in which it was exploited to promote 
national integration,, so that Africans of differing back­
grounds could, find an.identity of interest in the anti­
colonial movement- . The incident contained’ all that was 
necessary to play, upon the. fears and resentments of. peasant 
farmers even in districts where the amount of■land alienated 
was minimal. But equally important, Kirilo Japhet became 
sufficiently well known to be able to attract interest, 
wherever he was invited to speak. To some extent, the 
regular visits of the,Trusteeship Council missions provided: 
the means of gaining publicity; however, more important.for. , 
Japhet was the opportunity the incident gave to tour the 
country with Abbas' Sykes, a leading member of T.A.A., to ' 
raise funds to pay the costs of appearing at the Trusteeship 
Council’s hearing of the petition.submitted by the Meru , 
Citizens Union. The necessary funds were collected without 
.difficulty and in July 1952 Japhet presented his case at the 
Council meeting. Although he failed to obtain sufficient , 
support either in the Trusteeship Council or in the subsequent 
hearing before the Fourth. Committee of the.General Assembly, : 
the fact that Japhet had been .able, to present the Meru,case 
before a world forum and obtain considerable;support created 
a deep impression on those unfamiliar with the United Nations.
After, being allowed to speak at a further meeting 
of the Trusteeship Council in mid 1953? Japhet returned to 
Tanganyika and with T.A.A. leaders toured the,'Territory, ; 
describing the events in New/fork. Meanwhile the govern­
ment provided extra staff and resources in Arusha district 
with the aim of inducing the Meru to forget the past. In 
spite of this, many of those who had been, moved continued to 
refuse to accept the. compensation offered and thus end the 
matter; The 1954- Visiting’Mission, although assured by ;
the government that the dispute was now settled, concluded-
' 39 , • '
that thrs was . not the caseh For the Meru Involved, the
matter was not ended'until the situation prior to 1951 had
been restored.
One final comment on .the affair is necessary. In 
charting.the course of political development ,in the Territory, 
the Meru problem.is important-for-its effect in undermining 
confidence in the Territorial government; the way in which 
the dispute was kept alive for so long was one of the more 
successful tactics adopted by the nationalist leaders. But 
also the incident provides an exception to the general rule 
that changes in the landscape during the colonial period were 
to a large extent the result of government decisions., By 
1951 in Tanganyika, a. greater degree.of co-operation from the 
people themselves was necessary-before plans affecting the 
land' could be implemented.
The. 1 and ali enation i s sue j ^
The anxiety felt by Africans in different parts of 
the Territory whenever tho alienation of land was discussed '
made. it- inevitable that a major reason given by nationalists 
■for wanting independence was the necessity for stricter 
control in the future... Even before, the end of the second" 
World war, the T.A.A* was voicing.its opposition to the 
'proposals of the Central Development. Committee, complaining
that the arguments used were wrong and that .‘settlement was
'■ f t '  '' ■ ''r -' - ■ "  -  4 1  . .  • - -■ ,.
disastrous for Africans. Opposition to more land being
. alienated was a consistent' theme in. the Association’ s;
representations made to successive visiting missions. In
•thevcase of ./Northern'province-there was' ample proof that-in
some areas a, land shortage was already a problem. Elsewhere,
with the change in government policy from protection of
African interests-to land utilization and with a fast-
increasing African population, it was not difficult to
arouse, fears , that shortages would soon .be evident.
But it was not only the occupation of the land
which caused the,controversy; the issue was inextricably
linked with .the supposedly inordinate amount of political
influence enjoyed, by the settlers.. -If the number of
settlers were allowed to grow, it was argued, their influence
would also:increase. Thus, when the native authorities of
Western province told the 1954- Visiting Mission.that settlers
were welcome in the province since they would provide
employment, their remarks, were strongly criticised by local
• 42 'TANU leaders. To the same Mission,.it was made clear
that it was for political reasons that settlers.were not
welcome. African organizations in Bukoba objected to non-
Africans being called Tanganyikans since t h e y ’might claim
rights which they did notlyet possess-and particularly rights
to land.’ At the other end of the Territory the.Mbeya -
chiefs-expressed similar fears as follows:
'The main thing is no more alienation. We do 
not want to see - the things' that are happening 
in Kenya and South Africa. All the- troubles 
there are because of land.'^
This remark impressed the Mission, coming as ,it did from
the more conservative element of the African population.
The reference to South Africa no doubt stems from the
accounts of labourers returning from the Rand; Rungwe and
Mbeya districts provided;a large proportion of contract
labour taken south. ^
Thus it was no surprise when the Mission concluded
that African opposition to alienation was now a serious
political matter; there was little doubt that in the future
opposition would be expressed more forcefully and more
vocally than in the past. It was probably recognition of
this trend rather than the prospect of criticism from the
Trusteeship Council that prompted the Governor to assure
the Mission that■'it was unlikely that much more land would.
be alienated for individual European agricultural settle- 
46ment.1 ; In any case, it was hot: enough for the members 
of this'Mission and in their report it was recommended that 
land should be acquired from settlers and a policy of land 
redistribution adopted. It was the kind of observation 
which made the private - investor look elsewhere before 
committing money and: effort to enterprises in the Territory.
After the visit of the 1954- Mission, the govern­
ment had.no difficulty in slowing down the pace in dealing 
with plans for new alienations. Applications for land 
decreased rapidly once the racial harmony of previous years 
was seen to be in jeopardy. furthermore, once organized
branches of CDANU were established in each area district
officers found it’more difficult to obtain unanimous consent
from-Africans affected' by an application for land. for even
when the. people most directly affected were willing to give
their consent, they were also reluctant to ignore the
• official nationalist view that any new alienation should 
i\.n .
,be resisted. In addition, the more militant leaders
made sure that alienations previously made were called into 
question. Survey boundary stones disappeared with increasing 
frequency and. where a settler or plantation manager neglected 
.to make use of fertile land near his boundary? squatters were 
encouraged to move in and. plant crops. IV evict them often - 
required police action and tliis was sufficient to create 
.greater tension.^  ^ ■
FANU as. a mass movement
The African political leaders now beginning to 
attract attention made use of several other issues in their 
bid to capture.the interest of the scattered rural communities 
and the skill with which they were argued became an important 
factor in the process of; national integration.
First, there was the widespread dislike of the 
government’s regulations' associated with the various develop-.
zj-9
ment schemes already described. . The rules were irksome 
and the manner in which they were applied often unfair. It 
was therefore a'popular proposition to suggest that they 
would one day be abolished, together with the cesses levied 
on certain cash crops. But the encouraging of opposition
to such measures was a. sure way of provoking retaliation 
from government officials convinced, that they were necessary 
and from native authorities charged with seeing.that they 
were . observed. ■ Thus in Sukumaland,.no TATTU branch was 
permitted^ to be registered until 1958 since the party there 
was believed, to pose a threat to 'the maintenance of peace, . 
order and good.government. In Tanga province, the Korogwe
branch was required to.be closed after the chairman announced 
that there was no longer’;any need'to obey the'.agricultural 
ruies. In most parts of the Territory, similar conflicts 
between local political leaders and government officials 
developed in spite of action taken by Nyerere to prevent it - 
happening. As early as 195^5 he had visited Kondoa and 
expressed support.for the unpopular.soil conservation 
measures; when TANIf' was allowed to function in Lake province. 
he spoke in Mwanzawarning the audience that, the laws had 
to be obeyed;^ after -the incident at. Korogwe related above, 
he saw.to it that the chairman was replaced; on another 
occasion he made.it clear that he disapproved of the agitation
; " . ■ / . • 52
in Iringa'which led to the closure,of the dipping scheme.
For'him. the major- difficulty was the conflict between the 
need to retain popular support, and the equally important 
ob jective of, demonstrating to the- world that TAMI could 
provide responsible leadership if'self-government was 
achieved. From- his statement to the Trusteeship Council 
in 1955.> it seems.,that he never wanted TAKU to develop as 
a mass movement because it might prove difficult,to control 
the more irresponsible, local leaders..
;. Changes in the . structure of local government'
provided yet another cause of opposition in rural areas to
the policies introduced by the’Government. The changes in
part ivere the logical outcome of the much criticised policy
of multi-racialism, which, as already mentioned, required the
Territorial government to protect the interests of all the * ;
54-inhabitants regardless of race- The Constitutional
Committee, appointed by Twining recommended that changes in
the composition of the Legislative Council were necessary
if the new policy was to be taken seriously- 'The answer,
it was argued was to introduce the principle of parity of
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representation for each of. the major racial groups. The
careful enunciation of rules to govern communal representation
and the ensuing deb;ate was a sure-way'of introducing racial
politics into the Territory and the recommendation of the
Committee, accepted by the Colonial Office, has been-
described as 'in retrospect, the principal.blunder of the
56Twining regime.1^  In fact, at the time, the options were 
severely limited; the European settlers, who still provided 
the major part of the export crops on which the economy 
depended would not have settled for anything less than 
parity. If their support had been withdrawn, the consequent 
publicity would•have discouraged investment at a time when 
it was more necessary than ever before to demonstrate to a, 
sceptical world that a colonial administration could provide 
the surest way to prosperity. At a-meeting, of the Trustee­
ship Council, Mason Sears, .who had never endeared himself to 
the Tanganyika .government, expressed the view which at the 
time was widely accepted: 'The multi-racial approach is
... designed to keep alive European and Asian interests which
have contributed so much knowhow and capital to the
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development of the Territory....1 In London, the
Colonial Secretary explained that the proposals were
intended 'to safeguard the•proper rights -and interests
of all the-different;>communities.'■
• vv' The respective attitudes of officials and settlers
to the multi-racial ideals are, discussed in the following .
chapter. ..Here, it is only necessary to observe that once
the principle of racial representation was accepted in
respect of central government institutions, it was logical
59
to apply it to local government. In 195C? Twining still
supported Cameron’s' argument that native authorities should" 
be permitted to adapt to new conditions in their own way and 
in’their own tirne.^1 By the following year, he accepted 
the proposals whereby.:, non-Africans would participate in new.
forms of. local government which were to be established in
'■ >' I ' V 61 'both urban,and rural areas. . '
The consequences' were two-fold. First, under the
new local government legislation a county council was
established with.jurisdiction over the South East Lake area,
which;included'all•the territory controlled by a council of
62which all the Sukuma chiefs were members. Thus at a time
when the1 chiefs were prepared to resist the incursions of 
the urban-based nationalists, they learned that their power- 
base was to be abolished, i It was therefore not surprising 
that -they began to act more circumspectly in their dealings' 
with nationalist politicians. In other parts of the 
Territory, the former native: authority councils were effect­
ively replaced by. the new multi-racial local (later called
district) councils. Nyerere, being well,, aware of the.
chiefs dislike of these innovations, took the opportunity
to win their support. ... He pointed out that their position
was. threatened not by TANU. but by the colonial government:
• *... ...what we should ..have done is to evolve
:' ^  our local authorities, around the chief as
. - . the centre. That is what has been taking .
" ' place all the time and .... local government
■. should not tend to rule out the chief.'^ ■
Second, the statutory right of non-Africans to
participate, in local government councils provided, nationalists
with, yet another opportunity for confronting the government.
Whereas, in 1954,.the official TANU view was that members of
all races should be invited to take part in local government
deliberations and many Native Authority councils co-opted
non-Africans as members, any attempt to insist that they
had'a right'to full membership was, in some instances,
6 Astrongly opposed. .The government view was that there was a
.difference between districts with a comparatively large
settler, population and those without; in the latter, since
non-Africans would always remain a very small minority, it
was predicted that there would be little opposition to multi- 
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.racial councils. • In such districts, where the new 
councils had been' established? they-were already functioning 
well. -A ' ■. -
. The government1 s plans to proceed, with, creating
more district councils were examined by a select committee 
of Legislative. Council; and, with a. few minor amendments, 
the, plans were approved. .However, by 1957? TANU .policy 
was firmly opposed to statutory multi-racialism and conflict . 
was inevitable. In the following year, an attempt in Geita
■to establish a.district council led to some disturbances 
arid in the ensuing argument Africans in-many rural areas
=for the first time became, aware of the implications of
■ '' 66 the intended innovations. Not only was it widely .
:believed that Europeans would tend to dominate proceedings
in the Oouncils; also, it became clear that the bringing
together of the, representatives of the communities in the
council chamber .only served.to draw attention to the
differences between them. Even in Dar es Salaam, where
the...parity principle had been adopted in the municipal
council, it was found necessary to revive the. post of .
district commissioner. Although this seemed at the time
to be a retrograde step, in that it reinforced racial
exclusiveness, it was argued, that the central government
was still the most, suitable ..institution
.’to maintain law and order, to provide 
administrative conciliation between 
’■ ' .Africans and the municipality and to 
■' promote the growth of representative 
■ institutions for the African population.
15bt another reason for Africans disliking the 
parity principle was based on the suspicion that it could 
be invoked in ordeir to justify an unfair allocation of . 
available, resources. '. Eor example,, when the funds obtained 
from the sale of enemy properties confiscated'in,1939 were 
made available for spending, it was announced that .equal 
sums were to be ’allocated to each of the three communities 
for spending.on improving their education facilities.
Since by now education to Africans was a much-prized asset, 
it seemed unfair that with the disparity in numbers and the 
obvious deficiencies in the African school system, the
government "should contemplate parity in distribution of ' 
these funds. . It was not difficult for nationalists to 
arouse resentment against a/politically ham-fisted decision.
The reform of the native authority ..system and 
the introduction of local elections helped TANU. to consol- . 
idate its influence -in the rural areas and'the chiefs ; 1 
became progressively more reluctant to declare open support . 
for government policies. In a bid to stop this unwelcome 
trend, Twining used the occasion of his address to 
Legislative Council in May 1957 to emphasise the importance 
of chiefs in African society and suggested that in a future, 
parliament there might be a place for ah 'Upper House' 
consisting of traditional rulers.  ^ A territorial Chiefs 
Convention was established and although regular, meetings 
were, arranged it never,lived up to the government's expect-, 
ations; there were: by this stage few traditional rulers 
who were willing torisk their position in their own 
communities by. making-an open declaration'of opposition 
to ;TANU and its aims. '
Einally, the co-operative movement made an 
important contribution to the growth.of TANU. The close 
association of the organisations representing political 
and economic change was recognised by giving representatives 
of the three major unions seats on the party's National 
Executive. In Sukumaland in particular the co-operative 
movement was both the cause and the consequence of the 
■growth of opposition to-colonial rule.
The. movement started in Tanganyika in 1925,' when 
the Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association was formed. In
-1932,,, in the face.Sf spirited opposition from-traders, 
rules were, introduced enabling a Registrar of Societies 
to1be-appointed. Thereafter the number of societies rose 
-steadily, fpom 23 in'1934- to 77 ia 1948 and to 140 in 1951- 
During this period the majority of these societies were 
affiliated to four unions, three dealing almost entirely
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with coffee and one, in Southern province, with tobacco.'
As might be expected, in 1951 the majority of the societies 
were located in the peripheral areas of the Territory
(Table XIX). ■
These figureS3 are significant in view of what 
occurred during the next five years. For although there 
was a steady increase in the number of societies throughout 
the Territory, in Sukumaland the jump in the number of :
registered societies was spectacular once .the co-operative 
marketing of cotton was introduced. This, was stimulated 
by discontent with the organization of the cotton industry 
in the. province. The ’ginneries, all Asian owned, appointed 
their,own buying agents each season. Such appointments . 
were lucrative since it was not difficult to cheat illiterate 
farmers; for good measure the latter-often retaliated by
concealing stones in their loads of cotton. , - In 1947 the
TAA appointed independent weighers in Ukerewe^ an innovation 
quickly copied in other Sukuma districts. Even so.,, the
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buyers-continued to employ sharp practices. Consequently,
when Paul Bomani, at the time the secretary of a Traders 
co-operative toured Sukumaland in 1952 seeking support for 
.-the co-operative idea, he found many farmers willing to 
listen. He could by now explain his plans with some
TABLE XIX
AFRICAN CO-OPERATIVE 
SOCIETIES 1951
Province -Affiliated Unaffiliated
to Unions
Tanga , -1 - . 5
Northern ‘ ,■ -29 3
Lake . - . . 51 - 1
/Southern-Highlands 11 3
Southern 17 1
Eastern ' - 1
(source: Annual Report, Department
of. Co-operative Development).
authority, . since he had been made a member 'of the Lake : 
Province Council and had.visited Uganda to study the 
cotton co-operatives which, functioned there. Between 
1953 and I960,,360 registered societies, organized into 
19 - unions., were started in the South-East Lake area.
Undoubtedly, the rapid increase in the number 
of societies■in Sukumaland was the consequence of African 
farmers being.persuaded that they stood.to gain if a new 
system of marketing their crop was introduced. At the. 
same time, the men who toured-the countryside seeking !
support for cb-operative principles based their appeal to 
a suspicious peasantry on political arguments as well and 
these found a ready response. They, aroused resentment 
against a system which tolerated a 1 foreign' buyer growing 
rich at African expense; they sought to appeal to local 
. pride' by suggesting that African 'umoja' (unity) could best -, 
be demonstrated by.the people themselves,controlling the 
marketing organization; they criticised the government and 
the chiefs for .instituting the two cents cotton cess and 
promised to campaign for its abolition. The fact that the 
Sukuma Union and T.A.A. were also encouraging opposition to. 
the cess made evident the close association between the 
co-operative leaders and the African politicians. Further­
more, when the numbei* of societies increased a new bureau­
cracy to manage them came into ..being and this proved capable 
of acting.on behalf of TANU when registration of branches in 
Sukumaland. was refused. Even more important, the new 
organization provided the necessary link between town and 
country with the .result that parochial barriers were
progressively reduced and Africans from different communities 
wera able to.appreciate a sense of common-purpose.
When the development of the co-operative,movement 
in Sukumaland is linked with the rapid spread of nationalism 
it is necessary to remember that the' crucial;dimension 
throughout was. time. For although each movement gave 
impetus to the other, the co-operative' organization was only 
an asset to TANU as long as it retained the support of the, 
farmers. At first, this presented no difficulty . since the \ 
government quickly made it clear that the co-operative 
marketing.of cotton would be encouraged. There-were good 
reasons for this policy in spite of the suspicion of Bomani'.s 
motives in official circles due to his close, association 
with Mwanza nationalists. - . It was argued that with govern­
ment supervision and emphasis on -the societies being run on 
sound commercial lines, the members, could be persuaded to 
concentrate on economic rather than political issues. With 
this aim in mind, Twining agreed- to an. experienced admini­
strative officer being made responsible for the development 
of- the Sukuma,societies. In any case, support of:co-oper­
atives accorded with previous government policy in that any. 
form of African commercial enterprise was to be encouraged. 
And, so, with the assurance that government would supervise 
accounting procedures, the more sceptical farmers were, also 
won over. More important, the period of most rapid growth 
in the number of•societies coincided with a substantial rise 
in prices paid for raw cotton; the more plausible committee 
members of the societies had no difficulty in convincing 
their members that co-operation was responsible for the 
improvement..
•But five years ’later, the picture-was- different.
The distance and communication factors had always made the 
marketing of produce a difficult operation and by their 
nature co-operatives are cumbersome and inefficient organ­
izations in situations where quick decisions on commercial - 
transactions are necessary.,, However competent, the paid / 
staff, may have been, adequate ..discretionary powers could 
not be permitted without incurring unacceptable risks.
The bureaucracy needed for the effective running of the 
organization grew rapidly and became expensive to maintain. 
Then, once the difference was perceived between the price 
paid to the growers and that received from the ginners,
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Criticism of the societies and the unions became widespread. - 
When in 1959 there was a threat that rival organizations
would emerge the Victoria Federation was appointed the sole ■
, 75 ’■
buying agent m  Sukumaland. _ This did little to stifle . -
opposition, particularly since'the move coincided with a 
drop in world prices.. Inevitably, since TANU was committed 
to supporting Bomani and the VFGU, opposition to the co­
operative unions led to a reduction in,the support for the 
national movement..
. Similar developments occurred elsewhere, in the 
Territory.- In Rungwe, for example, R.A.C.U., the coffee 
marketing organization, by 1957 was deducting.14.7 per cent, 
from proceeds due- to growers for marketing expenses, R.A.O.U.
levy and commission and, finally, a levy payable to’ primary
74 -societies. Legislation enforcing one channel marketing
was introduced, in order to prevent' farmers taking, their
coffee crop to Nibeya to sell to. Asian traders there.^  Even
before this, trouble had occurred in Bukoba. In 19557
discontent with the Union led to the creation of a rival
organization with enough support to enable its promoter
76to.be elected chairman of TANU ..the. following year.' Never­
theless, from Bar e.s Salaam TANU. headquarters made it clear 
that it was desirable, for the monopoly enjoyed by the 
existing.Union to continue and as a consequence division 
within the local .leadership was accompanied by increased 
opposition by farmers to the marketing arrangements. The. 
political.significance of the co-operative movement at this 
time- can be. summarised in ' this way. ./First, in, the short 
term it reinforced the nationalist movement'in the rural 
areas. But if the process of.winning Independence had been 
prolonged it; seems, clear that the struggle to control 
marketing arrangements in many districts .would have led to 
a lessening of support,for TANU. .- Within a few.years, of 
independence being achieved, a full-scale Inquiry revealed 
the extent of the malaise within the movement. .Second, the 
co-operative organization provided a new and Important link 
between .the town-based headquarters of unions and the 
committees of the primary societies elected from among the 
farmers. It was the overwhelming support for /TANU. in the 
■rural areas during the critical years' of the party’s 
dialogue with the: colonial government,1 1955-1958? which 
undermined the confidence of the chiefs to such an extent 
that they were unwilling to unite and become an effective 
political force.
Thus it seems that the manner' of the expansion of 
the co-operative movement, and in particular its development
in Sukumaland, ensured that it was at the.stage in.its ■ 
growth when it was best able,to give support'to the- demand 
for. independence. : On the other hand,'the more the - diversity 
in forms of African enterprise the more.likely the appearance, 
of factions which tended to weaken the opposition to the/ 
government. . Thus, although the government rated some 
districts as ‘difficult*, it cannot.be claimed'when'the
predominantly rural districts are compared that support for ,
• 7 7  ■
TANU followed any well-defined pattern." During .this,
period the arguments advanced by.the. new political leaders
made.an impression on Africans of Very different backgrounds,.
abilities and interests and whether the issues raised were
clearly understood or not was immaterial; the effect was to
arouse resentment at/European and Asian dominance in
political and economic affairs. Much of Twiningrs' un-: .
sympathetic- attitude to; TANU can be attributed, to his concern
at the inevitable,damage to racial harmony which occurred.
He stated■bluntly 'that the party's policy was racial - it
n o
was pure racialism.'' . He and his advisers were well, aware 
of the gap between the reasoned and reasonable arguments 
skilfully presented, by Nyerere at .’international gatherings 
and on formal occasions in the Territory and, on the . other 
hand, the inflammatory and misleading statements made by 
his.subordinates in the vernacular press and at public 
meetings. As elsewhere in Africa at this' time the .new 
leaders were Africanists•rather than nationalists. ^  In 
the situation which existed, the appeal to racial awareness 
was only to be expected and there seems' no reason to try to 
justify it in such extraordinary terms such ...as Vnon-racial
QQ
racialism.' The consequence was confrontation with
the colonial-government, since the attack was shifted■ ■ 
from the settlers as a group to non-Africans in general.
Many officials were surprised at this turn of 
events. To most of them, it seemed so obvious that govern­
ment policies were aimed at improving African living; 
.standards that all that was necessary was to ensure that 
this:fact was fully appreciated. iThe Public Relations 
department produced three' newspapers for this purpose and 
an official’description of the department published-in 
1954.added, with a touch of complacency,.that Tanganyika 
'was in a rare position.among British dependencies in that 
at the moment it possesses no critical vernacular press.1 
What was not. appreciated at .the time was that official hand­
outs :appearingin government-sponsored newspapers made little 
impression. instead what mattered was the power of the. 
local demagogue who could address, meetings in "the language 
that people understood, who made no mention of past achieve­
ments but instead promised a future, with plenty Of excite­
ment and-satisfaction as well as assured prosperity.. With 
the aid; of a remarkable degree of support from the African 
population, Nyerere,and:his supporters were,able,to demand 
and extract concessions with.: more success than they dared 
hope for. Within-a short space, of .time, settlers‘through­
out the. Territory were compelled to take cognizance of the 
changes'Which had occurred and which were to influence the. 
course.of land utilization in the future.
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CHAPTER XII
SETTLERS IN A CHANGING WORLD
. Prom the preceding chapters it ;is evident that 
the policies.implemented by the Tanganyika government after 
1945 made a major.contribution to. the changes in land usage 
which occurred. Consequently, it has been necessary to 
take into account African reaction to colonial rule during;. 
this period and to be aware of the constraints it placed on 
government policy. Also important during this period was 
the influence exerted by the non-African communities,, 
insignificant in.numbers but essential for.the economic 
progress of the Territory. Although the period 1950-55 
saw the end of the predominance of the European settlers, 
it was also a time of increasing production on plantations, 
small estates and mixed farms. It was,a time of confidence 
in the future, with the probability of expanding world trade 
and increasing opportunities in local markets.; of increased - , 
financial support from, the'Land Bank; of. adequate labour 
supply, more agricultural machinery and new techniques; 
finally, a time of conviction that the-existing complementary 
agricultural systemswould have to continue indefinitely. .
When Twining was appointed Governor in 1949 * the 
European settlers were confident that their influence would , 
remain undirainished. They had powerful allies in Kenya, 
spokesmen for their interests, in London and generous 
representation on numerous statutory Boards and advisory 
committees in the.Territory. In Legislative Council, the
unofficial seats were distributed as follows: Europeans,
seven; Asians, three; Africans, four. In Executive 
Council,, of the four unofficials, three were Europeans and 
the,.fourth an Asian. At the same time, the rapid increase 
in the non-African- population between 1948 and 1952 end the 
subsequent up-turn in economic activity seemed to confirm 
the importance of the immigrant, communities.
Nevertheless, although it was recognized that 
investment had to be encouraged to promote economic develop­
ment, it also became, evident , that opposition from the non- 
Africans might not prevent constitutional changes being 
introduced. There was only a modest increase in the number 
of settler farmers and they were well aware that they came 
at their own risk and did not enjoy the same degree of 
sponsorship as their counterparts in Kenya. .. The Asian 
communities had always been divided by religion and culture 
and the differences had been sharpened by the partition of 
Imperial India. Einally, the new Governor had come with 
clear instructions to take measures to modernize.an.out-of- 
date political system and this he proceeded to do.without 
delay. >
The London view.
Since any significant innovation needed Colonial 
Office approval, Twining had to take into account metro­
politan as: well as local Opinion. It is now suggested 
that there, was never any dramatic and radical change in 
British colonial policy.^ After 1945, the official classes
concerned with colonial affairs ‘became increasingly aware 
of the essential contradictions which were bound, sooner 
or later, to lead to major crises.. Colonial Secretaries 
of both parties had declared.their intention to ensure that 
the inhabitants of the dependent territories of the Empire 
were trained to. manage their own affairs. At the same 
time, in.those, territories where British settiers lived it 
was necessary to compromise and avoid, confrontations, which 
the Colonial Officer feared would end in public opinion 
supporting their colonial kith and kin. But compromises 
cause delay, and from 1947 there was also the growing 
realisation that there was, no longer, unlimited time 
available. Eor the first time plans were, made outlining 
the constitutional and economic measures necessary so that 
colonial administrations in the African territories could 
be gradually changed into self-governing states. In the- . 
multi^racihl territories of. East Africa it Was therefore 
necessary to prepare a new African elite to participate in 
the colonial, institutions. There was no longer time for 
African, political processes to 'evolve * as Cameron had hoped, 
would be possible; . There was, as Sir Ered Clarke had 
observed, 'unconscious universalizing of what is distinct­
ively English', a process which years later caused more
6resentment against colonial rule than it did at the time.
In 1950, only a. minority of Conservative,M.P.s 
would have supported a rapid transformation of Empire into 
Commonwealth. . It was therefore a relief for the settlers ; 
of East Africa when a Conservative government took office 
in 1951 and in Tanganyika many Europeans weie. confident that /
a number, of the proposed innovations which they disliked 
would be quietly dropped., .They were -soon, disillusioned.,
A number of events brought about the change in Conservative 
attitudes to colonies and overseas commitments. The Mau 
Mau rebellion provided ax salutary shock. .Once it became 
evident that the cost of a military campaign was too great 
to be met from local resources, it was argued in London 
that,the British government must find and, if necessary, 
impose a political solution so that future conflicts 
involving armed intervention might.be avoided. A clear 
warning was given to the settlers when Oliver Lyttleton 
visited Nairobi in 1952, when he. told their leaders that 
'rule by a small minority was over and that political ■ 
advance., when it took place, must embrace all the races in 
the country.' Although at the time the warning Went
unheeded, there were soon other indications that Britain 
had neither the will nor the capability to provide 
unlimited, military aid in colonial wars. The Suez 
adventure and the sudden about-turn in Cyprus made this 
only too clear..
.Thus,, if minority groups' in the British African 
dependencies were no longer to be guaranteed special status, 
some form of power-sharing had to be devised which would, 
command the support of the majority of the inhabitants. .
The argument for multi-racial constitutions seemed to be 
.confirmed; the role of the local administrations hence­
forth was to hold the balance between the competing racial 
groups. Gradualism had to be re-interpreted; instead of 
being seen as a long-term process of .instructing Africans
to assume positions of responsibility it now became a 
process of making an orderly retreat, from a position .of 
parity toward a' new one of supervised majority rule. , To 
those who clamoured for a confrontation, the realities of 
the situation had to be spelled out, often with brutal
o . y t ;;
frankness. Once; the significance of. the Gold Coast 
becoming independent became apparent, the pressures mounted; 
and with the appointment of Iain McLeod there was a Colonial. 
Secretary.who was prepared to. act.decisively when the need 
arose. As he described it later:.
'The ends, of British.colonial policy do not . 
change with the change of partiesnor with 
V. different Secretaries of State from the same 
political party. What does change is the 
sense of urgency of the Secretary of'State, 
or his estimate of how much time is left in 
the hour-glass - or both ..... Independence 
once given to the African in the Gold Coast 
could not for long. be denied to his brother 
in Kenya, and in particular it could not be 
long delayed only because of the presence of 
European settlers. '^ . •'
But in fact, policy,.had changed as he admitted on another
occasion:-
■. 'When Harold.Macmillan, after the 1959 election, 
gave me this post (Colonial Secretary) he knew 
very well, and indeed it was implicit in the 
offer, that I was going to operate a different 
form of regime from my predecessor.'-^ q
It seems clear that Macmillan wasa^are that he was altering.
course and knew that his position within his party was strong
enough for him to do this without causing open dissension;
otherwise, in finding a replacement for Lennox Boyd.he would
have, appointed someone who was prepared, to risk some delay
in the ending of British .responsibilities if the. nationalist
leaders,: in.,the multiracial dependencies as a result could be
persuaded to offer more precise guarantees .to their '
non-African communities,
In' the cg.se of Tanganyika, Hacleod soon founds 
that there was no need -to upge. --more''.'haste in’-introducing/., 
reforms. The. first Territorial' elections had provided 
TARU with an overwhelming victory and Turnbull, ' now Governor, 
had responded by appointing'a committee.with Sir Richard 
Ramage as chairman, charged with considering further 
constitutional changes. The proposals submitted by TANUJ 
to this committee amounted to internal self-government as ‘",;- 
well as the demand for new elections based on a common roll ; 
and universal adult suffrage. .-'.From- the nationalists'. point
of view there could have been no more opportune moment to 
obtain further concessions from the British government. .
With public opinion still disturbed by events to the north 
and south of Tanganyika., namely the Hola Gamp affair and 
the Devlin Report On Nyasaiand, it was more necessary than 
ever before to avoid any further trouble in the area. ; 
Returning .from a visit to London ,,;]lyerare stated that he was 
satisfied with, the British attitude towards Tanganyika.
Two months later, the Governor announced that the date of: 
the ^ ext elections, to be based on a common roll, had been 
brought forward.
It was at this point that Macleod became Golonial . 
Secretary. He called Turnbull to London in order to discuss 
the proposals in the Ramage Report and on his return to 
Tanganyika, the .Governor was able to announce that with only 
a few exceptions the recommendations would be implemented. 
African majority government was thus:assured and. it became ■ 
clear'that independence could not be long delayed. Once 
this was understood, many leaders of TAHU-branches changed
their attitude to expatriate civil servants. Eor the 
preceding three years there had been an:increasing tendency 
to make verbal attacks on. European officials as if they 
formed a rival political party. With the Governor’s 
announcement these attacks diminished; expatriate morale 
improved and there was less talk of leaving at the first 
opportunity. This was to have an important influence on 
decisions taken a year later. One of the only valid 
objections to a rapid transfer of power was based on the 
fear of ah administrative breakdown and an end to law and 
order. :The events in the Congo in July I960 showed only 
too clearly what could happen if the government lost control 
of the situation and there might have been a greater delay 
between internal self-government (October 196Q)and independ­
ence, if it had been necessary to replace all the expatriates 
at once. But as it was, Turnbull was able to maintain a 
pace which satisfied Macleod's own.plans for colonial dis­
engagement. 4s one senior official in the Colonial Office 
remarked:; 'Your Governor, seems to be going far too fast in 
our view, but nobody in Tanganyika seems at all concerned.'^ 
Past attempts at predicting a. timetable for constitutional 
changes proved to be utterly wrong; as late as January 1959, 
it was thought that Tanganyika might achieve independence
in 1979; instead, it was to be accomplished within three
14 • ;years. .
It can be misleading to place undue emphasis on 
the change of Governors in 1958 by suggesting that Turnbull 
understood better than his predecessor the emotive appeal 
of African nationalism.'1'^  Comparisons are: pointless, since
the situation in 1959 was quite different from what it had 
been two years earlier and the contest between nationalism 
and multi-racialism remained undecided. Once it became 
clear that, self-government meant handing over control to a 
TANU-led administration, it was necessary, as never before, 
to ensure.that the party leadership stayed in the hands of 
someone, who had already gained the;confidence of all commun­
ities.. There were already signs.that extreme racialists in 
the Trade Union movement and in the party itself could attract 
support and it was therefore necessary to demonstrate that
under the existing leadership all aims could be- achieved 
16without delay. The turning point m  British policy had 
been the event of the first election, which made it clear 
that the European settlers no longer existed as a political 
force. Since everything that followed was affected by this . 
fact, it is necessary to observe, how the settlers were 
compelled to come, to terms with African nationalism.
Settlers in.the post-War era
In spite of their apparent ability to influence 
government policy in. the past, it was soon evident that the 
European settlers in Tanganyika were too disunited, to prevail 
in the event of a direct confrontation with the colonial 
administration. Boon they were being forced to accept 
innovations, which they disliked without the crises which 
would have occurred in Kenya under similar circumstances.
There are a number of explanations which, taken together, 
provide the answer. Hailey has suggested that the diversity 
in nationalities and the absence of a. compact area of settle-
ment similar to the WhiteHighlands of Kenya were, the 
important factors."1*^  Although by 1947 the proportion of 
•British nationals in the total European population was 
considerably greater than before the War, this change was 
due to the larger’number of persons employed in the public .
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services and their dependants, mostly of British origin.
The preponderance of British nationals in the settler 
population was much less than in Kenya and it was only this 
section of the European community which could provide 
organized opposition to government policies.
The geographical distribution of the settlers 
undoubtedly affected their collective impact in political 
matters although the. absence: of a single highlands area was 
not the. only factor involved. Table XX describes where the 
different categories of large-scale farming units were 
situated in 1952. It will be noted that although the areas 
where settlers, were, farming are separated by considerable 
distances, most of these areas are located in only four 
provinces. It was a case of separated concentrations 
rather than scattered settlement.
But more important than the location of the areas 
of European settlement was the factor already'mentioned - 
the peripheral siting of the capital and, the absence of a - 
•core area around it. Eor the majority of settlers, Bar 
- es Salaam was- top remote for anything more than.the 
occasional visit; incontrast,"Nairobi was within easy 
reach of most of .the Kenya settlers who were, able to keep 
-informed on political developments. The towns of Tanganyika 
although growing rapidly, provided no adequate substitute, as
■-/CABLE,.XX!
LOCATION 0,1 NON-AFRICAN 
FARMING UNITS IN 1952.. .
.
Province sisal , ■ tea. coffee tobacco mixed tota]
Northern 19 86 157 262
Tanga , 91 10 9 94 204
Eastern 71 212 .283
S. Highlands .14 31 31- 134 210
Central ■ - 31 . 31
Lake 22 1. 23 . 47
Southern 19 X 46 67
Western 1 ' i ‘; 53, 59
1,163
Csource:: . Report on, the Census of the non- 
African population held on: 13 
February 1952.) — —
can be noted from Table XXL. Although these urban centres 
(Kongwa excepted), provided.convenient meeting places for 
settlers and permanent residents, when compared with Kenya 
they contained relatively few European residents who were 
not employed in the public services. A lack of readily., 
available support made it more difficult to organize 
effective opposition to government policies.
But there are several other factors which help to 
explain why the settlers were unable to offer any real 
resistance to the erosion of their influence. First, 
different forms of economic activity in different areas, 
as evidenced in Table XX, led to different expectations and 
attitudes toward African advancement. Those who were 
determined that the status quo had to be maintained derived 
support from the owner-farmers and. others owning properties 
and small, businesses. In contrast, owners and managers of 
the large plantations or mining and Commercial enterprises 
were in effect no more than long-term residents, more 
interested in preserving conditions in which their businesses 
could prosper. As in the pre-war period the managers of
the large estates had little in common with the true settlers
\ ■ . - iq
who were potential, competitors in times of labour shortages. ■
As might be expected it was the sisal interest which carried. .
the most weight with the colonial administration, particularly
during the first years of Twining1s governorship. Nearly
one third of all African ..paid labour worked for the industry;
in 1950 sisal accounted for; 55 per cent, of the Territoryfs
exports; equally important, when the sterling area was
short of dollars, in 1949 89 per cent, of the dollar
TABLE -XXI
THE LARGER URBAN CENTRES.
OF EUROPEAN POPULATION
Town Province Population 
1952 ; 1957
Bar es Salaam , 3603 4479
Arusha Northern . 974- ; 878
Tanga. Tanga 566., 768
Kongwa; Central . 482 502
Moshi - Northern 459 . 441
(;souroes Censuses of non-African 
population held'in 1952 
. and 19.57) ■ :
earnings of 'Tanganyika came from the sale of sisal.
Compared with.Kenya the -contrast is striking. At this time 
the settlers, there werb producing eighty per. cent, of the 
colony1s exports from, a variety of enterprises; of these, 
the sisal interests, which :produced such a divisive effect 
in European politics in Tanganyika, were much less important.
- Second, . the .pre- 1945 residents in tlie Territory in 
the European community formed a comparatively small minority 
of the group as ;a whole and.their ability to exercise 
influence was. affected accordingly. , The more recently, 
arrived settlers were.usually more amenable to proposals for 
change. s"r ,■/
-Third;Vthe^ fact of settler over-representation on 
Boards and committees can be.misleading. On the two most 
important institutions for exercising influence, the Legis­
lative add.Executive Councils,.by 1948 settlers were by no * 
means.adequately, represented. They campaigned in vain for 
the right to elect the European non-official M.L.O.s, well 
aware that successive Governors had been careful to nominate 
those who would, support the’official1 view on the major 
issues. As. a.consequence.there was a continuous conflict 
between the 'M.LiC^s and the spokesmen for the settlers' each 
branding the other as being unrepresentative. Indeed, 
one il.L.C. considered it necessary on one occasion to echo; 
Edmund Burke -and. remind his colleagues that in advising the 
Governor, nominatediM.L.C.swefe under no duty to speak for
■ • .i" . " 2 2  : '
areas or interests. - ;
. Fourth y the settlers attracted little support in 
London which might ;have\counteracted, some of the influence
of ;commeiits from the Trusteeship Council and pressure from 
the"Fabian.Colonial Bureau. Settler supporters in Parlia­
ment ..found themselves increasingly isolated and,unable.to 
extract firm promises from the successive Colonial Secretaries
Finally, a. change in the, structure and conditions 
of employment in the,Civil Service effectively reduced the 
opportunities open to resident Europeans to enter government 
v,service.^ The East African governments:, introduced a, unified 
pay structure .in order to avoid complaints of racial discrim­
ination and at the same time- provided attractive terms for- •
"expatriate recruits by paying' ah inducement allowance. Since 
employment vi.n the .public services provided a greater 
^proportion’of Job' opportunities;in . Tanganyika . than in Kenya,' ; 
the effects of the new arrangements were all'= the more keenly : 
felt; 'settlers planning careers for their children came to 
realise that there - .was. little chance of finding employment 
in the Territory dt salaries at the expatriate .level.
, These diverse factors discouraged and sometimes 
divided the ^ European.community and» as will be seen in the 
:foilowing. paragraphplayed dome .part in determining how v 
their political organizations were to 'develpp ,during the 
decade, preceding .independence.If these Cwere not always • 
very effective,-it must be remembered that more willing 
support was always, given to the numerous functional • . 
.associations which seemed more; likely to achieve results. ;
European.political organizations
After the War, Northern province became the centre- 
of European political activity. Interest was aroused and
maintained by the criticism of white settlement made in the 
Visiting Mission's Report of 1948, by the Report of the 
Arusha-Moshi Lands Commission and by the decisions of. the 
Land Settlement Bureau. In 1945 the value of protest had 
. been; clearly demonstrated when the settlers of the province 
had.supported the Kenya Europeans in comdemning 'Colonial 191' 
and its proposals for the composition of the East African 
Legislative Assembly. This protest was important in that 
it achieved its objective and revealed the gap between the
Northern province settlers and the European.unofficial
■ ' ' 24 '
M.L.C.s in Bar es Salaam. In 1947 a Northern Province ;: . 
-Council '-was^formed,,. with a full-time executive officer. A. , 
monthly netws sheet was published setting out the policies to 
be followed. In brief, these amounted to putting pressure 
on the government to encourage more European settlement, 
demanding the re-alienation of the ex-German estates and 
asking for amendments to the Land Acquisition Ordinance*
- The last two: matters were of particular interest in the 
province in view of the uncertainty as to what the govern­
ment. would do to meet African demands• ,
Shortly after Twining*s arrival in the Territory 
the Northern Province Council was changed into the Tanganyika 
European-Council ( T E C ) - I n  its first bulletin it was 
pointed out that all.the.members of the council had. been 
elected, -the.-inference being that there was no reason why. 
European unofficial M.L.C.s. should not be chosen in a similar 
way. Thereafter, increasing criticism of the practice of
nominating M.L.C.s. was heard at ^ meetings and was the subject
' . ' 26 of correspondence xn the Press. But it was already too
late* Twining had come to Tanganyika with, instructions 
to see that more Africans participated in-the.“decision-making 
processes and he fully intended to see that,this occurred..
With characteristic energy, he set about seeking, support for 
multi-racial provincial councils and for fundamental changes 
in the existing Legislative Council. A Constitutional,,
‘Committee was appointed and.all the.unofficial M.L.C.s were
: ; ■ '27 • ' : - ' ' *
invited to be members. /. Twining submitted his own
confidential memorandum to the Committee, proposing that 
the provincial councils once established should act as 
electoral colleges to choose M.L.C.s and that- in an enlarged 
Legislative Council, one half of the unofficial members should 
be Africans. It was not long before extracts from his 
memorandum were being published in the local press and, 
after some.Incitement from Kenya, causing anger among the 
settlers. In London, when the Colonial Secretary was 
asked to comment on Twining1s memorandum he replied, some­
what ambiguously, that his predecessor had not received, a
29
copy before its issue.
It is curious that Twining should have made 
proposals which conflicted with the cardinal principle of 
multi-racialism, which he was to advocate with enthusiasm 
the ..following year; this required strict adherence to the 
rule of parity of representation.for the three, racial groups. 
In Kenya, parity between Europeans and Asians had beeri the 
rule for a time between the Wars in the composition of 
-membership of the Nairobi Municipal Council. After 1945 > 
the parity principle again became popular when Mitchell, 
preparing the draft for ’Colonial 191’, persuaded the
Colonial Office that for some multi-racial states it
provided the only solution. As he described it:
’I had,, long thought that where there was a 
problem of several communities, with political 
capacity in more or less inverse ratio, to 
numbers, the only workable solution was the 
■equal representation of them all without any 
regard to numbers.... (In Fiji) it seemed to 
me to work well, and I suggested the same 
arrangement for the East African assembly ' jq
The Committee opted for the parity arrangement. Their
report was published and,, predictably, bitterly attacked by
the TEC. Criticism' was redoubled when it was learned that
the Report had been presented to the Legislative Council and .
duly approved; since all the unofficial M.L.C.s has been.
.members of the Committee it seemed like constitutional incest
to go through the farce of obtaining their approval. To
describe the debate as uninspiring would be charitable, the
speeches of Phillips and Scupham excepted. Nevertheless,
it is of interest in that it revealed that those who served
on the Committee had decided that the parity proposal was
• ' . : - . 3 2
only a temporary expedient. Perhaps it was the memory of
this occasion that led Twining some years later, to assert
that at the time ’all clear-thinking people realized the ■
arrangement was only a temporary m e a s u r e . N e v e r t h e l e s s ,
it would seem that in the Colonial Office either it was
. believed that there was nothing temporary about the parity
proposals or else it was decided that it would be wise to
declare that there was every intention of retaining the
arrangement for some time. Both Lyttleton.and his successor
Lennox-Boyd, made such declarations, thereby forcing Twining
. ■ • 3 4
to assert his own confidence in the .policy of parity. •
The publication of the Report and the public :, 
debate which followed .are now remembered as factors which 
contributed to the decline in inter-racial amity in. the 
Territory. In observing the year which followed, there 
are two other points worthy of note. ;
First, in spite of the vehemence of their 
Opposition to the proposals and the promises of support.
• they received from Kenya, the settlers were unable to obtain 
any concessions. As Twining correctly Judged, they could 
do nothing but pass resolutions. . For although individual 
settlers were usually.on good terms with government officers 
stationed in the same district and. no doubt often managed 
to obtain preferential treatment;,in a. number of ways, 
collectively-their influence was minimal, onCe the admini­
stration was controlled by a determined Governor who, like 
Cameron, was not afraid to make enemies.
Second, the debate over the Report brought an end 
to the brief unity of European political opinion under the 
aegis of the T.E*C. The differences could not be concealed 
or resolved and led eventually to new political alignments 
under'different:leadership. The T.E.C. adopted/the line 
,that experiments, in power-sharing should be delayed until 
further economic development had been achieved and that the 
only immediate constitutional development necessary was to 
obtain some unofficial M.L.C.s. more representative of 
European opinion. Accordingly, the Regional Associations 
Of the Council were invited to hold meetings and obtain 
support for these views. At meetings in Northern province,- 
as might be expected, more positive rejection of the Report
was .demanded- and it was even suggested that outside aid ; 
should be sought in order to prevent the Report being imple­
mented.^ Such suggestions alarmed settlers in,other - 
provinces and were, roundly condemned by the T.F.G.
Most of the Regional Associations decided to 
support the policies;;recommended by the T.E.C, However, 
the Tanga Association, dominated by the sisal interest, came 
out firmly in favour of the1 proposals in the .Report../
It was the; chairman of the Association, Eldred 
Hitchcock, who persuaded the Tanga Europeans to reject'T.E.C 
policy. Although he had previously agreed to be nominated 
as a Vice-President of the Council,.Hitchcock's views were 
usually poles apart from contemporary settler opinion; when 
he Observed that 'European leadership was an anachronism and , 
change was inevitable 1 , , his associated wondered why 1 he had 
ever agreed to lend his name to the Council. His 
influence.was enormous and although he was a comparatively 
recent arrival in. East Africa he. already dominated the sisal 
industry. During the second world war he had.performed an 
outstanding service as negotiator for the sisal-growers in, 
making agreements with the British Board of Trade; he was 
the General Manager of the extensive estates owned by Bird 
and Company; in 1949 he founded his own selling organization 
(TASMA) which was soon responsible for over two-fifths‘ of the 
sisal exported from Tanganyika and Kenya. Eccentric and 
often perverse, he was no admirer of colonial establishments; 
now,however he was proving to be a useful.ally for Twining.
In 1955? Hitchcock was himself nominated to join the enlarged 
Legislative Council, thereby involving him in the political 
developments in the^following year.
While .the debate on the Report continued and 
European opinion remained divided, on the Correct tactics, 
to/adopt, other influences were at work which were soon/to 
cause further'loss of support for,.the T.E.C. Colonel .
D. Stirling, President -of the Capricorn African Society, ■ 
became a frequent' visitor to- the Territory and, with, 
official approval, began to recruit: people who vould be 
willing to take an active part in, promoting the,Society'S: .. 
objectives in Tanganyika. In. the Capricorn Declaration,
published ih/December-.1952? the Society was dedicated to - 
bringing;,an end-to all forms of * racial discrimination, "'to// 
promoting the development of .the area/jointly.by all races 
-and bo working ;to encourage federations, of-adjoining 
territories under British .administration*
In Dar es Salaam, Stirling found a valuable ally 
in T..W. Tyrell, Vice-President'of -the T.E.C. and Chairman of 
..the local branch. .. jTyrell had already drawn away- from/, , 
settler opinion' in/ the belief that opposition to the-Report i- 
should be ended; however, he now found thab.'although the r 
supporters of the T.E.C. were prepared to accept the parity 
.arrangement, there was no enthusiasm for the'ideal of‘racial 
partnership.inherent in the Capricorn, contract. He there­
fore resigned from the T.E.C. and with Kidaha (David)
Makwaia, how a,member of the Executive Council, started a
’ ‘\ . - v ' f S \  ; '■ : 4 0  ‘ \ *  - ■ - ■
Capricorn .group in the capital. In Northern province,
Stirling asked .Robin., Johnston,r a former administrative
officer, to/accept the,post of Executive Officer for the
Capricorn Society* in Tanganyika and to recruit supporters
wherever possible. • With no end of the Kikuyu rebellion in
sight and with;trouble from Mau Mau supporters in Northern
province, Europeans were now more/ready than in the past to ; 
listen to the exponents of the Capricorn ideas and the old- 
"guard settlers found/themselves in an increasingly isolated 
' position* . Eor;the T.E*C. it was the end of the road; ,in 
June 1953 it was announced that* the. Council would try to
make the parity, arrangement "work. Successfully and henceforth
‘' ' ■ ’ ■ '■■'■' 41would concentrate on economic matters. . . Thus there was a
three-way split within the European population. The old
guard continued'; to insist that- no change'was necessary; the.
T.E.C.:supporters occupied the middle ground accepting the
multi-raciai principle based on the parity arrangement; . •
finally, the Capricorn Group advocated a non-racial society
in: which, deader ship would emerge: on merits
The new and enlarged Legislative Council met for
the first time.in.vApril 1955 and from the start, proceedings
were accompanied by good-will and co-operation between all
races. Moreover,/during the year the same amity existed
■ 40
throughout.the Territory. Unfortunately for the govern­
ment this state pf affairs was short-lived. / No sooner had . 
the parity proposals been adopted and the new- Council 
assembled than further reforms were introduced which effect­
ively undermined, the hew system over which there had been 
so much argument. ; 1 •
The 'Constitutional Committee had considered not 
only the composition of. the Council, but also the possibility 
of introducing an electoral system. A Special Commissioner 
was appointed and recommended how elections might be held in 
selected constituencies on the basis of a common roll.^
When Twining was prepared to accept these recommendations,
he found that the reply from the Colonial Office .was not 
over-enthusiastic all the same, he was!authorised to 
proceed with making arranagements as he wished, provided 
there -was a'substantial demand fpr elections, that it was 
practicable to; hold'them and the parity system was 
maintained. A. Committee chaired;by the. Chief Secretary 
was appointed to work out -the qualifications to be demanded 
of potential voters. ^ The report, when submitted was 
forwarded Vfo the- Colonial Office;,, for approval, with the 
following observation by Twining:..' •
‘ ■ *If ... all/those qualified to vote will duly
:/ register and; vote, then Africans will in air - 
constituencies except bar es'Salaam have a 
majority over the combined European and Asian; 
votes. \ 6 : ; \ : ' -
Thus, if a general"election was held and voting/ followed a
racial pattern, the difficulty in continuing the parity
arrangement was obvious. . Twining disarmed the potential
; critics by•;adding that 'as far as-I am: at present advised .
elections are unlikely to be held in.more.than three or
four c o n s t i t u e n c i e s . W i t h i n  a few months all was"
changed; it Was announced that elections, would be held, ■
in all ten constituencies in two stages. ,When the :
elections for the first stage were held in September 1958,
TANtt achieved such an overwhelming victory . that: the ;
opposition virtually1 ceased to exist. ,:>
These political developments need to-be remembered
when the-final stages in the decline .of the settlei influence
are examined. . When the T.E.C. ceased to function as a/ V\:
political organization,, other leaders began to emerge. At
the same time-once.it was realized- that the government were
unwilling to take, counter-measures in order toweakenTAMT, 
there was a perceptible reduction in investment'in agric­
ultural development in some of the.crop sectors. Thus, in
this Case indirectly, government decisions and actions in 
the political arena were to affect land usage in the future. 
The, decisions which were taken were influenced, not only by ; . 
African reaction to 'events but also by the government's 
capacity and will in resisting any resurgence of settler 
influence both within the Territory and ,elsewhere.
.From the settlers' point of view, once:the threat 
from TANU was perceived and the government had decided to 
hold elections based on a- common roll, it was necessary to 
create an organization to replace the defunct T.F.G. The 
most sensible tactic seemed to be to infiltrate TANU and , 
thus reduce the growing .tensions caused by its racial 
exclusiveness. The only other alternative, the Capricorn 
Group in Tanganyika., was not.a political party and in any . 
case it was compromised by the paternalistic flavour of some 
Of its,/statements and its declared objective of encouraging 
: federations .of adjoining territoriesPolicies which might 
appeal to Africans further south, in Tanganyika led to 
irritation and suspicion.
Twining was thus left to find an, answer to the 
problem he had himself created by allowing the rapid march 
of; ,events leading to the inevitability of elections, on a ., 
common roll. His solution was to persuade his nominated 
M.L.C.s of all races to unite to oppose the nationalist 
threat. When Stirling stayed at Government House in. 
October 1955» Twining told him that he had decided to
encourage Ivor Bayldon to form a new party; Stirling later
commented, 'he implied, but did,not say, that the Capricorn
4.9
Society would be superfluous.' The Governor explained
that the name Capricorn and the support of the idea of
federation aroused suspicion arid anew start was necessary.,,
Stirling took these comments rto heart and when he
found that the promoters of the new party,were not interested
in uniting with his supporters he had, Capricorn in the
Territory renamed the Tanganyika. National Society. . Shortly
afterwards, the formation of the new party was announced, the
name chosen for it being, the United Tanganyika Party (UTP).
Its aims were to be as follows.:
'to evolve the most suitable form of franchise
... to resist proposals which would result in
. the domination of one racial group over another „
... to resist racial discrimination ... to stress
the interdependence of . races and to build a \ .
nationhood of Tanganyika•'
It is necessary to treat with .caution the widely accepted
comment that the U.T.P. was a European-dominated party. It .
is true that the European members were the most articulate,
mainly because there were considerable disagreements between:
Bayldon and the members of the Bar es Salaam branch, who
preferred the more liberal policies advocated by. Tyrell,
But. the Asian members of the party, although tending to
remain in the background, provided much of the financial
support without1 which no organization could have survived.
Finally, since the registered African voters outnumbered
the combined totals of the other races, support from that.
community was essential and explains why in 1957 two thirds
of the members were Africans.^ But the price of retaining
African support was for the party leaders to accept policies
■ ' " «'■ ■; - - ' ^ 0 5 .
which were little different from those being proclaimed 
more stridently by TANU. Thus the second policy statement,., 
issued in October 1957 > demanded a date to be fixed for self- 
government and an electoral system based on single member 
constituencies. More important however, was ..the party's 
reaction to the election proposals. It will be recalled 
that Twining expected elections to be held in three or four 
constituencies. A Bill to, make this possible was introduced 
in May 1957v with unexpected results. Bor the government, 
it was prudent to slow the pace of constitutional change 
without provoking the more impatient nationalists; it was 
believed that the limited scope of the elections could be . 
effectively justified on administrative grounds. Bor the 
U.T.P. it was an advantage to limit the elections to a few 
constituencies because it was certain that these would be 
the. major urban areas where support for the party was 
strongest. Brom the record of the debate in Legislative 
Council, it would appear that opinions were divided on.racial 
dines. The African speakers, most of. them U.T.P. supporters, 
tabled a.n amendment calling for elections in. all constituencies. 
The surprise came when Bayldon,also spoke in favour of the
amendment asserting that.'piece-meal elections would
■ 52 ' - •>exacerbate tension.V As a .member of Executive Council.
and in view of his close collaboration with Twining, his
support of the government1s Bill was only to ,be expected.
But many European members of U.T.P. disliked the proposals
which they found doubly restrictive, both in the extent of
the franchise and in the limited number of constituencies
which would be involved.*^ It seems probable that Bayldon
was following a decision taken by his party's executive,
well knowing that to-do otherwise might have caused the
bheak-up of the party. The" government was. thus, placed in
an awkward position; to have passed the Bill using the
official majority would have invited a boycott of the .
elections and civil, disobedience. After an adjournment,-
the Bill was withdrawn, with the. warning that elections
would probably be delayed. In London, Lennox Boyd
explained that he was having-consultations' with the Governor
and that 'whatever was decided, those steps, will not be
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taken out of p i q u e . S o o n  It was announced that during 
1958 and I?59 elections would be held in all ten 
constituenciesi
African influence, over .party policy had two.: 
obvious consequences. .Birst, the small settler farmer' 
either ignored the call, for support or at best gave.it 
half-heartedly. Long before the election debacle, Twining
had commented:: 'the trouble, with Europeans was that. they.
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did not, like or did not see the need for politics.'^
While this might have been true at. first, by 1957 most of
those settlers who with-held their suppoxt were either dls-.
appointed with the leadership.or disliked the compromises
in policies which were adopted ini order to attract African .
support. Second,, as the party moved closer to TAUU thinking
‘ there emerged the possibility for a time of. a merger between :
the parties. That this could be contemplated at all
reveals that there was an inter-racial consensus on ending -
colonial rule to an extent never found in other British-
administered African territories: with plural5 societies.
.Whereas the settlers, with very few exceptions, were firmly 
Opposed to self-government on any terms, the leaders of the 
sisal industry and members, of the business community viewed 
things differently; for them, there was less concern with 
the kind of government in power and more interest in its 
potential capacity to govern effectively so that private 
investment could continue• . Their opposition to TAWU was 
founded on the belief'that the nationalist leaders were too 
inexperienced and their followers too undisciplined to provide 
stability; it was therefore necessary to support. U.T.P.
Help from the sisal industry .was assured from the beginning;: 
Hitchcock, who had; found himself opposed to the T.E.C. and • > 
unconvinced by the arguments of the Capricorn Group, 
organized support for the party in Tanga and it was here 
that the main strength of the party existed until-the end.
In contrast, some members of the business community were slow 
in offering help; this .was hardly surprising since many of 
the more liberal-minded had been members of Tyrell1s 
Capricorn Group and were no doubt confused at the turn of 
events. Twining, on his visit to London in 1956, explained 
the position to the Executive Council of JECAB.^7 The ’ 
following year, the Chairman reminded his members that more 
active support was still needed: 'the U.TP is a body which
we believe to be the only hope for the territory'. , He,, 
went on to ask his members, whether as firms or individuals, 
they were giving the party the support it deserved. .
After he.left Tanganyika, Twining, somewhat. 1 
uncharitably, attributed the dismal failure of U.TP to poor 
leadership... While there is some truth in this, there were
more fundamental reasons, for the lack of success.
UTirst, the,' majority of Asians, who as a community, 
provided the second largest number of voters, were not 
willing to be seen as opposing a nationalist party. When 
Amir Jamal, elected with TANU support gave this advice,
'the only way for Asians to live in Tanganyika was to 
identify themselves with the indigenous majority', many 
acted accordingly and provided generous financial aid to 
TAKU.59 ' .
Second, for the African voters, ILTB could only / -
offer an alternative.to the emotive appeal- of TANU if 
material self-interest was better protected in the event 
of power being transferred to-the multi-racial party. But 
the elections took place before the entrepreneurial sector 
of the African middle.class had become large enough to 
count , Moreover, in the professions, Africans occupying 
positions of responsibility stood to gain more from a 
transfer of power to a government representing the aspirations 
of African nationalism; if TANU won their elections their 
sl^ills would: be in short supply and their position assured.
Pinaily, the emotive issue of land alienation
provided the real difference between the parties. Whatever
reassurances concerning security of tenure the TANU leaders
offered the non-Africans, it never seemed credible that
promises made in such circumstances could ever be kept.
To outside observers at the time the following comment
summarised the situation:
'the main reason for friction between Africans 
-and Europeans is over land and the nationalist 
land policy, has vastly more popular appeal than 
the multi-raOialist. TANU's canvassers (though 
not its leaders) promise that European land will
ultimately be shared out between Africans; 
the UTP asks for the granting of long-term . 
rights of occupancy and an unequivocal 
policy Over land tenure.'
Compared, with the TNS-manifesto, which stated that 'all :
residents have the right to acquire and enjoy property',
the UTP policy went further toward recognizing African
susceptibilities over land occupied by settlerst Whereas
the former implied that alienation might continue, the
latter restricted .its interest to'providing security for
those already in.:possession. The. distinction is an , ■ -
important one; the Capricorn Declaration, which was similar
in this respect to the TNS manifesto, attracted the retort
from the nationalists■that it was meaningless to proclaim
the principle of equality of treatment in purchasing or
leasing land when only the. Immigrant races had the necessary
accumulated wealth or credit backing. The European
spokesmen in UTP realized that security of tenure of land
and ownership of property were .the two issues which were
most important for their non-African supporters; providing
they could persuade' their African members to agree to the
necessary assurances, they were prepared to make any amount
of concessions in other matters. Bor their part, the TANU
leadership both before and after the elections were persuaded
to accept as a political necessity the fact that Nyerere on
many occasions gave positive assurances to non-Africans that
their rigbt to possess land would remain unchanged after
independence was gained.
The consequences of these developments were a 
growing similarity between policy, statement's emanating from 
TANU. and. UTP respectively and a blurring of the racial
divisions in political alignments to- an extent that had 
never occurred before in a multi-racial territory in Africa. 
Bor Nyerere and his closest followers, the- greatest danger 
came from within the nationalist movement. - There'also 
seemed to be differences between those who':spoke for the
European community although they were generally agreed on
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the proposed Constitutional developments. The active
supporters of TNS. prudently called themselves independents
•: , 05
and were able to obtain TANU . support.. in .the elections; 
afterwards, Nyerere adroitly made use of their influence 
in negotiating further concessions., from the colonial admini­
stration so that the majority .of his supporters, remained 
satisfied with the progress toward independence. Moreover, 
it was not:only in Tahganyika. that these e^afriate 
nationalists were influential; 'inV Britain:their support . 
for/the demand for: independence made a profound,impression, 
and their contact with Stirling ensured the full use of 
informal channels. . The European leaders of the now 
defunct. UTE also-'made statements welcoming the progress 
toward independence and this apparent harmony in views 
received world-wide publicity. - Thus the; orderly and rapid 
transfer of power could be arranged without causing indig­
nation in Britain that 'kith and kin* were being betrayed. 
Burthermore, commercial interests were well satisfied with 
the political developments. More than once it was observed 
that nationalists who were prepared to use constitutional 
means to obtain their.objectives deserved co-operation. In 
his annual statement, the Chairman of JEOABi drew attention 
to- the 'amicable atmosphere1 prevailing in Tanganyika and
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the fact that 'all other territories with which the Board 
was concerned were in a disturbed political state in I960.' ' 
Nevertheless ? at this;-time the ,.average, settler , 
farmer was far from optimistic about, the future. According 
to one account, 'morale in Northern province is,at an ally v ; 
time low.' . She major reason for this was the increasing y. 
danger of a“breakdown in law and order, which posed an 
obvious threat to those who -lived, in. remote areas. Recent 
events: in Kenya and the Congo provided^alarming examples 
and there was a grov/ing realization ithat. tte colonial govern- . 
ment's capacity to keep control was now in doubt. Turnbull 
had given fair warning of the difficulties to be expected 
when in the previous year he announced the appointment; of 
five TANU.^approved ministers and added:
'.The government we are establishing today is 
designed to bridge the gap between - on the 
one hand - the old form of colonial government 
,V in which the,: Executive Council , consisting of . 
government officers plus a number of nominated ' ,, 
unofficlals, worked to a largely" nominated . !
legislature, and - on the other - what is known .
as 'responsible government' in which the Executive ^
will contain a majority of ..unofficial ministers 
and will work to a legislature of which the : 
majority of the members will be.elected. , y: |
Transitional governments of this sort are by ‘ v
repute the most difficult of all to operate.-.,. ' ^
Second $ the - settlers were conyin.eed that the - , ,
growing power of the trade unions" threatened their economic y i
survival. A series of strikes from 1956 .onwards, demonstrated
what could be done with organization and plantation manager
and settler farmer wero particularly vulnerable to the effects; y !
of a prolonged withdrawal of labour. The co-operation between
the TRL. and TANUywas complete at this time and with local , ,
nationalists showing scant sympathy towards .immigrant farmers.
it,seemed.as if demands for higher, wages would continue 
until every employer was forced out of business; It was 
the worst of all possible situations,'.the usual tensions . 
between management and .worker being exacerbated by the 
racial, differences between them./.
. To these problems there was an answer; the
settlers discovered Thomas Hobbes and came to realize that
divided sovereignty, as:existed during the transition period.,
was the road to chaos. Thus, if crime was to be punished
and restraints imposed on union leaders and other over-mighty
subjects it was better if sovereign power was unambiguously
- 70handed over to the nationalist leaders.( By'the following 
year, most settlers were convinced that providing they were 
making a contribution to the. country's, economy, they would 
be allowed to continue as before. Thus the fact of inde­
pendence brought no immediate end to the pattern of large-/ 
scale farming which had developed through the colonial era.
It did however make it improbable /that, any new. alienation of 
land would take place except where additions to existing 
leases.were considered to.be in the public interest. It 
remains necessary, to-assess the relative importance of the 
many factors mentioned above which together contributed to 
the failure of the European settlers in Tanganyika to make 
any impact while'the debate on. the TerritoryVs.future was 
being conducted.; //First, they were disorganized and divided 
at-the time when they had to meet the challenge from Twining1s 
innovations; the size of the■"settler population and some of 
its characteristics, the environment which determined the 
.economic activity and.the spatial distribution all 
contributed to leave them in a weak position.
Secondly, there were the external.factors, chiefly 
the British government's willingness to divest itself of. 
responsibility for Tanganyika and the failure of the settler's 
allies to provide help. In. the case of the Kenya'settlers 
this is understandable since they were soon pre-occupied 
with their own problems; but- in the case of IEGAB, which 
claimed to represent their interests in London, some further 
comment is necessary. Some indication of what the Board 
thought.'it could do is given in these extracts:.
'Balanced presentation of the facts to the 
authorities .... (is) of the utmost importance.
In this we have been well served by our members 
in the House of ..Commons.'^
and later:. ’
'We can. go and see. Ministers when we receive 
letters or any form of representation. Without 
1 saying.anything,or committing Ministers at all, 
one can go quietly and tell them what has been 
said.'^  •
But JECAB primarily represented commercial interests 
controlled by men who accepted that the old Colonial Empire 
had to change. /There were no objections to Twining's 
innovations and. no concern expressed about developments 
until the extent of the support for TANU was perceived.
After 1957s the government was firmly committed to its 
policy of disengagement and was more interested in the views 
of officials and nationalist politicians from the depend- ;
encies than in satisfying the requirements of the Board. 
Whether the close contacts with the government were ever 
as valuable as members,of the Board were led to believe is , 
something which would be difficult to decide; what is clear, . 
however, is that it became increasingly difficult for the
government to give the Board any firm indications of their 
future intentions in East Africa. The final entry in the 
Board's files, a history of its activities, contains this 
revealing comment:
'visitors were provided with up-to-date 
information on what the actual policies of 
HMG were and with a fair warning of what 
was actually happening and likely to. happen 
in the territories.
The changes which stemmed from the Report, on 
Constitutional Development, ihe rising expectations among 
African leaders following the Visiting Mission Report of 
1954 and events elsewhere in Africa made change inevitable.
The critical stage in the process was the event of the first 
elections. Critical,. because the decisions,taken affecting . 
the elections and in response to events immediately following 
them undoubtedly prevented, a situation arising which would 
have led. to a general disruption of the estate farming system. 
■First, there was the much criticized triple-vote system 
which prevented political .alignments corresponding with 
racial divisions. It provided the necessary political 
education for both Europeans and Africans; each was made 
to realize that if electoral success was to be achieved they 
could not disregard/the fears and hopes of the other..
Second, the fact .that the British government took the correct, 
decision - as it turned out - to make no objection when 
progress to independence was speeded up after 1939* The 
rapid change in the: political system and .the - amicable 
atmosphere in the. negotiations ending with independence did 
nothing.tp solve^ the economic problems of the new state.
In spite of the absence of. violence which, attended the.
changes, within one year nearly half the expatriate civil 
servants had resigned, private investment was 
disappo.inting/, unemployment had risen, there was a marked 
deterioration in race relations and the moderates in the
' nil
TANU leadership had. lost ground.■ The situation was not 
encouraging, but it would have been infinitely worse if 
the European settlers had been better organized, more 
militant, effectively represented and able to delay the 
...inevitable march of events. :
NOTES TO CHAPTER:XII
1. In these four years,.the European population 
increased from 10*648 to 17,885 and the total 
non-African population- from" 70,160! to 95,434::
Report on the Census of the1 non-rAfrican population 
held on 15 Eebruary l,9'52/-CDar es Salaam 1954).
2* In Kenya settlement of ex-servicemen was encouraged 
by the European Agricultural Settlement Board; for 
a summary of its activities see L .W. Cone and 
I.E. Lipscomb, The History Of Kenya Agriculture, 
(Nairobi 1974).
3. See. I. Ma.cleod, 'Britain's future policy in Africa', 
Weekend Telegraph, 12 March 1965>
4* - Statements by Oliver Stanley (1943) H.C. 391,
; Col. 48 and I. Griffiths (1950) H-.C. 477, Col-13.88.
5- Prepared by A.B. (later Sir Andrew) Cohen, at the 
time. Permanent Under Secretary,, Colonial Office 
Africa Division; the outcome was the Creech lones 
despatch on 'local government, 1948.
6. 'Cited by Lee, op.cit., p; 79, which see for
further comment. Also see, post, p.431 !
7. . M. Blundell, ,So Rough a Wind (London 1964) p. 115.
8* Ibid, p. 266; according to Blundell, a Tory M.P. 
expressed the prevailing mood with the memorable 
.words 'what.do I care about the **** settlers, let
them bloody well look after themselves.'
9. Macleo<i? op.cit.
10. I. Macleod, 'Blundell's Kenya', Spectator,
; 20 March 1964.
11. Kenya Weekly News, 21 August 1959, p. 20.
12. Governor's address to Legco., 12 December 1959*
13. Personal discussion with Sir John Macpherson, 
Permanent Under Secretary.
14. ‘ Conference of East African Governors at Chequers,
January 1959 (see Blundell, op.cit., p. 261.).
15. Listowel, op.cit., p. 167;: 'Twining's successor 
... knew the realities of modern Africa'; see
. also similar comment J. Hatch 'Bright Star of 
Africa', New Statesman, 12 September 1959*
417.
16. This was not always :easy; ^ ^  f cch ;X959;.a prisis
. arose when Nyerere, to retain the confidence of
his. followers, demanded self-government before the 
' end of the:year, adding ..that failure to meet the 
demand would resuit. it1 a campaign of mass di's-.
■ obedience. .Being, unable, to meet this .demand,; 
Turnbull had to produce other concessions.
17. Hailey (1956) op.cit., p. 302.
In 1952v 69.6 per cent, of the Europeah population 
were.,British suboects; ‘Census 1952, op.cit.
In Northern province annually 19^8-52 there,.whs .a . 
shortfall.in the labour supply with the, po sition 
gradually growing, worse*. Northern - Province Labour ...
Utilization- 1 Board Report: (Lar/es Salaam" 1952) -
20:. According to the 1952 cehsua,.’less ; thah one third.
' of the European populatioh^had-f-'b'eeh. ihthe Territory 
%;;• h,; for more than five years ;(Census Appendix JII)."
■ 21. C.f., Bayldon, TLC 26 sess., ;p. 2Q8... ‘ ' ^
22. Houri, loc.cit., p. 219*  ^\
' 23.7 . Report of the (Lidbury) Commission on' the Civil
Services of the East African Territories and the ■
EAHC (London 1954). . ;v:~ , - . :
24. ' As a result of: settler ,’prbtest, . Colonial1191. was;
X replaced by Colonial 210.) " = ' - v ' V :.;
.2.5*:; The -decision to: form- the TEC was taken at Dodoma.
. in October 1949. ' • ) .> '.
26. Tanganyika Standard., 5 July ;I949'X >p . v'-
27. The chairman was. the Member. for Lav/ and Order; X',
. for. a full account; of sthe;rC.ommittee ,s. work,,, see; ;
Xl.h. Bates, Tanganyika under British AdministrationX' 
Thesis held at Rhodes House .Oxford* - '■*
28. Known as the -cockshy1 the substance’ of Twiningfs .
■ memorandum wa^dischssed'in the Lake‘Province;' r .
,■ Council in De c ember 1949 ;, se e al s o Tanganyika.
Standard, 5 December 1949. ’ p * X
29. Griffiths, H.C. 474, Col. 94*0. .;
3.0 * Mitchell., op .cit ., p. 219;; see also Inter- ' ; T
Territorial Organization in East Africa, (Col. 191) 
(London 1943) , p* 8. ■,
31. B.C. Phillips, was :Chairman of Tanganyika Packers. V ■ 
Ltd; Brigadier W. .Scupham; was an¥ex-administrative 
V,officer. , ) B°tb were'subsehuentXy knighted for 
X  services :to Tanganyika. .  ^ 7 ^ .
18.: 
19* ■
3.2. TLC 2.6 sess. pp. 168 and 174
33. Twining, tape-recorded interview, held at Foreign 
and Commonwealth: Office, Library.
34. Governor1 s address,/ TLC 50, sess. 20 April 1955*
35* ' VMH, 1931v p.6 ; on the demand for intervention
see East Africa and Rhodesia, 13 September 1951*
36. East Africa and Rhodesia, 18 October 1951*
37. E.E. (later Sir Eldred) Hitchcock, 1887-1959;.
arrived .Tanga 1937 ; . MLC 1955-1958, sea --'"~
V. Bartlett, 1Struggle for Africa1, (London 
1953) v P* ,206.
38. His brother was a Director of Stirling Astaldi V  
Ltd., a.firm which undertook.several-major road 
building contracts with the Tanganyika .government.
39. The Declaration was: eventually ratified at the
Salima (Hyasaland.) Convention in 1956. . Dr.J.H. 
Oldham, chairman of one,of the London'Capricorn 
committees'based his,book, Hew Hope, in Africa, 
on the Capricorn ideals, C.A.S. files, 15> 16.
40. . Kidaha Makwaia, Chief of Hsiha, Shinyanga-
district until he resigned in 1952. ’ Appointed 
< MLC and became the first African member of
;• A Executive Council. Member of the 1954 Royal ■
Commission on East Africa.;;;
41. East Africa and Rhodesia, 18 June. 1953 * p. 1351*
42. C.f. J. Hatch, Hew from Africa (London 1956) p. 53
43. Professor W.J.1 Mackenzie; • see Constitutional 
Development" Commission Report of" the - Special^• 
Commissioner (Par es Salaam 1953)V
44. Colonial Secretary, confidential telegram 
■ No. 206 dated 4 April 1956.
-45. Committee regarding election qualifications,
Paper No. 1 of 1957 (Dar es Salaam 1957)•
46. Twining, despatch No. 117Q, dated 23 November 1956
47* Ibid.
48. TLC 33 sess. 17 September .1957•
49. I.E.G. Bayldon, MLC 1952-1958, member of Executive 
Council; ^Stirling,, letter, to Johnston and Tyrell 
dated 2 November 1955j. CAS 11/15*
419
5<X Summarised from statement published in East 
Africa and Rhodesian 1 March 1956.
51* &ee VMR 1957, p. 13; the Mission was. told 
that the total number of enrolled members 
was about 10,000,
'52, TEC 32 sess, p, 99*
•55, Personal communication from a UfP committee 
■ member. r '
54. H.C. 5.69, Col., 761.
55* 1wining» confidential meeting with JECAB
Executive Council, 5 September 1956.
56. For comment on possible merger, see Tanganyika
Standard , 26 June 1958; negotiations ended 
abruptly when the news was leaked to the Press.
57* JECAB meeting, loc.cit..
58. Earl De Ea Warr at Annual General Meeting, 1957*
59. A. Jamal, as reported by East Africa and 
Rhodesia., 25 September 1958.
60. Ante, p.348 also refers.
61. , Economist, 26 October 1957, P* 300.
62. N.K. Japhet in Manas , (Calif PLUS*A.) 12 December
1956. -
63* E.g., .'Nobody asks him to give up his sisal
estates... he should only give up the privilege 
of being regarded as a special Tanganyikan1',
J .10. Nyerere in Kenya Weekly News, 19 September 
1959.
64. "Particularly on the subject of representation;
; the Northern province settlers continued pressing 
0 for. communal representation, which.TNS and UTP 
r opposed. ;
65. After the elections a Capricorn Newsletter 
congratulated 'members Bryceson and Chesham,on
;their electoral successes', in spite of their 
close association with TANU, CAS Newsletter 17/58.
66.: ;Although -Stirling resigned the leadership of the
; Capricorn Society in.1958, he maintained close
contacts with successive Colonial Secretaries,
,1 {including Macleod.
67. . Chairman' s ' statement., Annual General Meeting I960.
68.
69-
70-
71-
72-
73- 
74.
Better dated 9 August I960 from a settler
to Capricorn Office, CAS/11/97-
Turnbull, Swearing in of Ministers, 1 July
1959 (Par es Salaam 19599/ ”■ .
Confirmed by the fall in man days lost through
strikes; in I960, 1.49 million, reduced to
74,000 in 1961. .■
Chairman's statement to Annual General Meeting.
Ibid
JECAB files, final entry. V
:(;i) Race relations were.adversely affected in 
1962 by publicity when four 'arrogant'. 
Europeans were deported and by a spate of 
provocative editorials in the vernacular: 
press.
(ii) Extremists in TANU gained a temporary
advantage with the 'reorganization' of the 
government following Nyerere1 s. resignation: 
as Prime Minister in the same year.
CHAPTER XXII
COLONIAL POLICY:: : •SOME CONSEQUENCES ,
At the beginning, it was emphasised;that land { , 
usage during the colonial period., was profoundly affected by 
government policies;. Nevertheless, frotti .the, description of. 
the events and. pressures .which influenced the decisions .. 
affecting agricultural development^during vthe period under 
reviewV it- is, evident that at different, times{there were 
important; changes{ in priorities. Hence, if explanation of
.patterns of iand usage is attempted,;the point in time is 
important; no one' conceptual model could{portray with any 
accuracy the variety .of factors which at all times determined 
the crucial relationship between Man and Land. Instead, a 
series, of constructs would be necessary, taking into account. 
innovations, in farming organization and the consequences of 
a combination.of greater financial resources: and improved 
technical knowledge. .{ Change in the African sector of the 
agricultural system was particularly affected;by government: 
policies as acquired knowledge, more finance, more staff, 
and an improved infrastructure- permitted a gradual release 
from the tyranny of the environment so that the.underlying \ 
mechanism governing the development of spatial'patterns has 
to be explained, to an ever-increasing extent, in;political 
terms set in a world context. ,1For Africans the tangible 
signs of colonial rule {represented a' decisive break with 
their past; the infrastructure - of communicationsmarket, 
organization and the various. services, provided the foundation
on which Africans themselves would build., after independence; 
on the other hand the colonial presence in the Territory was , 
of such short duration and contact, with non-Africans so 
limited that it is doubtful whether it affected more than 
superficially the basic, cultural continuity in many of the : 
African communities. Nevertheless, among historians the: 
debate will no' doubt continue; either the colonial period 
is an episode of African history to which the various 
indigenous communities made the necessary adaptations or, 
on the other hand, it introduced a disruptive element with 
such traumatic consequences that in the post-independence 
era political and social structures need psychological 
decolonisation.
These arguments may be relevant in the case of 
many newly-independent African states when explanations of 
social behaviour are sought; in the case of Tanganyika, 
both are valid when the post-independence developments in 
the agricultural sector are considered. On the one hand, 
in the rural areas an essential continuity could be discerned, 
not only in attitudes and perceptions, but also in the 
planning'of innovations. On the other, the leaders were 
well aware of the need to assert new values before too many 
people had a vested interest -in preventing change. The 
two strands came together in the creation of the Utjamaa 
settlements, combining-the knowledge gained by past, experience 
with a new ideology, based on the desire to make the term 
‘African socialism1 more than empty rhetoric. Whereas the 
latter was the product of African reaction to colonial rule, 
the former was the consequence of an equilibrium maintained
between the different sectors of the colonial, agricultural 
system. , " ; , ; .
• For this reasbh, it,helps,to understand the 
foundations on which innovation,<couldbe based and the - 
events which led to the development;of the dual, and later, 
the triple, system of agriculture in the Territory. Each 
situation which developed was .linked to the one which 
preceded it.and.explanations of the phenomena Of the 
present are best,found by genetic study* -Although the’ 
utility of.this approach has been questioned^ from events in 
Tanganyika it is evident.; that .innovating policies; have often 
been limited or influenced by the situation resulting from 
previous, decisions; in . particular., where/environmental
andvspatial factors limited choices in, land usage policies . 
it was found to be unwise to embarkOn ma^or projects without 
the benefit of past, experience;• or'- of adequate’research. In .
• anyjstudy of land;usage during the colonial period in Africa 
the Conclusions are likely to be incomplete,unless there is 
an.understanding of the political and .social factors which 
■- determined the course of development; " f orxthese. are nearly 
as important as ’ the various practical steps taken in'the'”' ’• 
.Territory after,1945 which led to a rapid expansion of the 
agricultural sector, a development already ably described 
by others.. Hence it is necessary to f inish, by summarising 
the ma^or aims of colonial policy; to, which substantive 
agricultural policies were always subordinated and the 
changes in the.cultural landscape which resulted from these 
policies. v It is, then.possible to assess the political;and 1, 
social consequences of implementing these; policies and the
economic structures which had developed at. the time of 
independence.
Aims, achievements and consequences
There is no satisfactory answer to the question 
concerning the degree, of Colonial Office control over 
events in any of the territories administered, by Britain.
As with other,African colonial dependencies, after 1945 the 
administration in Tanganyika was more effectively supervised 
than in the past; this was made possible by the increase in 
the number of committees and advisory bodies working within
the Colonial Office and was stimulated by M.P.s showing ...
more interest in African affairs as well as more critical , 
international comment. But supervision is essentially
negative and in the post-war period the new emphasis On the 
government's role in economic development made it more 
necessary than ever before to ensure that budgetary policies 
were appropriate. Nevertheless, even when the Territory's' 
annual estimates gave cause for misgiving, the Colonial 
Office officials could do nothing about it. When this 
occurred in 1947, it was observed that by the time the
details were received in London it was already too late to
,  . 4insist on changes being made. .
In order to comprehend the.Colonial Office 
'thinking' it is necessary to make assumptions from the 
public statements of Colonial Secretaries and Governors. 
Within the guide-lines imposed by substantive aims of 
British policy for Tanganyika, the local administration,
devised their own empirical policies. In the case of 
agriculture, these were subjected to the environmental, 
limitations already: described, but .were adapted to meet  ^ :
new demands, to make use of newly-found knowledge and to 
exploit new opportunities. -The substantive aims mentioned . 
above can' '.lie -discerned 'without’- 'difficulty and can be briefly 
summarised.; Before 19597 the aim was to govern in accord­
ance with the spirit and'letter of the Mandate and to take 
precautions against the German threat;;-- after 1945, it was 
to. encOurage; economic development and prepare, without undue 
haste, 'for self-government. Throughout-the period of V 
British control,;it was necessary to Observe.the iron law 
of colonial .self-sufficiency, imposed by the British Treasury.
Oolonisation, the. Settlement of British nationals 
in. theTerritory en. a permanent basis, was encouraged if it 
contributed to these fundamental' '.aims.. The only time that , 
.it.was considered desirable for political, reasons was when 
the German threat was perceived-and required counter-measures. 
In' retrospect, the decision, to step up alienation after.1945 
has caused more, controversy than was apparent at the time; 
Greech tones, .having decided that//settlement might aid the 
Territory’s economy, was able to reassure those who feared r 
the consequences of settle! influence.' It must be 
remembered, that in 1947, no one; could foresee- the extent 
of the sisal boom and, the immediate concern was to achieve., 
self-sufficiency in cereals* In short, settlement was . 
encouraged while it was expedient; with, no freehold grants 
or 999 year leases, it cannot be concluded that there was 
any attempt’ to, impiantVa white community on a..permanent basis.
Moreover, the colonial administration was.able
to steer the Land Settlement Board on a course which took
account of the intention to expand,the non-African sector
on one hand and of African anxiety on the other* The -
number of applicants for land was never so large that it
was necessary to yield to pressure and permit more alienation
than was deemed expedient; at the same time there were
enough would-be farmers to make it unnecessary to offer extra
inducements in the form.of subsidies or grants. When prior :
to independence applications for land diminished substantially,
there was cause for satisfaction; the economic contribution
which might be expected from new settlers had become
progressively less important as more funds than ever before
were allocated for expanding other methods of commercial
farming. In social terms, too,'there were no advantages
now from increased white settlement; the 'contact' theory
had been made irrelevant for a number of reasons. The
increasing opportunities to obtain formal education provided
a more direct way of changing attitudes and customs; the'
enlarged natural resources departments were better able to
furnish information and advice; the Department of Community
Development was expanded and extended its operations in the
more remote rural areas; finally, there was a substantial
increase in the. activities’of the Christian missions,
thereby providing one of the most important forms of
, 5
contact with African communities,
in the preceding chapters it was opportune to 
consider the consequences of colonial agricultural policies 
in Tanganyika in the. context both' of their economic effects
and .of-their' influence on the growth of African nationalism-.
In the case of the latter, it has.been pointed out that 
policies unpopular- with rural communities gave African. . 
political leaders a tactical weapon which they exploited 
to'good effect during the period of confrontation with 
colonial authority. Nevertheless, the consequences of 
colonial policy in the long term are of greater importance 
and .require further explanation. ' ,
In retrospect, it is evident that after 1945 the ' 
Colonial- Office insisted on the'adoption of policies which 
not only repealed the political limitations of colonial 
administration but also; provoked an African reaction which 
was to influence.post-independence agricultural policy.
The many facets of development policy were always inter­
connected and problems arose because innovations.could not 
be introduced piece-meal in an orderly fashion. Long before 
the dissolution of the British. Empire was contemplated,
Oliver Stanley had placed on -record the plan for the 
dependent territories, observing that ’political development
towards self-government had to follow investment in education
' -‘ 0  , 1 
and economic development*. I-Ils ..successors at the Colonial
Office were soon to be persuaded that there was no question ., 
of political change being delayed until the other aims had 
been fulfilled. Independence granted to India and Pakistan 
created expectations in other, dependent territories which had 
at least to be recognized; . in Tanganyika, more than else­
where, innovation leading to political development was \
necessary if Britain.was to be able to justify her stewardship 
. Thus, in line with other dependent territories, the
428.
.^government of Tanganyika exchanged Its negative, 'protective 1 
;.role . after ,1945 for: more/constructive policies. /This;fAct'//-'// 
-and the progressIve\rejaction:of>the device of indirect rule- / : . 
which operated £n much of the .Territory combined' to bring- 
about a change; in'African attitudes to colonial rule. They - . / ':
•wer# / far •more ';;compie:x/''an>dV:-«3iduriiig than what might be ; :i:; 
attributed' to a temporary resentment ' at alien:•■rule-. The.
; development of agricultural policies after-independence 
VrefXects/a continuing/awareness , of the colonial experience: - I ,
as well as a handed-down .aceeptance of the shortcomings of ..
traditional farming-practices:.! . ., ' , ,v -/ J ■■■/// ,
.: . CoioniaSlagr£buitural policy, was/based on the need .//' 
to; continue with the dual system , with the expectation that ; 
the African sector would contribute a progressively increasing ?/
; proportion of the total amount of'cash crops. - The searching 
investigations cfl^he/Royal -COnmission had led. to its. members '. 
expressing- their confidence that the African sector of the 
/agricultural. -System-"frouldbe‘ modernized/through the eff orts •
of the .existing extension services once' the traditional! -
pattern.^  of land .tenure was changed; In; turn, the World/Bank ■ ;
► . Mission ■ while' agreeing the argument, amended it in/the
. light Of changed .political , clrcumstahces, and the observed 
results' of.later experiments in land usage. /; It was . / j
suggested:-that; the policies being followed, needed to /be / /;
; supplemented by a more radical plan of action; the Mission's 
. .report’recommended the adoption of/the, 'imprpyement1 /
/approach, aimed.ht/porsuading peasant farmers'to change, 
methods/and attitudes and the;. Ifransformation1. policy ,
■//., requiring close control; pf land: use when' new land was made /■
. ;  : 7  ' ' - /  ' ‘ • ' • 1 • ' ' 'V available. ■; The latter, prescription found, favour with 
the African leadership after, independence for a number of 
'reasons,, technical?. social,and; political. They • are
important, not only because they were the consequence of 
colonial policies but also because they illustrate the 
variety of the factors which affect the crucial relationship 
between Man and the land he cultivates.
First, 'the technical reasons for adopting the 
transformation approach require little in the way of further 
explanation. Except where perennial crops were grown, 
peasant farming organization had been linked with' small 
cash incomes and usually-with-soil deterioration. Group 
farming schemes, although they had often not been well 
supported and- had proved difficult to administer, could 
nevertheless provide some genuine economies of scale as 
well as the opportunity for effective/supervision. Further­
more, much of the land destined1 to become available for
/farming would be based on Irrigation schemes which would 
require farming practices to be more closely supervised 
than was necessary in the dry-farming areas. More important, 
by 1959 the T.A.C, experiments had/begun to provide some hope 
that-supervised schemes would eventually be both popular- and 
profitable. Finally,,the opening up of new land offered 
opportunities for enterprising Africans to use modern equip­
ment, and farm larger,.areas; by copying the methods adopted 
on the estates and with the added.advantage of expert advice 
from the extension services, there was every likelihood that 
the farmer, who was prepared, to take risks would usually find 
his efforts rewarded.
But to N^ re'rere and his colleagues,•the 
transformation approach was attractive since it provided 
an , opportunity to show that independence made it possible... 
to introduce new policies and to question the generally- 
accepted view that progress depended on Africans adopting 
commercial attitudes to farming. The perceived need was 
to create a national identity and tp put an end to the 
thoughtless admiration of European technical andi. cultural 
superiority.
Such attitudes, which caused Nyerere much 
irritation, had developed rapidly after the second-world . 
war. At a time when a number of new policies had to be 
implemented, the civil service received an influx of newly-, 
recruited expatriates; most df them were freshly discharged 
from the Forces, a fact which set them apart from the old 
hands. Posted to remote areas, they had little under­
standing of traditional customs or patience with a more 
leisurely attitude to life. Progress, they said or implied, 
could only be achieved if European standards were adopted.
At the same time, Africans were discovering the1 economic 
advantages of a formal, westernised education and soon there 
was more prestige in having attended a secondary school than . 
that formerly accorded to a ’swahili1.
Ihe consequences were two-fold. Muslim 
organizations formed their own pressure group and for a 
time exercised a divisive influence within 1ANU.' Secondly, 
at a time when the sudden event of independence made it 
necessary to create a national identity without delay, some 
form of. protest became necessary whenever expatriate advisers
appeared to assume that modernization was synonymous, with, 
the adoption of European customs -and attitudes. Nyerere's 
• speeches after independence criticising colonial rule contain 
many more references to 'humiliation1 than to economic 
injustice or neglect. On one occasion he observed:
'Of all the crimes of colonialism:there is none 
worse than the attempt to make us believe we had 
no indigenous culture of our own and :what we did 
have was worthless.’iq
But this retrospective resentment was more than.an appeal
to national pride; . it helped to reassure the middle-rank
,TANU leaders, most of whom had had little opportunity for ■'t*‘
. achievement within the. colonial bureaucracy. Many of
these suspected,- that although they had been in the fore-:. .
. front of the.independence struggle, they would be .supplanted
by men who had obtained a better formal education.
Nevertheless, observations' about the past had to. 
be translated, into something -more positive, if independence 
was to. be seen as more than the exchange of one: elite for 
another.. Thus.:"Nyerere's well-known explanation of African 
.socialism; went, further, than reminding his, followers of. the 
value of the communal loyalties and social obligations of 
traditional society. It constituted' an attack on the
basic tenets, .of western liberalism, whereby political, 
economic or social restraints on individual liberty should . 
be as few as possible. Colonial administration had been 
anchored on the assumption that economic development and the 
improvement of living standards would be achieved, on the 
one hand by encouraging private investment, which would 
create wealth and on' the other, by supporting those Africans 
.who were prepared to emulate the foreign entrepreneurs with
whom they, came- in' contact.'**:?  ^fhe Royal Commission Report ,
the result .of a,,searching' .inquiry by acknowledged experts,
.did- not*' challenge.’'these- ‘.hsshmptipns'h the contribution of 
the' non-African se.ctor: to; the - net money product was 
ackhOjWledged ahd:;it;::was recommended that enterprising
Africans, ’who Wanted to live differently from their
■ ’ i 14. : - ■
neighbours1, -needed encouragement. , This was. forthcoming; 
aid was given to the 'progressive:* farmer and annual /
.1 competitions were instituted to name the most'successful.- 
.(The advocates of the new socialist philosophy : 
looked askance, at this support for individuals who sought 
personal gain, and,Nyerere1s arguments repeated more force­
fully. his:past' opposition: to attempts to implement the Royal 
Commission's proposals for’individualization of land owner­
ship.- h .InVl.95'8-;he"' had1 warned that if a freehold system, was; 
intrdduced- 'it: would be Just possible that within eighty or 
. :a hundred, years, all the land in fanganyi^a would belong,to 
. wealthy immigrants and the local people would .be. tenants.1 
A t :the time his fear'seemed exaggerated since the government 
had already confirmed thatcontrol over1 transfers of land.. 
v-would be retaihed^where, transactions involved Africans and 
inon-Afripans;; . - . nevertheless, if multi-racialism required - 
the. abolition of discriminatory laws, the situation might 
"-■'we.ll ‘have'dhahgecLi '.Now:,:, with ,independence achieved, it ..
. . was -evident • that :;it: wasvnot; enough to re ject " the proposals 
inr-the' 1958:;,Whit.§ Raperp ■....’instead* -it was decided to 
hationalise -the freehold lands, most of which had been 
granted during.the German-period and to convert ,them into 
government leases for a period- of 99 years.
. . v ;  ^  .v 1 '.v ‘:  ^ v
But in addition to,, 'changing the law, it was.-felt;: -
necessary to question the motives :6f the all too"few African
entrepreneurs and Nyerere argued that attitudes encouraged1
by.colonialism had to be attuned to new conditions:
'In the.old days the’African, had' never aspired ; •. \v. = ' '
= to the. possession of personal wealth for .the 
purpose of. dominating any of his: fellows. He 
. had never had labourers, or 'factory hands' to 
do his work for him.'
But for the time; being, no objection was made to non-Africans
engaging in commercial .farming and, two years later, -with the
publication of the Five Year flan, more land was promised to
estate owners,who increased output'and, where applicable,
took African-grown produce for processing. Nevertheless,.
the. ideofogical,.guidelines had to be prescribed and the
colonial .capitalist: thesis had to matched with the socialist
antithesis, duly provided1 with a cultural slant. Even so,■
the’new:philosophy was at first of more interest to foreign
diplomats and the. academic world than to the great majority
of African farmers; to reach-the rural areas, it was, .
. necessary to: translate, it into specific policies;which could
be acted upon. .
The consequence was a synthesis between ideology/ 
and the 'technical advice, expressed in the form,of the 
decision to adopt the.transformation approach suitably 
tailored to meet post-independence exigencies. What emerged 
V'was - more than -'gust; .another attempt at group farming or 
supervised; smallholder. schemes following the f AC model.
Instead, it wasipfanned to start farming settlements in 
whichthe-residents Wbuld liye in compact villages, where 
they could enjoy a.;comparatively high standard of services,
- ’ /'v" ■ ■ ' - ■ ■ • : / ■ '
and where they ccruld easily be mobilized to support the
" ' 22 local. I'ANU organization. The aim was to counteract the
lure of the towns by making rural life more comfortable;
even if the. income return for the residents was no better
than the norm - a s  the World Bank Mission had warned would
probably be the case with most supervised settlement schemes
“the political advantages seemed substantial.’
In addition, the. 'villagisationf.plan could assist
in resolving another problem. Independence had stimulated
interest in hundreds, of .'self-help’ schemes,, an indication
of the public's willingness to support nation-building
projects. Some of these schemes1 had been farming settle-
: ments started as a result of the initiative of local party
.officials; most of them needed supervision if they were not
to fail and. damage the party image.,, Again, the popular
enthusiasm for participating in. self-help schemes could be
utilized in building the new settlements with facilities for
all the services which would prove that independence had
brought, progress. On the other hand,-the safer and less
spectacular improvement approach offered far less. Where
it was successful it would lead to progressive class
differentiation,, undermining national unity and conflicting
with avowed ;socialist principles; where it failed, an
impoverished peasantry would feel that independence had
brought nothing new and the familiar contrast between urban
and rural,life-styles, noted elsewhere1 in Africa, would have
led to resentment. ^ Ihe inevitable, consequence, so it
, seemed, would be the growth of populist forces,, the radical
democracy associated with peasant revolts, thereby weakening
the. party and threatening the image of a united nation.
The twin .aims of implementing the transformation 
policy and v.illagization were entrusted to a Rural Settle­
ment Commission and the 196*4- I'ive Year Plan provided funds 
on a generous scale. fen pilot village settlements were 
started, planned by the Village Settlement Agency, the. 
executive arm of the Commissiph; in’addition, a number of 
.co-operative and irrigation schemes were made the respons- , 
ability of., thd Agency.; No -rigid commitment to collective ■’ 
farmingwas prescribed and instead much depended on what ■ 
crop was,..being grown. Ihus at the Kabuku settlement,
established to-grow sisal, land was held and cultivated on
■ ■ ■ '' ■ * 'r ' -v' : . 25an individual basis but cutting, was organized .collectively.
The usual practice was to allocate plots to residents for
growing their own food and to cultivate the main crop on a
collective basis, particularly if a saving.in tractor costs
could be achieved. But the results were disappointing; in
spite of the lavish allocation of . funds and staff,' both of
which could have been employed more profitably elsewhere,
;most of the settlements never looked like becoming viable
; and there were many instances of friction between the farmer
residents and the supervising government staff. After
three years;it was decided that no new pilot village settle-.
ments would be created and those already established would
either’be reorganized or closed down. Announcing this
"surprise'decision, the second Vice-President observed that
people in the settlements had shown far less enthusiasm than
those in unassisted schemes and that 'they are full of
complaints and expect the government’ to give them everything.
But if these schemes, based on the premise that efficient
production was. Only possible with close supervision, .were . * 
unable to: provide promise of eventual successy. at the: same,. 
time -the Ruyumafsettlements were demonstrating thatwith ' : 
good'.leadership, much could be achieved. r :It was therefore 
a- logiqul step to^introduce ■ the much-publicised; policy^ of ; At; 
hi am a a villhgesy; based on; voluntary cO“dp;eratioh>hnd ^ communal 
living, rwhere$A;in;Nyerere ‘s words, ‘people.;would ;live and-work :;. 
.together, and govern themselves. ‘ . ry .■ y
^Ihis-digression\intQ:tpost^independen.ce developments; A 
' is necessary for thiee, reasons. ; First,- it illustrates how1 , 
,,.accvunulated-;t';ectoical.>'knowledge-;:Was combined with-^a;developing 
ideology, itself the product oh the'-previous Apolitical _ .y;
- situation. Secbndy.it shows that, once, again,;the familiar 
f arming lessons^ of the past could be. ignored.and no doubt f 
willcontinueAtoybeigribred. They are. important enough to 
Oustifyianycre^titibn;Aa;hd;;are, as follows: mechanized farming
equipment ownedAcollectively-was usually Uneconomic unless y 
othbaCinputs,oouid‘-’lead to above-average yield's p likewise,
. admihistrafiye>voyerheads or the generous provision of seryib.es 
and amenities tended;-to undermine the* economic viability of •  ^
A settlement schemes unless, their costs were carefully; related A 
to a! profitatiilty' whicH ;oft.en fluctuated : considerably from 
year; to, year. : v - - ‘ . ' =
; ■ V tho ;!Second point is well- illustrated by the example 
of the :IsraelifrUh Agridev schemes started in 1962.^ In 
this, case the aim,Was to establish co-operative villages in 
Sukumalarid which wpre to be self-supporting. Within .three 
years 200 families;hadjoined; the. scheme and 854 acres were. 
cultivated. OOttbn Was'expected to be the main crop.
Irrigation, machinery, pesticides and fertilisers were used 
,and these factors, coupled with the seed improvements 
resulting from pastifesearch, led to phenomenally high, 
outputs per acre.^ In spite of this, the scheme could, 
not be run at a.profit ,and was terminated. . In sharp 
contrast with this .course of events the settler farmer
managing his own. estate knew that if his enterprise.was to.
• - , •* ' - - a - 33
survive he had to keep ..costs to a minimum'. ./ -
Finally, on these controlled settlement schemes.,, 
initial enthusiasm, too of ten gave way 'to* disillusionment. 7.
From the description of the colonial -TAG schemes it is 
evident that the resident farmers were; irritated at the 
supervision which; was exercised; similarly, in the post-, 
independence schemes a, high cash return was the only real 
compensation for the loss of freedom-. A The Agridev schemes 
provided no- such incentive, Cince the profits.were eaten up 
by the overheads. In the pilot village schemes the situation 
was no better; in.sbme of them there wasvan additional 
irritant caused, by. the. policy of insisting on the adoption 
of village lay-outs bf ten at, variance with the residents1 
past experience . ■ it ,is'not easy to describe a typical rural 
village in Tanganyika during the colonial period; however, 
.over, much of the Territory'it is. safe, to state, that once law
. and order, had beenA,established, settlement was evenly ,
. A. > A ’ ' ^ . . ' 5 4
distributed .throughout . an arable area. People, tended to
avoid living Ain,, close proximity because, they preferred it
that way;. Where clusters of . houses were to be; founds it
was usually^because?local custom expected members of the
same family. toHremain together. ■ Such people found” it hard. AAy
/a;/;7;. - ;,y • 77 V ' V ’ " ' /?7'y.lA438.
to adjust to an imposed-lay-out-which provided for a ;more * “ 
Compact settlement. Perversely, in some settlements, the 
residents complained that the houses were expected to/be .too 
scattered.^ / Gathered * settlements are common in the coastal 
areas, where the hblises are usually clustered around the mosque, 
the shops and the fish market and- the same pattern developed -
in some areas further inland; :it was only to be expected
that/farmers recruited from such places would dislike the 
unfamiliar lay-out of the, pilot villages. Nevertheless, if 
the residents had;obtained.a more substantial cash, return and 
if better than average .amenities had-been developed, it seems y  
probable that;the " schemes would have aroused more - enthusiasm ; 
and support. y  V / / , '"p
The;settlement schemes and the Ijamaa villages 
which followed them stand .in sharp contrast\with colonial. 1
agricultural policy which, was based.;,on the assumption that a
the majority of. family"farming;units would gradually become 
more prosperoUsv and enterprising. A ;ln time,' it. was believed, 
that the less efficient would lose their independence; and ; 
become -the;hired labourers ofathe .more, successful. The . 
latter would, prosper ," providing they observed the rules .which 
had proved so difficult to enforcef/A , - A ‘
Underdevelopment; a colonial legacy
AA . An examination of coibnial agricultural strategy . 1
. would he .incomplete .without consideration of its effect on 
other aspects of development* A ,In the case of Tanganyika, 
the two major inquiries into economic.policies conducted by/ ;
the Royal Commission and the World Bank Mission respectively 
drew attention to the:potential of the Territory as well as 
observing that living standards enjoyed by most Africans were 
very low. Both reports emphasised the need for the increased 
production of export crops and the same view prevailed six 
years after independence in the Arusha Declaration. The . 
dual system, and particularly the: expansion'of the non-African 
sector in this system/after 1945* played an important part in 
increasing crop production for sale in the world markets and 
therefore made.a substantial contribution to implementing the . 
broad economic policy. It is only: recently that it has been , 
suggested that the. private investment which enabled the non- 
African sector to expand was also the cause of the undeveloped 
state of the Territory at the time of independence or, as some 
would prefer to call it, a state of underdevelopment.
These terms can be. misleading and some definition 
is necessary. A closed society with no external trading 
contacts, stagnating in isolation can be termed: 'undeveloped'.;, 
in Tanganyika at the end of the colonial period there were a 
few communities in the more remote areas which fitted this 
description but their.size and number render them insignif­
icant. But in the sense that pre-capitalist modes of 
production predominatedy : the Territory was undeveloped; as 
late as 19.58* the; agricultural and livestock subsistence 
sectors were still substantially larger than the respective
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monetary sectors. If the change from , a subsistence to a ' 
market economy provides the. basis for development, the 
contribution of the estates to making this change possible 
must be examined. They provided work for over half the
total number of. wage earners in the Territory, thereby 
increasing the diffusion of knowledge* and the circulation .
58
of currency. On the other hand, because they provided
a large proportion of the export crops it was less necessary 
for the government to take more positive measures to increase 
the production of cash crops in the African sector. . But. 
unless it is suggested that coercion might have been employed 
in the interests .of the community at large, without specific, 
proposals the argument remains conjectural. Obviously, in 
some areas, farmers would have responded to more.assistance 
and encouragement as the 'increased productivity schemes' 
demonstrated; in others,.however, the attitude persisted -
and still persists -that effort should be related to a
■ ^9 .'
'.target* income. y
8ince.it was widely believed that Africans 
preferred leisure to wealth, there seemed little purpose in ; 
questioning the wages structure prevailing on estates and 
plantations; if the target income theory was correct, any 
action by the government which caused wage levels to rise 
might have contributed to a labour shortage. Thus wages, 
particularly those paid to unskilled labourers,' remained 
very low until the' Trade,-. Union,movement was sufficiently 
organized to negotiate better terms.. The main reasons for 
low rates were, as follows. First, there was the slow rise 
in the rural per capita purchasing power and the large 
subsistence sector;, as. a.consequence the average peasant 
farmer, unless he was fortunate enough to be able to grow . 
perennial- crops; earned less than most wage earners.in towns 
and,often no more than, the labourer on a sisal estate.1*’0 It
has been observed that .only the return obtainable, from
growing maize was above the/average daily wage of a labourer
• ' ' A y  . V  ■ '"• - . ' A 'mi •' A
in. the;agricultural industry. Second, since after 1945
there was a steady inflow of recruits for the estates from
neighbouring territories, it was less necessary than in the
past for,the owners and managers, to offer more generous
A AA 42 • • a.'- ;. . y, y
wages. -Finally,/.the Provincial Wages Boards exercised
a,pervasive influence, since every year they decided the
'Aa-: • - A., ■■-Ay . A ' ■' . ■ - ' - 45 - ■
minimum wage rates for government, employees.
. From a study of the wages structure in' 19.52, it
is apparent that there were some enormous differentials;.
for' example, a labourer on a Mufindi tea estate was paid
a basic wage of 18 shillings a month, approximately a
quarter of that paid, to an African'clerk and one hundredth
■ 'v A / . '■''/■ ■ • , -.A' 44
of the salary of an expatriate estate manager. . On the
sisai estates wagesAwere not much^higher; being the largest
agricultural industry the wage scales influenced those paid
by other estate owners. But in fact the wage levels were
not So inequitable as might first seem the case, owing to /
the mechanisms of the subsistence sector. Although the
basic/rates quoted above were low, they were supplemented
• by inducements for those who were prepared to work regularly.
This however rarely happened; the majority of the unskilled
■labour, force, if they.brought their wives with them to the
estates, spent much of their time obtaining a second income
by engaging in.a variety of commercial activities. It was
not until after independence that it became the practice.to;
punish persistent absentees and thereby bring about a
reduction of:the reserve labour force carried by most, estates.
The'single man,, usually, having no second income, would work
more regularly and would earn a higher wage than the norm*
But often his objective was to earn a specified, sum and then
to terminate his employment* The high turnover scarcely
made for efficiency and, to the extent that development
required a change to a money economy, the wage earners on
the estates were.acquiring little surplus cash to spend and
thereby to introduce new consumption patterns. At the time,
however, this did not seem important; vestigial support for
.the contact theory led administrators to approve of any
arrangement whereby some of the under-employed in their
districts left to work elsewhere. Exploitation, it was
believed, existed not on the estates but in the villages
where the women were expected to bear the major share of
46the work burden.
It is more difficult to assess whether the dual 
system of agriculture, caused underdevelopment. It is a 
term lacking a precise definition and before it is applied 
to Tanganyika at the time of independence, some explanation 
is necessary. It is sometimes used to denote the transit­
ional stage between a traditional society and the establish-. 
ment of a 'modern' economy; it is also used comparatively, 
when the economies and wealth of different countries are 
contrasted. If either of these meanings of the word! is 
accepted, Tanganyika was underdeveloped at the time of 
independence. In view of the many factors already described, 
environmental, historical and spatial, the existence of the 
dual system cannot have been the cause of a situation which 
existed at the beginning of the colonial era before the
estates and plantations were established. However, in
yet another meaning given to the word, a more detailed
examination of the effects of the dual system is necessary.
Underdevelopment, within the, meaning currently
attributed to it, describes the situation in a country which
has to endure a position.of servile dependency on a
'developed' state and its economy and its inf restructure*
are distorted, in most' cases in order to benefit an indigenous.
/ ■ ■ i±n ‘
elite or expatriate investors; ( inevitably, excessive 
profits are extracted and little or no improvement in the 
living standards of the, majority of the,population is 
possible.. ,When;'this situation is combined with a risings 
population and inefficient methods of cultivation., the 
situation gets worse. It has been argued that the solution 
is to reject the;iopg-accepted arguments that an inter­
national division of labour can be nothing but beneficial :
4 to" all concerned.'A. ;It is not enough to" increase, the export. Z 
of raw materials,or to develop import-substituting
industries; if.foreign capital has to be offered attractive
A ■ ' . A ■ ’ ’ -A ’ ' A . ' - mg ■
terms to achieye-this objective.. It has been asserted
that foreign.investment, was responsible for underdevelopment
in Tanganyika and it Is therefore appropriate to consider
whether such investment'in the agricultural sector was a
contributory factor in slowing down development and in
' A* - A A-.*, ■ - , . 49 '
causing a distortion, of the . economic system. v
Certainly growth was*- the, consequence of such
investment and - as has: been observed on numerous occasions -
'growth1, needs,.fo be distinguished from 'development1. '. In :
. Tanganyika during the pre-independence decade both were staking
: place and events moved too rapidly for any judgment to be 
: made on whether the'distinction was important or likely to 
become important. For this period, plantations .were serving 
a>useful purpose in the-efficient .production,, of cash crops;
•the settlers, .whose cohtribut.ibn has -always/been more suspect 
in .the case of annual; crops, nevertheless provided employment 
: opportunities and-helped, substantially, as already explained, 
in making good the short age;/of; cereals which occurred after 
1945. Provided there was diversification and opportunities 
for entrepreneurs in the/ African sector, ike subsistence, 
sector was gradually reduced and a. Change Occurred in the 
spending habits of consumers, development might well have 
continued as a parameter of growth./, But this is speculation 
time did not permit the necessary changes in economic 
structures and attitudes to take place.
. The comprehensive inquiries into development 
problems, conducted at intervals"during the colonial; period, 
all have one point .in common; better road or .rail communi­
cations were, essential if there was to be any improvement in 
living standards. . The. experts seemed to be obsessed with 
the spatial 'problem, the vast distances which had to be 
traversed over /sparsely/inhabited land in order to exploit 
the advantages' of the more fertile areas. Thus a circular 
argument was evolved; ;/ better communications, were necessary 
in order to.extract the Crops/produced and these crops had 
to be' exported in order to pay for the communications. It 
was inevitable/that/the communications network would be 
outward-looking, linking, the, farming areas with the coast and 
the adjacent territories! The critics of the export-
orientated economy point out, that\the -Territory's road: Ay-- , 
system is visible evidence-/of the'.distortion caused by/ the 
wrong' policiesAand.; fhat if^must,/be1 re-designed to suit the A‘, 
change in direction which is/sought/for thp economy. Moving 
the capital -away\froii the coastIs in accord with the re- , 
structuring/ of 'cotomuriicatiCids-Which is now /thought necessary;:
it is//a ref lection ohf the:; neW: approach to development that it :
’ • A"1- ■ V-. ' -A'A '■ :A'< . CQ ,
should: now. be/decided to'/make this move.< Since the non-
African sector was a major cpntributor . in . supplying the*
/export /c/rbps,: it-is: plausible to suggest that the' expenditure 
on roads was, designed:to meet the wishes .of a wealthy-and 
influbhtiai\r/minor,ity* : After 1945 the' expense, not only of 
••constructing roads but /also of /maintaining /them, took a 
progressively larger slice of the - available funds, as 
fable AXXII; shows. / y- A.-AA/' y/y V: - "A A y / ' :
. .:.Bu.t without further elaboration the argument-is • 
untenable bebause the roads were/necessary whatever strategy 
fob :develppmehtVwas/,adopfa"d; A there were only isolated 
instances of f  oadArail^/expenditure being /undertaken primarily 
for/the benefit! Of/non-Africans and production for local A/r 
consumption needed /not only an/efficient marketing organ- 
i^ation^but/alsarthe: capability of'transporting products: 
without- undue difficulty. But- when the: post-war develop­
ment plans/ were made ;themost compelling argument for 
improving,the/main reads was based on the relationship 
between good communications ' and. food supplies. It was the A 
frequent experibnbb of being'dsolated by Impassable roads .
. which lent support to the pOIdcy : of . condoning district self- 
sufficiency which Ain turn prolonged-/ the practice of purely.
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TABLE XXII'
ROAD AND BRIDGE CONSTRUCTION: 
AND MAINTENANCE COSTS •
1948
(£000)
Capital
expenditure,
Roads and.
Bridges 112
Total
capital
expenditure , 996
Recurrent 
expenditure, •
Roads and
Bridges 185
Total
recurrent '
expenditure , 5842
(source:
1950 1955/56 1958/59
(£000) (£000) ,(£000)
1094. , 1172 849
3.438 4084 5159
281 785 970
8127 18491 19527
Tanganyika Statistical 
Abstracts!
■ subsistence .agriculture. ; The remedy,: according to the 
Royal Commission Report, was ’improvement in communications 
and, the removal of all unnecessary obstacles to trade.,'
-A;,'- /The master-plan. for main road* development was;
'based on a grid design, three all-weather;roads running ‘ , 
/north and south, intersected by three running east and west.:. 
Any informed.criticism ;of this basic plan would have to be 
founded, on specificAproposals amounting to an alternative 
strategy for development in which the non-existence of main 
roads.was of,no consequence. This has never been suggested 
and-yet, as Table XXII indicates, the more new*roads are 
conbtrucied and old ones improved, the greater the annual 
maintenance costs will; be.;unless foreign aid or Increased 
revenue , can be obtained there must be an .increasing. drain -;on . 
available resources. . y
Next, it is necessary to consider/whether the 
estates and plantations contributed to the emergence of a 
distorted economyAbytheir labour needs, a situation often 
associated with Atuiderdevelopment-. The argument .hinges on 
the oppoffunity costs, involved when numbers of unskilled.: 
labourers leave their home districts and are therefore unable 
.to contribute, to the process of. development in their own 
villages.; The fact that the annual earnings of an- estate 
labourer were- often moreythan he might have, obtained working 
.at home has already been/noted;, nevertheless, in a mainly 
subsistence economy., his usefulness in a family farming : 
organization can,only be judged after studying work loads /
in the group during the peak season and the length of the
period:of under^employment which so often, exists for the
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rest of the year. Thus recruitment of migrant labour
must be linked With, the: potential ;of the home areas from 
which they name. ' After 1945* these areas .were of two kinds; 
either they were, 'districts, where overcrowding occurred, or 
they contained, a high proportion of land on which cash crops • 
could not;’be grown profitably.' If the recruitment figures 
for. 1.951? a typical year, are studied', -it'wili1 be seen that 
the :districts supplying,most recruits.(excluding those which 
were reception:areas for immigrant workers from Mozambique or 
Ruanda Urundi).were as shown in Table XXIII. In the first 
, two districts, mentioned, in Central province," arable farming, 
produced.meagre returns in much of the area; in the latter 
two, overcrowding in localised areas was the cause of the 
comparatively large.number who left home to seek work on 
estates. At no. time.after 1945 was there any suggestion 
that the exodus was contrary to the.best interests of the 
home communities.' ;
One of the,more common characteristics of under­
development was manifest in the sisal industry in that it 
was entirely owned by foreign private- investors and African 
participation was restricted to the'performance of menial 
tasks. Unlike the tea industry, in which some progress in 
securing. African smallholder participation had been possible, 
the. plantation sisal industry continued to reject any 
suggestion of processing fibre grown outside1the plantations. 
Managers and estate,,owners saw little' advantage in being., 
obliged to accept African-grown sisal; profitable sisal 
growing .required expert management, a fact which was often 
overlooked by those without practical experience. It was 
therefore not: surprising that /the colonial government avoided
TABLE XXIII*
DISTRICTS PROVIDING.THE MOST 
TANGANYIKA-BORN RECRUITS FOR 
- . AGRICULTURAL ,;WORK IN 1951
District Sisal Tea fee,ft farming
Singida - " — • 2401
Dodoraa 1527/ - 113
Mbeya 5532 555 386
Njombe 3433 86
(source: Department of Labour,
Annual Report 1951)
a confrontation with the. powerful TSGA bn the subject of 
smallholder participation* \ it needed,the.revenue it 
derived from the industry, and, if the level of investment 
was to be maintained; it needed to maintain confidence in 
profitability in the. future. After 195.5? when the outlook 
/for sisal became uncertain :it became even.more difficult to 
persuade the estates to enter on experiments for political 
rather than commercial reasons. It was therefore not until 
the end of colonial ..rule was ..certain that smallholder part­
icipation was’ introduced,too late to save the industry from 
nationalization. Thus it is to be expected that., conflicting 
views of the sisal industry; during this period, will continue 
to be aired; , on the one hand, plantation owners for a time . 
made enormous profits, much of. which they spent outside the 
Territory; on the other, in; view of the needto encourage 
investment and the, ever-present possibility that prices 
'would fall to pre-195? levels,. the imposition of, an Export , 
Tax..and a progressive system of personal taxes provided the 
most/practical way of sharing the wealth derived from the 
industry. ' ■. v v - ‘
Finally, it is ■ a'characteristic of the, under-r , 
development: model that!the surplus derived from production 
should be1 utilized for the benefit of the metropole rather 
than,its dependent, territory. ■ It has already been noted 
that a substantial proportion of the profits of the sisal 
Industry left the Territory; the same applied in the case 
-Of other enterprises in that when prof its. were spent, either 
in re-investment or in personal consumption, the benefic­
iaries were usually the overseas suppliers and the local
importers. Nevertheless, the Territorial revenues derived 
benefit in import duties and there was little support for
,  58
adopting a policy of self-sufficiency. More serious 
was the use made of retained earnings; some left the 
Territory by way of a; direct transfer of funds; and much 
of the remainder was invested elsewhere in the world by . the 
commercial banks, acting in their clients' interests. A 
more comprehensive system of exchange control might have 
led to improvement but this was considered impractical and 
counter-productive when the/perceived need was to attract 
further investment.
But even this argument, which only needs to be 
considered in respect of the final decade--:-,of’,the. colonial 
period when;at last wealth was being"created, rests on two . 
questionable assumptions. 1 First, it implies.that public 
expenditure on development projects was adversely affected 
by a lack of funds; and secondly that the non-African 
population could have been made to make up this deficiency. - 
At the time it was believed to be better to adopt a time­
table in executing projects rather than to try to solve the 
technical and administrative problems which, would arise if 
too much was attempted too quickly. Delay was caused more 
often by shortage of technical skill than by a lack of fundsv 
Moreover, local, resources contributed less than half the A 
total amount of development finances, thus reducing the
significance of an increased influx of funds from non- 
60Africans. Secondly, it is.necessary to retain in.perspect­
ive: /the actual*-amount which might have, been raised; the 
Royal Commission pointed out that the capital required by
the East African Railways and Harbours administration was
more than the. entire voluntary savings of the immigrant
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communities of East Africa,. It is unlikely that the 
non-African farmers of Tanganyika represented a large 
proportion of this group.
Thus in the case of Tanganyika, in spite of some
Obvious shortcomings, the decision to continue providing
support.for both sectors of the agricultural system does
not appear to have delayed development before:independence;
conversely, to have expanded the non-African sector with
more determination, in order to secure faster growth would
have'incurred unacceptably high political risks. As it
was, the course of events ran counter to what might have
been predicted; where the distribution of rewards is
unequal, those who receive most will usually increase their
62capacity to influence politxcal institutions. That this
did not happen was due, primarily, to Twining1s handling of 
the events leading to constitutional reform; although he 
was helped by the fact that both in Kenya and’ in London 
the settler lobby were beginning to lose credibility, 
nevertheless,, it was., by his personal authority, that he was 
able to prevent the emergence of any united European 
opposition io his plans.
.. Furthermore, the existence of the dual system was 
never responsible for what some see as a disappointing rate 
..of progress after independence. If explanation is sought, 
it would be more appropriate to consider whether capital 
invested is income-generating, to take account of the many 
new calls on scarce resources which arose after 1961 and
finally to emphasise the need for time in solving the 
various technical and spatial problems which e x i s t . . B u t  
like other/private, investors, the settler-farmers and the 
plantation owners from time to time obtained, concessions or 
were the beneficiaries of government spending; but this 
does hot justify the simple reductionism,implicit■in the, 
argument that since private Investment heeded attractive 
terms it must therefore be inimical to development. Instead 
with the.prbviso that sensible controls are,imposed and 
honest government exists ,/the observation in a' U.N. report 
published twenty years ago is equally valid today:
Ain every territory of Tropical Africa:the main 
impetus to the growth of an exchange economy has 
come from outside, through non-indigenous business 
enterprise and government administrations which 
* have provided the means and incentives to bring 
certain of the products of tropical Africa within 
reach of world markets.1^  /
v With the approval of the Colonial Office, the
government of Tanganyika provided such incentives by the 
decision to honour the German grants of freehold and by, 
alienating land on leases of sufficient duration to 
encourage the lessees' to invest capital in improving their 
holdings. The settler-farmers and the plantation owners 
and managers, although never numerous, have become part of 
the country's history. Their influence on events was 
limited and became progressively less important, in spite 
of their substantial contribution to the Territory's 
revenues. Today, the visible signs of their achievement* 
can still be found, although they are unlikely to endure  ^
in tropical conditions. * OfBritain Itself.it has been 
observed, that; ’the landscape is the fullest and most, certain
of all documents. r It is a, statement worth remembering 
.while all the arguments over aims and motives continue.
It has been suggested, incorrectly, that British 
colonial policy lacked an ideology. In Tanganyika, whatever 
policies Were adopted, the aim throughout the forty years 
under review was to employ the authority of the government . 
to provide the conditions for social change rather, than 
insist on the acceptance of'traumatic innovations. Modern­
isation was to be encouraged, but the measures,to bring it 
about were to depend On the will and the capacity of a 
particular community to adopt them. /..Government interference, 
whether direct or through native authorities was. restricted 
to fundamentals; although a farmer ran. the:risk of 
prosecution if he‘ failed to try, to grow food crops for his 
family, he had. a free choice on'whether to grow cash crops.
It was a .policy.born of necessity; the means of exercising 
coercion were almost non-existent and official edicts were 
seldom successful:in inducing a change :of attitude. It 
required, the • impetus of a national movement.to create the 
organization and the leadership which could insist on 
change.0^
Throughout the colonial period it was assumed . 
that African arable agriculture would have to remain based 
on the family unit of production; however inefficient and 
whatever the threat to the continued fertility of the land, 
it was believed that this type of smallholder farming was 
the foundation of;stability and happiness. The importance, 
of the non-African-sector is that it provided the time 
needed, to try to improve the existing-structure; .if.its
.contribution to the economy had been less, the consequences 
.during the decade of colonial development would have been 
serious. Agronomists will be satisfied that time ran out 
and more radical innovations were adopted; but some, who 
have a more perceptive eye;for human relationships will 
argue that it is no sentimental attachment to outdated 
tradition which leads them to hope that the African small­
holder in this/ corner of :the continent can adapt and endure 
Their message is already' on record:
1 The peasants are the great: sanctuary of sanity, 
the country the last stronghold of happiness.
-When they disappear there is no hope for the.
race-'66 . A / A /  \
Postscript
- " , When Turnbull announced the plans which would 
make independence a reality within months instead of years, 
opinion among European settlers was equally divided on the 
question of their future under an African, government. The , 
pessimistic view was based on the argument that a popularly 
elected/government would be unable to- withstand demands, from 
party workers for the termination of Rights of Occupancy;, 
when-.this happened, the occupants would lose their land and . 
the capital invested ih it.°^ Neither the British nor the’ . 
Tanganyika government offered reassurance pn this issue, and; 
Fletcher GOoke, presenting the/official view to the final 
.Visiting Mission, emphasised that although Nyerere recognized 
the yalue of the non-African contribution, his supporters / 
did n o t . .. : ■ , .
The opposing view was based on the belief that 
providing the settlers made an effective contribution in . 
the prodiiction of eipoint crops and Were politically incon-, / 
spicuous,ihdepehdence: would change nothing as far'as they 
were c o n c e r n e d yy ; Since; both>Nyerere and the British govern-; 
merit wanted to show settlers elsewhere in Africa that 
majority rule could/be granted: without forcing/the immigrant; 
communities to leave, the country-; /the more-extreme nation^.. 
alists would be kept in check. -Nyerere himself had consist­
ently provided unambiguous, assurances and his: personal 
standing was,unassailable;^: moreover, in 196Q and again
in 196i successive Ministers ,pf Lands .and Surveys'confirmed
• '/"'-A/' Av: V  . ■ 7 Q ‘ (.■
.that rights Of tenure, would be • respected.' , ' •
As it happened, neither prediction was completely 
accurate. Apart from places of past contention, such as 
the Sanya corridor, the post-independence government was 
able to resist grass-roots demands for the termination of 
leases. Instead, when changes affecting land tenure were .. 
made, they were clearly the consequence of considered policy 
formulation; the abolition of freehold and the moves to 
nationalize the sisal industry are examples. . Similarly, it 
. was the development of the new State's socialist ideology 
which illuminated the'.anomalous position of those settlers.
. who were atill farming; after the Arusha Declaration it was
inevitable that the non—African sector would contract
71 ’ ’ .further. '• . Speaking to a group of European farmers in
West Kilimanjaro in 1972, the President gave a clear ;
indication of what was to come: .
'The. private .capitalist farmer ..whether he has 
a large estate or a small farm has no place 
in socialist Tanzania .... There Is no room 
for capitalist producers.... ..We would be. 
delighted if some of you stayed on as managers 
of Uhamaa villages or state;.farms, or if you 
helped us to train managers until Tanzanians . 
can take over. But in the long run this is 
no country for you - i t  is a country for 
Africans.1
With changes affecting both its sectors, the dual system of/ 
agriculture was at last coming to an end.
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increased his. income to more than £1,150 on his 
.140 acre farm1, Tanganyika Standard, 25 August 1965).
Pamphlet,. Mali ya Taifa (1958):. see also 
J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity (London 1967), 
p. 55.
See Summary of Observations by the Tanganyika 
Government on the Major Recommendations. or 
Conclusions of the Royal Commission Report 1956 
(Dar es Salaam 1956), p. 55*
Ante, p. 304
Freehold Titles (Conversion and Government Leases)
Act 1963': the leases, which ensued could'be made
subject to development clauses.
UJamaa etc•, loc.cit.
President’s address to. T.N.A. 12 May 1964..
President's address to T.N.A. 10 December 1962.
C.f. A.A. Afrifa, The Ghana Coup (London 1966), 
p. 95, for aicomparison between life in Accra 
and the surrounding countryside.
. Five Year Plan, op.cit., Vol.II, p. 55: £6
million was allocated for 35 schemes.
In Handeni district; financed by Britain, the 
Tanganyika government and Amboni Sisal Estate.
See James, op.cit., for a short summary of the 
Village Settlement Scheme and a list of some 
relevant accounts. Most of these concentrate 
on the behavioural aspects of the scheme; never­
theless there, were a number of unsound administrative 
and technical decisions which contributed to the 
failure of, the project,1 a view based on my own 
observations at the time and recently confirmed 
in an‘interview with the Settlement Officer,
Bwakora Chini.
Announced by the Second Vice President at 
University College, Dar es Salaam; his speech 
was published, Tanzania Information Service,
Press Release. 4. April' 1966. ~
The Ruvuma Development Association (RDA) 
established 15 settlements, the first.sited at 
Litowa, Songea., district; see Mbioni, Vol. Ill,
No.II (Dar es Salaam).
29- This statement reveals the contradiction which
was to lead to the conflict between the RDA and 
TANtJL. In a one party state can any institution 
be permitted to ‘govern itself1?.
30. As an example of the services and staffing of 
pilot villages, see the Commission's circular 
VSC/E7/1/II -undated, advertising the post of 
settlement manager. The applicant is
■ expected to supervise a staff of, 2 4 , although 
there are only 250 settlers resident.
31. ' Report on the.-Co-operative Farming Schemes at
Mbarika, Kalamera and.Nyetwali.in the Lake 
Victoria Territory of Tanganyika (Te1-Aviv •
1966), published by Agridev. .
.32. Estimated at over 1000 lbs. per acre in the 
Agridev Report. *
33*. ' Some NativetAuthorities charged settlers if
estate labour made.use of their dispensaries. 
Moreover, if numbers justified it. settlers 
often employed teachers and established schools 
for the children of estate labour.
34. For a number of articles on the layout of 
villages, see Tanganyika Notes and Records, 
between 1957 and 1954-; for Nyakyusa customs 
see Wilson, op.cit.
35. . Interview, Settlement Officer, Bwakora Chini;
see also N. Georgulas, Settlement Patterns and 1 
Rural Development in Tanganyika (Syracuse 1967).
36. C.f. EARC Report, pp. 77-78; WBR, pp. 13-15,
Arusha Dec1ar ation, pp. 12-14.
37. Estimates vary but to no great extent; for a
comparison of different figures, see WBR, p.419*
58. E.g., in 1958 they provided employment for
213,092 persons out of a total number.of 
employed persons amounting to 430,547;:
Department of Labour, AR 1958.
39. There are enough examples to support, any view in
this matter; a personal recollection concerns a 
farmer in Maswa district who invited the District 
Office staff to help themselves to the cotton they'1 
would find on his land - he told me he had already ;
. . sold some of it and been paid £300, adding that he ■ 
did not know what to do with so much money. Also 
see Tanganyika Standard, 11July •1966,. for one of 
the many reported instances of pombe clubs being 
closed until farmers were willing to harvest all 
their cotton. The official view was reflected In 
Report of the Committee, on Rising Costs (Dar es. 
Salaam 1951)? P* 42 where it was observed that when 
their wages were increased the attendance of dock 
workers dropped immediately.
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45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
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See Ruthehberg ed. op.cit., pp. 327-394? where the 
average gross -return per Household' lh Sukumaland is - 
calculated. .at £■ 61- p. a.;j see -al'sa Village Economic* Surveys 
10,61/ 62_(Ear es-Salaam-1:963),-where- the-equivalent figure^" 
in Morogoro ■'district in 1961 was ;£12 p, a. cash income.
Fuggles Couchman, op.cit., p. 39*
In 1957 twelve per cent, of the total African 
labour force were recruited, from outside the 
Territory, mostly from Ruanda-U.rundi and 
Mozambique. ■ Many arrivals were not recorded 
AR 1957, p.166. '■■
Summary of _ Observations, op.cit., p .25; the 
average daily rate for casual labour employed 
by government in 1955 was 80 cents per day, 
without house or rations. r
Department of-Labour AR, 1952, P*67; a 
labourer was provided with house and rations.
This was the. conclusion of a pos't-independence 
report; Report of the Plantation Agricultural 
'Workers Minimum Wages Board ( P a r  es Balaam 1963)•
The situation began to;change more rapidly after 
independence when the growing' of cash crops 
became compulsory;' but see. Nyerere, Arusha 
Declaration 1967» p.15; 1 the women in the 
villages work harder than anybody in Tanzania’.
Some qualification of the statement is necessary;
Senegal, for example, comes within the category 
of a dependant, distorted economy, but this seems 
to be the result of having obtained a favourable 
trading agreement with Prance for the sale of 
groundnuts.
C.f. A.G. Prank, Capitalism, and Underdevelopment 
in"Latin America (London 1969)• ”” ! r
See A.M.. Babu, writing in" W. Rodney, • How Europe 
Underdeveloped Africa (London 1972). As Minister 
for Economic Affairs and Development, Mr. Babu must 
have been aware of the realities of financing 
development.
The cost’ of the move in I960 was estimated at £7ra; 
in 1973 the estimated cost had risen to £228m;- 
* Coast gives up its long rule*, The Times (Special 
Supplement), 9 December 1974.
The extension of the railway from Moshi to Arusha 
was primarily for the settlers* benefit; the 
bitumenising of. the Tanga-Korogwe road was to 
benefit the sisal industry, but construction was 
financed by the sisal export tax.
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55.
, 5^.
57.
58.
59.
60. 
61.
■ 62.
63.
E.A.R.C. Report, p.66: 'Restrictions on the .
movement of crops fasten upon the producer the 
strait-gacket of. subsistence production'.
Ibid, p. 66.
See WBR, where it is argued that only when the 
main road .programme was completed should funds 
be provided for feeder roads. : '
Bitumen!sing roads increases maintenance costs 
considerably, a fact.which is sometimes overlooked.
See Ruthehberg ed., op.cit.y for some, interesting 
studies of the labour economy in peasant agriculture; 
see also R.S* Ray, Labour Force,.Survey of Tanzania 
(Manpower Planning Unit, Dar es Salaam 1966), where 
it is observed from data obtained in 1965.that less 
than half the total of male adults working on their 
farm plots showed no under-employment on the basis v 
of a 40 hour week.
Plantation sisal needs to be distinguished from 
African-grown hedge sisal; the latter.was 
processed and marketed separately.
Prior to nationalisation world market prices had 
fallen to.£55 pei? ton f.o.b. compared with £108 
in 1962.. Only well-managed estates could, operate 
profitably at this lower price. Por. low 
efficiency on communal plantations, see Ruthenberg 
ed., op.cit., p. 359». also see Financial; limes,
30 June 1972, where A. Shaba, Chairman fanzania 
Sisal Corporation states that production costs on 
government estates was £65 per ton compared.with 
£25-28 on private estates. -
In 1953. one third of all taxation,was derived from - 
import duties:: E.A.R.Q. Report, p,91- The
Commission.was satisfied that autarchy would prolong 
poverty: Report, p.80.
Ibid,p.95- 
Ibid, p.84.
See Brett, op.cit.., p.17? where the argument is ■ 
developed, the writer concluding that 'a process 
of cumulative causation can be shown to operate 
in these matters.'
This can best be adduced from the pamphlets,
Annual Background to . the Budget and the 1964 FYP.
It wiil be.noted that there was a rapid increase 
in the bureaucracy after 1962 and a significant 
increase of expenditure on internal, security, 
defence and foreign affairs. There was also the 
fact of a rapid increase in the population with 
extra demands on the social services, a problem 
foreseen by J.E. Goldthorpe in his 'memorandum to 
the Royal ..Commission, p.473*
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64. Enlargement of the Exchange Economy in. Tropical 
, A f n c a , (New York 1954) prepared by the U.N. ,
'< . Department .of Economic Affairs. ^
65. ‘Many people would prefer to be left alone; we 
are not going to leave them alone.1 President
■ ■. Nyerere speaking to M. Wolfers, The limes Special :
Supplement, .9 December 1974.’ -V
66:., \; Virginia Woolf, .quoted by E* Newby, Love and War
. ' ■ in the Appenines (London 1972). \
67. VNR I960, p.17. v
68. Ihid., p .60. J. Fletcher Cooke was Deputy
Governor at the time. • . .
69. E.g., Nyerere Vs.. repetitions of what he had said
. ' in an earlier speech: . ’Asians and the Europeans /
in the country ... are our neighbours and they 
are going to be permanently, our neighbours.1 
Trusteeship Council Proces Verbaux, 819, cited 
by Ghidzero, op.cit., p.199*
70. Chief A. P-undikira, writing in Month, I960 p.6
and P. Bomani in Tanganyika News Review, July 1961.
71- Between 1967 and 1973 & large number.of. the estates
in private hands were expropriated; negotiations 
over compensation;continue, with the British, 
government assisting in providing fuiids for this 
purpose. Pop the taking over of fifty farms in 
- the Kilimanoaro region, ' see ;.W. Tordoff 1 Tanzania, 
in II.B. Hodson ed., Annual Register of World Events 
1973 (London 1974), p.255.
7;2., vf1 President Ny.erere spells it out for whites, in 
' Tanzania1, The Times, 5° June 1972.(Article by 
J. Listowel)~
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Appendix (i)
Land Availability in East Africa
Throughout East Africa in the past it was only in certain areas that there was 
a shortage of land for arable farming* In Kenya, according to the World Bank 
Mission in 1962, the most intractable problem was to prevent the loss of soil 
fertility in areas being cultivated* The Mission concluded that managerial 
practices were more important than the availability of land*
In Uganda there are still large tracts of uninhabited and undeveloped land*
Many of these were once occupied but were closed to habitation by the colonial 
administration through fear of sleeping sickness* A large area of potentially 
good land, (approximately 6000 square miles) has been designated as swamp and 
has never been used* A certain amount of reclamation was undertaken, 
particularly in the Kigezi area, but unless there was an immediate danger of 
over-crowding it was not considered that the high cost of such work was 
justified*
In Tanganyika the overall density of the population was low throughout the 
colonial period but this did not prevent problems of over-crowding arising 
in certain areas; in such places soil erosion and a general loss of 
fertility usually resulted* The system of shifting cultivation was 
practicable as long as it was only intended for providing the food requirements 
of a well-dispersed population* As numbers increased it became necessary 
to adopt different farming practices or to persuade people to move elsewhere*
The undermentioned table, compiled by the basis of data supplied for the 1953 
Royal Commission gives an indication of the position at a time when the post 
war development plans were being implemented*
Kenya Uganda Tanganyika
Estimated population 1953s
African 5,644,000 5,286,000 7,965,000
Asian+ 160,300 49,200 78,800
European 42,200 6,600 20,300
Land area (sq mis) 219,789 74,789 338,325
Percentage of forest Reserves 15 6 , 8.8
Percentage of land in Game 
Reserves/Nationals Parks 4 3 2.5
Percentage of land with 
tsetse fly infestation 10 32
60
Percentage of land area in 
large farms and estates 4 1 1.1
African population density 
(per sq mile) in the most 
populated province
167
(Nyanza)
> 129 ‘
(Eastern)
47
(Lake)
4- Includes Indians, Pakistanis, Jews and Arabs*
* Figure excludes water areas and swamps.
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THE RAILWAY CCMMISSIOH 1930
The Bast Africa Commission recommended that a line should be constructed to join 
the Central line to a terminal serving the Lake Nyasa basin, thereby opening up the 
southern highlands area for development* Between 1925 and 1929 preliminary surveys of 
various routes were carried out* A committee appointed to submit proposals to be 
financed under the Imperial Colonial Development Act recommended in 1929 that lines 
should be constructed from Dodoma to Iringa and from Kilosa to Ifakara* Shortly 
afterwards, Mr C Gillman, Chief Engineer, published his own report stating that in his 
view the Dodoma — Iringa route was an unsound proposition; his view was endorsed by 
Brigadier-General Hammond, in a report published in the autumn of 1929» commissioned by 
the Colonial Secretary.
The Hammond and Gillman reports disappointed and incensed the Iringa settlers and 
the supporters of-the plan for ’an Imperial Link*. As a consequence Sir Donald Cameron 
in July 1930 appointed a Railway Commission, chairman Sir Sidney Henn, to consider, 
among other questions three possible alignments for extensions south of the Central 
Line (see Map III)* The Commission noted that the most western alignment, from Manyoni, 
would only be useful if the Lupa Goldfield developed rapidly as some believed was 
possible* The Commission considered they could ignore this alignment for the time being 
and members were soon divided on the choice between the remaining two proposals*
However, it was unanimously agreed that constructing the Kilosa-Ifakara line was the 
first priority and it was expected that revenue would meet expenditure within five 
years.
The Commission noted that non-native settlement in Iringa province was unlikely to 
expand unless a railway was constructed at least as far as Ubena junction and better 
roads were provided. They added that they were opposed to the principle of uneconomic 
railway rates as a means of subsidising the growing of particular crops* With the 
Chairman and one member (Mr Chitale) dissenting; members recommended the construction 
of a line from Dodoma to Ubena, *on the assumption that H.M.G. will provide the 
capital free of interest for at least 20 years*•
In October 1930 Sir D Cameron wrote a despatch concerning the Commission’s 
report; he recommended the line Kilosa — Ifakara should be constructed and that the 
proposed line from Dodoma should be rejected* The Depression and the Second World 
War effectively ended the controversy.
SOIL EROSION MEASURES 1920-1939
By 1937 the Director of Agriculture was able to report some progress in measures 
to prevent further soil erosion* Although some action had been taken in all 
provinces it was only in three that a wide variety of measures had been introduced 
on anything like the scale required* A summary of the measures adopted in those 
three provinces indicates the kind of action taken*
Lake Province Dam construction; selection of areas for deferred grazing; 
seasonal movement of stock to selected pasture areas; 
wind-breaks; hillside tree plantations; contour walls, 
banks and hedges; tie-ridging; storm drains*
Northern and 
Tanga Provinces
--------w  — — —  ——  1
Demonstrations to show value of green manuring and contour 
hedging;
assistance to native coffee growers
coffee rules controlling cultivation and layout
50 yard rule preventing cultivation of steep river banks
Re—afforestation of steep hill slopes
Public meetings to discuss measures taken !
Planking of Mauritius thorn hedges 
Reservation of pastures for dry season grazing 
Meetings with Planters Associations
The use of box terraces and uncultivated contour strips
Better control of water used for irrigation
N A Rules covering all cultivation in Moshi, Usambara,
Pare, Arusha, Mbulu
Riverside rules in Moshi, Arusha
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Appendix (vii)
The Kingolwira Settlement Scheme
By the early nineteen-thirties, African peasant farmers in the 
Uluguru hills above Morogoro, Eastern province, were faced with a land 
shortage and problems of falling yields as a result of the impoverishment 
of the soil* The settlement scheme near the Kingolwira prison was 
started in order to alleviate this situation* The government took over 
a tract of land and provided farms for the landless* Some cattle could 
be kept and farmers were encouraged to grow food crops and some cotton, 
under controlled conditions* The Empire Cotton Growing Committee supported 
the scheme by giving financial aid*
The scheme was started in 1933, each farmer being given 14 acres, 
approximately* The aims of the scheme as published and the conditions 
which the occupants had to accept were as followsi
(i) Soil fertility was to be maintained so that it 
would be possible to reduce the amount of manual 
labour necessary.
(ii) Systematic methods of soil conservation and of 
crop rotation would be observed.
(iii) Residents would be encouraged to adopt a more 
varied diet.
(iv) Security of tenure would be given but no sub­
division of plots would be allowed*
By 1938 some 40 applicants had obtained holdings and the progress of 
the scheme was viewed with optimism*
(sourcei Sessional Paper No* 1 of 193&, Government Printer,
Bar es Salaam 193^ )
Appendix (viii ) ^ g
Sources
Kenya
Tanganyika
Uganda
of Finance for Post-War Development Plans in East Africa
( £ * 000 )
Total C.D.&W Loan Funds Local Resources
funds — —-—  ..
42.450 3,500 23,450 15,500
24.450 5,349 10,000 9,101
28,500 2,500 2,000 24,000
( source: The Colonial Territories 1953-54,Appendix III,(HMS0 cmd 9169 )
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Appendix (x) 480
DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS IMPOSED WITH RIGHTS OP OCCUPANCY
Land Regulations 1926 (Extract)
Area of 
Land
Minimum value 
of improvements 
within first 3 
years
Nature of 
improve­
ments
Value of 
additional 
improvements 
within first 5 
years
Nature of
additional
improvements
Over 300 
acres (120 
hectares 
or more)
Shs.6000/00 and 
in addition Shs 
4/00 per acre in 
respect of every 
acre over 300 
acres
Permanent 
and/or Non- 
Permanent**
Shs.3000/00 and 
addition Shs.2/00 
per acre in res­
pect of every 
acre over 300 
acres
Permanent 
and/or Non- 
Permanent**
*Fermanent Improvements i
Embanking or protective works;
Planting of long-lived crops;
Planting trees or live hedges;
Clearing land for agriculture;
(Cultivating gardens, nurseries;
Sheep or cattle dips;
Road making;
** Non—Permanent Improvements: Livestock; Dairy appliances; Agricultural
implements and machinery; v
Land Regulation 1948 (Summary)
1. Land held for agricultural purposes only: the occupier of such land was to
fully cultivate -§ of the total area during the first year of the term of 
occupancy. . During each of the next four years of the term an additional -g-
of the total area was to come under full cultivation. Therefore, at the end
of five years -§ of the total area of the right of occupancy was to be fully
cultivated and maintained.
2. Land held for pastoral purposes only: the occupier of such land, in the first
year of the right of occupancy, was to stock with his own cattle l/7th of the
total area held, and during the next four years to fully stock a fhrther l/7th 
of the total area per year. Thus, after five years, 5/7ths of the total
area of the grant was to be fully stocked.
3. Land held for mixed agricultural and pastoral purposes: the occupier was
to cultivate l/50th of the total area and stock l/l0th of the area held in 
the first year. Increments of the same proportions were to be added in 
each of the next four years.
Swamp reclamation; 
Water Tanks;
Irrigation works; 
Fixed machinery; 
Reservoirs; Dams; 
Water races; Bridges;
Farm buildings; 
Fencing; Walls; 
Water furrows; 
Wells;
Draining land; 
Water boring;
The Groundnut Scheme
In 1946, the British government appointed a special mission to investigate 
the'possibilities of the mechanised production of groundnuts in East and 
Central Africa, A J Wakefield, a former Director of Agriculture in 
Tanganyika, was appointed chairman; with two other experts, the mission 
visited the areas suggested and submitted a report confirming that the 
proposal was viable.
As a consequence of the report and guarded acceptance of its conclusions by 
Ministry of Food officials, it was decided to establish 107 farming units, 
each of 30,000 acres. These were to be distributed as follows:
Nachingwea, 55j Kongwa, 15; Urambo, 10; remainder in Kenya and 
Northern Rhodesia, The cost was estimated at £23 million.
In May 1947» work in clearing the bush started at Kongwa; although it was 
the least likely of the three areas to be profitable, it was more accessible. 
Meanwhile, a temporary jetty was constructed at Mkwaya, near Lindi, which 
was to be utilised until the new port of Mtwara was ready. Development at 
Urambo was delayed at the request of the Tanganyika government until the new 
rail link to Mpanda was ready#
The bush was difficult to clear; after one year instead of 150,000 acres 
being ready, the total was 10,000. The first harvest was well below 
expectations. The following year yields were poor through drought at Kongwa 
and rosette at Urambo.
In 1951 in a White Paper (cmd 8125) it was decided to attempt no more 
clearing at Urambo or Kongwa; at Nachingwea, clearing would continue 
until 60,000 acres were prepared. The aim of the scheme was changed to 
investigating whether large-scale, mechanised, tropical agriculture was a 
practical proposition. Responsibility for the scheme was transferred to 
the Colonial Office; in 1954 the assets were transferred to the Tanganyika 
Agricultural Corpoxvation. The loss to the British taxpayer amounted to 
£36 million. .
(Sources: White Papers cmd 7030 and 8125; Report of the Kongwa Working
Party; OFC Annual Reports)
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Distribution of coffee estates and approximate 
income obtainable from a medium size estate 
1949 - 1954
I* Coffee from estates was sold by the Tanganyika Coffee Growers Association* 
During the period under review there were 242 estates selling their crop through 
the Association in five separate areas of the Territory, as follows:
Average over five Southern
years of produotion Moshi Arusha Qldeani Usambara,1.—  r ----- Highlandsof clean coffee — .s— .— —
0 - 1 0  tons 39 41 22 24 57
11 - 115 -tons 24 18 12 - 5
Totals 63 59 34 24 62
B B  S S B  B B  S B  S B
II. Estimated cost and profit from an estate producing ten tons of clean 
coffee from 100 acres of land planted with mature bearing coffee#
£ £
Cost of production 2500 Sales at £^00 per ton 5000
Export tax 500
Income Tax 340
Surtax -
Net profit 1660
Totals 5000 5000
(source: Report of a Committee of Enquiry into the Coffee Export Tax,
Dar es Salaam.1955)
Jj\ii \ \
THE SISAL INDUSTRY AFTER 1946
The expansion of the Sisal Industry during the latter half of the British 
'colonial period can best he summarised by providing details from the relevant 
statistics* The figures are based on those included in Department of Agriculture 
Annual Reports, the Annual Trade Statistics and Budget Surveys and extracts from 
data compiled by C W Guillebaud, Economic Survey of the Sisal Industry*
A# Export Production and Value over Twelve Years
Year Exported ('000 tons) Value fmillion
1946 112 . 3.9
1948 117 8*9
1951 142 23*7
1954 168 10.9
1958 198 ;10*4 .
B • ' Hew Land Planted with Sisal 1 9 5 6
Year Acres Year Acres
1951 13807 1954 ’ 8544
1952 15183 1955 7454
1953 9749 1956 8751
Total new area planted 63488
Total area replanted 1951 “*5^  69166
C• ' Land and Labour Utilization 1945 and 1960
' Number of adult m ^ j AcreageYear ~ ;--- — Tons exported T1. ----v— ,
   males employed Under sisal
1945 102,478 ■ 110,637 448,784
1960 104,413 207,200 664,482
484*
D* Location of Sisal Estates and Production 1956.
Area No«> of Estates Production TtonsT $ of total
Northern . 18 9600 5 ® 2
Tanga 71 113700 61 o2
Central Line 64 49900 26*9
Southern 16 11400 6*2
E. Profits and Distribution, ten Largest Companies 1951-*56
Total Profit £9«6M
i
Distribut ion Per cent
Capital expenditure 27
Current assets 8
Taxation 24
Dividends 37
Capital re-organization 4
Tot al 100
